Mr Christopher Charles Kamolins vs Union Of India

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU ® DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ WRIT PETITION NO. 26412 OF 2019 (GM-RES) BETWEEN

MR CHRISTOPHER CHARLES KAMOLINS S/O CHARLES VICTOR KAMOLINS AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, CURRENTLY RESIDING AT NO.142, TOWER 3, PEBBLE BAY, FIRST MAIN ROAD, DOLLARS COLONY, RMV 2ND STAGE, SANJAY NAGAR, BENGALURU-560094

...PETITIONER

(BY SRI. K.G. RAGHAVAN SR. ADVOCATE FOR SRI. ANIND THOMAS., ADVOCATE)

AND

Digitally signed UNION OF INDIA by SHWETHA BY THE FOREIGN REGIONAL REGISTRATION OFFICER, RAGHAVENDRA FOREIGN REGIONAL REGISTRATION OFFICE, Location: HIGH COURT OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, KARNATAKA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, 5TH FLOOR, A-BLOCK, TTMC, BMTC BUS STAND BUILDING, SHANTHI NAGAR, K.H.ROAD, BANGALORE-560027

.... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. K. ARAVIND KAMATH., ASGI., FOR SRI. ADITYA SINGH., CGC )

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF -2- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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CERTIORARI QUASHING THE LEAVE INDA NOTICE DATED MAY 1, 2019, BEARING REFERENCE NO. 03/FM/BOI/2019-LIN-162, PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A TO THIS PETITION AND ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 16.12.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

CAV ORDER

1. The petitioner who is an Australian national/citizen is

before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

i. Issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the Leave India Notice dated May 1, 2019 bearing reference No. 03/FM/BOI/2019-LIN-162, produced as Annexure-A to the petition.

ii. Issue a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent not to take any further action pursuant to the Leave India Notice produced at Annexure-A and to reverse any action that may have been taken pursuant to the said Leave India Notice; and

iii. Grant any other relief that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit having regard to the facts and circumstances of this Case, in the interests of justice and equity.

2. The petitioner is an Australian citizen holding a valid

Australian passport. He asserts that he was granted

an Employment Visa (E-2) on 08.01.2018, permitting -3- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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multiple entries into India and valid until 07.01.2020.

The said visa was issued on the basis of his proposed

employment as General Manager of Fisher and

Paykel Health Care India Private Limited, an Indian

subsidiary of Fisher and Paykel Health Care Limited,

a New Zealand-based multinational corporation with

operations in 36 countries and distribution of its

products in over 125 countries worldwide.

3. The company is engaged in the manufacturing,

design, and marketing of medical devices used in

respiratory care, acute care, and the treatment of

obstructive sleep apnea. It is stated that the

company has been operating in India since 2008. The

petitioner was appointed as General Manager with

effect from 01.02.2018 pursuant to an appointment

letter dated 11.12.2017.

4. According to the petitioner, prior to his appointment,

the Indian operations of the company were headed

by an Indian national who functioned as Resident -4- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Director and was responsible for managing business

operations within the country. It is alleged that

during that tenure, the company experienced

significant performance challenges, including high

attrition rates, particularly within its sales team,

adversely affecting overall business performance.

5. The petitioner asserts that the company undertook

an internal review or study to analyse the causes of

attrition and operational decline. It is claimed that

this review revealed that certain members of the

senior management were engaged in practices

inconsistent with the company's global ethics,

principles, and corporate culture. Consequently, the

services of the concerned senior management

personnel were discontinued.

6. It is in this background that the petitioner was

appointed as General Manager. The company

contends that the petitioner possessed the requisite

mix of experience, technical knowledge, and -5- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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familiarity with the company's global business

standards necessary to stabilise operations and align

the Indian entity with international corporate

practices. It is further asserted that prior to

appointing the petitioner, the company conducted

enquiries to identify a suitable Indian candidate for

the position, but none was found to meet the

required qualifications and experience. On that basis,

the petitioner's appointment was finalised and the

Employment Visa was obtained.

7. Subsequently, on 11.07.2018, the Respondent,

Foreign Regional Registration Officer (FRRO)

addressed an email to the company seeking details

regarding the employment status of three former

Indian employees, two of whom were part of the

earlier senior management, and also sought

information regarding foreign nationals employed by

the company. The company responded on

26.07.2018 stating that the three former employees -6- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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had resigned or separated in accordance with the

terms of their appointment.

8. Thereafter, on or about 25.07.2018, the FRRO again

called upon the company to furnish detailed

particulars regarding the employment of the

petitioner and another expatriate employee. The

company claims to have submitted a response to the

said query. Several further communications were

exchanged between the FRRO and the company in

the ensuing months.

9. Ultimately, on 19.06.2019, a Leave India Notice

(LIN) was issued to the petitioner directing him not

to remain in India. It is the legality and validity of

the said Leave India Notice that is challenged in the

present writ petition, in which the petitioner seeks

the reliefs prayed for.

10. Sri.K.G.Raghavan, learned senior counsel appearing

for the Petitioner would submit that: -7- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.1. There being no eligible or suitably qualified

Indian candidate available for appointment to

the post of General Manager, the petitioner was

selected for the said position. It is contended

that the company had furnished all requisite

particulars and documentation to the

competent authorities at the time of seeking

the Employment Visa. Upon scrutiny of the

material placed before it, the High Commission

of India at Canberra granted the Employment

Visa (E-2) in favour of the petitioner. Once such

approval had been accorded by the competent

visa-issuing authority, the same could not,

according to the petitioner, be effectively

nullified by the FRRO through issuance of a

Leave India Notice (LIN), which in substance

amounts to cancellation of the Employment

Visa. -8- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.2. The company had, prior to the petitioner's

appointment, experienced operational

instability under the earlier Indian

management, including high attrition rates in

the sales division, which adversely impacted

business continuity and client relationships. It is

submitted that these difficulties were attributed

to deviations from the group's global standards,

corporate ethics and management systems. In

order to restore organisational stability, the

services of the then General Manager and

certain senior employees were discontinued. In

that background, the petitioner was appointed,

he being familiar with the group's global

operations and culture.

10.3. In support of the petitioner's candidature, it is

submitted that he is an Australian citizen

possessing a Bachelor's degree in Nursing and a

Graduate Certificate in Critical Care Nursing. He -9- NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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had served the parent organisation for over

twelve years and possessed, according to the

company, the necessary technical proficiency,

managerial experience and institutional

familiarity to stabilise Indian operations,

restructure workflows and train local staff. It is

emphasised that no Indian candidate with

comparable expertise and organisational

exposure was available at the relevant time.

10.4. It is contended that while applying for the

Employment Visa, the company submitted a

detailed justification letter dated 14.12.2017 to

the High Commission of India at Canberra. The

letter set out the petitioner's qualifications,

experience and the reasons necessitating the

appointment of a foreign national, including the

assertion that no comparably experienced

Indian candidate was available. Upon

consideration of the said material, the - 10 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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competent authority granted the Employment

Visa on 08.01.2018, valid for multiple entries

until 07.01.2020. Upon arrival in India, the

petitioner registered with the FRRO on

09.02.2018 and was issued a Registration

Certificate/Residential Permit, which was

thereafter renewed upon compliance with the

applicable statutory norms.

10.5. It is submitted that during the year 2018,

certain queries were raised by the FRRO with

respect to the petitioner's employment and

other related matters. In response, the

company furnished what it describes as

comprehensive particulars, including

documentation evidencing the petitioner's

professional expertise and indispensability.

Despite this, the FRRO issued a Leave India

Notice, dated 01.05.2019, which was served

upon the petitioner on 19.06.2019. It is the - 11 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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petitioner's grievance that the said notice was

issued without assigning reasons and without

affording him any opportunity of hearing.

10.6. The LIN is arbitrary and procedurally improper.

It is contended that the petitioner was not put

on notice nor granted an opportunity to explain

his position prior to the issuance of the LIN,

thereby violating principles of natural justice. It

is further pointed out that a show-cause notice

was subsequently issued to the company on

04.06.2019 alleging that the petitioner had

fraudulently obtained the Employment Visa in

breach of visa norms.

10.7. Emphasis is laid on the sequence of dates. The

LIN is dated 01.05.2019 and was served on

19.06.2019, whereas the show-cause notice to

the company was issued only on 04.06.2019. It

is argued that there is no reference to the LIN

in the show-cause notice, which, according to - 12 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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the petitioner, indicates that the latter was an

afterthought. The petitioner submits that a

reply to the show-cause notice was promptly

furnished by the company on 20.06.2019

refuting the allegations. On this basis, it is

contended that the issuance of the LIN prior to

the show-cause notice demonstrates pre-

determination and non-application of mind on

the part of the FRRO.

10.8. It is further argued that the petitioner's

employment was valid, his selection was lawful,

and the documentation submitted to the visa-

issuing authority had been duly examined and

accepted. The Employment Visa having been

issued by the High Commission of India at

Canberra, it is submitted that the FRRO, by

issuing the LIN, has in effect sought to

overreach or override the decision of the visa-

issuing authority, which is impermissible in law. - 13 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.9. The petitioner asserts that the LIN was issued

arbitrarily and without issuance of any prior

show-cause notice to him personally. No

opportunity of hearing was afforded to him

before directing him to leave the country. Such

action, it is submitted, violates the principles of

natural justice and fair procedure.

10.10. On the aforesaid grounds, learned Senior

Counsel submits that the Leave India Notice is

liable to be quashed as being arbitrary,

violative of natural justice, issued without

jurisdiction, and unsustainable in law.

10.11. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Hasan Ali Raihany v. Union of

India1, more particularly Paras 1, 6, 7 and 8

thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for

easy reference:

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner prays for issuance of a writ of mandamus quashing the order cancelling the residence visa permit by order dated 7-10-2005. He has

1 (2006) 3 SCC 705 - 14 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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also prayed for directions to the respondent to produce the papers relating to grant of Indian citizenship to him by naturalisation. He further prays that this Court may issue a writ of certiorari quashing and setting aside the oral direction or order of deportation passed by the respondents and allow the petitioner to enter the Indian territory.

6. The question that arises for consideration is whether the authorities intend to deport him again and if so, whether they are obliged to disclose to the petitioner the reasons for his proposed deportation.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh [(1996) 1 SCC 742] and particularly to the principles laid down in para 19 thereof and submitted that the petitioner cannot be thrown out of this country having regard to the fact that he was born in this country and lived here for many years and his application for grant of Indian citizenship is still pending. It is not as if he has entered the territory of India stealthily with any ulterior objective and, therefore, it is only proper, even though he is not an Indian citizen, that he should at least be informed of the reasons why he is sought to be deported, and his representation if any in this regard considered. The learned Additional Solicitor General has fairly brought to our notice the principles laid down by this Court in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India [(2005) 5 SCC 665] . This Court in para 75 of the report has observed as follows: (SCC p. 720)

"Like the power to refuse admission this is regarded as an incident of the State's territorial sovereignty. International law does not prohibit the expulsion en masse of aliens. (p. 351) Reference has also been made to Article 13 of the International Covenant of 1966 on Civil and Political Rights which provides that an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party to the Covenant may be expelled only pursuant to a decision reached by law, and except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, is to be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by and to be represented for the purpose before the competent authority. It is important to note that this Covenant of 1966 would apply provided an alien is lawfully in India, namely, with valid passport, visa, etc. and not to those who have entered illegally or unlawfully." (emphasis in original) - 15 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly, having regard to the fact that the petitioner has entered this country legally upon the single entry permit issued to him, it is only fair that the competent authority must inform him the reasons for his deportation. If such a decision is taken, the petitioner must be given an opportunity to submit his representation against his proposed expulsion. The competent authority may thereafter consider his representation and pass appropriate order. As observed by this Court, this procedure may be departed from for compelling reasons of national security, etc. In the instant case, we have not so far noticed any fact which may provide a compelling reason for the State not to observe this procedure.

10.12. Learned Senior Counsel, placing reliance on the

decision in Hasan Ali Raihany, submits that

before a person is directed to leave the country

or deported, the reasons forming the basis of

such action must be communicated to him,

particularly where the individual had entered

the country lawfully and in accordance with due

procedure. It is contended that deportation or

an order directing a foreign national not to

remain in India carries serious civil

consequences and therefore must conform to

the minimum standards of fairness and

transparency. - 16 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.13. It is further urged that the jurisprudence

emerging from the said decision recognises only

a limited exception to the requirement of

disclosure of reasons, namely, where

compelling considerations of national security

or public interest justify non-disclosure. In the

absence of such exceptional circumstances, the

affected individual must be informed of the

grounds so as to enable him to effectively

respond or seek appropriate remedies.

10.14. In the present case, it is submitted, there is no

allegation of threat to national security, public

order, or sovereignty of the State. The sole

basis for issuance of the Leave India Notice is

stated to be alleged irregularity or impropriety

in the procurement of the Employment Visa.

Such an allegation, according to the petitioner,

does not fall within the narrow category of - 17 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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cases where reasons may be legitimately

withheld.

10.15. It is therefore contended that the impugned

LIN, having been issued without furnishing

reasons and without affording an opportunity of

hearing, is contrary to established principles of

fairness and procedural propriety. The

petitioner submits that where entry was legal

and registration formalities were complied with,

expulsion without disclosure of reasons cannot

be sustained in law.

10.16. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi

High Court in the case of Mohd. Javed v.

Union of India2, more particularly paras 1, 25,

26, 27, 35, 37 and 42, which are reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

1. By the present appeal filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Delhi High Court, the appellants Mohd. Javed (appellant No. 1) and Nausheen Naz (appellant No. 2)

2 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8741 - 18 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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impugn order dated 28.02.2019 made by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 1835/2019, whereby the single Judge has been pleased to dismiss the writ petition, thereby upholding the 'Leave India Notice' dated 07.02.2019 issued by respondent No. 2 through the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, New Delhi ('Notice', for short) directing appellant No. 2 to leave India within 15 days of receipt of the Notice, that is by 22.02.2019.

25. Much as the Ministry states in short affidavit dated 10.04.2019 that:

"... Based on these inputs, the Central Govt. has arrived at a conclusion that the Appellant No. 2 has to be served with a "Leave India Notice" in the interest of the security of the nation."

26. We find no reasoning or basis for the Central Government to have arrived at the conclusion as the Ministry says above, nor any basis for perceiving a threat to national security.

27. We have recorded the above only to say that the overall facts and circumstances of the case, including in particular, the conduct of the Ministry and the authorities, do not inspire confidence or persuade us to believe that Nausheen is a persona non grata.

35. We must also remind ourselves that our country is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR', for short) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19.12.1966, Articles 13, 17, 23 and 24 whereof read as under:

"Article 13. An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the competent authority.

XXXXX

"Article 17.

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or - 19 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

XXXXX

"Article 23.

1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

2. xxxxx

3. xxxxx

4. xxxxx

Article 24.

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality"

37. In the present case, the mandate of Articles 13, 17 and 23 have been thrown to the winds. The record does not reveal that Nausheen has indulged in any unlawful conduct, unfriendly activity or offensive act. Even upon perusal of the 'inputs' received from the Intelligence Bureau, as shared by the Ministry with the court, no such act or omission is discernible as would warrant unilateral, peremptory action by the Ministry.

