Municipal Board, Pushkar vs State Transport Authority,rajasthan And Ors.
- Neutral1962 INSC 338
- AIRAIR 1965 SC 458
- SCR[1963] 2 SCR 273
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. The fixation or alteration of a bus stand by the Regional Transport Authority is an order made under rule 134 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1955, made in exercise of powers conferred by section 68(2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and is therefore liable to revision under section 64A of the Act; such an order cannot be made under section 76 of the Act, which deals with control of traffic and has nothing to do with the fixation or alteration of bus stands. 2. In interpreting the expression "date of the order" in the first proviso to section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, equitable considerations have no place and the strict grammatical meaning must be adhered to; accordingly, "date of the order" cannot be read as "date of knowledge of the order" in the absence of clear legislative indication to that effect. 3. Where an order fixing or discontinuing a bus stand is to be made by notification under the relevant rule, the effective date of the order is the date of publication of the notification, not the date of the resolution expressing the intention to make such an order; consequently, an application for revision made before the date of notification is made within time under section 64A. 4. The principle of merger, whereby an appellate or revisional authority's order supersedes the original authority's order, does not apply where the revisional application was made before the operative order had come into existence and the revisional authority's order was also made before the operative order came into existence. 5. An order passed in revision under section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act without giving the person likely to be affected reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, as required by the second proviso to that section, is invalid; in such circumstances, the Court may exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to send the matter back to the revisional authority for disposal according to law rather than quashing the order entirely. 6. (Per Sarkar, J., dissenting in part) The State Transport Authority acting under section 64A lacks the power to treat an application nominally seeking to set aside one order as an application to set aside a different order, and cannot suo motu amend a petition to change its subject-matter after the period of limitation has expired.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
PETITIONER:MUNICIPAL BOARD, PUSHKAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:21/11/1962
BENCH:GUPTA, K.C. DASBENCH:GUPTA, K.C. DASGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.SARKAR, A.K.WANCHOO, K.N.AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:1965 AIR 458 1963 SCR (2) 273CITATOR INFO :R 1973 SC2420 (4)E 1975 SC2085 (7)RF 1987 SC1059 (17)F 1987 SC1339 (6)
ACT:Motor Vehicles-order of Regional Transport Authorityshifting bus stand-Revision-Limitation-Motor Vehicles Act,1939 (4 of 1939), ss. 64A, 68, 76, 91(2)-Rajasthan MotorVehicles Rules, 1955, r. 134-Constitution of India, Art.142.
HEADNOTE:The Municipal Board of Pushkar passed a resolution on May24, 1948, for the shifting of the bus stand on the sacredlake to another site near the Police Station where itresolved to construct a passenger shed and provide otherfacilities for the pilgrims. The Regional TransportAuthority by a resolution dated December 3/4, 1959, acceptedthe suggestion and issued a public notification to thateffect on June 28, 1960. Long before the notification, tworesidents of Pushkar moved the State Transport Authorityunder s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act for revision of thedecision of the Regional Transport Authority dated December3/4, 1959, changing the bus stand but that application wasrejected on February 18, 1960. Another petition for therevision of the same orders under the same section was movedby certain bus operators on April 13, 1960. The StateTransport Authority on January 6, 1961, allowed thatapplication, reversed the decision of the Regional 'Trans-port Authority of December 31, 1959, and directed that theold bus stand should continue. The Municipal Board movedthe High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution againstthis order of State Transport Authority. The High Courtrejected the application. The Board appealed to this Courtby special leave. Its case was that the order of theRegional Transport Authority changing the bus stand was madeunder s. 76 of the, Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, wasnot open to revision, that the revision application wasbarred by limitation and that the first revision applicationhaving been rejected the second did not lie inasmuch as onthe rejection of the first, the Regional TransportAuthority's order ceased to exist having merged in the StateTransport Authority's order,374Held (per curiam), that it was well settled that equitableconsiderations have no place in interpreting provision oflimitation and their strict grammatical meaning has to beadhered to. The expression "date of the order" in the firstproviso to s. 64A of the Act, therefore, could not mean thedate of the knowledge of the order.Per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar, JJ. Theorder of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new busstand and discontinuing the old was one made not under s. 76of the Act, which had no application, but under r. 134 ofthe Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1955, made in exerciseof the powers conferred by s. 68 (2) (r) the Motor VehiclesAct. The order was, therefore, open to revision tinders. 64A by the State Transport Authority.T.B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore,[1953] S.C.R. 290, applied.Section 76 had nothing to do with the fixation or alterationof a bus stand. Although the word bus stand' had not beendefined in the Act, it was clear that a bus stand meant aplace where bus services commenced or terminated. Section76, properly construed, dealt with the determination ofparking places referred to by s. 91(2)(e) of the Act. Thefixation of bus stands was within s. 68(2)(r) of the Act andthe power to issue the necessary notification was implied inthat clause.Nagendranath v. Suresh, A.I.R. (1 932) P.C. 165, GeneralAccident Fire and Life, Assurance Corporation Ltd, v.Janmohomed Abdul Rahim, A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 6 and Boota Mal v.Union of India, [1963] 1 S.C.R. 70, referred to.In the instant case the effective order fixing the new busstand was made not by the declaration of intention in theresolution of December 3/4, 1959, but by the publication ofthe notification on June 28, 1960, and the impugnedapplication for revision under s. 64A of the Act having beenmade before that date, no question of limitation couldarise.There was no scope for the application of the principle ofmerger in the present case since the State TransportAuthority's order rejecting the first revision applicationhad been made before the effective and lawful order fixingthe new bus stand was made by the notification.Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co.Ltd. [1963] 3 S.C.R. 338 and Madan Gopal Bungta v. Secretaryto the Government of Orissa[1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 906,distinguished.375Since the notice obligatory under the second proviso to s.64A was not admittedly (riven by the State Transport Autho-rity before it passed its order dated January 6, 1961, thisCourt should, in the ends of justice, exercise its powersunder Art. 142 of the Constitution and send the matter backto the revisional authority for disposal according to law.Per Sarkar,J.-The State Transport Authority's order ofJanuary 6, 1961 was patently erroneous and should have beenset aside as it was passed under s. 64A on an applicationmade set aside an order of the Regional Transport Authority,passed on December 3, 4, 1939, after the period of 30 daysprescribed for such application under that section hadexpired.Assuming that the Regional Transport Authority's order whichcould be set aside under s. 64A was the one made on June 28,1960. The State Transport Authority's order of .January 6,1961, would still be patently wrong for it set aside notthat order but the order of December 3/4, 1959, which theState Transport Authority had no power tinder s. 64A to setaside.The State Transport Authority had no power suo motu to treatthe application to set aside the order of December 3/4,1959, as an application to set aside the order of June 28,1960. It had never been moved to do so nor had it in factsuo motu treated the application as one to set aside theorder of June 28, 1960, for it expressly set aside only theRegional Transport Authority's order of December 3/4, 1959.The High Court was in error in holding that as theNotification of June 28, 1960, contained the order whichcould be set aside Linder s. 64A, the application under thatsection which had been made before that date was not beyondtime, for it omitted to notice that that application askednothing concerning that order.The application for setting aside the order of December 3/4,1959, could not by amendment be turned into an applicationto set aside an order of June 28, 1960, after thirty daysfrom the last mentioned day had expired.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 332 of 1962.Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order datedAugust 31, 1961, of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. CivilWrit No. 76 of 1961'376M. C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, N.C.Chatterjee, L. L.Sharma, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg,S. C. Agarwal and D. P. Singh, for the appellant.P. D. Menon, for respondents Nos. 1 and 7.
