Mr. Ranvir Dewan vs Mrs. Rashmi Khanna

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 21784 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.32044/2016)

Mr. Ranvir Dewan ...Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Mrs. Rashmi Khanna & Anr. ….Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is filed by plaintiff No.1 against the

final judgment and order dated 13.07.2016 passed

by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at

New Delhi in R.F.A.(OS) No.147 of 2013 whereby the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL High Court dismissed the appeal filed by Plaintiff Date: 2017.12.12 15:36:37 IST Reason: 1 No.2 (since dead) and the appellant (plaintiff No.1)

herein and confirmed the judgment and order

dated 11.10.2013 of the Single Judge of the High

Court in C.S.(O.S.) No.1502 of 2010.

3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved

in the appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts of

the case.

4. The appellant is plaintiff No.1 whereas the

respondents are the defendants in a suit out of

which this appeal arises. The appellant is the

brother whereas respondent No.1 is the appellant’s

sister.

5. The dispute in this appeal is essentially

between the mother, brother(son) and the

sister(daughter). It relates to a residential house

consists of basement and two floors situated at D-

246, Defense Colony, New Delhi (hereinafter referred

to as the “suit house”).

2

6. Mr. B.R. Dewan was the sole owner of the suit

house. He had two wives-Mrs. Kamla Devi and

second - Mrs. Pritam. Out of wedlock with first wife

- Mrs. Kamla Devi, a son - Ashok was born whereas

out of wedlock with second wife -Mrs. Pritam, a son-

Ranvir-appellant and a daughter-Rashmi-

respondent No.1 were born. Mr. Dewan owned

moveable and immovable properties,

7. On 24.06.1984, Mr. Dewan executed a Will of

his properties (movables and immoveable). So far

as the suit house with which we are concerned in

this appeal, Mr. Dewan gave its ground floor to his

son-Ranvir Dewan exclusively whereas the first

floor, he gave exclusively to his daughter-Rashmi

Khanna.

8. So far as wife-Pritam was concerned, he gave

to her a “life interest” to reside in the suit house till

her death and also to recover the rent and utilize

the income earned by way of rent to maintain

3 herself and the suit house. He also gave her a right

to evict the tenants and induct the new ones.

9. The Will, in clear terms, recited that the wife -

Mrs. Pritam is given “life interest” in the suit house

and she will act as a trustee of its legal owners (son

and daughter) and utilize the income earned out of

it and on her death, by his son and daughter to

whom the suit house was given exclusively.

10. The Will also recited that Ranvir and Rashmi

would be free to get themselves assessed as owners

of their respective shares in the suit house in their

wealth tax assessment cases on the death of Mr.

Dewan.

11. Mr. Dewan then gave his share in HUF

property - B.R. Dewan & sons which consists of a

plot at Ghaziabad, bank balances, shares,

debentures, fixed deposits and all household

articles exclusively to his wife –Mrs. Pritam. He also

made provision for his first wife-Kamla Devi for her

4 maintenance to pay Rs.500/- per month to her

during her life time.

12. In this manner, Mr. Dewan made disposition of

his entire moveable and immoveable property in the

Will. In the last, he expressed that he has executed

the Will with a hope that there would be no dispute

and litigation amongst his family members qua the

properties on his death.

13. On 16.09.1984, Mr. Dewan expired. Mrs.

Pritam - second wife of late Mr. Dewan then applied

for grant of probate of the Will dated 26.04.1984.

The Competent Court granted the probate on

12.10.1987. It was followed by the consequential

order dated 05.01.1989 to enable the parties to give

effect to the Will. The son and daughter accordingly

got their names mutated in the municipal records

as owners of their respective shares in the suit

house.

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14. Contrary to the testator’s hope, soon after his

demise, the disputes started between the mother

and son on one side and the daughter on the other

side. Initially, parties sat together and decided to

develop the suit house by making some

additions/alterations and accordingly entered in

family settlement followed by an agreement with the

developers/builders to develop the suit house.

15. However, the disputes could not be settled

amicably and instead got precipitated. The disputes

were essentially centered around to their inter se

ownership rights over the suit house including its

nature, their shares, income earned from the suit

house and the newly constructed 3rd floor and who

should receive it and lastly, ownership rights over

the 3rd floor.