42. In the backdrop of the above administrative and legal contours, the position that emerges is the following:

(a) Nausheen's LTV is valid until 08.06.2020. As of date, she has also applied for citizenship in India, which application is pending with the authorities;

(b) No notice, order or communication has ever been issued to Nausheen by the Ministry or by any other authority - 20 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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calling upon her to show cause against any alleged breach or violation of any terms or conditions of her LTV;

(c) Nausheen's LTV has never been cancelled;

(d) The Ministry's decision, as also the decision of the single Judge, against Nausheen's continued residence in India are based upon intelligence 'inputs' which, in our view, do not disclose matters that are egregious enough nor do they disclose a proximate or causal link between what is stated in the 'inputs' and the issuance of the Notice;

(e) While the single Judge proceeds on the essential basis of Nausheen being an alien who has no 'right' to continue to reside in India, that view omits to note that being the mother of two children who are Indian citizens and the wife of an Indian citizen, directing Nausheen to leave the country would break-up the family and would thereby be a serious infraction of the rights of at least three Indian citizens, namely the husband and the two sons aged 6 and 11 years, to live as a family. It bears mention that appellant/petitioner No. 1 in these proceedings is Mohd. Javed, an Indian citizen;

(f) In our view, the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India would include the right of young children to live with their mother and the right of a husband to consortium with his wife; and State entities cannot be permitted to deprive Nausheen's sons and husband of these rights, merely by a stroke of the pen, in a manner that smacks of authoritarianism, without authority of law and without complying with basic tenets of natural justice and without affording her an opportunity of hearing to answer any matter alleged against her;

(g) While grant of a visa in the first instance may be a matter of pure discretion with the authorities, curtailing the liberty of residing in the country during the validity of an LTV cannot be permitted except by a reasoned decision, as has been held by the Supreme Court in Hasan Ali Raihany (supra) and by a Division Bench of this court in Mohammad Sediq (supra);

(h) If, as contended by the Ministry in affidavit dated 10.04.2019, it derives the power to regulate the entry, stay and exit of a foreign national from India inter-alia from Section 3 of the Foreigners Act 1946, then a fortiori such power can never be untrammelled or unregulated since law abhors absolutism and arbitrariness; - 21 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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(i) What is under consideration here is not Nausheen's 'right' to stay in the country so much as the entitlement of the Ministry to act with manifest arbitrariness in directing Nausheen to leave the country in spite of a valid and subsisting visa that she holds.

10.17. Placing reliance upon Mohd. Javed, learned

Senior Counsel reiterates that before directing a

person to leave the country, particularly one

who has entered lawfully and holds a valid visa,

the authority must furnish reasons and afford

an opportunity of hearing. He submits that the

right to travel and reside, though subject to

statutory regulation, is intertwined with the

broader protection of life and personal liberty

under Article 21 of the Constitution. In Mohd.

Javed, the Court considered the impact of

expulsion upon family life and recognised that

arbitrary executive action affecting residence

during the currency of a visa cannot be

sustained without due process. - 22 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.18. It is therefore argued that the power vested in

the FRRO under the Foreigners Act cannot be

exercised in an unguided, uncanalised or

untrammelled manner. According to the

petitioner, the statute does not confer absolute

authority to virtually cancel a visa issued by the

High Commission through the mechanism of a

Leave India Notice. The absence of a prior

show-cause notice to the petitioner before

issuance of the LIN is emphasised. It is

contended that the subsequent issuance of a

show-cause notice to the company, after the

LIN had already been issued, cannot cure the

initial procedural defect or validate what is

described as a predetermined action.

10.19. On this basis, learned Senior Counsel submits

that the impugned Leave India Notice is vitiated

for want of reasons, violation of natural justice, - 23 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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and arbitrary exercise of statutory power, and

therefore deserves to be quashed.

10.20. The notices which have been issued to the

company are different from that to be issued to

the petitioner to whom the LIN has been

issued. In this regard, he relies upon the

decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Canara

Bank v. Debasis Das3, more particularly

paras 15, 16 and 19 thereof, which are

reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found

3 (2003) 4 SCC 557 - 24 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate, interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works [(1863) 143 ER 414 : 14 CBNS 180 : (1861-73) All ER Rep Ext 1554] the principle was thus stated : (ER p. 420)

"[E]ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam' (says God), 'where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof, I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?' "

Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond.

16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.

19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression "civil consequences" encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. - 25 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.21. By relying on Debasis Das he submits that the

doctrine of audi alteram partem, has been

elaborated by holding that notice is the

foundational limb of natural justice. Such notice

must be precise, unambiguous and

determinative of the case that the affected

party is required to meet. Adequate time must

be afforded to enable representation. In the

absence of proper notice and opportunity, any

adverse order stands vitiated.

10.22. Learned Senior Counsel also refers to the

observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that

natural justice is not confined to judicial

proceedings alone but extends to administrative

actions having civil consequences. The

expression "civil consequences" has been

interpreted expansively to include infraction of

civil liberties, material deprivation and even - 26 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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non-pecuniary injury affecting a person's civil

life.

10.23. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid principles,

learned Senior Counsel submits that the

issuance of a Leave India Notice unquestionably

entails civil consequences. It affects the

petitioner's right to reside in the country during

the currency of a valid visa, disrupts his

employment, and impacts his personal and

professional standing. Such action, even if

characterised as administrative, must conform

to the minimum standards of fairness

mandated by natural justice.

10.24. It is contended that no notice was issued to the

petitioner prior to the issuance of the Leave

India Notice. No opportunity was granted to

him to explain his position or rebut the

allegations underlying the impugned action.

According to the petitioner, the subsequent - 27 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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show-cause notice issued to the employer

cannot cure the initial procedural defect nor

substitute the requirement of a personal

hearing where adverse civil consequences are

directed against him.

10.25. Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits that,

in view of the ratio laid down in Debasis Das,

the impugned Leave India Notice stands

vitiated for failure to comply with the

foundational requirement of notice and hearing

and is liable to be set aside on that ground

alone.

10.26. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in CCE v. Brindavan Beverages (P)

Ltd4., more particularly para 14 thereof, which

is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

14. There is no allegation of the respondents being parties to any arrangement. In any event, no material in that regard was placed on record. The show-cause notice is the foundation on which the Department has to build up its case. If the allegations in the show-

4 (2007) 5 SCC 388 - 28 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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cause notice are not specific and are on the contrary vague, lack details and/or unintelligible that is sufficient to hold that the noticee was not given proper opportunity to meet the allegations indicated in the show-cause notice. In the instant case, what the appellant has tried to highlight is the alleged connection between the various concerns. That is not sufficient to proceed against the respondents unless it is shown that they were parties to the arrangements, if any. As no sufficient material much less any material has been placed on record to substantiate the stand of the appellant, the conclusions of the Commissioner as affirmed by cegat cannot be faulted.

10.27. By relying on Brindavan Beverages's case,

he submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the said decision has held that a show-cause

notice constitutes the very foundation of the

case sought to be built by the authority. If the

allegations in such notice are vague, lacking in

particulars, or unintelligible, the noticee cannot

be said to have been afforded a proper

opportunity to meet the case against him. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the absence

of specific allegations supported by material,

any consequential order would stand vitiated - 29 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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for failure to comply with principles of natural

justice.

10.28. He draws attention to the observation of the

Supreme Court that mere assertions or broad

allegations without substantive material are

insufficient to proceed against a party. The

notice must clearly set out the factual basis, the

nature of alleged contravention, and the role

attributed to the noticee so as to enable an

effective defence.

10.29. Relying on the aforesaid principles, learned

Senior Counsel submits that even the show-

cause notice issued in the present case suffers

from vagueness and absence of particulars. It is

contended that neither the petitioner nor the

company was clearly apprised of the specific

allegations that they were required to meet.

According to him, the notice merely makes

broad assertions regarding alleged violations of - 30 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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visa norms without detailing the factual

foundation or specifying the precise

misrepresentation alleged.

10.30. It is therefore submitted that in the absence of

a precise and intelligible notice, the petitioner

was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to

respond, rendering the subsequent action

unsustainable in law. On this ground as well, it

is urged that the impugned Leave India Notice

is liable to be set aside.

10.31. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Gorkha Security Services v. Govt.

(NCT of Delhi)5, more particularly paras 21

and 22 thereof, which are reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

21. The central issue, however, pertains to the requirement of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind the serving of show-cause notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement,

5 2014, SCC Online, SC 599 - 31 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated so that the noticee is able to point out that proposed action is not warranted in the given case, even if the defaults/breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to blacklisting, this requirement becomes all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it is harshest possible action.

22. The High Court has simply stated that the purpose of show-cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural justice, a show-cause notice should meet the following two requirements viz: (i) The material/grounds to be stated which according to the department necessitates an action; (ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second requirement which the High Court has failed to omit. We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice but it can clearly and safely be discerned from the reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement.

10.32. By relying on Gorkha Security Services's

learned Senior Counsel submits that in the

present case the fundamental requirements of a

valid show-cause notice have not been

satisfied. It is contended that no notice was

issued to the petitioner prior to the issuance of

the Leave India Notice. The show-cause notice - 32 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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issued to the company, according to the

petitioner, does not clearly articulate the

specific imputations nor does it specify the

precise action proposed to be taken against the

petitioner.

10.33. It is therefore argued that the petitioner was

never apprised of the precise case he was

required to meet, nor was he informed of the

proposed adverse action so as to enable him to

demonstrate why such action ought not to be

taken. In the absence of compliance with the

dual requirements laid down in Gorkha

Security Services, the impugned Leave India

Notice, it is submitted, stands vitiated for

violation of principles of natural justice and is

liable to be quashed.

10.34. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of UMC Technologies (P) - 33 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India6, more

particularly paras 19, 20 and 24 thereof, which

are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

19. In light of the above decisions, it is clear that a prior show-cause notice granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard is an essential element of all administrative decision-making and particularly so in decisions pertaining to blacklisting which entail grave consequences for the entity being blacklisted. In these cases, furnishing of a valid show-cause notice is critical and a failure to do so would be fatal to any order of blacklisting pursuant thereto.

20. In the present case, the factum of service of the show- cause notice dated 10-4-2018 by the Corporation upon the appellant is not in dispute. Rather, what Shri Banerji has argued on behalf of the appellant is that the contents of the said show-cause notice were not such that the appellant could have anticipated that an order of blacklisting was being contemplated by the Corporation. Gorkha Security Services [Gorkha Security Services v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105] is a case where this Court had to decide whether the action of blacklisting could have been taken without specifically proposing/contemplating such an action in the show-cause notice. For this purpose, this Court laid down the below guidelines as to the contents of a show- cause notice pursuant to which adverse action such as blacklisting may be adopted : (SCC pp. 118-19, paras 21- 22)

"Contents of the show-cause notice

21. The central issue, however, pertains to the requirement of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind the serving of show-cause notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement, according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated so that the noticee is able to point out that proposed action is not warranted in the given case, even if the

6 (2021) 2 SCC 551 - 34 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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defaults/breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to blacklisting, this requirement becomes all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it is harshest possible action.

22. The High Court has simply stated [Gorkha Security Services v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4289] that the purpose of show-cause notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to what would be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the grounds on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the opinion that in order to fulfil the requirements of principles of natural justice, a show-cause notice should meet the following two requirements viz:

(i) The material/grounds to be stated which according to the department necessitates an action;

(ii) Particular penalty/action which is proposed to be taken. It is this second requirement which the High Court has failed to omit.

We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the show-cause notice but it can clearly and safely be discerned from the reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement."

24. A plain reading of the notice makes it clear that the action of blacklisting was neither expressly proposed nor could it have been inferred from the language employed by the Corporation in its show-cause notice. After listing 12 clauses of the "Instruction to Bidders", which were part of the Corporation's bid document dated 25-11-2016, the notice merely contains a vague statement that in light of the alleged leakage of question papers by the appellant, an appropriate decision will be taken by the Corporation. In fact, Clause 10 of the same Instruction to Bidders section of the bid document, which the Corporation has argued to be the source of its power to blacklist the appellant, is not even mentioned in the show-cause notice. While the notice clarified that the 12 clauses specified in the notice were only indicative and not exhaustive, there was nothing in the notice which could have given the appellant the impression that the action of blacklisting was being proposed. This is especially true since the appellant was under the belief that the Corporation was not even empowered to take such an action against it and since the only clause which mentioned - 35 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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blacklisting was not referred to by the Corporation in its show-cause notice. While the following paragraphs deal with whether or not the appellant's said belief was well-founded, there can be no question that it was incumbent on the part of the Corporation to clarify in the show-cause notice that it intended to blacklist the appellant, so as to provide adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause against the same.

10.35. His submission is that the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in UMC Technologies, after referring to

Gorkha Security Services, held that a valid

show-cause notice must clearly indicate both (i)

the material or grounds necessitating action,

and (ii) the specific action or penalty proposed

to be taken. The Court emphasised that the

noticee must be placed in a position where he

can effectively rebut not only the allegations

but also the proportionality or justification of

the proposed action. A notice that merely refers

to alleged breaches without specifying the

nature of the contemplated penalty fails to

meet the requirements of natural justice. - 36 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.36. Absence of clarity regarding the proposed

action deprived the noticee of meaningful

opportunity and rendered the subsequent

blacklisting order unsustainable.

10.37. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid principles,

learned Senior Counsel submits that issuance of

a valid show-cause notice is not a mere

procedural formality but a substantive

safeguard inherent in fair administrative

process. In the present case, it is contended

that no show-cause notice was issued to the

petitioner prior to the issuance of the Leave

India Notice. Even the show-cause notice issued

to the company, it is argued, did not clearly set

out the specific action proposed to be taken

against the petitioner, nor did it indicate that

expulsion was contemplated.

10.38. It is therefore submitted that the impugned

Leave India Notice, having been issued without - 37 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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compliance with the minimum procedural

requirements articulated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in UMC Technologies, stands

vitiated. Learned Senior Counsel reiterates that

the decision to direct the petitioner to leave

India was taken arbitrarily, without adherence

to due process and without affording the

procedural safeguards guaranteed under law.

10.39. On this ground as well, it is urged that the

Leave India Notice is liable to be quashed.

10.40. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the

issuance of the Leave India Notice carries with

it a lasting stigma that extends beyond the

immediate regulatory consequence. It is

contended that even if the petitioner has since

exited India and the Employment Visa has

expired, the existence of the LIN remains part

of his immigration history. In future visa

applications to various countries, the petitioner - 38 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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may be required to disclose whether he has

ever been directed to leave any country. Being

duty-bound to answer truthfully, the petitioner

would be compelled to disclose the issuance of

the LIN. Such disclosure, it is argued, may

adversely influence decisions of foreign

immigration authorities and potentially result in

denial of visas, thereby impacting his

professional trajectory and personal mobility.

10.41. It is further submitted that the LIN was issued

without due process and allegedly on the basis

of an unverified and motivated complaint made

by a disgruntled former employee of the

company. According to the petitioner, the

issuance of the LIN, without prior notice and

without adjudication of the allegations, has

already affected his professional reputation.

The continuing existence of the LIN, it is urged,

compounds that injury and may prejudice his - 39 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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prospects in other jurisdictions where

immigration authorities may take note of such

regulatory history.

10.42. Learned Senior Counsel also refers to Rule 5 of

the Passport (Entry into India) Rules, 1950,

submitting that the essential requirements for

lawful entry into India are possession of a valid

passport and a valid visa. The petitioner, it is

contended, satisfied both requirements at the

time of entry. The Employment Visa having

been granted by the competent authority at the

High Commission of India in Canberra, and

there being no formal cancellation thereof by

the issuing authority at the relevant time, the

FRRO could not, by issuance of a Leave India

Notice, effectively nullify or overriding the visa

while it remained valid. If there was an

allegation that the visa had been procured by

fraud, it is argued, such determination ought to - 40 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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have been undertaken by the visa-issuing

authority and not by the FRRO.

10.43. Reiterating the submission regarding

institutional competence, learned Senior

Counsel contends that the High Commission of

India at Canberra, after examining all

documents including the justification letter,

employment terms, and the representation

regarding non-availability of suitable Indian

candidates, granted the Employment Visa upon

being satisfied of compliance with applicable

norms. The FRRO, it is urged, cannot now

overreach or sit in appeal over the satisfaction

recorded by the High Commission.

10.44. It is further submitted that even subsequent to

the issuance of the LIN, the petitioner applied

for and was granted fresh visas to enter India.

According to the petitioner, this conduct of the

Respondents themselves demonstrates that he - 41 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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has not engaged in any activity rendering him

undesirable or persona non grata. In such

circumstances, it is argued, the continuance of

the LIN in official records serves no regulatory

purpose and merely perpetuates stigma without

justification.

10.45. His vehement submission is that the FRRO does

not have the jurisdiction to issue a LIN under

any statute or notification. In this regard, he

refers to Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946,

which is reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

3. Power to make orders.--

(1)The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner, for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into [India] or their departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein.