C. K. Daphtay, Solicitor General of India,Rameshwar Nath, S. N.Andley and P.L.Vohra, for therespondents Nos. 2-(6).
1962. November 21. The judgment of Gajendragadkar,Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by DasGupta, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate judgment.DAS GUPTA, J.-At Pushkar in Rajasthan exists a tank whichhas long been considered one of the holiest places of theHindus and a well known place of pilgrimage. By. the eastof the lake runs a road approximately north to south. TheGhats for getting into the lake are situated contiguous westof this road. Several Dharmshalas and at least oneGurudwara have been established by the side of this road notfar from the lake. A temple of Hanumanji stands east of theroad, a short distance from the southern edge of the lake.Another temple close to the road is the temple of Rangji.This is situated very near the Ghats and to the east of theroad. There is also a temple of Brahamaji further awaytowards the north but on this very road a little away fromwhere the road further north cast from the edge of the lakemeets, another Road Ganera Deedwana Nagar. Towards thesouth of the Dharamashalas the road goes on to Ajmer. Thepolice station of Pushkar is situated at some distance fromthe Pushkar lake. The police station stands on a road whichgoes on towards Ganera Deedwana Nagar to the north; and onthe south joins the road377to Ajmer, Thus the road running north to south by the sideof the police station and the road running by the east ofthe Ghats of the lake meet a short distance north of thepolice station and a greater distance towards the south. Inthis way the two roads form a somewhat irregular figurealmost like a triangle. The pilgrims use this road incoming to the lake and for this purpose can avail of anumber of motor transport services. The dispute which isthe subjectmatter of the present appeal is as regards thelocation of the bus stand at Pushkar, for these numerousmotor transport services.
For many years the bus stand was located by the side of theroad which runs cast of the lake, a little away to the northof Hanumanji's temple and very near the, Dharamiashalas. OnMAy 24, 1948, the Municipal Board of Pushkar passed aresolution that the Bus stand should be shifted to anothersite by the side of the road which passes by the policestation. By the same resolution it was resolved toconstruct a passenger shed, pivaoo, baths, latrines, urinalsand other facilities for the convenience of the passengersat the new bus stand as proposed. The Regional TransportAuthority in its meeting held on December 3 & 4, 1959,considered this proposal and passed a resolution in thefollowing words .-
"The Bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot ofland at the junction of the Hallows Road withGanera Road near the Police Station andKalkaji's Temple. The present bus stand onthe northern Patri between Hanumangarhi Templeand Bralimannandji's Baghichi will cease to bea bus stand and will be a bus stop only. Thebuses will not pass through the city. Theywill go back from the bus stop to the new busstand. The Municipal Board will provide thenecessary facilities. The buses will shift to378the new bus stand after such facilities areprovided."
It was not however until June 28, 1960, that a publicnotification was issued in pursuance of the resolution. Onthat date a notification was issued notifying the public ofthe resolution of the Regional Transport Authority fixingthe new stand for buses at Pushkar and discontinuing the oldstand but directing that it will be used as a bus stop. Thenotification further stated that the buses shall not passthrough the city but will proceed to the new stand back fromthe bus stop and that except the above-mentioned bus standno other place shall be used as a bus stand in Pushkar. Itwas after this notification was issued, that the newarrangement came into force.
Long before this notification was made, two residents ofPushkar, Jai Narain and Madan Mohan moved before the StateTransport Authority an application for revision of' thedecision of the Regional Transport Authority changing thebus stand. This application purported to be under s. 64A ofthe Motor Vehicles Act. It was heard by the State TransportAuthority on February 18, 1960, and was rejected the sameday. On April 13, 1960, five bus operators of the AjmerPushkar route moved a fresh application for revision unders. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act against the RegionalTransport Authority's decision to change the stand. Thisapplication was decided by an order dated January 6, 1961.The State Transport Authority rejected the preliminaryobjection raised by the respondent's counsel that norevision lay against the Regional Transport Authority'sorder and also the objection that the matter in dispute hadalready been heard and decided on February 18, 1960 and theState Transport Authority had no right to review its ownorder. It also rejected the contention that the revisionpetition was barred by limitation. Coming to the merits ofthe case the State Transport Authority was of379opinion that the proposed new bus stand was likely to be asource of inconvenience to women pilgrims and children andthat the old bus stand should be retained from the point ofview of both public utility and convenience. Accordingly,the State Transport Authority allowed the application forrevision and reversed the decision of the Regional TransportAuthority and directed that the old bus stand shouldcontinue to be recognised as the official bus stand for thePushkar town.