16. Mrs. Pritam-mother and Ranvir-son then

jointly filed a suit being O.S. No.1502/2010 against

the daughter/sister - Rashmi and the developer on

6 the original side of the High Court at New Delhi out

of which this appeal arises and claimed following

reliefs:

“(i) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, successors and any third party claiming through them from creating any/any further third party rights in respect of the 2nd and 3rd floors of the property bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(ii) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of declaration that the alleged tenancy agreement dated 7 th July, 2010 executed by Defendant No.01 in favour of Defendant No.02 are illegal, null and void and of no effect.

(iii) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of declaration that the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental, the security deposit all other incomes accruing from the 2nd floor of the property bearing No.D-246 Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(iv) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of declaration that the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental, the security deposit and all other income accruing from the 3rd floor of the property bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.

(v) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of declaration that the Plaintiff No.01 is entitled to absolute

7 rights over the 3rd floor and roof rights of the 3rd floor apart from the Basement and Ground Floor of the property bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.”

17. Though the plaint runs into several pages and

seeks to claim five reliefs but, in substance, the

controversy centered around to relief No.(v) only.

18. According to the plaintiff, Mrs. Pritam (wife)

was entitled to seek a declaration that she is the

absolute owner of the suit house including its 3 rd

floor. It was alleged that her “life interest” was

enlarged and ripened into an absolute interest by

virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) on the death of

her husband. Though the plaint contains several

other averments but they need not be stated herein

being unnecessary to examine the issue relating to

grant of relief No. (v).

19. Respondent No.1 (defendant No.1) filed the

written statement. While denying the plaintiffs’

8 claim, it was contended that plaintiff No.2-Mrs.

Pritam did not acquire absolute interest in the suit

house and nor her “life interest” was enlarged and

ripened into an absolute interest by virtue of

Section 14 (1) of the Act. It was contended that

plaintiff No.2 received only “life interest” to live in

the suit house during her lifetime in terms of the

Will and, therefore, such right squarely falls under

Section 14(2) of the Act. It was contended that so

far as respondent No.1 is concerned, she acquired

an absolute ownership right in the first floor of the

suit house on the strength of clear recitals in the

Will.

20. The Single Judge framed the issues. Parties

adduced their evidence. By judgment/decree dated

11.10.2013, the suit was dismissed. It was held

that Mrs. Pritam received only “life interest” in the

suit house. In other words, it was held that the

plaintiffs’ case falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act.

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21. Felt aggrieved, plaintiffs filed first appeal

bearing R.F.A. (OS) No.147 of 2013 before the

Division Bench of the High Court. By impugned

judgment dated 13.07.2016, the Division Bench

dismissed the appeal and upheld the

judgment/decree of the Single Judge giving rise to

filing the present appeal by way of special leave by

plaintiff No.1 in this Court.

22. Heard Mr. Guru Krishan Kumar, learned

senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. K.

Ramamoorthy, learned counsel for respondent No.1

and Mr. S.S. Jauhar, learned counsel for

respondent No.2.

23. Mr. Guru Krishan Kumar, learned senior

counsel for the appellant while assailing the legality

and correctness of the impugned judgment

reiterated the same submissions, which were urged

unsuccessfully before the Courts below.

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24. His main submission was that the appellant’s

case squarely falls under Section 14(1) of the Act,

which confers on Mrs. Pritam the absolute right of

ownership over the suit house.

25. Elaborating the submission, learned counsel

urged that since the wife is entitled in law to claim

maintenance from her husband even prior to and

also after coming into force of the Act, it is in

recognition of this pre-recognized right when the

husband gave a “life interest” through Will, the

same got enlarged and ripened into an absolute

right by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Act. It is

essentially this submission, which was elaborated

by the learned counsel with reference to decided

cases.

26. In reply, Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior

counsel for respondent No.1 while supporting the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two

Courts below contended that the same is in

11 accordance with the law and does not call for any

interference.

27. According to learned counsel, as rightly held

by the two Courts below, the appellant's case

squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act.

28. Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find no merit in the appeal. In our view, the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two

Courts is just and proper and being in accordance

with law does not call for any interference.

29. Before we proceed to decide the appeal on

merits, we may take a note of one subsequent event,

which occurred during the pendency of this

litigation. It is the death of wife-Mrs. Pritam

(plaintiff No.2) on 12.09.2016. She left behind her

two legal representatives, namely, appellant, i.e.,

son and respondent No.1, i.e., daughter. Both being

Class I heirs would succeed to their mother's estate

12 in equal share, if she has died intestate. However, if

she has made any testamentary disposition of her

estate in favour of any person then subject to

proving the claim in accordance with law by the

person(s) concerned, the disposition of her estate

would take place accordingly.

30. We, however, express no opinion on any of

these issues because, in our view, it is not the

subject matter of this appeal and leave the parties

to work out their inter se rights, if any, in

accordance with law in the estate of Mrs. Pritam in

appropriate forum as and when occasion so arises.

31. The main question, which arises for

consideration in this appeal, is whether two Courts

below were justified in holding that the case of

appellant, i.e. Mrs. Pritam falls under Section 14 (2)

of the Act thereby she continued to enjoy only the

“life interest” in the suit house.

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32. In other words, the question arises for

consideration in this appeal is, what is the true

nature of the right received by Mrs. Pritam in the

suit house through Will dated 24.08.1986 from her

husband, viz., "absolute" by virtue of Section 14 (1)

of the Act or "life interest" by virtue of Section 14 (2)

of the Act.

33. In order to decide the question as to whether

the appellant’s case falls under Section 14 (1) or (2)

of the Act, it is necessary to first examine as to what

is the true nature of the estate held by the testator.

Second, what the testator had intended and actually

bequeathed to his wife by his Will; and lastly, the

right in the property received by Mrs. Pritam, viz.,

absolute interest by virtue of sub-section (1) or “life

interest” by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of

the Act.

34. Coming now to the facts of the case, it is not in

dispute that the suit house was the self-acquired

14 property of late Mr. Dewan. It is also not in dispute

as one can take it from reading the contents of Will

that Mr. Dewan had intended to give only “life

interest" to his wife in the suit house, which he gave

to her for the first time by way of disposition of his

estate independent of her any right. It is also not in

dispute that it was confined to a right of residence

to live in the suit house during her lifetime and to

use the income earned from the suit house to

maintain herself and the suit house. It is also not

in dispute that the testator gave to his son ground

floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter

with absolute right of ownership. The testator also

permitted both of them to get their names mutated

in the municipal records as absolute owners and

also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax

assessment cases.

35. So far as other properties, viz., one plot at

Ghaziabad, share in HUF and moveable properties

15 were concerned, Mr. Dewan gave these properties to

Mrs. Pritam-his wife absolutely.

36. It is a settled principle of law that what the

testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his

Will has to be gathered primarily by reading the

recitals of the Will only.

37. As mentioned above, reading of the Will would

go to show that it does not leave any kind of

ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to

how and in what manner and with what rights, the

testator wished to give to three of his legal

representatives his self acquired properties and how

he wanted to make its disposition.

38. Law relating to interpretation of Section 14 (1)

and (2) of the Act is fairly well settled by series of

decisions of this Court. However, the discussion on

the interpretation of Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act

can never be complete without mentioning the first

leading decision of this Court in V. Tulasamma &

16 Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) by L.Rs. (1977) 3 SCC

99. In this decision, Their Lordships (Three Judge

Bench) interpreted succinctly sub-sections (1) and

(2) of Section 14 of the Act and then on facts

involved in that case held that the case falls under

Section 14(1) of the Act. This decision is referred by

this Court in every subsequent case dealing with

the issue relating to Section 14 of the Act and then

after explaining its ratio has applied the same to the

facts of each case to find out as to whether the case

on hand attracts Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act.

Indeed, we find that attempts were made in past for

reconsideration of the law laid down in V.

Tulasamma (supra), but this Court consistently

turned down the request. (see-Gullapalli Krishna

Das vs. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Anr. (1978)

1 SCC 67, Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. vs.

Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., (1979) 3 SCC 300

and Thota Sesharathamma & Anr. vs. Thota

17 Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1991) 4

SCC 312 ).