(2)In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner--

(a)shall not enter [India] or shall enter [India] only at such times and by such route and at such port or - 42 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed;

(b)shall not depart from [India], or shall depart only at such times and by such route and from such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on departure as may be prescribed;

(c)shall not remain in [India] or in any prescribed areas therein; [(cc) shall, if he has been required by order under this section not to remain in India, meet from any resources at his disposal the cost of his removal from India and of his maintenance therein pending such removal;]

(d)shall remove himself to, and remain in, such area in [India] as may be prescribed;

(e)shall comply with such conditions as may be prescribed or specified--

(i)requiring him to reside in a particular place;

(ii)imposing any restrictions on his movements;

(iii)requiring him to furnish such proof of his identity and to report such particulars to such authority in such manner and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified;

(iv)requiring him to allow his photograph and finger impressions to be taken and to furnish specimens of his handwriting and signature to such authority and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified;

(v)requiring him to submit himself to such medical examination by such authority and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified;

(vi)prohibiting him from association with persons of a prescribed or specified description; (vii)prohibiting him from engaging in activities of a prescribed or specified description; - 43 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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(viii)prohibiting him from using or possessing prescribed or specified articles;

(ix)otherwise regulating his conduct in any such particular as may be prescribed or specified;

(f)shall enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of, or as an alternative to the enforcement of, any or all prescribed or specified restrictions or conditions;

(g) shall be arrested and detained or confined;]and may make provision [for any matter which is to be or may be prescribed and] for such incidental and supplementary matters as may, in the opinion of the Central Government, be expedient or necessary for giving effect to this Act.

(3) Any authority prescribed in this behalf may with respect to any particular foreigner make orders under clause (e) 5 [or clause (f)] of sub-section (2).]

[3A. Power to exempt citizens of Commonwealth Countries and other persons from application of Act in certain cases.--(1) The Central Government may, by order, declare that all or any of the provisions of this Act or of any order made thereunder shall not apply, or shall apply only in such circumstances or with such exceptions or modifications or subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, to or in relation to--

(a)the citizens of any such Commonwealth Country as may be so specified; or

(b)any other individual foreigner or class or description of foreigner.

(2)A copy of every order made under this section shall be placed on the table of both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made.] - 44 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.46. By referring to Section 3, he submits that the

said provision empowers the Central

Government to make orders regarding the

entry, presence and departure of foreigners in

India.

10.47. In terms of clause (c) of subsection (2) of

Section 3, an order directing the person not to

remain in India or in a prescribed area therein

could be passed. Thus, it is only the Central

Government which would pass such an order

and not the FRRO is his submission.

10.48. He refers to Section 12 of the Foreigners Act,

1946, relating to the delegation of powers, and

he submits that any authority upon which a

power is conferred by the Act can authorise in

writing any subordinate authority to exercise

such power on its behalf. The delegation

contemplated is only a one-step delegation

from the Central Government and not for the - 45 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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delegatee to further delegate to another

subordinate authority, namely the FRRO.

10.49. It is only the Central Government that can

delegate its powers under Clause (c) of

Subsection (2) of Section 3, and not for the

delegatee to further delegate. In the present

case, the delegatee being the Joint Director

(Bureau of Immigration), it is only the said

Joint Director who could exercise powers under

Clause (c) of Subsection (2) of Section 3. By

referring to the notification dated 13.07.2000,

he submits that the authorisation is only in

favour of the Joint Director of Immigration.

Even the exercise of the powers by the Joint

Director is subject to compliance with any

general or specific conditions issued by the

Central Government. Such exercise of powers

has to be done in a proper manner by following

the applicable procedure. - 46 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.50. The Joint Director not being authorised to

delegate his powers, the respondents cannot

contend that there is a delegation of such

powers by the Joint Director (Immigration), in

favour of the FRRO.

10.51. By referring to Section 3 of the Registration of

Foreigners Rules, 1992, he submits that the

powers of a registration officer would include

the power to authorise the performance of any

functions under the rules with the approval of

the Central Government. His submission is that

the Foreigners Act empowers the Central

Government to regulate the presence of

foreigners in India, including by directing their

removal under Section 3. In furtherance of

this, Section 12 permits the Central

Government to delegate to a subordinate

authority. In the present case, there is no such

delegation to the FRRO. The delegation, in - 47 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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terms of notification dated 13.7.2000, is only to

the Joint Director (Immigration), and it is only

the Joint Director (Immigration), who could

have exercised such powers.

10.52. The FRRO, having exercised powers under the

Foreigners Act 1946, and the notification dated

13.7.2000 is not authorised or empowered to

issue a LIN as done by the FRRO. Insofar as

the alleged sub-delegation by the Joint Director

in favour of the FRRO, his submission is that

Firsty, such delegation could not be made, since

such sub-delegation is not contemplated.

Secondly, the submission is that even the so-

called delegation has not been published and is

not known to the world as such.

10.53. At the most, it can be said to be an internal

office note which cannot be considered as a

valid delegation dehors a gazette notification

which has not been issued. His further - 48 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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submission is that the said delegation is not

published and there is no date stamp, and as

such, doubts the veracity and validity of the so-

called delegation.

10.54. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Harla vs. State of Rajasthan7, more

particularly Para 9 thereof, which is reproduced

hereunder for reference:

9. Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and property by the mere passing of a resolution without anything more is abhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or custom, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential.

10.55. By referring to Harla's case, his submission is

that before a law can become operative, it must

be promulgated or published, that is to say, it 7 1951, SCC 936 - 49 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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must be broadcast in some reasonable way so

that all men may know what it is, so as to

exercise due and reasonable diligence. Any

decision which is reached in the secret recesses

to which the public has no access cannot bind

the general public.

10.56. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards

v. Mandal Revenue Officer8, more

particularly Para 13 thereof, which is

reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

13. The first question we have to answer is whether the publication of the exemption notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, as required by Section 11(1) of the Act, is mandatory or merely directory? Section 11(1) requires that an order made thereunder should be (i) published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and (ii) must set out the grounds for granting the exemption. The exemption may be on a permanent basis or for a specified period and shall be subject to such restrictions or conditions as the Government may deem necessary. Shri Sorabjee's contention is that while the requirements that the power under Section 11 should be expressed through an order, that it must contain the grounds for granting exemption and that the order should specify whether the exemption is on a permanent basis or for a specified period are mandatory, the requirement of publication in the Gazette is not. According to the learned counsel, the said requirement is merely directory. It is enough, says the counsel, if due publicity is given to the order. He relies upon certain decisions to which

8 (1996) 6 SCC 634 - 50 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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we shall presently refer. We find it difficult to agree. The power under Section 11 is in the nature of conditional legislation, as would be explained later. The object of publication in the Gazette is not merely to give information to public. Official Gazette, as the very name indicates, is an official document. It is published under the authority of the Government. Publication of an order or rule in the Gazette is the official confirmation of the making of such an order or rule. The version as printed in the Gazette is final. The same order or rule may also be published in the newspapers or may be broadcast by radio or television. If a question arises when was a particular order or rule made, it is the date of Gazette publication that is relevant and not the date of publication in a newspaper or in the media (See Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India [(1994) 5 SCC 198] ). In other words, the publication of an order or rule is the official irrefutable affirmation that a particular order or rule is made, is made on a particular day (where the order or rule takes effect from the date of its publication) and is made by a particular authority; it is also the official version of the order or rule. It is a common practice in courts to refer to the Gazette whenever there is a doubt about the language of, or punctuation in, an Act, Rule or Order. Section 83 of the Evidence Act, 1872 says that the court shall presume the genuineness of the Gazette. Court will take judicial notice of what is published therein, unlike the publication in a newspaper, which has to be proved as a fact as provided in the Evidence Act. If a dispute arises with respect to the precise language or contents of a rule or order, and if such rule or order is not published in the Official Gazette, it would become necessary to refer to the original itself, involving a good amount of inconvenience, delay and unnecessary controversies. It is for this reason that very often enactments provide that Rules and/or Regulations and certain type of orders made thereunder shall be published in the Official Gazette. To call such a requirement as a dispensable one -- directory requirement -- is, in our opinion, unacceptable. Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act says that even where an Act or Rule provides merely for publication but does not say expressly that it shall be published in the Official Gazette, it would be deemed to have been duly made if it is published in the Official Gazette [ Section 21 reads:"21. Publication of Orders and Notifications in the Official Gazette.--Where in any Act or in any rule passed under any Act, it is directed that any order, notification or other matter shall be notified or published, that notification or publication shall, unless the Act otherwise provides, be deemed to be duly made if it is published in the Official Gazette."] . As observed by Khanna, J., speaking for himself and Shelat, J. in Sammbhu Nath Jha - 51 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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v. Kedar Prasad Sinha [(1972) 1 SCC 573 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 337] the requirement of publication in the Gazette (SCC p. 578, para 17) "is an imperative requirement and cannot be dispensed with". The learned Judge was dealing with Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 which provides inter alia that a Commission of Inquiry shall be appointed "by notification in the Official Gazette". The learned Judge held that the said requirement is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with. The learned Judge further observed: (SCC p. 578, para 17)

"The commission of inquiry is appointed for the purpose of making an inquiry into some matter of public importance. The schedule containing the various allegations in the present case was a part of the notification, dated 12-3-1968 and specified definite matters of public importance which were to be inquired into by the Commission. As such, the publication of the schedule in the Official Gazette should be held to be in compliance with the statutory requirement. The object of publication in an Official Gazette is twofold: to give publicity to the notification and further to provide authenticity to the contents of that notification in case some dispute arises with regard to the contents."

10.57. By relying on ITC Bhadrachalam's case, his

submission is that the publication of sub-

delegation is mandatory, and if there is an

exemption claim, the reasons for such

exemption would have to be clearly and

categorically specified. The publication in the

Gazette not only provides information to the

general public but also makes it an official

document published under the authority of the

government. - 52 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.58. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs.

Mayer Hans George9 more particularly Para

34 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for

easy reference:

34. Reverting now to the question whether mens rea-in the sense of actual knowledge that the act done by the accused was contrary to the law-is requisite in respect of a contravention of S. 8(1), starting with an initial prescription in favour of the need for mens rea, we have to ascertain whether the presumption is overborne by the language of the enactment, read in the light of the objects and purposes of the Act, and particularly whether the enforcement of the law and the attainment of its purpose would not be rendered futile in the event of such an ingredient being considered necessary.

10.59. By referring to Mayer Hans George's case his

submission is that there is no purpose served

by the manner in which the law is sought to be

enforced, when the petitioner has been granted

a valid employment visa which was in force and

never cancelled.

9 (1965) 35 Comp Cas 557 - 53 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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10.60. On the above basis, his submission is that the

Writ Petition is required to be allowed and the

relief/s sought for is/are to be granted.

11. Sri. Arvind Kamath, learned Additional Solicitor

General of India, appearing for the respondent,

submits that:

11.1. The present writ petition has wholly lost its

substratum. The Leave India Notice (LIN) dated

01.05.2019 was issued exclusively in relation to

the petitioner's Employment Visa (E-2), which

was valid only until 07.01.2020. The operation

of the LIN was necessarily coterminous with the

subsistence of that visa category. Upon the

petitioner's exit from India and the subsequent

expiry of the Employment Visa by efflux of

time, the LIN stood exhausted and became

functus officio. There is, therefore, no

subsisting order operating against the petitioner

that calls for adjudication. - 54 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.2. It is emphatically contended that the

Employment Visa was secured through

suppression and misrepresentation. The

company represented that no suitable Indian

national was available for the position of

General Manager. Subsequent material,

including admissions made during

correspondence, revealed that the foundational

representation was untenable. The issuance of

the LIN was therefore not arbitrary but a lawful

regulatory response to material irregularity. The

Respondents maintain that fraud vitiates the

foundation of any administrative grant.

11.3. An Employment Visa is conditional upon the

position being of a highly skilled or specialised

nature for which no qualified Indian candidate

is available. The petitioner's qualifications, a

Bachelor's degree in Nursing and a Graduate

Certificate in Critical Care Nursing, do not, - 55 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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according to the Respondents, justify

displacement of Indian managerial talent in a

general managerial role, there are innumerable

persons with the same qualifications in India.

India has no dearth of qualified and

experienced professionals in such fields. The

visa regime is not designed to facilitate

substitution of domestic managerial leadership

with expatriates without all conditions being

fulfilled.

11.4. The Employment Visa framework cannot be

exploited as a device to circumvent domestic

employment safeguards. The policy objective

underlying the visa regime is to preserve

employment opportunities for Indian citizens

while permitting foreign expertise strictly in

cases of genuine requirement. Any

interpretation diluting this principle would - 56 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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defeat the statutory and policy architecture

governing foreign employment.

11.5. The petitioner voluntarily exited India on

15.11.2019. Even though interim protection

had been granted by this Court, the petitioner

chose to leave. Upon such departure, the

directive contained in the LIN stood complied

with. The LIN was not a continuing restraint but

a direction not to remain in India under the

Employment Visa. Once the petitioner departed,

the LIN achieved its purpose and extinguished

itself. The underlying visa expired on

07.01.2020 and was never renewed.

Consequently, the LIN no longer has operative

force.

11.6. Significantly, neither the petitioner nor the

employer seek renewal of the Employment Visa

nor challenge the alleged visa irregularity

through re-application under the same - 57 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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category. Instead, the petitioner voluntarily

applied for a Business Visa, which was granted

from 10.01.2020 to 09.01.2021. This conduct

demonstrates conscious abandonment of the

Employment Visa category. The petitioner's own

actions reflect that he did not seek restoration

of employment-based residence. If any

employment activity were undertaken under

the guise of a Business Visa, appropriate action

would follow in accordance with law.

11.7. The record further demonstrates that the

petitioner travelled to India on the Business

Visa in January 2020 and later on a Tourist Visa

in May 2024. Both visas were granted by the

competent authorities of the Government of

India. These subsequent grants categorically

negate the allegation of blacklist, prohibition, or

continuing stigma within the Indian immigration

system. - 58 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.8. The petitioner, by voluntarily shifting visa

categories and entering India thereafter without

impediment, has waived any residual grievance

connected with the Employment Visa. The LIN

became inoperative upon expiry of that visa. A

spent administrative direction cannot be

resurrected for academic adjudication.

11.9. It is categorically affirmed that the LIN does not

constitute a permanent bar to future visa

applications, which is borne out by official

record and subsequent conduct of the

authorities. The Respondents have formally

clarified this position through written

communication dated 26.06.2025. The

petitioner has thereafter been granted further

visa permissions. The assertion of continuing

injury is therefore factually untenable.

11.10. The plea regarding adverse impact on foreign

visa applications was not part of the original - 59 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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writ petition. It has been raised for the first

time in the rejoinder filed in 2025, several

years after the initiation of proceedings. The

Respondents submit that a speculative

apprehension introduced belatedly cannot

revive a petition otherwise rendered

infructuous.

11.11. It is emphasised that the issuance or refusal of

visas by other sovereign nations lies entirely

outside the jurisdictional domain of this Court.

No material has been placed on record to

demonstrate that any foreign country has

denied the petitioner a visa on account of the

LIN. The alleged prejudice remains

hypothetical. Courts do not adjudicate upon

conjectural possibilities.

11.12. The Respondents categorically state that the

details of the LIN are not disseminated to

foreign governments or international databases. - 60 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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By official letter dated 26.06.2025 and further

clarification dated 04.11.2025, it has been

made clear that no further action is

contemplated pursuant to the LIN. These

communications were issued to bring finality

and to dispel apprehension.

11.13. The visa application forms produced by the

petitioner refer to removal or deportation. The

petitioner was not forcibly deported; he exited

voluntarily. The LIN directed him not to remain

under a particular visa category. The petitioner

cannot equate regulatory departure with

deportation so as to artificially construct a

continuing grievance

11.14. That the present petition seeks adjudication of

a spent administrative directive tied to an

expired visa category. The petitioner has re-

entered India under fresh visas. No operative

restraint exists. No continuing disability - 61 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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subsists. No concrete injury has been

demonstrated. The writ petition, having lost

both factual and legal substratum, deserves to

be dismissed as wholly infructuous.

