Naresh @ Nehru vs The State Of Haryana

2023INSC889 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1786 OF 2023

NARESH @ NEHRU .... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA …. RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1787-1788OF 2023

IRSHAD AND ANOTHER .... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA …. RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

Aravind Kumar, J.

1. Judgment dated 09-01-2020 rendered in Criminal Appeal Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

Nos.1063 of 2017, 997 & 1043 of 2017 by the High Court of Punjab NEETA SAPRA Date: 2023.10.09 19:33:33 IST Reason:

and Haryana, Judicature at Chandigarh is under challenge in these 2

appeals, whereunder the accused Nos.4, 5 and 6 (appellants herein) who

were convicted for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with

Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) by the Sessions

Court came to be affirmed.

GIST OF PROSECUTION CASE:

2. On 22-04-2016, ASI Ram Kishan while on patrolling duty at 75

feet road, had received a telephonic information that in the village

Maheshwari certain persons had fired a gun-shot at a boy and upon

reaching there, statement of Mohit @ Kala came to be recorded which

was to the effect that at about 6.40 pm his cousins Ajay and Suraj were

talking in front of the house of Ex. Sarpanch Karan Singh and they were

near the house of Dharmender and he (Mohit) saw Ajay and Suraj

running towards the house of Dharmender as they were being chased by

three youngsters on a bullet motorcycle. It was also stated by Mohit @

Kala that bullet motorcycle was being driven by Ravi, Shoaib Khan was

the pillion rider and one unknown person was sitting behind them. It was

further stated that two more motorcycles having two riders each, with

batons in their hands were following the Bullet motorcycle. It was also

alleged that unknown person sitting on the Bullet motorcycle got down 3

and fired at Ajay with country-made revolver, which hit his head and

Ajay fell in front of the house of Dharmender. Suraj hid in Dharmender’s

house and on raising the alarm the assailants sped away on their

motorcycles towards Bhiwadi; it is also stated by Mohit @ Kala that

injured Ajay was shifted to the hospital; it is further stated that Ravi was

studying in his school and was his junior and he used to bully and

threaten all. Mohit also stated that Ajay and Suraj had a fight with Ravi

on the day of ‘Dulhandi’ and he had threatened to kill them and Ravi

along with his companions had fired at Ajay with intend to kill him.

Based on the said statement FIR under Sections 148, 149, 307 of IPC

and Section 25 of the Arms Act came to be registered and on the death

of Ajay (on 23-04-2016) Section 302 of IPC was substituted in place of

Section 307 IPC and accused persons were apprehended; on the

disclosure statement of first accused (Pawan) country made pistol was

recovered and as per the statement of accused No.2 (Dharmender)

wooden stick was recovered apart from four motorcycles. One of the

accused-Shoaib was produced before the Juvenile Justice Board and

Ravi was tried by the Children’s Court under the provisions of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The charge

was framed against six accused persons and in all 18 witnesses were 4

examined on behalf of the prosecution. The statements of the accused

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short

‘Cr.P.C.’) came to be recorded and the accused having denied the

incriminating material appearing in evidence against them, had pleaded

not guilty. After hearing the learned advocates appearing for the accused

persons and the public prosecutor and on appreciation of the evidence

laid before the court, the learned Sessions Judge by judgment dated 06-

10-2017 convicted the accused persons for the offences already noticed

hereinabove and said order of conviction and sentence imposed came to

be affirmed by the High Court under the impugned order vide judgment

dated 09-01-2020. Hence, these appeals have been preferred by accused

Nos.4 to 6.

3. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Mittal and Mr. Soumik Ghosal,

learned Advocates appearing for the accused-appellants in Criminal

Appeal Nos.1786 of 2023 and 1787-1788 of 2023 respectively, and Ms.

Manisha Aggarwal Narain, learned Additional Advocate General

appearing for the State of Haryana, Respondent.

5

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:

4. Mr. Siddharth Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant

appearing for Naresh @ Nehru Accused No.4, contends that the trial

court and High Court had committed an error in convicting him without

considering the statement of Mohit @ Kala (PW-9) in proper

perspective whereunder he had not named the appellant and the CCTV

footage did not conform to Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act

which even otherwise did not reflect A-4’s of presence. He also

contends that no Test Identification Parade (TIP ‘for short’) was

conducted, and PW-9 had only identified this accused (A-4) in the court.