Against this order of the State Transport Authority theMunicipal Board of Pushkar moved the High Court of Rajasthanunder Art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed forappropriate writs or directions, setting aside the StateTransport Authority's order of January 6, 1961. The maingrounds on which this relief was sought were : (1) that theorder of the Regional Transport Authority had been madeunder s. 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act and was therefore notliable to revision; (2) that, in any case, the applicationwas barred by limitation; and (3) that the State TransportAuthority having already rejected one application inrevision against the Regional Transport Authority's orderchanging the bus stand could not entertain anotherapplication on absolutely the same grounds. The High Courtcame to the conclusion that there was no substance in any ofthese contentions and rejected the application.It is against this decision of the High Court that thepresent appeal has been filed by the Municipal Board,Pushkar, with special leave.
In support of the appeal the learned Attorney-General hascontended that the High. Court's decision on all thesethree points was incorrect. He has reiterated before usthat the order of the Regional Transport Authority changingthe bus stand must be held to have been made under s. 76 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act and therefore not liable380to revision, that the application for revision wits barredby limitation and thirdly, that in any case, the firstrevision application having been rejected, a second revisionapplication did not lie inasmuch as on the rejection of thefirst revision application the Regional TransportAuthority's order had ceased to exist having merged in theState Transport Authority's order.
The first question that arises for decision therefore iswhether the Regional Transport Authority's order has beenmade under s. 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act or, as urged onbehalf of the respondents, it was made under s. 68 of theAct. Section 76, it has to be noticed, is in Chapter VI ofthe Motor Vehicles Act which deals with the control oftraffic. Section 68 is in Chapter TV which deals with the,control of transport vehicles. Section 76 gives power tothe State Government or any authority authorised in thisbehalf by the State Government "to determine places at whichmotor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for aspecified period of time" and also to determine the placesat which public service vehicles may stop for a longer timethan is necessary for the taking up and setting down ofpassengers. According to the learned Attorney General it isunder this power to determine a place at which motorvehicles may stand indefinitely or for a specified period oftime that the location of a bus stand is and can bedetermined by the State Government or any other authorityauthorised by it in this behalf.
The rival contention on behalf of the respondent is that thedetermination of places at which motor vehicles may standeither indefinitely or for a specified period of time meansthe determination of parking place while the determinationof places at which public service vehicles may stop for alonger time than is necessary for the taking up and setting381down of passengers, contained in the latter portion of s. 76means the determination of halting stations. Neither ofthese, it is urged, has anything to do with the provision ofa bus stand. A bus stand, it is argued on behalf of therespondents, means the place where a bus service eithercommences or terminates. This according to the learnedSolicitor-General, who appeared for the respondents, has tobe done under a rule made under s. 68(2) (r) of the Act,giving power to the Regional Transport Authority to fix busstands. Section 68 empowers the State Government to makerules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisionsof Chapter IV. The second subsection provides that withoutprejudice to the generality of the power just mentionedrules under this section may be made with respect to all orany of the matters mentioned in the clause set out in thesub-section. Of these cl. (r) is in these words:--
Section 68 (2) (r).
" prohibiting the picking up and setting downof passengers by stage or contract carriagesat specified places or in specified areas orat places other than duly notified stands orhalting places and requiring the driver of astage carriage to stop and remain stationaryfor a reasonable time when so required by apassenger desiring to board or alight from thevehicle at a notified halting place."
In order to make an effective rule under this clause unders. 68(2), it is said, it is first necessary to have dulynotified stands. This clause contemplates, it is urged,that a rule has to first provide for the notification ofcertain stands for transport vehicles and, secondly, forprohibiting the picking up and setting down of passengers bystage or contract carriages inter alia at places other thanthe stands which have been duly notified. The learnedSolicitor--General has further urged that the questionwhether382the fixation or alteration of bus stands can be made unders. 76 or s. 68 of the Act is no longer res integra and mustbe taken to have been decided in favour of his contention inT. B. Ibrahim v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore. (1)There is, in our opinion, force in this argument T. B.Ibrahim, the appellant in that case, had a bus stand at asite belonging to himself. On February 21, 1950, theRegional Transport Authority, Tanjore declared that busstand as unsuitable and with effect from April 1, 1950,altered the starting and terminal points by means of tworesolutions purporting to have been passed under s. 76 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act. When the validity of theseresolutions was challenged before the Madras High Court by apetition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the High Courtheld that s. 76 did not authorise the respondent to closethe previous bus stand and quashed the orders. On November10, 1950, the Regional Transport Authority of Tanjore, afterhearing the appellant Ibrahim and the Municipality passed aresolution that for good and proper reasons, viz., theconvenience of the travelling public the Transport Authorityhad resolved to alter the starting places and termini of allpublic service vehicles, other than motor cabs, arriving atand proceeding from Tanjore from the existing buts stand toanother area of the town. Against this resolution a freshpetition under Art. 226 was filed in the High Court but thepetition was dismissed. Against the High Court's order,Ibrahim appealed to this Court by special leave and it isthe judgment in that appeal which has been reported in[1953] S. C. le. 290.
The impugned resolution was passed by the TransportAuthority under Rule 268 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules,as amended. The amended Rule was in these words :-
268. In the case of public service vehicles(other than motor cabs) the transportauthority(1) [1953] S.C.R. 290.
383may after consultation with such otherauthority as it may consider desirable andafter notice to the parties affected, fix oralter from time to time for good and properreasons, the starting places and terminibetween which such vehicles shall be permittedto be used within its jurisdiction. A list ofsuch places shall be supplied by suchauthority to every holder of a permit for suchvehicles at the time of grant of or renewal ofpermits.