11.15. He refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd., and

ors vs. Union of India10 more particularly,

Paras 36 and 37 thereof, which are reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

36. Both the Attorney-General and the Additional Solicitor- General have raised a preliminary objection to the consideration of the question raised by the petitioners as regards the validity of Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment. It is contended by them that the issue formulated for consideration of the court: "Whether the provisions of the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution which deprived the fundamental rights of their supremacy and, inter alia, made them subordinate to the directive principles of State policy are ultra vires the amending power of Parliament? is too wide and academic. It is urged that since it is the settled practice of the court not to decide academic questions and since property rights claimed by the petitioners under Articles 19(1) (f) and 31 do not survive after the 44th Amendment, the court should not entertain any argument on the points raised by the petitioners.

37. In support of this submission reliance is placed by the learned counsel on the decisions of the American Supreme Court in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrew W. Mellon, George Ashwander v. Tenneses Vally Authority, and on WEAVER'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1946 Edition and AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCES, Reliance is also placed on

10 (1980) 3 SCC 625 - 62 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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certain decisions of this court to which it is unnecessary to refer because the Attorney-General and the Additional Solicitor-General are right that it is the settled practice this Court to which it is unnecessary to refer because the Attorney-General of this Court not to decide academic questions. The American authorities on which the learned counsel rely take the view that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the courts as a hypotheti-cal question, because constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly or in the manner of an academic discussion. In other words, the courts do not anticipate constitutional issues so as to assume in advance that our Court has consistently taken the view that we will not formulate a rule ment which may offend against the provisions of the Constitution. Similarly, a certain law may be passed in pursuance of a certain constitutional amend-of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. It is only when the rights of persons are directly involved that relief is granted by this Court.

11.16. By relying on the decision in Minerva Mills

Limited's case, his submission is that the

Court is not required to address or decide

academic questions. It is only when the rights

of persons are directly involved that the matter

would be considered and relief granted by a

Court. All the contentions and apprehensions

on the part of the petitioner are hypothetical in

nature. The petitioner has not placed even one

document on record indicating that an - 63 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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application made by the petitioner has been

rejected on the ground that a LIN had been

issued by the respondent.

11.17. Learned ASGI submits, alternatively and

without prejudice, that even assuming any

foreign sovereign were to refuse a visa to the

petitioner in future, this Court would have no

territorial or subject-matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate upon such refusal. Decisions of

foreign immigration authorities are governed

exclusively by the domestic law of those

jurisdictions. The petitioner's legal rights within

India have not been adversely affected in any

continuing manner. On the contrary, the grant

of a Business Visa and thereafter a Tourist Visa

clearly demonstrates that the petitioner's travel

interests into India remain intact and

unhindered. - 64 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.18. It is therefore emphatically submitted that this

Court cannot pass directions, directly or

indirectly, regarding issuance or refusal of visas

by foreign countries. Any such relief would be

beyond the constitutional competence of this

Court.

11.19. On merits, learned ASGI submits that the

action of the Respondents was entirely justified.

The Employment Visa regime mandates that

such visas be granted only where the position

requires highly specialised skills unavailable in

India. The justification letter dated 14.12.2017,

though authored by the employer, was

submitted as part of the petitioner's visa

application. The petitioner derived direct benefit

from that representation. If that representation

is shown to be false or misleading, the

beneficiary cannot disclaim responsibility for its

consequences. - 65 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.20. Referring to the documentary requirements

accompanying an Employment Visa application,

learned ASGI submits that the employer is

required to furnish:

11.20.1. A categorical undertaking that the

applicant will be employed full-time;

11.20.2. An undertaking assuming responsibility

for the applicant's professional conduct;

11.20.3. A detailed justification letter explaining

why no Indian national can be employed

against the post;

11.20.4. Specific details of efforts made to

identify suitable Indian candidates.

11.21. These requirements are not a formality they

form the foundation for consideration of the

application. The justification must demonstrate

actual search and due diligence within India. In

the present case, the explanation furnished

later reveals that no such search was - 66 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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conducted. This constitutes a fundamental non-

compliance warranting revocation and

regulatory action.

11.22. The justification letter dated 14.12.2017

asserted that the petitioner possessed

experience unavailable in India and that no

individual with similar qualifications could be

found domestically. This categorical

representation formed the basis of visa

issuance.

11.23. The use of the expression "could not be found"

necessarily implied that a search had been

undertaken and that efforts had been made to

locate suitable Indian candidates. However,

subsequent correspondence revealed that no

such search was conducted. The employer later

admitted that there was no advertisement, no

recruitment exercise, and no attempt to identify

Indian candidates. The petitioner, in his visa - 67 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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application, had expressly declared that the

information furnished was true and complete

and that he understood that incorrect

information could result in denial of entry,

deportation or other penalties. He was

therefore fully aware of the legal consequences

of misrepresentation.

11.24. It was only after a complaint was received by

the Ministry of Home Affairs alleging

irregularities in visa procurement that an

enquiry was directed. Pursuant thereto, the

FRRO sought detailed clarification regarding

recruitment methodology, qualifications

required, advertisements issued, number of

applicants, and interview procedures. These

queries were not speculative; they were

grounded in regulatory duty.

11.25. The employer's response dated 25.07.2018

admitted that due to business urgency, - 68 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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candidates were selected from the Australian

office and no search was conducted within

India. No advertisements were issued; no

domestic recruitment process was undertaken.

This admission directly contradicted the earlier

justification. Selection from an internal

overseas office without even attempting

domestic recruitment cannot satisfy the

fundamental requirement of the non-availability

of Indian talent.

11.26. The contradiction between the original

justification and subsequent explanation

establishes misrepresentation. Had the latter

explanation, that no domestic search was

conducted, been disclosed in the justification

letter, the Employment Visa would not have

been granted. The misrepresentation therefore,

goes to the root of the visa's validity. The

issuance of the LIN was not arbitrary; it was a - 69 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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proportionate regulatory response to a

foundational defect.

11.27. Upon admission by the employer, a show-cause

notice was issued to the employer.

Simultaneously, the derivative beneficiary, the

petitioner, was issued a LIN. This was

consistent with the structure of an Employment

Visa, where the employee's status is dependent

upon the sponsor's compliance. The petitioner

had expressly accepted potential consequences

for incorrect information.

11.28. He submits that the FRRO acted with restraint

and proportionality. The authorities could have

initiated deportation proceedings. Instead, the

petitioner was permitted to exit voluntarily. His

family was not subjected to coercive measures.

The action taken was the least intrusive

response consistent with regulatory

enforcement. - 70 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.29. Even thereafter, the petitioner was granted

Business and Tourist Visas. This fact

demonstrates the absence of vindictiveness or

punitive intent. The action was confined to

rectifying a defective Employment Visa, not

imposing lasting disability.

11.30. On the issue of authority, learned ASGI submits

that the FRRO acted strictly within the statutory

framework. The FRRO sought directions from

the competent authority, namely the Joint

Director (Immigration), Bureau of Immigration,

Ministry of Home Affairs. The original file placed

before the Court evidences this hierarchical

decision-making process.

11.31. He refers to Notifications S.O. 3310(E) and S.O.

3311(E) dated 30.12.2009, whereby the FRRO,

Bangalore, was appointed as Civil Authority

under the Foreigners Act and Registration - 71 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Officer under the Registration of Foreigners

Rules.

11.32. Further reliance is placed upon Gazette

Notification GSR 605(E) dated 13.07.2000

issued under Section 12 of the Foreigners Act,

authorising the Joint Director (Immigration) to

exercise powers under Section 3(2)(c). The LIN

was issued pursuant to such delegated

authority.

11.33. It is submitted that there was no impermissible

sub-delegation. The Joint Director, being the

statutory delegate of the Central Government,

directed issuance of the LIN. The FRRO merely

executed that direction in formal terms. The

issuing authority, in substance, was the Joint

Director acting within delegated competence.

11.34. On the question of natural justice, learned ASGI

submits that the alleged misrepresentation was

by the employer. The authorities corresponded - 72 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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extensively with the employer, sought

explanation, and considered the responses

before taking action. The principles of natural

justice were satisfied vis-à-vis the party

responsible for the representation. The

employee, whose visa status was derivative,

cannot demand a separate adjudication on

matters exclusively within the employer's

domain.

11.35. In so far as the decisions relied upon by the

learned senior counsel for the petitioner his

submission is that the decision in Hasan Ali

Raihanys' case would not be applicable

inasmuch as in that case the petitioner had

applied for seeking citizenship of India and

while the said application was pending, he was

sought to be deported and in that background,

the Hon'ble Apex Court had come to a

conclusion that without hearing the person who - 73 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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had applied for Indian citizenship, a deportation

order could not be passed. In the present case,

there being a misrepresentation by the

employer, which was a cause for issuance of the

employment visa, that decision would not be

applicable.

11.36. As regards the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi

High Court in Mohammed Javid's case, he

again submits that, that was also a case where

the petitioner had made an application for grant

of Indian citizenship, the petitioner being a

Pakistani national having married an Indian

national and in that background the Hon'ble

Delhi Court came to a conclusion that an

applicant for Indian citizenship was required to

be heard before issuance of a LIN, she having a

valid long-term visa. The submission is also

that the decision in Mohammed Javid's case

is now pending before the Hon'ble Supreme - 74 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Court in SLP Nos.24092-24093/2019 and as

such, the said decision not having attained

finality, cannot be relied upon by the petitioner.

11.37. He relies upon the decision in Hans Muller of

Nurenburg v. State of W.B11., particularly

Paragraph 35 thereof which is reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

35. Entries 9, 10, 17, 18 and 19 in the Union List confer wide powers on the Centre to make laws about, among other things, admission into and expulsion from India, about extradition and aliens and about preventive detention connected with foreign affairs. Therefore, the right to make laws about the extradition or aliens and about their expulsion from the land is expressly conferred; also, it is to be observed that extradition and expulsion are contained in separate entries indicating that though they may overlap in certain aspects, they are different and distinct subjects. And that brings us to the Foreigners Act which deals, among other things, with expulsion, and the Extradition Act which regulates extradition.

11.38. By relying on Hans Muller's case, it is

submitted that the said decision authoritatively

recognises the plenary sovereign power of the

State in matters relating to admission,

regulation and expulsion of foreigners.

11 (1955) 1 SCC 167 - 75 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hans Muller

examined the constitutional scheme under the

Seventh Schedule and noted that Entries 9, 10,

17, 18 and 19 of the Union List confer wide and

exclusive legislative competence upon

Parliament in matters concerning admission into

India, expulsion, extradition, aliens and

preventive detention connected with foreign

affairs. The Court observed that extradition and

expulsion are distinct and separately

enumerated subjects, thereby emphasising that

the power to expel is not derivative or

incidental, but an independent and express

constitutional competence.

11.40. Learned ASGI submits that the Foreigners Act,

1946 is a direct legislative manifestation of this

sovereign authority. Section 3 of the Act

empowers the Central Government to regulate,

restrict, or direct that a foreigner shall not - 76 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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remain in India. The power of expulsion is not a

matter of concession but an incident of

sovereignty. A foreign national has no

fundamental right to reside or settle in India.

His presence in the country is conditional,

regulated by statute, and subject at all times to

executive supervision in accordance with law.

11.41. Relying upon Hans Muller, learned ASGI

submits that the executive discretion in matters

of expulsion is necessarily wide. Immigration

control is intimately connected with

sovereignty, national policy, labour regulation,

and public order. Courts have consistently

recognised that such matters fall within the

executive domain, subject only to limited

judicial review to ensure absence of mala fides,

arbitrariness, or statutory violation.

11.42. In the present case, it is contended that

irregularities in the procurement of the - 77 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Employment Visa were established through

documentary admissions by the employer. Once

the foundational misrepresentation stood

revealed, the executive was well within its

statutory competence to direct that the

petitioner shall not remain in India under that

visa category. The power to expel includes the

lesser power to direct departure without

initiating coercive deportation proceedings.

11.43. Learned ASGI emphasises that the authorities

did not exercise the full rigour of deportation

powers. The petitioner was not forcibly

removed. He was permitted voluntary exit. His

family was not detained. No permanent

prohibition was imposed. Instead of invoking

the harshest available measure, the authorities

adopted a measured and proportionate course

by issuing a Leave India Notice, thereby

allowing compliance without coercion. - 78 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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11.44. It is submitted that when viewed through the

constitutional lens articulated in Hans Muller,

the impugned action represents a restrained

and calibrated exercise of sovereign power. The

petitioner, being a foreign national whose visa

was found to be tainted by misrepresentation,

cannot claim immunity from the regulatory

consequences contemplated under the

Foreigners Act.

11.45. Thus, learned ASGI contends that the issuance

of the LIN was not only within statutory

competence but also reflective of a

proportionate exercise of executive discretion in

a domain where the Constitution accords

primacy to sovereign authority.

11.46. On all the above basis, the submission of

learned ASGI is that the Writ Petition as filed is

required to be dismissed. - 79 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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12. Shri K.G. Raghavan learned senior counsel in

rejoinder, would submit that:

12.1. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner

submits that the reliance placed by the

Respondents upon Hans Muller is misplaced

and inapposite to the present controversy. It is

contended that the said decision was rendered

in the year 1955, at a constitutional moment

when the jurisprudence relating to personal

liberty, procedural fairness and international

human rights obligations had not yet evolved to

their present contours. The constitutional

interpretation prevailing at that time, it is

argued, was pre-Maneka Gandhi and pre-dates

the incorporation of modern standards of

fairness under Articles 14 and 21.

12.2. Learned counsel submits that the legal

landscape governing expulsion of foreign

nationals has undergone significant - 80 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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transformation since 1955. India is now a

signatory to the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights (ICCPR), which, inter alia,

mandates under Article 13 that an alien lawfully

present in the territory of a State Party shall

not be expelled except in pursuance of a

decision reached in accordance with law and

shall, save for compelling reasons of national

security, be allowed to submit reasons against

his expulsion and have his case reviewed by a

competent authority.

12.3. It is contended that India's accession to the

ICCPR imposes binding international obligations

to ensure procedural safeguards in matters of

expulsion. These safeguards include fairness,

transparency, and opportunity of

representation, except in narrowly defined

cases of national security. The petitioner

submits that the principles embodied in the - 81 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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ICCPR have informed the development of

domestic constitutional jurisprudence,

particularly post Maneka Gandhi, where the

Hon'ble Supreme Court expanded the meaning

of "procedure established by law" to require

that such procedure be just, fair and

reasonable.

12.4. According to the petitioner, the ratio in Hans

Muller must therefore be read in the historical

and constitutional context in which it was

delivered. The broad observations regarding

executive discretion in matters of expulsion

cannot, it is submitted, be understood as

conferring unfettered or unreviewable power in

the contemporary constitutional framework.

Executive action affecting personal liberty, even

of a foreign national, must now withstand

scrutiny under Articles 14 and 21 and conform - 82 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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to principles of non-arbitrariness and procedural

fairness.

12.5. It is further submitted that the present case

does not involve considerations of national

security or public order that might justify

curtailed procedural safeguards. The sole basis

for the impugned action is alleged irregularity in

procurement of the Employment Visa. In such

circumstances, reliance upon a 1955

articulation of sovereign power without

incorporating the subsequent evolution of

constitutional and international law principles, it

is argued, would be inappropriate.

12.6. He therefore submits that Hans Muller cannot

be invoked as authority for the proposition that

expulsion power is unfettered or immune from

contemporary procedural safeguards. The

decision, it is urged, must yield to the modern

constitutional doctrine that even where the - 83 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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State possesses sovereign authority over

foreigners, the exercise of such authority must

conform to fair procedure and international

human rights commitments.