Mr. Mittal learned counsel would also contend that said witness (PW-

9) was shocked or perplexed when his statement came to be recorded

as admitted by him and reliance could not have been placed on said

evidence for convicting the appellant. He would further contend that A-

4 had no common object to share with the main accused, Pawan (PW-

1), who is said to have fired at Ajay (deceased). Mr. Mittal, learned

counsel would also contend that PW-9 was an interested witness as he

was a close relative of the deceased, and various discrepancies,

including the improvement in his statement made before court, ought to

have been the ground to summarily brush aside his testimony. Mr. 6

Mittal, learned advocate would point out that discrepancies in PW-9's

statement had clearly surfaced which was evident from his admission

of not informing the police about the Splendor vehicle being driven by

the appellant and this fact was conveniently ignored by the courts

below. Mr. Mittal, learned counsel would also contend that CCTV

footage relied upon by prosecution was recorded on a mobile phone by

PW-8 and converted into a CD, which was not in conformity with

Section 65B of the Evidence Act and it was allegedly recorded on

26.04.2016 but handed over to the police on 01.06.2016 and during this

interregnum period the possibility of said recording being tampered

could not have been ruled out. Even otherwise the face of the assailants

was not identifiable in the CCTV footage as found by the trial court

itself and, therefore, no inference could have been drawn to implicate

the appellant(A-4).

5. He would contend that the alleged motive attributed to the

accused persons is due to a quarrel that had ensued between the

deceased, Suraj, Ravi, and Nabbu on the day of Dulhandi and there was

no evidence placed on record by prosecution to suggest any common

object had been shared by the appellants with other accused persons. He

would contend that appellant has not been alleged to have been armed 7

with any weapon, so no inference could have been drawn about the

common object to commit the offence. He would submit that the

reasoning adopted by the courts below to convict the accused by

overlooking the fact that TIP had not been conducted and only on the

ground of PW-9 having known the remaining accused by face before the

incident was erroneous, though the testimony of PW-9 would suggest

that accused persons were not previously known to him and his

admission in evidence that came to know about them only when they

were arrested and their names were published in the newspaper. The

non-disclosure of the names of the accused persons at the first instance

creates reasonable doubts as to the appellant's identity. The learned

counsel for the appellant (A-4) would also contend that there was

unexplained delay in recording PW-9's statement, namely it was

recorded at 11:30 p.m., despite the incident having taken place at 6:30

p.m. and PW-9 was present during this period. The alleged confessional

statement of the appellant is of no value in the light of Section 25 of the

Evidence Act and said statement does not indicate any common object

having been shared by the appellant with other assailants. Hence, he

prays for his appeal being allowed and the appellant (A-4) being

acquitted.

8

6. Mr. Soumik Ghosal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,

namely, Irshad and Sonu Kumar (accused numbers 5 and 6 respectively)

in Criminal Appeal Nos.1787-1788 of 2023, contends that courts below

had erred in not considering the fact that a person liable for being

punished for the offence of being a member of an unlawful assembly

under Section 149 IPC would be necessary to prove that such persons

had acted in pursuance of a common object. He would further contend

that prosecution had failed to prove that appellants were aware of

Pawan's (Accused No.1) possessing the pistol and he had the

intention/object to kill Ajay and such intention could not be inferred. He

would contend that appellants' involvement in the unlawful assembly

and sharing a common object to kill Ajay could not be inferred in the

circumstances of the case, particularly when there was no evidence to

support the stand of the prosecution that appellants were aware of pistol

being in possession of Pawan (A-1).

7. He would further contend that the prosecution failed to prove that

the members of the unlawful assembly had assembled to accomplish the

common object of killing Ajay, as attributed to them. There was no

evidence suggesting a sharing of common object between the accused. 9

The CCTV footage, which was relied upon by the prosecution, does not

inspire confidence to accept the story of the prosecution, since, faces

appearing in the video was not clear and this itself would be a good

ground to allow appeals and set aside the conviction of the appellants.

He would also contend that appellants were not residents of the village

where the incident took place and there is no whisper in the statement of

PW-9 recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. on this aspect. Hence, he

prays for appeal preferred by A-5, and A-6 be allowed by setting aside

the impugned judgment.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:

8. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and

on perusal of the judgments of the courts below, it would emerge

therefrom, that conviction of all the accused is based on the testimony of

PW-9 and recovery of the motor-cycles and the motive for the crime

attributed by PW-9 in his statement recorded on the date of incident. In

this background, we have perused the judgments of the courts below by

bestowing our anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the

Bar.

