Munigadappa Meenaiah vs State Of A.P

Munigadappa Meenaiah ...Appellant

Vs.

The State of Andhra Pradesh ...Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the

Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding

the conviction recorded by III Additional District and Sessions

Judge, Ranga Reddy District, holding the appellant guilty for

the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (in short `IPC') and sentencing him imprisonment

for life.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

1

The accused Munigadapa Meenaiah is native of

Thimmapuram, Bommalaramaram of Nalgonda District. He

was doing fruit business at Medchal. Ten years back, his

younger brother Mallaiah died. After demise of Mallaiah, his

wife Yellamma (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased'), along

with her two sons took shelter at the house of the accused.

During that period, he developed illegal intimacy with the

deceased and both were living together and her sons were

living separately. Suspecting the fidelity of the deceased, the

accused used to pick up quarrels with her, as a result of

which, he separated and took another portion at Medchal.

While so, the accused hatched up a plan to liquidate the

deceased. On 3.6.2001 at about 9.00 A.M. the accused went

to the house of deceased and invited her to house to

consume toddy and both of them went to the toddy shop of

PW 2, purchased two bottle of toddy and brought the same to

his house in a tumbler and both of them consumed toddy.

While consuming toddy, the accused picked up quarrel with

the deceased on the ground of her chastity. As a consequence

of which the deceased grew wild and abused him by denying

2 the allegations of illegal contacts with others. On that, the

accused brought a pestle and murdered the deceased by

hitting the same on her head and laid the body on the road in

front of his house, cleaned the blood stains in the room and

tried to obliterate the scientific evidence so as to throw the

suspicion on other persons. On the report given by P.W.1, a

case in Cr. No.117 of 2001 of Medchel Police Station was

registered for the offence under Section 302 IPC and after

completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed.

Accused abjured guilt and demanded trial. The

prosecution examined 10 witnesses, and marked Exs P 1 to P

21 and Mos 1 to 5. On the other hand, no oral evidence was

adduced on behalf of the accused, Ex. D1 contradiction was

marked.

After scrutinizing the entire material on record and after

hearing the learned counsel on both sides, the learned District

Judge found the accused guilty of the offence punishable

under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced him to suffer

imprisonment for life.

3. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of

3 PWs. 1 and 10 who spoke to have seen the deceased last in

the company of the appellant. Reference was also made to the

evidence of PW5 relating to certain recoveries by PW. 19. PW

2 also deposed to have seen accused and deceased together

when they purchased toddy and thereafter the dead body of

the deceased was found in front of the house of the accused

with injuries on her head and other parts of the body. As

noted above, the learned Trial Court found the accused guilty.

4. Before the High Court the stand was that PWs. 1 and

10 are sons of the deceased and are interested witnesses and

should not have been believed. It was also submitted that the

circumstances highlighted do not make a complete chain of

circumstances. The High Court did not find any substance in

the plea and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment.

5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the

appellant reiterated the stands taken before the High Court.

4

6. In response, learned counsel for the State supported

the judgment of the Trial Court and the High Court.

7. We shall first deal with the contention regarding

interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution

version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a

witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not

conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an

innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false

implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a

careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it

is cogent and credible.

8. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (AIR

1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-

"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and

5 there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

9. The above decision has since been followed in Guli

Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in

which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)

was also relied upon.

10. We may also observe that the ground that the

witness being a close relative and consequently being a

partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no

substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as

in Dalip Singh's case (supra) in which surprise was expressed

over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the

Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent

6 witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:

"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in - `Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan' (AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel."

11. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P. (AIR

1965 SC 202) this Court observed: (p, 209-210 para 14):

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses.......The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be

7 accepted as correct."

12. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab

v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of

Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76).

13. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v.

Teja Ram and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1776) the over-insistence on

witnesses having no relation with the victims often results in

criminal justice going awry. When any incident happens in a

dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would

be the inmates of that house.

14. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that

where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the

inference of guilt can be justified only when all the

incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be

incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of

any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR

(1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR

1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR

1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985

8 SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC

350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC

1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to the

guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely

connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from

those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR

1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends

upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the

cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to

negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences

home beyond any reasonable doubt.

15. We may also make a reference to a decision of this

Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10

SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:

"In a case based on circumstantial evi- dence, the settled law is that the circum- stances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such cir- cumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be

9 complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved cir- cumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and to- tally inconsistent with his innocence....".

16. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR

1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon

circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the

following tests:

"(1) the circumstances from which an

inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must

be cogently and firmly established;

(2) those circumstances should be of a

definite tendency unerringly pointing towards

guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken

cumulatively should form a chain so complete

that there is no escape from the conclusion

that within all human probability the crime

was committed by the accused and none else;

and

10 (4) the circumstantial evidence in order

to sustain conviction must be complete and

incapable of explanation of any other

hypothesis than that of the guilt of the

accused and such evidence should not only be

consistent with the guilt of the accused but

should be inconsistent with his innocence.

17. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992

Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken

in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence

relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in

favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed

out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have

been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts

so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of

guilt.

18. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills'

Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following

rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial

11 evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal

inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable

doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden

of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of

any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases,

whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence

must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in

order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts

must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and

incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable

hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable

doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to

be acquitted".

19. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely

on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the

touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid

down by the this Court as far back as in 1952.

20. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State

12 of Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was

observed thus:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

21. A reference may be made to a later decision in

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984

SC 1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence,

it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove

that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in

prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The

conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before

13 conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be

fully established. They are:

(1) the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be

fully established. The circumstances

concerned `must' or `should' and not `may be'

established;

(2) the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt

of the accused, that is to say, they should not

be explainable on any other hypothesis except

that the accused is guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible

hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable

ground for the conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and must show that

14 in all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.

22. These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan

v. Rajaram (2003 (8) SCC 180) and State of Haryana v. Jagbir

Singh (2003 (11) SCC 261).

23. In the instance PWs 1 and 10 as well as PW2 saw the

deceased and the accused together in the night of the

occurrence. In the morning, dead body of the deceased was

found in front of the house of the accused. Additionally, on

the basis of information given by the accused certain articles

were recovered and one of them was the pestle used for

inflicting the injury on the head. That being so, the judgment

of the Trial Court and the High Court do not suffer from any

infirmity.

24. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal,

which we direct.

15 .............................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

.............................................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, July 23, 2008

16