12.7. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble

Madras High Court in R.I. Jebaraj v. Union of

India12, more particularly Para 28 thereof,

which is reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

28. As concluded above, if the order under challenge is in the nature of an order of expulsion of a foreigner from Indian soil, necessarily notice should have been given by the Central Government to the foreigner to afford an opportunity to him to make representation. The entire argument of Mr. V.T. Gopalan, the learned Senior Counsel, was under the premise that the impugned order is an order of expulsion. But I am unable to subscribe to the said contention. Admittedly, the petitioner's brother was not in Indian soil and so, the impugned order cannot be construed to be an order of expulsion at all. As rightly pointed out by the respondents in the counter, the impugned order is only an order banning the entry of the petitioner's brother into India without reference to the Central Government. Nowhere it has been held in any of the judgments cited supra that before passing any order under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act r/w Clause 3 of the Foreigners Order, 1948 such a notice should be given to the foreigner and he should be afforded an opportunity of being heard before passing an order prohibiting the entry of the foreigner. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hans Muller v. Supdt., Presidency Jail, Calcutta's case (cited supra) for passing an order either regulating or banning the entry of any foreigner into India, it is the absolute and unfettered discretion of the Central

12 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 160 - 84 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Government. The said soverign power is unlimited and unrestricted. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 does not speak of any such opportunity to be given to any foreign national in respect of prohibitory or regulatory orders. As I have already stated, in Gilles Preifer v. The Union of India, Sarbananda Sonowal's case and Hasan Ali Aihany's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in clear terms that the soverign power of the Central Government is absolute and has further held that only in the matter of expulsion of a foreign national who has already been allowed to be in Indian soil, in view of the International Covenant 1966, such a notice and opportunity should be given to him before expelling him. But in respect of an order banning the entry of a national into India, the Central Government need not state any reason as to why such ban order is imposed on him and it need not give any opportunity or notice to the foreign national. The Constitution of India does not contain any provision obliging the Central Government to issue notice affording an opportunity. The right to life guaranteed under Article 21 which is available to any foreign national does not engulf into its ambit a right to a foreign national to compel the Central Government either to allow him to enter into India or to afford an opportunity to make representation or to state the reasons for such a ban. Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the impugned order is vitiated on the ground that the same came to be passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioner deserves only to be rejected.

12.8. By relying on Jebaraj's case, his submission is

that before an order of expulsion of a foreigner

from Indian soil is made, a necessary notice

should have been given by the Central

Government to the foreigner to afford an

opportunity for him to make a representation.

The decision in Hans Muller's case, having - 85 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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been considered by the Hon'ble Madras High

Court in Jebaraj's case, and reference having

been made to ICCPR, it is the decision in

Jebaraj's case which is required to be

considered by this Court.

12.9. He relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi

High Court in Mohd. Javed v. Union of

India13, more particularly paras 28, 29, 33 and

41 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for

easy reference:

28. From the juristic standpoint, what requires elucidation is the exact nature of the 'right' that is under consideration. Confusion appears to have arisen from the perception that the 'right' being considered is Nausheen's 'right to live in India', which it is contended, she has none since she is an alien or foreigner. That is indeed true. What we are losing sight of though, is the fact that Nausheen is not an illegal immigrant and has not entered India clandestinely or unlawfully but has been continually residing in India for the last thirteen years on a valid visa, which has been renewed by the authorities from time-to-time. What is under the lens here is not Nausheen's right to reside in the country but the Ministry's authority to revoke a valid and subsisting LTV without following any process or procedure whatsoever and without arriving at a reasoned decision based on a factual matrix. It is not Nausheen's substantive right but her procedural right to 'due process' or right to procedural due process, as it is sometimes called, that is required to be considered.

29. In this context, while we are clear that most of the Part III rights under the Constitution, namely fundamental

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rights, are available only to citizens and not to foreigners, however, as has been consistently held, on a bare perusal of the constitutional provisions the rights enshrined in Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution are available even to non- citizens or foreigners. While invocation of rights under Articles 20 and 22 does not arise in the present case, the right under Article 21, namely the right of a person not to be "deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law" does. Here also, we hasten to add, it is not that Nausheen has been deprived of her life or personal liberty, in the narrow and restricted sense, by being asked to leave India but what is impacted is Nausheen's 'right to life' in its expanded interpretation as given by the courts, with several aspects of 'life' having been read into Article 21 of the Constitution.

33. It is also a basic tenet of the rule of law, that no power conferred upon any authority must be unguided, uncanalized, untrammelled or absolute. Courts will invariably frown upon unguided power, wherever it be found; and the test would be vis-a-vis the authority upon which power is conferred, regardless of the subject upon which the power is exercised. That is to say, in the present context, the Ministry cannot have absolute, unguided power, regardless of whether the power be exercised over a citizen or a foreigner. The question to ask therefore is, whether there is any guidance or restraint on the power of the Ministry to direct a foreigner to leave the country or is the discretion unguided and absolute? The fact that the power is exercised upon or against a foreigner is not the point. It is the existence of unguided power in the hands of an authority that is in issue. Providing a procedure for its exercise is the basic minimum restraint on exercise of any power. What, may we ask, is the procedure for exercise of the Ministry's power to direct a foreigner on a valid and subsisting visa, to leave the country. If no procedure is discernible in the statute, a basic procedure must be read into it. What was the procedure followed by the Ministry in the present case before issuing the Notice to Nausheen? Here we are not holding the Ministry to the standard of a just, fair or reasonable procedure prescribed by law as per the principles laid down inter alia in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 which may not be applicable to a case under the Foreigners Act or to regulations or orders made thereunder; but did the Ministry follow any procedure at all? We are afraid we are unable to discern any procedure whatsoever having been followed before the issuance of the Notice. The abrupt and peremptory issuance of the Notice itself cannot, on any parameters, be construed to be a procedure. A legal - 87 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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procedure must be a set of steps prescribed by law or read into the law, involving and displaying assessment of a fact situation, application of mind, leading to inferential action by the authorities, that precedes such action; which, in case of civil consequences, must also include due consideration of the version or representation of the person who will be visited with such consequences. The absence of any steps cannot itself pass-off as procedure.

41. We are only too familiar with the vast scope and expanse of rights protected under the overarching principles of Article 21 of the Constitution as developed over the past decades by court pronouncements. How then can the rights of a family against arbitrary and capricious interference by the State not be protected as part of the ever-growing bundle of rights under Article 21? Drawing upon the covenants contained in the ICCPR, we hold that the 'family', being the natural and fundamental unit of society, is entitled to protection of its integrity against arbitrary interference by the State.

12.10. By relying on Mohammed Javid's case, his

submission is that when a person has entered

India lawfully under a valid visa, the right of

such a person has to be balanced with the right

of the authority of the ministry to revoke the

long-term visa by following a procedure and

arriving at a reasoned decision based on the

factual matrix. He distinguishes the right to be

in India from the procedural due process right

to be denied the right to live in India, even if

the petitioner did not have a right to live in - 88 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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India, that right cannot be deprived without the

procedural due process being followed by the

authorities.

12.11. He reiterates the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Hasan Ali's case and also places

reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of

India14, more particularly para 75 thereof,

which is reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

75. In Introduction to International Law by J.G. Starke (1st Indian Reprint 1994) in Chapter 12 (p. 348), the law on the points has been stated thus:

"Most States claim in legal theory to exclude all aliens at will, affirming that such unqualified right is an essential attribute of sovereign government. The courts of Great Britain and the United States have laid it down that the right to exclude aliens at will is an incident of territorial sovereignty. Unless bound by an international treaty to the contrary, States are not subject to a duty under international law to admit aliens or any duty thereunder not to expel them. Nor does international law impose any duty as to the period of stay of an admitted alien."

Like the power to refuse admission this is regarded as an incident of the State's territorial sovereignty. International law does not prohibit the expulsion en masse of aliens. (p. 351). Reference has also been made to Article 13 of the International Covenant of 1966 on Civil and Political Rights which provides that an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party to the Covenant may be expelled only pursuant

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to a decision reached by law, and except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, is to be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by and to be represented for the purpose before the competent authority. It is important to note that this Covenant of 1966 would apply provided an alien is lawfully in India, namely, with valid passport, visa, etc. and not to those who have entered illegally or unlawfully. Similar view has been expressed in Oppenheim's International Law (Ninth Edn. 1992 in paras 400, 401 and 413). The author has said that the reception of aliens is a matter of discretion, and every State is by reason of its territorial supremacy, competent to exclude aliens from the whole or any part of its territory. In para 413 it is said that the right of States to expel aliens is generally recognised. It matters not whether the alien is only on a temporary visit, or has settled down for professional business or any other purposes in its territory, having established his domicile there. A belligerent may consider it convenient to expel all hostile nationals residing or temporarily staying within its territory, although such a measure may be very harsh on individual aliens, it is generally accepted that such expulsion is justifiable. Having regard to Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, an alien lawfully in a State's territory may be expelled only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.

12.12. By relying on Sarbananda Sonowal's case, he

again seeks to draw a distinction between a

person who has entered the country illegally or

unlawfully and a person who has entered legally

under a valid visa. He again reiterates that as

per the visa applications required to be filed

with the US Department of State, as also before

the consulate General of India in Australia, an - 90 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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applicant is required to make a disclosure as to

whether the applicant has been deported or

removed from the respective country and

insofar as the visa applications to United

Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia Japan and

Canada, the applicant is required to disclose

whether the applicant was asked to leave or

ordered to leave the country with a detailed

explanation. The LIN coming within the

mischief of being asked to leave or ordered to

leave, the petitioner is entitled to challenge the

LIN even after the expiry of the visa and or the

LIN having been rendered incapable of

enforcement.

12.13. As regards the letter dated 26.6.2025 issued by

the FRRO to the learned counsel for the

Respondent and the letter dated, 4.11.2025

issued by the FRRO to the petitioner, his

submission is that the operation of the LIN - 91 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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having been stayed by this Court by the order

dated 24.06.2019, it cannot be said that the

business and e-tourist visa was issued despite

the LIN being issued inasmuch as when the

business visa and e-tourist visa was issued, the

LIN had been stayed by this Court.

12.14. The visa, if any, filed by the petitioner with

other countries cannot be processed on the

basis of the assurance of the respondent that

there is a duty cast on the petitioner to disclose

the LIN having been issued.

12.15. He refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in M. Sudakar v. V. Manoharan15,

more particularly paras 15 and 16 thereof,

which are reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

15. True it is that the learned Single Judge had observed that the writ petition had become infructuous and still proceeded to grant relief to the appellant. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge may not be absolutely right in observing that the writ petition had become infructuous as the resolution debarring the appellant was still operative. In

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our opinion a writ petition broadly speaking is held infructuous when the relief sought for by the petitioner is already granted or because of certain events, there may not be necessity to decide the issue involved in the writ petition. Here in the present case the resolution of the governing body was still holding the field when the writ petition was heard and in fact was to operate for a further period, hence it cannot be said that the relief claimed by the appellant had become infructuous. In any view of the matter, as the effect of the order continued, the learned Single Judge was right in moulding the relief. The act of the appellant in removing a large number of members and financial impropriety will not clothe the general body to pass resolution debarring the appellant from holding the post for 10 years, as no such power is conferred by the bye-laws. The action being patently illegal, the learned Single Judge could not have declined the relief taking into account the alleged action.

16. As regards the decision of this Court in Krishna Rice Mills [(1981) 4 SCC 148] relied on by Mr Sorabjee, the same has no bearing in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the said case the instruction issued by the Government was challenged and when the matter was taken up it was conceded by the State that the State Government would withdraw the instruction. In view of the aforesaid the High Court observed that the writ petition has become infructuous and in that background this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have gone into the merit of the case. In the present case the resolution debarring the appellant was and still in force and, therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly went into its validity. Hence, the judgment relied on in no way supports the contention of the respondents.

12.16. By relying on M. Sudhakar's case, his

submission is that merely because the visa had

expired, the issuance of the LIN is not taken

away. The fact of the issuance of the LIN

continues to be true and valid. The petitioner, - 93 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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having left the country and subsequently

entered on the basis of other valid visas, the

disclosure of the said LIN being required to be

made by the petitioner, it cannot be said that

the writ petition has become infructuous.

12.17. He relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Union of India v. Narender Singh16,

more particularly para 5 and 6 thereof, which

are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

5. The High Court's order is clearly indefensible. A writ petition questioning the Tribunal's order on merits does not become infructuous by giving effect to the Tribunal's order. Merely because the order of reinstatement had been implemented by the appellant, that did not render the writ petition infructuous as has been observed by the High Court. This position was clearly stated in Union of India v. G.R. Prabhavalkar [(1973) 4 SCC 183 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 374] . In para 23 of the decision it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 193)

"23. Mr Singhvi, learned counsel, then referred us to the fact that after the judgment of the High Court the State Government has passed an order on 19-3-1971, the effect of which is to equate the Sales Tax Officers of the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh State with the Sales Tax Officers, Grade III, of Bombay. This order, in our opinion, has been passed by the State Government only to comply with the directions given by the High Court. It was made during a period when the appeal against the judgment was pending in this Court. The fact that the State Government took steps to comply with the directions of the High Court cannot lead to the inference that the appeal by the Union of India has become infructuous."

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6. The expression infructuous means ineffective, unproductive and unfruitful. It is derived from the Latin word "fructus" (fruit). By implementing an order, the challenge to the validity of the order is not wiped out and is not rendered redundant.

12.18. By relying on Narendra Singh's case, his

submission is that an order passed by a Court

or Tribunal, in this case by the FRRO, will not

become infructuous after the order is given

effect to. The right to challenge an order would

continue even after being given effect to, and

as a consequence thereof, the petitioner would

be entitled to restitution.

12.19. As regards the authority of the FRRO and the

delegation in favour of FRRO, he submits that

the FRRO in the impugned LIN has not

mentioned any direction issued by the

competent authority. Thus, the LIN can only be

presumed to have been issued by the FRRO in

its capacity as FRRO and not on the instruction

of the competent authority. The documents - 95 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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which have been shown to this Court have not

been made available to the petitioner, and as

such, those documents cannot be considered

for the purpose of passing an order against the

petitioner without a copy thereof having been

furnished to the petitioner.

12.20. The delegation is permitted only to the Joint

Director; the Joint Director is not permitted to

further delegate his powers to the FRRO. No

sub-delegation being provided, even if it were

to be accepted that there is sub-delegation, the

sub-delegation is not proper and valid. Be that

as it may, he again reiterates that the FRRO has

not, in the impugned LIN, mentioned anything

about the Joint Director having directed the

FRRO to issue the LIN.

12.21. He relies upon the decision in Amit Kumar

Sharma v. Union of India17, more particularly

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paras 25, 26 thereof, which are reproduced

hereunder for easy reference:

25. The elementary principle of law is that all material which is relied upon by either party in the course of a judicial proceeding must be disclosed. Even if the adjudicating authority does not rely on the material while arriving at a finding, information that is relevant to the dispute, which would with "reasonable probability" influence the decision of the authority must be disclosed. A one-sided submission of material which forms the subject- matter of adjudication to the exclusion of the other party causes a serious violation of natural justice. In the present case, this has resulted in grave prejudice to officers whose careers are directly affected as a consequence.

26. The non-disclosure of relevant material to the affected party and its disclosure in a sealed cover to the adjudicating authority (in this case AFT) sets a dangerous precedent. The disclosure of relevant material to the adjudicating authority in a sealed cover makes the process of adjudication vague and opaque. The disclosure in a sealed cover perpetuates two problems. Firstly, it denies the aggrieved party their legal right to effectively challenge an order since the adjudication of issues has proceeded on the basis of unshared material provided in a sealed cover. The adjudicating authority while relying on material furnished in the sealed cover arrives at a finding which is then effectively placed beyond the reach of challenge. Secondly, it perpetuates a culture of opaqueness and secrecy. It bestows absolute power in the hands of the adjudicating authority. It also tilts the balance of power in a litigation in favour of a dominant party which has control over information. Most often than not this is the state. A judicial order accompanied by reasons is the hallmark of the justice system. It espouses the rule of law. However, the sealed cover practice places the process by which the decision is arrived beyond scrutiny. The sealed cover procedure affects the functioning of the justice delivery system both at an individual case-to-case level and at an institutional level. However, this is not to say that all information must be disclosed in the public. Illustratively, sensitive information affecting the privacy of individuals such as the identity of a sexual harassment victim cannot be disclosed. The measure of non-disclosure of sensitive information in exceptional circumstances must be proportionate to the purpose that the non-disclosure seeks - 97 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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to serve. The exceptions should not, however, become the norm.