10

9. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that motive that has been

attributed against the accused persons for the killing of Ajay was, he

(Ajay) and Suraj had a fight with Ravi on the day of Dulhandi, where

Ravi had threatened to kill them and in furtherance of said threat, he is

said to have come along with other co-accused, and a person sitting on

the bullet motor-cycle had fired at Ajay from the pistol, while Ravi was

driving the Bullet motorcycle. PW-9 had also deposed that Ajay was in

the company of Suraj, who ran alongside the deceased and hid himself

in Dharmender's house. However, the police did not record the statement

of Suraj, and he was not even cited as a witness on behalf of the

prosecution. This would be the first gap in the prosecution story or a

defective investigation.

9.1 The prosecution relied on Statement of Mohit @ Kala (PW-

9) and courts below accepted him as a star witness to convict the

accused. PW-9's testimony was shrouded with inconsistencies and

he had not named the appellants in the FIR and had failed to identify

Naresh @ Nehru as the driver of the Splendor motorcycle. He had

identified Irshad and Sonu Kumar in court but had not named them in

his statement Ex.PM made before police. In his cross-examination,

PW-9 admitted of not informing the police about the Pulsar motorcycle 11

and two other Splendor motorcycles. He stated in his statement Ex.PM

that victim Ajay and his friend Suraj were being chased by three

motorcycles, namely Bullet, Splendor and Pulsar motorcycles

respectively. However, in the statement made before the court, he

improvised his version by deposing that the victim was being chased

by four motorcycles. In the cross-examination, PW-9 admitted to have

informed the police about deceased having been chased by four

motorcycles and reiterated the contents of his statement in Ex.PM as

true. These inconsistencies give rise to suspicion and raises doubt in the

prosecution story.

9.2 PW-9 had named only Ravi and Shoaib in his statement Ex.PM. and

for the first time before court he had identified Naresh (A-4), Irshad and

Sonu (A-9 and A-6). He admitted in his cross-examination that he only

knew Ravi and Shoaib before the incident, and had known about the

names of the other accused persons when they were arrested. This raises

doubts about PW-9's presence at the scene of the incident itself.

Undisputedly no recovery was made from Irshad and Sonu.

Contradictions in PW-9's statement is glaring. In his deposition he admits

his statement was written by the police at 10:45 PM on 22.04.2016,

whereas PW-12 (ASI Ram Kishan) deposed that written statement 12

EX.PM was handed over to the police by the complainant’s party at

11:30 PM on 22.04.2016. PW-9 and also deposes that police arrived at

the scene of crime between 10:30-11:00 PM, creating serious doubt

about the recording of PW-9's statement at the place of crime as claimed

by the prosecution.

9.3 As noticed hereinabove, the evidence of the eye-witness should

be of very sterling quality and calibre and it should not only instil

confidence in the court to accept the same but it should also be a version

of such nature that can be accepted at its face value. This Court in the

case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu alias Deepu Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

(2012) 8 SCC 21 has held:

“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” should be of very high quality and caliber whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and every one of other supporting material such 13

as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be called as a “sterling witness” whose version can be accepted by the court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

PW-9, the cousin of the deceased, was examined as an eyewitness to

the crime. However, the presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubt due

to contradictions. Although Suraj, who was also the deceased's cousin,

was accompanying the deceased, PW-9 never tried to contact him to

ascertain the names of the accused persons. This raises a serious doubt

about his presence that has been ignored by the courts below. The

presence of PW-9 at the scene raises doubts and raises questions about

the veracity of his evidence. This is the second lacunae in the

prosecution case.

14 9.4 The courts below have relied on CCTV footage to convict the

appellants and co-accused persons. However, we are of the considered

view that said evidence could not have been relied upon, as it was

infested with serious doubts and the very manner in which it came into

existence itself would raise a serious doubt not only about its source but

also raises a serious doubt about the presence of the appellants at the

scene of crime. PW-8, who made a video from his mobile phone of the

CCTV footage on 22.04.2016 and has claimed to have handed over the

recorded CD (Ex.P.3) to the police on 01.06.2016. However, the video

(CD) has not been forwarded by the police to the Forensic Science

Laboratory. He (PW-8) claims to have downloaded the video from his

mobile phone and transferred to his laptop and then prepared CD

(Ex.P.3). Neither laptop nor mobile phone was produced by prosecution

or had been seized by the police during the course of investigation. The

trial court's conclusion is based on inconsistent evidence and there is lack

of clarity in the evidence of PW.8. He has identified his signature on the

certificate Ex. P-L (furnished as required under Section 65-B of the

Evidence Act) which certificate was prepared by police official Mr.