When such places have been fixed every suchvehicle shall start only from such places".The very first ground that was urged in support of thesecond writ petition in the High Court was that Rule 268, asamended, was beyond the rulemaking power conferred by s.68(2)(r) of the Motor Vehicles Act. This contention wasrejected by the High Court and was repeated before thisCourt and was rejected by this Court also. After settingout the material portion of s. 68, the Court pointed outthat the purpose of Chapter IV was described by thecompendious expression "control of transport vehicles", andthe Provincial Government was invested with plenary powersto make rules for carrying out that purpose and thenobserved :-
"Keeping in view the purpose underlying theChapter we are not prepared to hold that thefixing or alteration of bus-stands is foreignto that purpose."
Dealing with the contention that s. 68(2)(r) does not conferthe power upon the transport authority to direct the fixingor the alteration of a bus stand and therefore Rule 268 ofthe rules framed under that section was ultra vires, theCourt observed thus :
"We are not prepared to accede to thiscontention. Sub-section 2(r) clearly contem-plates three definite situations. Itprohibits the384picking up or setting down of passengers (i)at specified places, (ii) in specified areas,and (iii) at places other than duly notifiedstands or halting places."
"If the power to make rules in regard to thesematters is given to the Government, then itfollows that a specified place may be prohi-bited from being used for picking Upon settingdown passengers. This will inevitably resultin the closing of that specified place for thepurpose of picking up or setting down ofpassengers. Similarly a specified area may beexcluded for the same purpose. The expression"duty notified stands" is not defined in th`Act, but it is reasonable to presume that aduly notified stand must be one which isnotified by the Transport Authority and bynone other. There is no warrant for thepresumption that it must be notified by theMunicipality."
The Court then discussed certain provisions of the MadrasDistrict Municipalities Act and said that these provisionsdid not affect the power of the Transport Authority tolocate traffic control and that if Rule 268 was within therule-making authority, it followed that it could riot bechallenged as being void because it was riot consistent withsome general law. The discussion on this point was con-cluded in these words :-
"Section 68, sub-section (2)(r) involves botha general prohibition that the , stand willcease to exist as well as a particularprohibition, namely, that passengers shallriot be picked up or set down at a specifiedpoint. The order passed by the TransportAuthority properly construed falls within theambit of section 68 sub-section 2(r). Rule268 under which the order impeached was passedis a rule framed385under the plenary rule-making power referredto in section 68, sub-section (1). Sub-sec-tion (2) (za) says that a rule may be madewith respect to any other matter which is tobe or may be prescribed. This shows theexistence of residuary power vested in therule-making authority. It follows thereforethat Rule 268 is within the scope of thepowers conferred under section 68 of the Act."
We have deliberately made these extensive quotations fromthe previous judgment of this Court because they clearlyshow, as nothing else can, that the Court had to consider inthat case the question whether s.68(2) (r) did confer uponthe Transport Authority the power to direct fixing oralteration of a bus stand and answered the question in theaffirmative. Ibrahim's case is thus a clear and directauthority for the proposition that under s. 68(2)(r) of theMotor Vehicles Act the State Government has power to framerules empowering the Regional Transport Authority to fix oralter bus-stands. The notification of June 28, 1960,mentions Rule 134 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules,1955, as the source of the power under which the new busstand was fixed, the old bus stand was discontinued and itwas ordered that no other place except the new bus standshould be used as a bus stand at Pushkar. The materialportion of Rule 134 reads thus:--
"A Regional Transport Authority bynotification in the Rajasthan Gazette, or bythe erection of traffic signs which arepermitted for-the purpose under subsection (1)of section 75 of the Act.. or both, may, inrespect of the taking up or setting down ofpassengers or both, by public service vehiclesor by any specified class of public servicevehicles......................
386within the limits of any municipality, orwithin such other limits as may be specifiedin the notification, certain specified standsor halting places only shall be so used."
This rule clearly empowers the fixation oralteration of bus stands.
In framing the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951, ofwhich Rule 134 form part the Rajasthan Government mentionedthe numerous sections which give the Government the power toframe rules as. the "authority under which the rules werebeing made, viz., ss. 21, 41, 65, 68, 70, 71, (2), 73, 74,75, 77, 80, 86, (2), 88, 90 and 91 of the Motor VehiclesAct, 1939. In view of this Court's decision in Ibrahim'sCase (1) it will be proper to hold that Rule 13,4 ,was madein exercise of the powers under s. 68. Accordingly, theorder of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new busstand and discontinuing the old should be held to have beenmade under a rule made under s. 68 and thus liable torevision under s. 64 A.The learned Attorney-General stressed the fact that inlbrahim's case this Court did not in so many words say thatsuch an order. fixing or altering a bus stand cannot be madeunder s. 76 of the Act and contended that that case is noauthority for holding that the order was not made under s.
76. Assuming for the sake of argument that that was so andthat the order could also be made under s. 76 that would notaffect or weaken the authority of Ibrahim's Case in so faras it decided that a rule empowering the Transport Authorityto fix or alter bus stands can be made under s. 68 (2) (r)of the Act. In that position there will be no escape fromthe conclusion that the Regional Transport Authority'sorder in the present case would be liable to revision unders 64 A.(1) [1953] S.C.R, 290.
387It appears clear to us however that Ibrahim's case is alsoauthority for the proposition that an order fixing oraltering a bus stand cannot be made under s. 76. From thesummary of 'what was discussed and decided in that case ashas been given above, it appears that the Division Bench ofthe Madras High Court gave a categorical decision in theearlier writ petition that s. 76 did not authorise theTransport Authority to close the bus stand. It appears tous clear that this view was approved by this Court. Indeed,the reasoning which this Court adopted for deciding that s.68 (2) (r) of the Act contemplates the fixation oralteration of a bus stand would become considerably weakenedand would not have been accepted by this Court if it thoughtthat s. 76 itself authorised the Transport Authority to fixor close a bus stand.