12.22. By relying on Commander Amit Kumar

Sharma's case, his submission is that any

material relied upon by either party in the Court

in a judicial proceedings must be disclosed and

even if the adjudicating authority does not rely

on the material while arriving at a finding if the

possibility of the same influencing the decision,

there would be a serious violation of principles

of natural justice.

12.23. On all the above grounds, he submits that the

Petition is required to be allowed and the relief

sought for to be granted.

13. Heard Sri.K.G.Raghavan, learned senior counsel for

the Petitioner, Sri.K.Aravind Kamath, learned ASGI

for the Respondents. Perused papers.

14. The points that would arise for consideration are: - 98 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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i) Whether the Leave India Notice (LIN) dated 01.05.2019 is vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice? ii) Whether the issuance of a Leave India Notice during the subsistence of a valid and un-cancelled Employment Visa (E-2) amounts to an impermissible indirect or de facto cancellation of the visa? iii) Does the Foreign Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) possess statutory jurisdiction to issue a Leave India Notice? iv) Whether the power under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, to direct a foreigner "not to remain in India" vests exclusively in the Central Government or its duly authorised delegate?. v) Whether an internal communication or direction issued by the Joint Director (Immigration) can constitute a lawful delegation or authorisation under the Foreigners Act? vi) Whether the impugned LIN suffers from arbitrariness and non-application of mind? vii) Whether allegations of fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of an Employment Visa can be acted upon by the FRRO without prior adjudication by the visa-issuing authority? viii) Whether a show-cause notice issued to the employer can satisfy the requirements of natural justice, qua the employee against whom the adverse civil consequence is directed? ix) Whether the writ petition has been rendered infructuous or academic on account of the petitioner's exit from India, expiry of the Employment Visa, and subsequent grant of business and tourist - 99 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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visas, or whether the impugned LIN continues to have civil, reputational, or legal consequences warranting judicial review? x) What order?

15. I answer the above points as folows:

16. Answer to Point No.1: Whether the Leave India Notice (LIN) dated 01.05.2019 is vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice?

16.1. Sri K.G. Raghavan, learned Senior Advocate

appearing for the Petitioner, challenges the

impugned LIN primarily on the ground of

procedural impropriety and violation of the audi

alteram partem rule. He submits that the Leave

India Notice dated 01.05.2019 was served on

the Petitioner on 19.06.2019 without any prior

show-cause notice (SCN) or opportunity of

hearing afforded specifically to him. The

Petitioner was presented with a fait accompli

directing him to leave the country, without

being informed of the grounds for such

expulsion. - 100 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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16.2. It is the specific contention of the Petitioner

that there exists a vital distinction between a

foreigner who enters the country illegally and

one who enters lawfully on a valid visa. The

Petitioner entered India on a valid Employment

Visa (E-2) issued by the High Commission of

India at Canberra after due verification of his

documents, including the Justification Letter.

He subsequently registered with the FRRO and

held a valid Residential Permit. As a lawful

entrant, he is entitled to the protection of

Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

16.3. The learned Senior Counsel places heavy

reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Hasan Ali Raihany v. Union of

India. He argues that in Hasan Ali, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that a

foreigner who enters on a valid visa must be

informed of the reasons for deportation and - 101 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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given an opportunity to represent his case. The

only exception to this rule is the existence of

"compelling national security reasons." In the

present case, the Respondents have not

pleaded any threat to national security, and

therefore, the denial of a hearing is illegal and

violative of the procedural due process

mandated by Article 21.

16.4. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the

Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Mohd. Javed v.

Union of India, where a LIN issued to a

Pakistani national was quashed. The Hon'ble

Delhi Court held that the "procedure

established by law" under Article 21 applies to

foreigners, and arbitrary expulsion without

reasons violates this fundamental right. The

learned Senior Counsel contends that the

impugned LIN is cryptic, unreasoned, and

arbitrary. - 102 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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16.5. Furthermore, referencing Canara Bank v.

Debasis Das, it is argued that even

administrative orders entail civil consequences,

here, the stigma of expulsion, loss of

employment, and disruption of residence,

requiring strict adherence to natural justice.

Specifically, the Court in Canara Bank held

that notice is the first limb of natural justice

and must be precise and unambiguous.

16.6. Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon CCE v.

Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd., to contend

that a show-cause notice is the foundation of

the department's case. If the allegations are

vague or lacking, the notice is vitiated. In the

present case, no notice was issued to the

Petitioner at all.

16.7. Further reliance was placed on Gorkha

Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi),

and UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Food - 103 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Corpn. of India, to submit that where an

action entails grave consequences like

blacklisting (or expulsion), a specific show-

cause notice proposing the exact penalty is

mandatory. The failure to issue such a notice

renders the subsequent order void.

16.8. He also cited R.I. Jebaraj v. Union of India,

wherein the Hon'ble Madras High Court

distinguished the power to ban entry from the

power to expel, holding that in cases of

expulsion of a foreigner already on Indian soil,

notice and opportunity are required, citing the

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (ICCPR).

16.9. Sri K. Aravind Kamath, learned Additional

Solicitor General of India (ASGI), countered

these submissions by asserting the sovereign

nature of the power exercised under the

Foreigners Act, 1946. - 104 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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16.10. The Respondent contends that under Section 3

of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Central

Government possesses absolute, unfettered,

and plenary discretion to expel a foreigner. This

power is an incident of territorial sovereignty

and is not subject to the strictures of natural

justice applicable to citizens.

16.11. The Respondent places strong reliance on the

Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Hans Muller of Nurenburg

v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,

Calcutta. It is submitted that this judgment

unequivocally holds that the Foreigners Act

vests the government with unrestricted power

to expel aliens, and the Constitution does not

fetter this discretion. The fundamental right to

reside and settle in India under Article 19(1)(e)

is not available to foreigners. - 105 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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16.12. The learned ASGI distinguishes Hasan Ali

Raihany v. Union of India on the facts. He

submits that in Hasan Ali, the petitioner

therein had an application for Indian Citizenship

pending and had deep roots in the country

(born in India). The Hon'ble Supreme Court's

direction for a hearing was influenced by the

potential claim to citizenship and long-standing

residence, which is absent in the present case

where the Petitioner is a contractual employee

on a temporary visa.

16.13. Similarly, Mohd. Javed v. Union of India is

distinguished as it involved the family rights of

an Indian citizen (husband) and Indian children,

implicating Article 21 rights of the family unit.

The present Petitioner has no such family ties in

India.

16.14. The Respondent submits that the visa was

procured through fraud and material - 106 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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misrepresentation by the Employer (Company).

The Justification Letter dated 14.12.2017

claimed no Indian was available, but the

Company later admitted in July 2018 that no

advertisement was placed. The Respondent

argues that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Since

the fraud was committed by the Employer, the

SCN was rightly issued to the Employer. The

Petitioner, being a beneficiary of this fraud,

cannot claim equitable relief or a separate

hearing. In cases of fraud, the principles of

natural justice are not required to be stretched

to the point of futility.

16.15. The primary question before this Court is

whether the principles of natural justice,

specifically the right to a pre-decisional hearing,

are absolute and mandatory in the context of

the expulsion of a foreign national holding an

employment visa, particularly when the validity - 107 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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of that visa is questioned on grounds of

misrepresentation.

16.16. It is settled constitutional law that while

foreigners in India enjoy the protection of

Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty)

and Article 14 (Equality before Law), they do

not possess the fundamental rights guaranteed

under Article 19, specifically the right to reside

and settle in any part of the territory of India

[Article 19(1)(e)].

16.17. The locus classicus on this subject is the

Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Hans Muller of Nurenburg

v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,

Calcutta. The Hon'ble Supreme Court

categorically held that the Foreigners Act

confers the power to expel foreigners from

India. It vests the Central Government with

absolute and unfettered discretion and, as there - 108 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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is no provision limiting this discretion, the

Constitution does not fetter this discretion.

16.18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hans Muller

further elucidated that the government has the

right to refuse entry or order expulsion, and

this right is "absolute and unlimited". While the

Petitioner argues that the evolving

jurisprudence under Article 21 dilutes this

principle, Hans Muller remains the binding law

of the land regarding the sovereign power of

the State over aliens. The classification of

foreigners as a distinct class permissible under

Article 14 was also upheld in this judgment.

16.19. The Petitioner's reliance on Hasan Ali Raihany

v. Union of India is misplaced. A careful

reading of that judgment reveals a crucial

factual distinction. In Hasan Ali, the petitioner

was born in India to Iranian parents, had lived

in India for a substantial period, and most - 109 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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importantly, had an application for

naturalisation (citizenship) pending before the

authorities. The Hon'ble Supreme Court invoked

the principles of natural justice in that specific

context, reasoning that a person seeking

citizenship who has lived in the country for

decades cannot be summarily deported without

reasons, as it affects his potential claim to

citizenship.

16.20. Similarly, Mohd. Javed v. Union of India

involved a Pakistani national who was the

spouse of an Indian citizen and mother to two

Indian minor children. The Delhi High Court's

intervention was predicated on the "Right to

Family Life" and the derivative rights of the

Indian family members (husband and children)

under Article 21. The disruption of the family

unit was a central concern. The Petitioner also

cited R.I. Jebaraj v. Union of India, which - 110 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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again deals with the expulsion of a person who

had acquired foreign citizenship but had roots

in India.

16.21. In stark contrast, the Petitioner herein is a

contractual employee of a foreign multinational

subsidiary. He has no claim to Indian

citizenship, nor does his expulsion separate him

from an Indian family. His right to stay is purely

contingent upon the validity of his employment

visa.

16.22. The Respondent has placed substantial material

on record demonstrating that the "Justification

Letter" dated 14.12.2017 submitted by the

Company to obtain the Petitioner's visa

contained a material misrepresentation. The

letter claimed that "no individual with similar

experience and qualification could be found

within India. However, upon inquiry, the

Company admitted in July 2018 that "no - 111 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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advertisements were placed" and they "selected

employees from their existing Australian office".

16.23. This contradiction is fatal. The Employment Visa

regime is designed to protect the domestic

labor market. A declaration that no local talent

is available is a jurisdictional fact for the grant

of the visa. If this declaration is false, the visa

is void ab initio.

16.24. The legal maxim fraus omnia corrumpit (fraud

vitiates everything) applies. When a privilege is

obtained by fraud, the beneficiary cannot claim

a violation of natural justice when that privilege

is withdrawn. Natural justice is not a rigid

formula, If the undisputed facts (here, the

Employer's admission) point to only one

conclusion, the issuance of a notice would be a

"useless formality" theory. The Petitioner's

reliance on Canara Bank v. Debasis Das

regarding strict adherence to notice in - 112 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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administrative matters is distinguishable

because Debasis Das involved a disciplinary

proceeding against an employee where rights

were protected by service regulations. Here,

the Petitioner is a foreigner with no vested

statutory right to stay beyond the pleasure of

the Government.

16.25. Similarly, the reliance on Gorkha Security

Services and UMC Technologies regarding

blacklisting is inapposite. Expulsion is not

blacklisting. Expulsion is the removal of an

unauthorised person. The Petitioner was

unauthorised because the basis of his

authorisation (the Justification Letter) was

found to be false.

16.26. Since the misrepresentation was made by the

Employer, the FRRO correctly issued the Show

Cause Notice to the Employer on 04.06.2019.

The Employer was heard. The Petitioner, whose - 113 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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status is derivative of the Employer's

sponsorship, has no independent ground to

stand on once the sponsorship is found tainted.

To require a separate hearing for every

expatriate employee when the employer admits

to a systemic breach of recruitment norms

would burden the administration unreasonably

and is not required by law.

16.27. I answer Point No.1 by holding that the Leave

India Notice is NOT vitiated for violation of

principles of natural justice. The Petitioner, as a

foreign national on a contractual visa obtained

through misrepresentation, does not enjoy the

same degree of procedural protection as a

citizen or a long-term resident seeking

citizenship. The hearing afforded to the

Employer was sufficient compliance with

fairness, given the nature of the fraud. - 114 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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17. Answer to Point No.2: Whether the issuance of a Leave India Notice during the subsistence of a valid and un-cancelled Employment Visa (E-2) amounts to an impermissible indirect or de facto cancellation of the visa?

17.1. The Petitioner contends that the FRRO lacks the

power to cancel a visa granted by the High

Commission of India. It is urged that by issuing

the Leave India Notice (LIN) while the

Employment Visa (E-2) remained facially valid

until January 2020, the FRRO achieved an

indirect cancellation, thereby violating the

principle that what cannot be done directly

cannot be done indirectly.

17.2. Learned Senior Counsel submits that an

Employment Visa is a sovereign grant issued by

the Ministry of External Affairs through its

diplomatic mission. The FRRO, functioning

under the Ministry of Home Affairs, cannot

override that sovereign act. According to the

Petitioner, issuance of the LIN effectively - 115 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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terminated the visa without adherence to a

formal cancellation proceeding, thereby

depriving him of procedural safeguards.

17.3. Reliance is placed upon K.S. Rashid & Son v.

Income Tax Investigation Commission, to

contend that a statutory authority cannot

achieve indirectly what it lacks power to do

directly. It is argued that if the FRRO cannot

cancel the visa, it cannot neutralise it through

expulsion.

17.4. The Respondents, on the other hand, submit

that the power to issue a Leave India Notice

under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act,

1946 is an independent statutory power,

distinct from the administrative act of visa

issuance, and that such statutory direction

overrides the subsisting visa.

17.5. Learned ASGI submits that a visa is merely an

initial permission to enter the country. - 116 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Continued presence is governed by the

Foreigners Act, 1946. Section 3(2)(c) expressly

empowers the Central Government and its

delegates to direct that a foreigner shall not

remain in India. That power is not conditioned

upon prior cancellation of the visa

endorsement.

17.6. The Petitioner's submission, though at first

blush appears attractive, rests upon a

fundamental misconception of the statutory

scheme governing foreigners in India.

17.7. Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act authorises

the Central Government to make orders

directing that a foreigner "shall not remain in

India." This power is statutory in origin, flowing

directly from Parliamentary legislation; plenary

in nature, not conditioned upon cancellation of

a visa stamp; and overriding in character, - 117 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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inasmuch as it operates irrespective of

administrative permissions previously granted.

17.8. The Foreigners Act, 1946 constitutes a

comprehensive regulatory code concerning

entry, stay and departure of foreigners. The

power under Section 3(2)(c) is preventive and

regulatory, rooted in sovereign control over

territorial presence. The statute does not

prescribe cancellation of a visa as a

jurisdictional precondition to expulsion. To read

such a requirement into the provision would

amount to judicial legislation.

17.9. A visa is a conditional permission to enter. It

does not create a vested right to remain for the

entirety of its duration if statutory conditions

are breached or if public interest so demands.

Acceptance of the Petitioner's argument would

lead to an untenable situation where domestic

authorities would be rendered powerless to - 118 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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remove a foreigner who violates conditions or

becomes undesirable, unless and until a

diplomatic mission abroad formally cancels the

visa. Such a construction would render Section

3(2)(c) nugatory and must be rejected.

17.10. The Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry

of Home Affairs are not competing sovereigns.

They are administrative departments of the

same Central Government. The grant of a visa

and the regulation of continued presence

operate within a coordinated sovereign

framework.

17.11. The reliance on K.S. Rashid & Son is

misplaced. That principle applies where an

authority lacking jurisdiction attempts to

accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly.

In the present case, the FRRO does not purport

to cancel the visa. It exercises a distinct

statutory power of expulsion under Section - 119 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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3(2)(c). The legal source of authority is explicit.

The incidental consequence that the visa

becomes practically ineffective does not

transform a statutory expulsion into a

colourable cancellation.

17.12. It is settled that Article 19 protections are

confined to citizens. In Hans Muller of

Nuremberg v. Superintendent, Presidency

Jail, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a

foreigner cannot claim the freedoms

guaranteed under Article 19. The right to reside

and settle in India is therefore not

constitutionally available to a non-citizen.