Aman and he has not been examined. The CD(Ex.P.3) was played in the 15

trial court and observation recorded by Sessions Judge which is to the

following effect would acquire great significance.

“COURT OBSERVATION:- from the video clips the faces of assailants and complainants are not decipherable.” (Emphasis supplied by us)

9.5 He (PW-8) admits in his cross-examination that certificate Ex.

PL was prepared by a police official, and he (PW-8) had affixed his

signature to Ex.PL. He also admits that faces of the assailants are not

visible and identifiable and the registration numbers of the motorcycles

are also not visible. It is pertinent to note at this juncture itself that

Investigating Officer (PW-15) also admits in his cross-examination that

faces of the accused are not identifiable from the video. The said video

according to PW-8 was taken from the CCTV camera located in the

house of Dharmendra and he (Dharmendra) was never cited as a witness

by the prosecution. This is the third stage of the deficient investigation

and blame has to be necessarily laid at their door and the benefit of the

doubt has to be extended to the accused persons.

9.6 The confessional statement of the accused and co-accused came to

be recorded when they were in police custody. This court in Mehboob

Ali & Another Vs. State of Rajasthan (2016) 14 SCC 640 has held: 16

“12. Section 25 of the Evidence Act provides that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 provides that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, it lays down how much of an information received from accused may be proved.

13. For application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, admissible portion of confessional statement has to be found as to a fact which were the immediate cause of the discovery, only that would be part of legal evidence and not the rest. In a statement if something new is discovered or recovered from the accused which was not in the knowledge of the police before disclosure statement of the accused is recorded, is admissible in the evidence.

14. Section 27 of the Evidence Act refers when any “fact” is deposed. Fact has been defined in Section 3 of the Act. Same is quoted below:

“‘Fact’.— ‘Fact’ means and includes— (1) any thing, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses;

(2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. Illustrations

(a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in a certain place, is a fact.

(b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact.

(c) That a man said certain words, is a fact.

(d) That a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention, acts in good faith or fraudulently, or uses a particular word in a particular sense, or is or was at a specified time conscious of a particular sensation, is a fact.

(e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact.

‘Relevant’.—One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts.”

In the instant case, the confessional statement of the accused relied

upon by the prosecution was admittedly recorded after the arrest of 17

those accused persons when accused 4, 5, and 6 were in police

custody. Hence, said statement would become inadmissible having

regard to the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, of

1872. Section 25 of the Act in no uncertain terms makes it clear that

no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a

person accused of any offence. Likewise, Section 26 states that any

such statement is inadmissible if given while in police custody. For

this proposition, the judgment of this Court in Indra Dalal vs. State of

Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 31 can be looked up.

10. As already noticed hereinabove prosecution has attempted to

drive home the guilt of the accused based on accused persons having

shared a common object, by pressing into service Section 149 of IPC.

This provision does not create a separate offence but only declares

vicarious liability of all members of unlawful assembly for acts done

in common object. Thus, in order to attract Section 149 of the Code it

must be shown by the prosecution that the incriminating act was done

to accomplish the common object by such unlawful assembly. It must

be within the knowledge of the other members as one likely to be

committed in furtherance of the common object. Even if no overt act

is imputed to the accused, the presence of the accused as part of 18

the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction. The inference of a

common object has to be drawn from various factors such as the

weapons with which the members were armed, their movements, the

acts of violence committed by them, and the end result. This court in

Roy Fernandes vs. State of Goa and Others (2012) 3 SCC 221 has

held:

“18. That leaves us with the question whether the commission of murder by a member of an unlawful assembly that does not have murder as its common object would attract the provisions of Section 149 IPC?

19. Section 149 IPC reads:

“149.Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.—If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

A plain reading of the above would show that the provision is in two parts. The first part deals with cases in which an offence is committed by any member of the assembly “in prosecution of the common object” of that assembly. The second part deals with cases where the commission of a given offence is not by itself the common object of the unlawful assembly but members of such assembly “knew that the same is likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly”.