We may make it clear that even if this binding authority inlbrahim's Case had not been present we would have had nohesitation in holding that the fixation or alteration of abus stand is made under a rule made under s. 68 of the MotorVehicles Act and cannot be made under s. 76. In ouropinion, Chapter VI which deals with the question of"'Control of traffic" in general has nothing to do with thefixation or alteration of bus stands. Section 76 has nodoubt used the words "'places at which motor vehicles maystand" and the learned Attorney--General tried to persuadeus that this includes the fixation of what is known as busstands. While the word "bus stand" has not been defined inthe Act, we have no hesitation in accepting the contentionof the respondents that a bus stand means a place where busservices commence or terminate. It is the place where thebuses stand for commencing its transport service or wherethey stand after terminating their service, that ispopularly known as a bus-stand. We do not think the words"places at which the motor vehicles may stand eitherindefinitely388or for a specified period of time" can be reasonablyinterpreted to include a bus stand in the above sense. Whenit is remembered that Chapter VI in which s. 76 occurs, isintended to deal with the control of ,traffic it becomesclear that the determination of places at which the MotorVehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specifiedperiod of time means the "determination of parking places"
while the determination of places at which public vehiclesmay stop for a longer time than is necessary for the takingup and setting down of passengers means "halting stationsfor public service vehicles". It is well worth noticingthat while the determination of such places for stoppage, inthe latter portion of the section can be in respect ofpublic service vehicles only the determination of places ofstanding in the first part of the section is in respect ofmotor vehicles in general.
All things considered, it appears to us clear that s. 76 hasnothing to do with the provision for bus stands. Section 91(2) (e) which empowers the State Government to make rulesfor "the maintenance and management of parking places andstands" does not refer, in our opinion, to bus stands but to"'stands" for motor vehicles which are in the nature ofparking places determined under s. 76.
It is equally clear to us that the "control of transportvehicles" with which Chapter IV purports to deal shouldreasonably be expected to contain provisions for fixation ofplaces where the transport vehicles may commence theirjourney or terminate their journey, that is, the fixation ofbus stands. When therefore we find in s. 68 (2),(r) thespecific clause about "prohibiting the picking up andsetting down of passengers............ at places other thanduly notified stands," it is reasonable to think that theword "stand" was used there to mean "bus stands" in thesense of places where services389terminate or commence. The scheme of the sub-sectionclearly shows that bus stands have first to be notified andregulatory orders can, and have to be issued thereafter. Inthe nature of things, the power to issue the necessarynotification is implied in the provision.The conclusion that necessarily follows from this is thatthe State Government has been given authority under thisclause to make rules for the fixation of bus-stands by dulynotifying the same. Rule 134 in so far as it empowers theRegional Transport Authority to fix or alter bus stands isthus a rule made under the rule-making authority under s.
68. Even apart from the authority of lbrahim's Case (1)therefore we are of opinion that the order of the RegionalTransport Authority was made in pursuance of powersconferred on it by a rule made under s. 68 (2) (r) of theMotor Vehicles Act and therefore liable to revision under s.64A.
This brings us to the question of limitation. Section 64 Aprovides that State Transport Authority shall not entertainany application from a person aggrieved by an order of theRegional Transport Authority unless the application is madewithin 30 days from the date of the order. According to theappellant, the impugned order was made by the RegionalTransport Authority on December 4, 1959, and consequentlythe application for revision made by the respondents onApril 13, 1960, was barred. It was suggested that in factthe respondents who moved the revision application on April13, 1960, were aware of the order made by the RegionalTransport Authority on December 4, 1959; but assuming thatthey had no such knowledge, the question of knowledge, itwas urged, was totally irrelevant. The section has providedthat no application shall bib entertained unless it is madewithin 30 days from the date of(1) [1953] S.C.R. 290.
390the order and the courts cannot read it as within 30 daysfrom the date of the knowledge of the order. In thisconnection the learned Attorney-General has drawn ourattention to the decisions of the Privy Council inNagendranath v. Suresh, (1) and General Accident Fire & LifeAssurance Corporation Limited v. Jarmohomnad Abdul Rahim (2)where it has been emphasised that in interpreting theprovisions of limitation, "'equitable considerations are outof place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words isthe only safe guide." There can be no doubt that thisprinciple has always been acted upon by the courts. Thisprinciple has recently been re-affirmed by this Court inBoota Mal.v. The Union of India (3).
We agree therefore that the words "-date of the order"
should not be read ""as from the date of knowledge of theorder" in the absence of clear indication to that effect.In this connection the learned Attorney-General has drawnour attention to several sections of the Motor Vehicles Actto show that where the legislature in prescribing the periodof limitation intended that time should run from some otherdate than the date when the order was made clear indicationof such intention was given. Thus s. 13 in providing for anappeal from an order made refusing or revoking a drivinglicence says that an aggrieved person may appeal "within 30days of the service on him of the order". Section 15 whichprovides for an appeal from an order of the licencingauthority disqualifying a person from holding a drivinglicence lays down that an aggrieved person may appeal"'within 30 days of the receipt of the order". Section 16which provides for an appeal against certain orders of theRegional Transport Authority says that the aggrieved personmay appeal "within 30 days of the receipt of intimation ofsuch order". Section 35 which is another section providingfor appeal says that the(1) A.I.R. (1932) P.C. 165 (2) A.I.R. (1941) P. C. 6,(3) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 70.
391appeal may be made "within 30 days of the date of receipt ofnotice of the order".