17.13. Article 21, however, applies to "persons" and

therefore extends to foreigners. While Article 21

is applicable, a foreigner has no fundamental

right to reside in India. The power of expulsion

is inherent in sovereignty, subject to procedure

established by law. - 120 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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17.14. Post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, such

procedure must be fair, just and reasonable.

Executive action must therefore withstand

scrutiny under Articles 14 and 21.

17.15. Applying the proportionality doctrine articulated

in Modern Dental College v. State of

Madhya Pradesh and reaffirmed in K.S.

Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the

impugned action satisfies constitutional

scrutiny. The objective of regulating foreign

presence is legitimate. The direction to leave is

rationally connected to that objective. No less

restrictive measure would achieve removal

where continued stay is impermissible. The

impact is limited to termination of territorial

presence and does not entail penal

consequences. The balance clearly favours

sovereign regulatory interest. - 121 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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17.16. The contention regarding violation of natural

justice must be examined contextually.

Principles of audi alteram partem are flexible

and not rigid. In Maneka Gandhi, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court recognised that a pre-decisional

hearing is not an invariable constitutional

mandate in every context.

17.17. In matters of immigration control, closely

connected with sovereignty and public order,

Parliament has not prescribed a mandatory

adjudicatory hearing prior to issuance of an

order under Section 3(2)(c). In Hans Muller,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not read such a

requirement into the statute.

17.18. Where power is preventive and regulatory,

particularly concerning non-citizens, fairness

may be satisfied through contextual

safeguards, including availability of post-

decisional representation and judicial review - 122 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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under Article 226. The existence of

constitutional oversight serves as a significant

check against abuse.

17.19. The action must also withstand scrutiny under

Article 14. In Shayara Bano v. Union of

India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised

"manifest arbitrariness" as a ground of

invalidation. Manifest arbitrariness denotes

capriciousness, irrationality, absence of

determining principle, or bad faith.

17.20. The Leave India Notice in the present case is

traceable to statutory authority, issued by a

competent delegate, and aligned with the

legislative scheme. There is no material

suggesting mala fides, discrimination, or

extraneous considerations. The action does not

cross the threshold of manifest arbitrariness.

17.21. Deportation is universally recognised as an

incident of national sovereignty. Visa - 123 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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permission does not confer an irrevocable right

to remain; it remains subordinate to statutory

power of removal.

17.22. Viewed cumulatively, under statutory

construction, constitutional doctrine,

proportionality analysis, contextual natural

justice, and Article 14 review, the Petitioner's

contention cannot be sustained.

17.23. The Leave India Notice is not an indirect

cancellation of the visa. It is a direct exercise of

statutory authority under Section 3(2)(c) of the

Foreigners Act, 1946. The visa does not create

an indefeasible right to remain immune from

that power. Articles 14 and 21 are not violated,

and Article 19 is inapplicable.

17.24. Accordingly, the issuance of the Leave India

Notice during the subsistence of the

Employment Visa does not amount to an - 124 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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impermissible indirect or de facto cancellation

of the visa.

17.25. I answer Point No.2 by holding that the

issuance of a Leave India Notice during the

subsistence of a visa does NOT amount to an

impermissible indirect cancellation. It is a

lawful, independent exercise of the power

under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act,

1946, which overrides the permission granted

by the visa.

18. Answer to Point No.3: Does the Foreign Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) possess statutory jurisdiction to issue a Leave India Notice?

18.1. The Petitioner argues that the FRRO has no

jurisdiction to issue the LIN as the Act vests

power in the "Central Government". They claim

there is no specific notification delegating this

power to the FRRO. - 125 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.2. Sri Raghavan argues that under Section 3 of

the Foreigners Act, the power to make orders is

vested in the Central Government. While

Section 12 allows delegation, such delegation

must be express and specific. The Petitioner

contends that no notification exists that

explicitly authorises the FRRO to issue an order

under Section 3(2)(c) to expel a foreigner

holding a valid visa.

18.3. The Respondent relies on Notification S.O.

3310(E) and others which designate the FRRO

as the "Civil Authority" and delegate powers

under Section 3.

18.4. The Respondent produced the relevant

notifications issued by the Ministry of Home

Affairs, specifically Notification S.O. 590(E) and

subsequent amendments, which appoint the

FRRO as the Civil Authority for the jurisdiction

of Bengaluru. - 126 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.5. The learned ASGI submits that as the Civil

Authority, the FRRO is empowered to regulate

the movement and stay of foreigners.

Furthermore, the specific direction in this case

came from the Joint Director (Immigration),

who holds delegated power from the Central

Government via GSR 605(E).

18.6. The FRRO is not merely a record-keeper. Under

the Foreigners Order, 1948, the "Civil

Authority" is vested with significant powers to

regulate the movement and stay of foreigners.

Paragraph 11 of the Foreigners Order

empowers the Civil Authority to direct a

foreigner to comply with conditions regarding

their place of residence and movements.

18.7. Furthermore, Section 12 of the Foreigners

Act authorizes the Central Government to

delegate its powers. By various notifications,

including S.O. 590 (E) and subsequent - 127 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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notifications defining the jurisdiction of FRROs,

the powers of the Central Government to

regulate the continued presence of foreigners

have been delegated to the FRROs.

18.8. Specifically, the Respondent has produced the

official file showing that the decision to issue

the LIN was processed through the Bureau of

Immigration (BoI), which is the apex

immigration body. The FRRO, as the regional

head of the BoI, exercises these delegated

powers. To suggest that the FRRO lacks

jurisdiction is to ignore the entire administrative

framework of immigration control in India. The

FRRO is the statutory authority on the ground

empowered to execute the orders of the Central

Government.

18.9. The Petitioner has mounted a jurisdictional

challenge to the issuance of the Leave India

Notice (LIN), contending that the Foreign - 128 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) lacks

statutory competence to exercise the power

under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act,

1946. It is urged that the power to make orders

under Section 3 is vested exclusively in the

"Central Government" and that any exercise of

such power by the FRRO must be supported by

a specific and express delegation. According to

the Petitioner, no notification has been

produced that explicitly authorises the FRRO to

direct a foreigner not to remain in India,

particularly in circumstances where the

foreigner holds a facially valid visa.

18.10. This contention requires careful examination of

the statutory framework, the scheme of

delegation under the Act, and the constitutional

doctrine governing delegated authority. - 129 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.11. The Foreigners Act, 1946 is a comprehensive

legislation enacted to regulate the entry,

presence, and departure of foreigners in India.

18.12. Section 3 is reproduced hereunder for easy

reference:

3. Power to make orders.-(1) The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating for restricting the entry of foreigners into [India) or their departure therefrom or their presence or continued presence therein

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner-

(a) shall not enter [India), or shall enter (India) only at such times and by such route and at such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on arrival as may be prescribed

(b) shall not depart from [India), or shall depart only at such times and by such route and from such port or place and subject to the observance of such conditions on departure as may be prescribed,

(c) shall not remain in India), or in any prescribed area therein,

(cc) shall, if he has been required by order under this section not to remain in India, meet from any resources at his disposal the cost of his removal from India and of his maintenance therein pending such removal.

(d) shall remove himself to, and remain in, such area in India) as may be prescribed

(e) shall comply with such conditions as may be prescribed or specified-

(i) requiring him to reside in a particular places - 130 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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(ii) imposing any restrictions on his movements

(iii) requiring him to furnish such proof of his identity and to report such particulars to such authority in such manner and at time and place as may be prescribed or specified,

(iv) requiring him to allow his photograph and finger impressions to be taken and to furnish specimens of his handwriting and signature to such authority and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified;

(v) requiring him to submit himself to such medical examination by such authority and at such time and place as may be prescribed or specified

(vi) prohibiting him from association with persons of a prescribed on specified description,

(vii) prohibiting him from engaging in activities of a prescribed or specified description:

(viii) prohibiting him from using or possessing prescribed on specified articles;

(ix) otherwise regulating his conduct in any such particular as may be prescribed or specified;

(f) shall enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of or as an alternative to the enforcement of, any or all prescribed or specified restrictions or conditions,

(g) shall be arrested and detained or confined

and may make provision for any matter which is to be or may be prescribed and] for such incidental and supplementary matters as may, in the opinion of the Central Government, be expedient or necessary for giving effect to this Act.

(3) Any authority prescribed in this behalf may with respect to any particular foreigner make orders under clause (e) for clause (fil of sub section (2).

18.13. Section 3 confers wide regulatory powers upon

the Central Government. Sub-section (2)

enumerates illustrative categories of orders that - 131 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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may be made, including, under clause (c), an

order that a foreigner "shall not remain in

India." The language of the provision is broad,

and its purpose is clear: to preserve sovereign

control over the territorial presence of non-

citizens.

18.14. However, the Act does not contemplate that the

Central Government must personally or directly

issue every individual order affecting a

foreigner. Recognising the practical necessity of

decentralised implementation, Parliament

enacted Section 12, which expressly authorises

the Central Government to direct, by

notification, that any power conferred by or

under the Act may be exercised by such officer

or authority as may be specified. Delegation is

therefore not incidental to the statutory

scheme; it is embedded within it as an essential

mechanism for operational enforcement. - 132 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.15. The Respondents have produced notifications

issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs,

including Notification S.O. 590(E), S.O.

3310(E), and subsequent amendments,

whereby the FRRO is appointed as the "Civil

Authority" for specified territorial jurisdictions,

including Bengaluru. These notifications are

issued in exercise of powers under Section 12

of the Act and operate in conjunction with the

Foreigners Order, 1948.

18.16. The Foreigners Order, 1948, issued under

Section 3, defines "Civil Authority" as such

authority as may be appointed by the Central

Government. The Order further confers upon

the Civil Authority substantive powers to

regulate movement, residence, reporting

obligations, and compliance with conditions

imposed upon foreigners. Paragraph 11

empowers the Civil Authority to issue directions - 133 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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concerning residence and movement, and to

ensure enforcement of statutory requirements.

18.17. The statutory structure is thus layered and

coherent:

18.17.1. Parliament confers substantive power

upon the Central Government under

Section 3.

18.17.2. Parliament expressly authorises

delegation under Section 12.

18.17.3. The Central Government, by notification,

appoints the Civil Authority for defined

jurisdictions.

18.17.4. The Foreigners Order, 1948

operationalises the role and authority of

such Civil Authority.

18.18. The FRRO, by virtue of the notifications on

record, functions as the Civil Authority within its

territorial domain. Its authority is neither - 134 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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implied nor assumed; it is expressly conferred

through statutory delegation.

18.19. The Petitioner's submission that the delegation

must specifically enumerate each sub-clause of

Section 3(2) is unsustainable. Delegation of

powers under Section 3, unless expressly

restricted, extends to the powers contained

therein. The notifications produced do not

impose any limitation curtailing the FRRO's

competence to exercise clause (c). Once the

power under Section 3 stands delegated, the

delegate may exercise it within the statutory

framework.

18.20. The records further reveal that the impugned

decision was processed through the Bureau of

Immigration (BoI), functioning under the

Ministry of Home Affairs. The FRRO operates as

the regional head within this administrative

hierarchy. The decision-making chain involved - 135 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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supervisory consideration at the level of the

Joint Director (Immigration), who exercises

authority under delegated notifications such as

GSR 605(E). This demonstrates that the

impugned action was not a unilateral or isolated

exercise but part of an integrated

administrative framework.

18.21. The challenge to jurisdiction must also be

examined against constitutional principles

governing delegation.

18.22. While essential legislative functions cannot be

abdicated, Parliament may delegate to the

executive the power to implement and

administer the legislative policy, provided that

the policy and guiding principles are clearly laid

down.

18.23. The Foreigners Act satisfies this constitutional

requirement. The legislative policy, regulation

of foreigners and preservation of sovereign - 136 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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control, is explicitly articulated. Section 3

enumerates the nature and scope of

permissible orders. Section 12 expressly

authorises delegation. The discretion conferred

is structured by statutory purpose and subject

to judicial review.

18.24. Delegation that is guided by legislative

standards and confined to execution of policy

would have to be upheld. The power exercised

by the FRRO under Section 3(2)(c) is executive

and administrative; it does not entail

formulation of new legislative norms but

enforcement of existing statutory commands.

18.25. Immigration control, by its very nature,

requires decentralised execution. The Central

Government cannot practically adjudicate every

individual case across the country. Delegation

to field-level authorities such as the FRRO is not

merely permissible; it is administratively - 137 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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indispensable. Such delegation remains subject

to statutory limits, executive supervision, and

constitutional review under Article 226.

18.26. The Petitioner's argument, if accepted, would

paralyse the statutory framework. It would

require the Central Government at the apex

level to personally issue every expulsion order,

defeating the legislative intent underlying

Section 12. Courts must construe statutes in a

manner that furthers, rather than frustrates,

legislative purpose.

18.27. Jurisdictional validity must ultimately be tested

on three planes:

18.27.1. Statutory Authority: Section 3 confers

the substantive power; Section 12

authorises delegation. - 138 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.27.2. Valid Delegation: Notifications appoint

the FRRO as Civil Authority for the

concerned jurisdiction.

18.27.3. Exercise Within Limits: The impugned

action was taken within territorial and

statutory bounds, under supervisory

administrative structure.

18.28. All three conditions are satisfied in the present

case.

18.29. The FRRO, acting as the delegated Civil

Authority under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and

the Foreigners Order, 1948, therefore

possesses statutory jurisdiction to issue a Leave

India Notice. The delegation is constitutionally

valid, statutorily authorised, administratively

structured, and subject to judicial control.

18.30. The impugned action thus cannot be invalidated

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. - 139 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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18.31. I answer Point No.3 by holding that the Foreign

Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) possesses

the statutory jurisdiction to issue a Leave India

Notice, acting as the delegated Civil Authority

under the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the

Foreigners Order, 1948.

19. Answer to Point No. 4: Whether the power under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, to direct a foreigner "not to remain in India" vests exclusively in the Central Government or its duly authorised delegate?.

and

Answer to Point No. 4:Whether an internal communication or direction issued by the Joint Director (Immigration) can constitute a lawful delegation or authorisation under the Foreigners Act?

19.1. The Petitioner contends that the delegation was

only to the Joint Director (Immigration) via

Notification GSR 605(E), and the Joint Director

could not "sub-delegate" this to the FRRO. - 140 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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19.2. It is submitted that the maxim delegatus non

potest delegare applies. If the Central

Government delegated the power of expulsion

to the Joint Director, the Joint Director must

exercise it personally. He cannot pass it down

to the FRRO.

19.3. Further, the instruction to issue the LIN was an

unpublished internal note. Relying on Harla v.

State of Rajasthan, the Petitioner argues that

secret orders or internal notes cannot have the

force of law to affect the rights of individuals.

The delegation must be published in the Official

Gazette to be valid.

19.4. Reliance is also placed on I.T.C.

Bhadrachalam Paperboards v. Mandal

Revenue Officer, to argue that where a

statute requires a particular mode of publication

(Gazette), non-compliance renders the order

void. - 141 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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19.5. The Respondent argues that the FRRO acted

under the direct instruction of the Joint

Director. This is not sub-delegation but

execution.

19.6. The learned ASGI clarifies that the decision was

taken by the Joint Director (Immigration) based

on the inquiry report. The Joint Director then

instructed the FRRO to issue the notice. This is

a standard administrative hierarchy where the

superior takes the decision and the subordinate

executes it.

19.7. Regarding Harla and ITC Bhadrachalam, the

Respondent submits that internal administrative

orders directing a subordinate to issue a notice

do not require gazetting. Only statutory rules

and notifications of general application require

publication. - 142 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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19.8. The Petitioner's argument suffers from a

confusion between "legislative delegation" and

"administrative execution".

19.8.1. Delegation: The Central Government

delegated power to the Joint Director

(BoI) via GSR 605(E). This is a valid

statutory delegation.

19.8.2. Execution: The Joint Director, having

taken the decision that the Petitioner

must leave, instructed the FRRO (his

subordinate officer) to issue the formal

notice. This is not delegatus non potest

delegare. It is the performance of a duty

through the machinery of the

department. The decision was taken by

the competent delegate (Joint

Director/MHA). The FRRO merely - 143 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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communicated and enforced that

decision.