39. In the case of V. Tulasamma(supra), the

learned Judge, Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali,

speaking for the Bench, succinctly and in a lucid

manner while analyzing the true scope of Section

14(1) and (2) of the Act held as under :

“Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that ‘property’ includes both movable and immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the socio-economic ends, namely, to enlarge her limited interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.

18 Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no application and the female’s limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

19 The use of terms like ‘property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of maintenance’, or ‘arrears of maintenance’ etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2).

The words ‘restricted estate’ in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.” .

40. Similarly, while explaining the ratio of V.

Tulasamma (supra) and how one has to read the

ratio for being applied to the facts of a particular

case, this Court in the case of Sadhu Singh vs.

Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 75

again succinctly discussed the applicability of

Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Act and on facts

involved therein held that the facts involved would

attract Section 14(2) of the Act. Justice

Balasubramanyan speaking for two Judge Bench

held in paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under: 20

“13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition

21 taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression “property possessed by a female Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.

15. Dealing with the legal position established by the decisions in Tulasamma1 and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai13 the position regarding the application of Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hindu Law thus:

“Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be

22 governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.”(See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)”

41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law

laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu

Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section

14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where

property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first

time as a grant without any pre-existing right,

under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or

award, the terms of which prescribe a “restricted

estate” in the property. Where, however, property is

acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu

of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a

pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not

be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of

the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or

award allotting the property prescribes a “restricted

estate” in the property.

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42. Applying the principle laid down in the

aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on

hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case

of plaintiff No.2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall under

Section 14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under

Section 14 (2) of the Act. In other words, in our

view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in

Sadhu Singh’s case(supra) would apply.

43. A fortorari, plaintiff No.2-late Mrs.Pritam

received only “life interest” in the suit house by the

Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and

such “life interest” was neither enlarged nor ripened

into an absolute interest in the suit house and

remained “life interest”, i.e., “restricted estate” till

her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we

say for following factual reasons arising in the case.

44. First, the testator-Mr.Dewan being the

exclusive owner of the suit house was free to

24 dispose of his property the way he liked because it

was his self earned property.

45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in

absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and

conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same

time, he gave only “life interest” to his wife, i.e., a

right to live in the suit house which belonged to son

and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could

make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section

30 of the Act.

46. Third, such “life interest” was in the nature of

“restricted estate” under Section 14(2) of the Act

which remained a “restricted estate” till her death

and did not ripen into an “absolute interest” under

Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the

case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes

out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law

because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section

14(1) of the Act.

25

47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became

operational after the death of testator, the son and

the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the

suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the

wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of

right. In other words, the wife became entitled in

law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua

her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for

any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was

entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but

not beyond it. However, such was not the case

here.

48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other

properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her

to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim

maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife.

She, however, never did it and rightly so because

both were living happily. There was, therefore, no

26 occasion for her to demand any kind of

maintenance from her husband.

49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the

“life interest” means an interest which determines

on the termination of life. It is incapable of being

transferred by such person to others being personal

in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the

“life interest” only during his/her lifetime which is

extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case

here. Her “life interest” in the suit house was

extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.

50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the

case on hand and the one involved in the case of

Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat

similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were

that the husband executed a Will in favour of his

wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though

he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties

bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her

27 right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it

was mentioned in the Will that the said properties

after wife’s death would go to testator’s nephew.

Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his

wife’s right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the

wife received only the “life interest” in the properties

by Will and such “life interest”, being a “restricted

estate” within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the

Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute

interest under Section 14(1) but remained a “life

interest” i.e. “restricted estate” under Section 14(2)

of the Act. It was held that such disposition made

by the husband in favour of his wife was

permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read

with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of

the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu

Singh’s case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully

covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singh's

case.

28

51. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that there is no error in the

impugned judgment, which has rightly held that the

case of Mrs. Pritam (Plaintiff No.2) falls under

Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the

suit house.

52. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal,

which thus fails and is accordingly dismissed.

…........................................J. [R.K. AGRAWAL]

...……..................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi;

December 12, 2017

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