There is considerable force therefore in the argument thatif the legislature had intended that an application forrevision under s. 64A may be made within 30 days from thedate of intimation or knowledge of the order to theaggrieved person it would have said so; and in the absenceof any such thing the court is bound to hold that theapplication will be barred unless made within 30 days fromthe date of the order by which. the person is aggrieved.This still leaves open for investigation the problem as towhat. is the date of the order. According to the appellantthe date when the Regional Transport Authority passed theresolution is the date of the order. Against this it isurged on behalf of the bus operators that it is the datewhen that resolution was brought into effect by thepublication of the notification which should be consideredto be the date of the order. In our opinion, therespondents' contention should be accepted. For, it is afallacy to think that the date when the Regional TransportAuthority passed the resolution was the date on which thefixation of the new-bus-stand or the discontinuance of theold bus stand was ordered. It has to be remembered in thisconnection that Rule 134 itself contemplates that thefixation or alteration of bus stands would be made by anotification. It is only on such notification that anotified bus stand comes into existence. So long as thenotification is not made there is in law no effectivefixation of a new bus stand or discontinuance of the old busstand.
The matter may be considered from another aspect. Section64A provides for an application for revision by a personaggrieved by an order. It is the making of the order whichgives rise to the grievance. In this case it is thefixation of the new bus stand and the discontinuance of theold bus stand by which the bus operators claim to have beenaggrieved,392It is easy to see that there is no real cause for grievancetill such fixation and discontinuance of 'bus stands havebeen made by a notified order. In other words, the orderhas not been "made" till the notification has beenpublished. Before that it is only an intention to make anorder that has been expressed. That this distinctionbetween the making of an order fixing or discontinuing a busstand and the expression of an intention to make such. anorder was present in the mind of the Regional TransportAuthority is abundantly clear from the language used by it.The resolution that Was Passed on December 4, 1959-whichaccording to the appellant was the date on which theimpugned order was made-says :-
"The bus stand for Pushkar will be the plot ofland at the junction of the Hallows Road withGanera Road near the Police Station and;
Kalkaji's Temple. The present bus' stand onthe northern Patri between Hanumangarhi Templeand Brahamanandji's Baghichi will cease to bea bus stand and will be a bus stop, only. Thebuses will not pass through the city;. Theywill go back from the bus stop to the newstand. The Municipal Board will provide the,necessary facilities. The buses will shift tothe new stand after such facilities areprovided."
The Transport Authority did not follow this up on that dateby a formal order. It is reasonable therefore to considerthe passing of the, resolution as the preliminary stage ofthe making of the order and the notification by which it waspublished as the final making of the order.Our conclusion therefore is that-the order; fixing a new busstand at Pushkar and discontinuing the old bus stand was ineffect made not on December 4. 1959, but on June 28, 1960,when. the notification about the fixation of a new bus standwas published,393It is this order, made on June 28, 1960, that was liable torevision and as the application for revision was made beforethat date--in anticipation of the notification the plea oflimitation raised on behalf of the appellant was rightlyrejected by the Regional Transport Authority.There remains for consideration the last contention raisedon behalf of the appellant that inasmuch as the StateTransport Authority rejected by its order dated February 18,1960, the first application, for revision of the RegionalTransport Authority's order fixing. or altering the busstand, the Regional Transport Authority's order merged inthe order of the State Transport Authority, the secondapplication for revision was incompetent.In Collector of Customs' Calcutta v. The, East IndiaCommercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta, (1)this Court held that whereonce an order of original authority is taken in appeal tothe appellate authority it is the order of the latterauthority which is the operative order after the appeal isdisposed of-whether the appellate authority reverses theorder under appeal or modifies that order or merelydismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order without anymodification. In Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to theGovt. of (2) Orissa this Court applied this principle ofmerger to orders passed by way of review and an order of theCentral Government in effect rejecting the application ofthe appellant for the grant of a mining lease to him andconfirming the rejection of the application of the appellantby the Orissa Government was held not amenable to thejurisdiction of the High Court of Orissa under Art. 226 ofthe Constitution in view of the fact that the CentralGovernment was not located within the territories subject tothe jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court on the ground thatthe Central Government's order rejecting the review petitionand in effect rejecting the application of the appellant forgrant of a mining lease was the(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 338.
(2) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 906,394operative order. It has been urged. on the authority ofthese cases that the principle of merger should be appliedto the cases of revision also where the revising authorityreverses the order or modifies it or merely dismisses therevision application thereby confirming the order.In our opinion, there is no scope for the application of theprinciple of merger to the facts of the present case. As wehave pointed out above the order fixing a new bus stand anddiscontinuing the old bus stand was in effect, and in law,made not on December 4, 1959, but on June 28, 1960. Theposition therefore was that neither on the date when thefirst application for revision was made nor when the StateTransport Authority disposed of that application, had anyorder of the Regional Transport Authority fixing the new busstand and discontinuing the old bus stand, come intoexistence.
The question of merger could only arise if the revision wasof an order that had come into existence. If even though anapplication for revision was made before the notificationbut the State Transport Authority had considered anddisposed of the matter after the notification was made itwould be possible and indeed reasonable to say that theapplication for revision should be deemed, at the time whenthe State Transport Authority, dealt with the matter, to beone for this completed order and the order of the RegionalTransport Authority merged in the revising authority'sorder. As, however, the revising authority's order was alsomade before the notification had been published there was nooperative order even by the State Transport Authority'sorder made on February 18, 1960. The contention. that thesecond revision was incompetent, must therefore be rejected.Two points which emerged during arguments at the Bar howeverrequire consideration. The first395is that the application which the respondents busoperatorsmade on April 13, 1960, was also not for a revision of acomplete order. As it was only this application forrevision which has been dealt with by the State TransportAuthority by its order of January 6, 1961, the questionarises whether that fact itself makes the order of the StateTransport Authority bad and entitles the appellant to adirection quashing this order. It has to be noticed thatthe position in law that there was no complete order offixation of a new bus stand and alteration of the old busstand at Pushkar till the notification was made on June 28,1960, was not present in the minds of either the applicantsor the appellant, Municipal, Board, which appeared to opposethe application or even the State Transport Authority. Itwas not the appellant's case in the writ petition that theState Transport Authority's order of January 6, 1961, shouldbe quashed, because it purported to revise an order whichhad no existence in the eye of law. On a consideration ofall the circumstances, we do not think that the appellantcan now claim an order for quashing the State TransportAuthority's decision on this ground. In our opinion, itwould be proper, in the special circumstances of the case,to hold that the State Transport Authority could,immediately after June 28, 1960, when the order wascompleted by the notification treat the application forrevision made on April 13, 1960, pending before it on thedate of the notification, as an application for revision ofthe order as completed by the notification, and that, insubstance, the order of January 6, 1961, was an orderrevising-not the decision of the Regional TransportAuthority's order of December 4, 1959, but the RegionalTransport Authority's order fixing a new bus stand atPushkar, as completed by the notification of June 28, 1960.The other point which was brought to our notice during thearguments at the Bar is that396the order of the State Transport Authority dated January 6,1961, was made without compliance with the second proviso tos. 64 A. That proviso is in these words:
"Provided further that the State TransportAuthority shall not pass an order under thissection prejudicial to any person withoutgiving him a reasonable opportunity of beingheard."
