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N.Eswari vs K.Swarajya Lakshmi

Supreme Court15 September 2009R. M. Lodha · Tarun Chatterjee

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A High Court in its revisional jurisdiction may not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below when those findings are supportable on the evidence on record and are not perverse or arbitrary; a revisional court must be reluctant to undertake an independent re-assessment of evidence so as to supplant the conclusions of the courts below where the evidence admitted of and supported those conclusions. The requirement of a landlord to evict a tenant under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is not bonafide merely because the landlord has expressed a desire to occupy the premises, where the landlord is already permanently residing elsewhere with family members and owns residential property in that location, and the landlord's stated intention appears to be voluntary relocation rather than a genuine necessity arising from absence of alternative residential accommodation.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6261 OF 2009(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6979 of 2009)

N. Eswari ...Appellant W/o Adhinarayana Rao

VERSUS

K. Swarajya Lakshmi ...Respondent W/o K.V.L.N.A. Sastry (Late)

JUDGMENT

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We are invited in this appeal to decide whether the High

Court was justified, in the facts and circumstances of the present

case in its revisional jurisdiction, in re-appreciating the facts and

setting aside the order of the Rent Controller, Vijayawada dated

31st of October, 2001 and the order of the Appellate Authority,

Vijayawada dated 21st of December, 2005.

1

3. In our view, the High Court was not justified in interfering

with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts

below.

4. The appellant is a tenant in respect of the premises in

question since 1982. In or about the year 2000, the

landlady/respondent herein filed an application for eviction of the

tenant/appellant under Section 10(3)(a)(i)(a) read with Section

10(2)(i) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act,

1960 (in short, "the Act") before the Rent Controller on the

ground that the landlady/respondent bonafide required the

premises in question and also the tenant/appellant was a willful

defaulter in payment of rent.

5. Parties adduced evidence and finally, the Rent Controller,

Vijayawada, by its final order dated 31st of October, 2001,

rejected the eviction petition inter alia holding that the

landlady/respondent had failed to prove that the tenant/appellant

was a defaulter in payment of rent and in so far as the bonafide

need of the premises in question was concerned, it was held that

the landlady/respondent had two houses at Hyderabad and the

2 landlady was residing in Vijayawada with her family members

consisting of one son and two daughters for the last 31 years.

6. Feeling aggrieved, an appeal was carried to the Appellate

Authority, namely, Principal Senior Civil Judge-cum-Appellate

Authority, Vijayawada. The Appellate Authority also affirmed the

findings of the Rent Controller, Vijayawada and dismissed the

appeal. A Civil Revision Petition was then filed in the High Court

of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad by the landlady/respondent

against the aforesaid concurrent orders of rejection of the

eviction petition and by the impugned order, the High Court had

set aside the concurrent orders of rejection and directed the

eviction of the tenant/appellant.

7. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order of the High

Court, this Special Leave Petition has been filed at the instance

of the tenant/appellant, which on grant of leave, was heard in

presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

8. So far as the ground of willful default was concerned, both

the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority held that

there was no willful default in payment of rent for the months of

December, 1998 and January, 1999. So far as this ground was

3 concerned, the High Court also observed that the learned

counsel for the landlady/respondent, not having urged the said

ground i.e. willful default in payment of rent, the findings of the

two Courts below must be affirmed. So far as the case of

bonafide requirement of the landlady/respondent was concerned,

the High Court has, by the impugned order, set aside the

concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below.

9. In our view, the High Court was not justified in the present

case to interfere with the concurrent orders of the Courts below

rejecting the plea of bonafide requirement of the

landlady/respondent. The only ground on which the High Court

had set aside the concurrent orders of the Courts below is that

since the husband of the landlady had retired from service in

1982 and was residing at Hyderabad and she was not having

any other residential house at Vijayawada where she was

planning to settle, it must be held that the requirement was

bonafide.