20. As noticed above, the commission of the offence of murder of Felix Felicio Monteiro was itself not the common object of the unlawful assembly in the case at hand. And yet the assembly was unlawful because from the evidence adduced at the trial it is proved that the common object of the persons comprising the assembly certainly was to either commit a mischief or criminal trespass or any other offence 19

within the contemplation of clause (3) of Section 141 IPC, which may to the extent the same is relevant for the present be extracted at this stage:

“141. Unlawful assembly.—An assembly of five or more persons is designated an ‘unlawful assembly’, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is— First.—*** Second.—*** Third.—To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence;”

21. From the evidence on record, we are inclined to hold that even when commission of murder was not the common object of the accused persons, they certainly had come to the spot with a view to overawe and prevent the deceased by use of criminal force from putting up the fence in question. That they actually slapped and boxed the witnesses, one of whom lost his two teeth and another sustained a fracture only proves that point.

22. What then remains to be considered is: whether the appellant as a member of the unlawful assembly knew that the murder of the deceased was also a likely event in prosecution of the object of preventing him from putting up the fence? The answer to that question will depend upon the circumstances in which the incident had taken place and the conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly including the weapons they carried or used on the spot. It was so stated by this Court in Lalji v. State of U.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 437 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 211] in the following words: (SCC p. 441, para 8)

“8. … Common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case.”

23. The Court elaborated the above proposition in Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. [(1975) 2 SCC 596 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 704] as: (SCC p. 603, para 11)

“11. Even if the number of assailants could have been less than five in the instant case (which, we think, on the facts stated above, was really not possible), we think that the fact that the attacking party was clearly shown to have waited for the buggi 20

to reach near the field of Daryao in the early hours of 7-6-

1967, shows pre-planning. Some of the assailants had sharp- edged weapons. They were obviously lying in wait for the buggi to arrive. They surrounded and attacked the occupants shouting that the occupants will be killed. We do not think that more convincing evidence of a preconcert was necessary. Therefore, if we had thought it necessary, we would not have hesitated to apply Section 34 IPC also to this case. The principle of vicarious liability does not depend upon the necessity to convict a required number of persons. It depends upon proof of facts, beyond reasonable doubt, which makes such a principle applicable. (See Yeshwant v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 639 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 684] and Sukh Ram v. State of U.P. [(1974) 3 SCC 656 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 186] ) The most general and basic rule, on a question such as the one we are considering, is that there is no uniform, inflexible, or invariable rule applicable for arriving at what is really an inference from the totality of facts and circumstances which varies from case to case. We have to examine the effect of findings given in each case on this totality. It is rarely exactly identical with that in another case. Other rules are really subsidiary to this basic verity and depend for their correct application on the peculiar facts and circumstances in the context of which they are enunciated.”

In the instant case by the impugned order, the High Court has held that

every member had inhibited the common intention to accomplish the

unlawful object. The facts on hand would disclose that the motive

alleged was a quarrel that ensued between Ravi and Nabbu with Ajay

and Suraj on the day of Dulhandi and Ravi is said to have threatened

to kill Ajay. This factor would clearly disclose that the appellants

herein were not involved in the fight that occurred on the day of

Dulhandi and as such no motive could be attributed to the appellants.

The prosecution had failed to prove that the appellants herein had 21

shared a common object with other members of the alleged unlawful

assembly. To convict a person under Section 149 IPC prosecution has

to establish with the help of evidence that firstly, appellants shared a

common object and were part of unlawful assembly and secondly, it

had to prove that they were aware of the offences likely to be

committed is to achieve the said common object. Both these

ingredients are conspicuously absent and there is no evidence to

connect the petitioners with the deceased or the co-accused.

Undisputedly, no overt act has been attributed to the appellants, and in

unequivocal terms PW-9 admits in his cross-examination that none of

the accused except Pawan had caused injury to the deceased and there

was only a single shot fired from the pistol. Hence, we are of the

considered view that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of

the appellants herein beyond reasonable doubt, and non-consideration

of the lacuna in the prosecution case in proper perspective by the Trial

Court and the High Court as analysed hereinabove has resulted in

miscarriage in the administration of justice namely conviction of the

appellants which cannot be sustained.

11. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed and the judgment passed

by the Sessions Court in SC No.21 of 2016 dated 09.05.2017 as 22

affirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in

CRA-D Nos.1063 of 2017, 997 of 2017 and 1043 of 2017 are hereby

set aside and consequently appellants are acquitted of the offences

alleged and are ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any

other case.

……………………….J. (S. Ravindra Bhat)

…………………..……J. (Aravind Kumar) New Delhi, October 09, 2023