This appears to us to make it necessary that before makingany revisional order under s. 64A the State TransportAuthority has to see that a person likely to be affected bythat revisional order receives notice of the matter and isgiven a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The requirementof this proviso was admittedly not complied with before theState Transport Authority made the order on January 6, 1961,in the present case. If the High Court's attention had beendrawn to this failure on the part of the State TransportAuthority to comply with this statutory requirement, we haveno doubt that the High Court would have felt compelled toquash the revisional order made.
Now, that we find that this statutory requirement was notcomplied with before the revisional order was made, we donot think it will be proper for us to ignore this infirmityin the order. It is true that the learned Attorney-Generalcontended that as soon as the Court accepts the plea thatthe revisional order challenged by the appellant by theirwrit petition is invalid for the reason that the appellateauthority did not comply with the provisions of S. 64A, thewrit petition ought to be allowed and no opportunity can orshould be given to the said authority to reconsider thematter. We are not impressed by this argument. We aresatisfied that in the circumstances of this case, we oughtto exercise our powers under Art. 142 of the Constitutionand397send the matter back to the revisional authority to be dealtwith in accordance with law, because there is no doubt thatby adopting this course full justice will be done betweenthe parties..
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and quash the StateTransport Authority's order made on January 6, 1961, anddirect that the application for revision of the RegionalTransport Authority's order as notified on June, 28, 1961,be disposed of by the State Transport Authority inaccordance with law after giving public notice of the matterand thereafter giving every person concerned in the matterwho wishes to be heard a reasonable opportunity of beingheard. In the circumstances of the case, we order that theparties will bear their own costs.
SARKAR,J--I have come to the conclusion that this appealshould be allowed.
The appellant is the Municipal Board of Pushkar in the Stateof Rajasthan. It passed a resolution sometime in 1958 thatthe bus stand near the Pushkar lake should be shifted towhat it considered a more suitable place. Now the power tofix bus stands was given to the Regional TransportAuthorities by r. 134 of the Rules framed by the RajasthanGovernment under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That ruleprovides as follows :
Rule 134. ""A Regional Transport Authority,by notifications in the Rajasthan Gazette, orby the erection of traffic signs which arepermitted for the purpose under sub section(1) of section 75 of the Act, or both, may, inrespect of the taking up or setting down ofpassengers or both, by public service vehiclesor by any specified class of public servicevehicles
(i) conditionally or unconditionally pro-
hibit the use of any specified place or of398any place of a specified nature or class, or
(ii) require that within the limits of anymunicipality or within such other limits asmay be specified in the notification, certainspecified stands or halting places only shallbe so used:
"
The appellant Municipality moved the Regional TransportAuthority, Jaipur, for making an order shifting the busstand to the place suggested by it. On December 3/4, 1959,the Regional Transport Authority passed a resolutionaccepting the appellant Municipality's proposal andproviding that the bus stand would be shifted to the placesuggested by the appellant Municipality and the old busstand would cease to be used as such but would only be usedas a bus stop. The resolution further provided that theappellant Municipality would provide certain facilities andthe new bus stand would start functioning after thefacilities had been provided.
Now s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act provides as follows:
S. 64A. "The State Transport Authoritymay, either on its own motion or on anapplication made to it, call for the record ofany case in which an order has been made by aRegional Transport Authority and in which noappeal lies, and if it appears to the StateTransport Authority that the order made by theRegional Transport Authority is improper or,illegal, the State Transport Authority maypass such order in relation to the case as itdeems fit :
Provided that the State Transport Authorityshall not entertain any application from a399person aggrieved by an order of a RegionalTransport Authority, unless the application ismade within thirty days from the date of theorderCertain bus operators of Pushkar who are respondents in thisappeal and whom I will refer to as the respondents, appliedto the State Transport Authority on April 13, 1960, under s.64A to quash the resolution of the Regional TransportAuthority of December 3/4, 1959. While this application waspending disposal by the State Transport Authority, theRegional Transport Authority issued a notification datedJune 28, 1960, finally declaring and notifying to the publicthe fixing of the new bus stand. This notification waspublished in the RajasthanGazette of July 14, 1960. Itappears that there wasthis delay in issuing thenotification of the Regional Transport Authority'snotification of December 3/4, 1959, because in the meantimetwo other persons had moved the State Transport Authorityunder s. 64A to quash that resolution and also because thefacilities which the appellant Municipality had beeddirected to provide had not till then been arranged for.That earlier petition under s. 64A was dismissed by theState Transport Authority on February 18, 1960, andthereafter the facilities required had been provided by theappellant Municipality. It is after all this that thenotification of June 28, 1960, had been issued. The respon-dent's petition under s. 64A was allowed by the StateTransport Authority by an order made on January 6, 1961. Bythat order the State Transport Authority directed that "thedecision passed by the R. T. A. dated 3/4 December 1959 andupheld by the STA on 18. 2. 1960 be set aside and cancelledand the old Bus stand shall continue to be recognised asOfficial Bus stand for the Pushkar Town."
400On February 10, 1961, the appellant Municipality filed apetition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the HighCourt of Rajasthan for a writ quashing the order of theState Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. This petitionwas dismissed by the High Court. The appellant has nowappealed to this Court against the decision of the HighCourt.