10. In Paragraph 16 of the impugned Judgment, the High Court

has given the reasons for setting aside the concurrent orders of

rejection of the eviction petition. We feel it proper in this case to

4 reproduce the said part of the impugned order, which runs as

under :-

"16. The evidence of P.W. 1 would go to show that he was retired from service in 1982, that at present he is residing at Hyderabad, that he was not having any other residential house at Vijayawada and he is planning to settle at Vijayawada. When a suggestion was given to the effect that with a view to evict the tenant so that he would get higher rent, the present petition was filed, but the same was denied. R.W. 1, who is no other than the tenant stated that she is a tenant right from 1986 and she never committed any default in payment of rents. Having come to the Court, it is for the petitioner to establish that the premises in question is required for bona fide purpose. P.W. 1 admitted that he has got two own houses at Hyderabad and at present the landlady is staying with her children at Hyderabad, but at the same time, admittedly, the landlady is not having any residential premises at Hyderabad. She is aged about 70 years. Since the children of landlady are residing at Hyderabad, it cannot be said that there would be no one to look after her. Landlady is the best judge for his residential requirement. It is for the landlady to look after herself at that age. She can chose any place where she wanted to settle down for variety of reasons."

11. On a bare perusal of these findings of the High Court, it

appears that PW1 has categorically admitted that he had

got two houses of his own at Hyderabad and at present,

the landlady/respondent is staying with her children at

5 Hyderabad but since she has no residential house at

Vijayawada and her age is about 70 years, she wants to

settle herself in Vijayawada in the disputed premises.

According to the High Court, the landlady/respondent was

the best judge for her residential requirement and she can

choose any place where she can settle down for various

reasons. In view of the above, the High Court had set

aside the concurrent orders of the Courts below and

granted eviction of the appellant.

12. We are unable to accept these findings of the High Court

made in the impugned order. It is an admitted position that

the landlady, who is permanently residing in Hyderabad

with her family consisting of a son and two daughters and

she has got two houses there, only because she has

expressed her desire to stay at this old age of 70 years in

the tenanted premises, it cannot be said that the

requirement of the landlady has been proved to be

genuine.

13. As noted hereinearlier, the Rent Controller, Vijayawada and

the Appellate Authority concurrently held on facts on proper

6 appreciation of evidence on record that the

landlady/respondent had failed to prove that she required

the premises in question for her bonafide need. This

concurrent finding of fact was upset by the High Court in its

revisional jurisdiction. In our view, the High Court was not

justified in interfering with such concurrent finding of fact in

the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and come to a

different finding on the question of bonafide need of the

landlady/respondent. In Smt. Rajbir Kaur and Another

Vs. M/s S. Chokesiri and Co. 1989 (1) SCC 19, this Court

considered this aspect of the matter and at Page 43, has

dealt with the aforesaid question elaborately -

"When the findings of fact recorded by the Courts- below are supportable on the evidence on record, the revisional Court must, indeed, be reluctant to embark upon an independent re-assessment of the evidence and to supplant a conclusion of its own, so long as the evidence on record admitted of and supported the one reached by the Courts-below. With respect to the High Court, we are afraid, the exercise made by it in its revisional jurisdiction incurs the criticism that the concurrent-finding of fact of the Courts-below could not be dealt and supplanted by a different finding arrived at on an independent re-assessment of evidence as was done in this case".

7 14. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had

considered the entire materials on record and the

arguments adduced by the parties and came to a finding

that the requirement of the landlady/respondent was not

genuine and there was no need to leave her permanent

house at Hyderabad, where she has been living, to come

over to Vijayawada to stay alone at the age of 70 years

without there being anyone to look after her. This finding of

fact arrived at by the Rent Controller and the Appellate

Authority, in our view, cannot be said to be perverse and

arbitrary.

15. That being the position, we are of the view that it was not

open to the High Court, in the exercise of its revisonal

jurisdiction, to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact

of the Rent Controller as well as of the Appellate Authority.

16. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside

and that of Rent Controller, Vijayawada and the Appellate

Authority are restored.

8

17. The application for eviction filed by the respondent stands

rejected. The appeal is thus allowed. There will be no

order as to costs.

..............................J. [ TARUN CHATTERJEE ]

NEW DELHI ..............................J. September 15, 2009 [ R. M. LODHA ]

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