There were various points taken in support of this appeal,but I think that one of them must succeed and I propose inthis judgment to discuss that point only. It was said onbehalf of the appellant Municipality that there was an errorapparent on the face of the record because the respondents'petition to the State Transport Authority under s.. 64A hadbeen filed after the period of thirty days limited for thatpurpose by the proviso to that section. It was contended onbehalf of the respondents that this was not so for under s.64 A the period of thirty days had to be counted not fromthe date of the order-in this case the resolution ofDecember 3/4, 1959-but from the date when the respondentshad the knowledge. of that order. It was contended that ifthe period was counted from such date, then the petition waswithin time.
I do not think that under s. 64 A the period of thirty dayshas to be counted from the date that the party wishing tomove under that section comes to have knowledge of the'order sought to be set aside. My learned brother DasGupta, J., has in the judgment just delivered by himdiscussed this question and with his view on that point I amin entire agreement. It is unnecessary for me to discussthis question further. Therefore, it would appear that therespondents' petition under s. 64A to set aside the order ofDecember 3/4, 1959, was out of time and should have beendismissed. The State Transport Authority's decision that itwas not out of time because the period of thirty days has tobe counted from the date of the knowledge of the order was401patently erroneous and therefore the appellant should havebeen held entitled to the writ by the High Court ofRajasthan.
But it was then said that the date of the order of theRegional Transport Authority was not december 3/4, 1959, butJune 28, 1960.' This was presumably put on the ground thatthe order could and r. 134, earlier set out, be made bynotification and in this case the notification was made onJune 28, 1960. Under that rule a bus stand could be fixedby the erection of traffic signs also but I will leave thismethod out of consideration as it was not followed in thiscase. I have some doubt whether the contention that theorder mentioned in s. 64 A, is for the purpose of thepresent case, the order contained in the notification, is'right, but I will assume that to be so.
If the Regional Transport Authority's order was made, onlyon June 28, 1960, as the respondents contend, then theirapplication under s. 644 was not barred by limitation for infact it was made before that date. But that gives therespondents no advantage. They had by their petition unders. 64A asked that the Regional Transport Authority's orderof December 3/4, 1959, be quashed. Now, on the respondentsown argument, that order was not an order under s. 64 A atall and could not be set aside under that section.Therefore, again the order of the State Transport Authoritysetting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolutionof December 3/4 1959, was incompetent on the face of it.That resolution was exhypothesi not art order liable to berevised under s. 64A. The State Transport Authority's orderof January 6, 1961, was even off this basis patentlyerroneous and without jurisdiction and so liable to be setaside,. by a writ.
Then it was said that it was in the power of ,the State Transport Authority to treat the petition 402 under s. 64A filed on April 13,1960, and pending on June 28, 1960, the date of the notification, as an application to set aside the order contained in that notification. Now I do not think the State Transport Authority suo motu could do so. It is for thepetitioner to decide what relief he would ask in his application under s. 64A. The State Transport Authority could not against the wish of the petitioner alter his prayer. Here therespondents never asked, that their application under s.64A should be treated as an application to set aside the order contained in theNotification of June 28, 1960. However that may be, even if the State Transport Authority could treat the petition of April 13, 1960, as asking, for quashing of the Regional Transport Authority's order of June 28, 60, it did not in fact do so. This is evident from the State Transport Authority's order of January 6, 1961, where in considering the question of limitation it proceeds on the basis that the period of thirty days provided in s. 64A is to be counted , from the date of The knowledge of the.order which would be insensible if it had treated the petition as one to set aside the order of June 28, 1960. Nowhere in its judgment, of January 6, 1961, does the State Transport Authority refer to the notification of june 28, 1960. In the operative part of its order which I have earlier set out. it expressly set aside and cancelled the Regional Transport Authorities resolution of December 3/4, 1959, and it is only as consequential thereto that it stated that "'the old Bus stand shall continue." Even in their affidavit in opposition to the petition under Art. 226 the respondents themselves did, not make the case that the State Transport Authority had treated their application under s. 64A as ;In application to set aside the order contained in the notification of June 28 1960. In that affidavit they Stated, that the revision filed by; the respondents before the S.T.A. was within the prescribed time as the same was filed within about a week of 'the respondents knowledge of the R.T.A.'s 403 order." They clearly even then proceeded on the basis that their application under s. 64A had been an application to set aside the resolution of December 3/4, 1959,. No doubt the High Court did not accept the view that the period of thirty days provided by s. 64A has to be counted from the date of the knowledge of the order sought to be impugned. It said that it was the notification which was the source of the respondents' grievance and, therefore, their petition under S., 64A was, not out of time. The High Court wholly omitted. to notice that the petition asked nothing concerning the notification of June 28, 1960. Therefore, it seems to me that it is to no purpose to consider whether the State Transport Authority could treat the respondents petition under s. 64A as having been filed on or after June 28, 1960, to cancel the order contained in the notification of that date. In fact, it did not do so. It was neither for the High Court nor it is for this Court now to amend the application under s. 64A and treat it as one for sett ing aside the Regional Transport Authority's order contained in the notification of June 28, 1960. That application was never before either of these Courts. If the respondents. themselves had made an application for such a amendment, then the application would have been dismissed if on its date, thirty days from the date of the notification had passed. Now on the dates when the State Transport Authority and the High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty days so counted had passed. On those dates the respondents could not successfully ask for an amendment of their application under s. 64A. It, therefore, seems to me that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having been, made, on June 28, 1960, then the respondents' petition under s. 64A was incompetent because it sought anorder for setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolution of December 3/4, 1959 404 and under s. 64A that order could not be effected at All. in. my view, the appellant municipality was clearly entitled to a writ quashing "I order of the; State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961.
I would, therefore; allow the appeal with cost. By COURT By majority judgment the appeals are allowed and the matter sent back for disposal in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own Costs.
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