19.9. The reliance on Harla v. State of Rajasthan is

legally untenable in this context. Harla dealt

with the non-publication of a penal statute

(Opium Act) which created general criminal

liability for the public. A law that creates

offences must be published.

19.10. Similarly, I.T.C. Bhadrachalam Paperboards

dealt with a power to grant tax exemptions

which required Gazette notification by the

explicit terms of the statute.

19.11. However, an internal file noting or an

administrative instruction from a superior

officer to a subordinate to issue a specific order

against a specific individual is not a law. It is an

executive instruction. There is no requirement

in the General Clauses Act or the Constitution - 144 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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that internal administrative hierarchies and

case-specific instructions be gazetted. The

"Law" (Foreigners Act) is published. The

"Order" (LIN) was served on the Petitioner. The

internal processing of that order is privileged

administrative business.

19.12. Section 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 vests

substantive power in the Central Government to

regulate the presence of foreigners. Section 12

expressly authorises delegation of that power.

Pursuant to statutory notifications, including

GSR 605(E), powers under Section 3 stand

delegated within the immigration hierarchy. The

Joint Director (Immigration), functioning within

the Bureau of Immigration under the Ministry of

Home Affairs, is one such delegate.

19.13. The question, however, is not whether there

was valid delegation from the Central

Government to the Joint Director, that position - 145 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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stands supported by notification, but whether

the act of the FRRO issuing the LIN pursuant to

instructions from the Joint Director constitutes

impermissible sub-delegation.

19.14. The records indicate that the decision that the

Petitioner ought not to remain in India was

taken at the level of the Joint Director

(Immigration) upon consideration of the inquiry

materials. The FRRO was thereafter instructed

to issue and serve the formal notice. The FRRO

did not independently assume the power to

expel; it acted within the administrative chain

to communicate and implement the decision

taken by the competent authority.

19.15. The maxim delegatus non potest delegare

applies where a delegate attempts to transfer

decision-making authority to another who is not

authorised by statute. It does not prohibit

performance of ministerial or procedural acts - 146 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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through subordinate officers within an

administrative hierarchy.

19.16. Administrative functioning necessarily operates

through departmental machinery. Decision-

making and execution are conceptually distinct.

The authority who takes the decision may

utilise subordinates for communication, service,

drafting, or enforcement. Such acts do not

constitute sub-delegation of statutory power.

19.17. The present case falls squarely within this

distinction. The Joint Director, being a statutory

delegate under GSR 605(E), exercised the

decision-making authority. The FRRO, acting

within the established hierarchy, carried out the

implementation. This is administrative

execution, not legislative or statutory sub-

delegation.

19.18. The reliance placed upon Harla v. State of

Rajasthan is misplaced. In Harla, the Hon'ble - 147 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Supreme Court dealt with the non-publication

of a penal law that created general criminal

liability. The Court held that a law which

imposes obligations upon the public must be

promulgated to acquire enforceability. The case

concerned absence of publication of a statute

affecting the general public.

19.19. Similarly, in I.T.C. Bhadrachalam

Paperboards, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

considered a statutory requirement mandating

Gazette notification for grant of tax exemption.

The statute itself prescribed publication as a

condition precedent to validity.

19.20. The present matter stands on a fundamentally

different footing. The Foreigners Act and the

relevant delegation notifications are duly

published. The Leave India Notice itself was

served upon the Petitioner. The internal file

movement, deliberations, and administrative - 148 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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directions between superior and subordinate

officers do not constitute "law" or "legislation."

They are components of executive decision-

making in an individual case.

19.21. There exists no constitutional or statutory

mandate requiring that every internal

administrative instruction or case-specific

direction be published in the Official Gazette. To

require gazetting of intra-departmental

communications would paralyse governance

and disregard the practical necessities of

executive administration.

19.22. The "law" in this case is the Foreigners Act,

1946, read with valid delegation notifications.

The "order" affecting the Petitioner is the Leave

India Notice, which was duly issued and served.

The internal instruction from the Joint Director

to the FRRO forms part of privileged - 149 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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administrative processing and does not

independently require publication.

19.23. It must also be noted that the power under

Section 3(2)(c) vests either in the Central

Government or in its duly authorised delegate.

Once validly delegated, the delegate acts in the

name and authority of the Central Government.

The exercise of power within that delegated

structure does not require personal issuance of

every communication by the highest officer in

the chain.

19.24. Administrative law recognises the distinction

between:

19.24.1. Delegation of power, which must be

authorised by statute and, where

required, notified; and

19.24.2. Administrative implementation,

which may be carried out through - 150 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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subordinate officers within a structured

hierarchy.

19.25. The Petitioner's argument collapses this

distinction and treats every act of execution as

impermissible sub-delegation. Such an

approach is unsustainable.

19.26. In the present case:

19.26.1. The power under Section 3(2)(c) stands

validly delegated under statutory

notification.

19.26.2. The decision was taken by a competent

delegate within the immigration

hierarchy.

19.26.3. The FRRO acted pursuant to that

decision in execution of departmental

authority. - 151 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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19.26.4. No statutory requirement mandates

Gazette publication of case-specific

internal directions.

19.26.5. The Leave India Notice itself was

formally issued and communicated to the

Petitioner.

19.27. Accordingly, the instruction from the Joint

Director (Immigration) to the FRRO constitutes

a lawful administrative direction for execution

of a statutory decision. It does not amount to

impermissible sub-delegation. Nor does it suffer

from invalidity on account of absence of

Gazette publication.

19.28. The power under Section 3(2)(c) is therefore

validly exercised through the duly authorised

administrative hierarchy.

19.29. I answers to Points 4 and 5 by holding that the

power under Section 3(2)(c) was validly - 152 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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exercised. The instruction from the Joint

Director to the FRRO constitutes a lawful

administrative direction for the execution of a

statutory order and does not amount to

impermissible sub-delegation. Such internal

communications need not be gazetted.

20. Answer to Point No.6: Whether the impugned LIN suffers from arbitrariness and non- application of mind?

20.1. The Petitioner argues arbitrariness based on the

dates: LIN dated 01.05.2019, SCN to Employer

dated 04.06.2019. They argue the decision was

pre-judged.

20.2. Sri Raghavan points out the glaring anomaly

the decision to expel the Petitioner (LIN) was

taken on May 1st, but the Show Cause Notice

asking the Employer to explain the fraud was

issued on June 4th. This chronology proves that

the Respondents had already decided to expel

the Petitioner before even hearing the - 153 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Employer's version. This amounts to a "post-

decisional hearing" which is a farce is his

submission.

20.3. The Respondent clarifies that the inquiry began

in 2018. The facts (misrepresentation) were

admitted by the Company in July 2018. The

decision was based on those earlier admissions.

20.4. The learned ASGI submits that the dates must

be read in context. The FRRO had been

corresponding with the Company since July

2018. The Company admitted in its letter dated

26.07.2018 that "no advertisements were

placed". This admission crystallised the fraud.

The decision to issue the LIN was based on this

admission from 2018. The SCN in June 2019

was a separate proceeding regarding the

Company's liability, distinct from the decision

regarding the Petitioner's visa. - 154 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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20.5. This contention of the Learned Senior Counsel

for the Petitioner, at first glance, appears to

raise a legitimate procedural concern. However,

when the factual matrix is examined in its

entirety, the argument does not withstand

scrutiny.

20.6. The Respondents have placed material on

record demonstrating that the inquiry did not

commence in May 2019. The process began

much earlier. In December 2017, the Employer

submitted a justification letter asserting that no

suitable Indian candidate was available for the

position for which the Petitioner was recruited.

This assertion formed the basis of the

employment visa grant.

20.7. In July 2018, the FRRO initiated

correspondence seeking clarification regarding

the recruitment process. In response, by

communication dated 26.07.2018, the - 155 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Employer admitted that no advertisements had

been placed to assess availability of Indian

candidates. This admission was not equivocal; it

directly contradicted the earlier representation

that no suitable Indian candidate was available

after due effort.

20.8. This sequence of events is significant. The

discrepancy between the 2017 justification and

the 2018 admission was not speculative; it was

documentary. Once the Employer conceded that

no advertisement was placed, the foundation of

the justification letter stood eroded. The

inference of misrepresentation was not a

matter of conjecture but arose from the

Employer's own written admission.

20.9. The decision-making process must therefore be

evaluated in light of this chronology: - 156 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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20.9.1. December 2017: Justification letter

claiming non-availability of Indian

candidates.

20.9.2. July 2018: Admission that no

advertisement was placed.

20.9.3. Post-July 2018: Evaluation of the

implications of that admission.

20.9.4. May 2019: Issuance of Leave India

Notice.

20.9.5. June 2019: Separate Show Cause Notice

to the Employer.

20.9.6. By May 2019, the authorities were in

possession of undisputed documentary

material establishing inconsistency

between representation and reality. The

LIN was thus not an impulsive or sudden

action; it followed a period of inquiry

extending over several months. - 157 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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20.10. The issuance of the Show Cause Notice to the

Employer in June 2019 must be understood in

its proper context. The proceedings concerning

the Petitioner's visa status and those

concerning the Employer's potential liability or

future eligibility under the visa regime are not

necessarily co-extensive. Immigration

enforcement action against a foreign national

may proceed independently of administrative or

penal consequences against the sponsoring

entity.

20.11. The Petitioner's argument presumes that both

proceedings must move together and that

expulsion cannot precede formal adjudication of

employer liability. The statute does not impose

such sequencing. The integrity of the visa

regime is compromised the moment material

misrepresentation is established. The regulatory

response concerning the foreign national is - 158 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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distinct from any collateral action against the

Employer.

20.12. Arbitrariness, in constitutional parlance, implies

action that is capricious, irrational, devoid of

relevant material, or taken without application

of mind. The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano

v. Union of India explained that "manifest

arbitrariness" denotes action that lacks a

determining principle or is excessive and

disproportionate.

20.13. In the present case, the impugned LIN is

traceable to a clearly identifiable factual basis,

admission of procedural non-compliance in

recruitment. The authorities did not act on

suspicion alone; they relied upon documentary

admission from the Employer. The decision was

therefore anchored in relevant material.

20.14. The allegation of non-application of mind must

also be rejected. Non-application of mind arises - 159 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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where the authority fails to consider relevant

material, considers irrelevant material, or acts

mechanically without discernible reasoning.

Here, the material forming the basis of the

action is evident from the record. The

chronology reflects a period of inquiry,

correspondence, and evaluation before issuance

of the LIN.

20.15. The mere fact that the Show Cause Notice to

the Employer bears a later date does not

invalidate the prior decision concerning the

Petitioner's visa. Administrative processes do

not always unfold in a linear or symmetrical

fashion. What is material is whether the

authority possessed sufficient material at the

time of decision. The record indicates that it

did.

20.16. Nor can the argument of "pre-judging" be

accepted in the absence of evidence of closed- - 160 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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mindedness. The decision appears to have been

taken after crystallisation of the discrepancy in

July 2018 and subsequent administrative

assessment. The interval between July 2018

and May 2019 itself indicates deliberation

rather than haste.

20.17. It must also be borne in mind that immigration

control is regulatory in nature. Once

misrepresentation underlying a visa is

established, continued stay loses its legal

foundation. The objective of protecting the

integrity of the visa regime constitutes a

legitimate state interest. The action taken bears

rational nexus to that objective.

20.18. Arbitrariness arises when an action is capricious

or lacks a rational basis. Here, the basis is

crystal clear and rational - Visa Fraud.

20.19. Delay in service or sequencing of notices,

without demonstrable prejudice, does not ipso - 161 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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facto establish arbitrariness. The Petitioner has

not demonstrated that relevant material was

ignored or that extraneous considerations

influenced the decision.

20.20. Viewed holistically, the impugned Leave India

Notice does not suffer from arbitrariness or

non-application of mind. It is founded upon

documentary material, processed through

administrative hierarchy, and directed towards

preserving the integrity of the immigration

framework.

20.21. I answer Point No.6: The impugned LIN does

NOT suffer from arbitrariness. It was based on

relevant material--the Employer's admission of

irregular recruitment--which constitutes a

rational nexus to the objective of protecting

national interests and the integrity of the visa

regime. - 162 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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21. Answer to Point No. 7: Whether allegations of fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of an Employment Visa can be acted upon by the FRRO without prior adjudication by the visa-issuing authority?

21.1. The Petitioner argues that only the High

Commission (Visa Issuer) can determine if the

visa was obtained by fraud. The FRRO cannot

usurp this adjudicatory function.

21.2. It is submitted that fraud is a mixed question of

law and fact. The determination that the

Justification Letter was fraudulent requires a

judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry by the authority

that accepted the letter (the High Commission).

The FRRO, acting unilaterally, cannot declare a

document submitted to another authority as

fraudulent.

21.3. The Respondent argues that the FRRO is the

domestic enforcement authority and can act on

fraud detected within India. - 163 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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21.4. The learned ASGI submits that the FRRO is the

"eyes and ears" of the Government. If an alien

is found in India with a visa obtained by fraud,

the FRRO is statutorily bound to act. There is

no legal requirement to refer the matter back

to the foreign mission, which would cause

indefinite delays and compromise national

security.

21.5. This submission by the Learned Senior Counsel

for the Petitioner, though framed as a

jurisdictional restraint, misconceives the nature

of immigration control and the statutory role of

domestic enforcement authorities.

21.6. A visa is granted abroad by a diplomatic

mission of India, functioning under the Ministry

of External Affairs. However, once the foreign

national enters Indian territory, regulatory

jurisdiction over his continued stay shifts to

domestic authorities acting under the - 164 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Foreigners Act, 1946 as also the state

authorities, our country being federal.

21.7. The Act does not create a bifurcated

sovereignty in which the visa-issuing authority

retains exclusive competence to determine

validity of representations or action even after

entry.

21.8. The Foreigners Act confers upon the Central

Government, and through valid delegation, its

domestic authorities, the power to regulate,

restrict, and if necessary terminate the

presence of foreigners within India. The FRRO

functions as the field-level statutory authority

responsible for monitoring compliance with visa

conditions, detecting irregularities, and

enforcing immigration control.

21.9. The Respondents submit that the FRRO acts as

the "eyes and ears" of the Government within

the territorial jurisdiction of India. This - 165 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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characterisation is not rhetorical but statutory

in substance. The detection of

misrepresentation after entry falls squarely

within the operational domain of domestic

immigration authorities. To hold otherwise

would create an artificial and impractical

distinction between grant of entry and

enforcement of conditions.

21.10. The Petitioner's argument implies that even if

fraud is detected on Indian soil, through

documentary admission or otherwise, the FRRO

must refer the matter back to the overseas

mission and await formal adjudication. Such a

proposition finds no support in the statute. The

Foreigners Act does not mandate referral to the

visa-issuing authority as a condition precedent

to regulatory action under Section 3(2)(c). This

is also impracticable and illogical since the

Petitioner against whom action is to be initiated - 166 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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would be residing in India, whereas the

determination would occur by the Indian High

Commission in Australia.

21.11. Looked at from any angale, once the visa has

been granted and the individual has entered

India, the diplomatic mission becomes functus

officio with respect to territorial regulation. The

jurisdiction to monitor compliance with visa

conditions and to respond to violations vests in

the domestic authorities, namely the Ministry of

Home Affairs and its delegates.

21.12. The argument that fraud requires a judicial or

quasi-judicial declaration also requires careful

scrutiny. The present matter does not involve

criminal prosecution for fraud under the Penal

Code. It concerns administrative satisfaction

that the foundation upon which the visa was

obtained stands vitiated by misrepresentation.

Administrative authorities are competent to act - 167 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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upon documentary material and admissions in

forming such satisfaction, subject to judicial

review.

21.13. In the present case, the material relied upon by

the authorities includes the Employer's own

written admission that no advertisements were

placed, contrary to the representation made in

the justification letter. The inference of

misrepresentation is therefore not speculative;

it is drawn from admitted facts. The FRRO did

not embark upon a roving adjudication of

complex disputed facts; it acted upon

documentary inconsistency apparent on record.

21.14. The Ho'ble Supreme Court in S.P.

Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath

observed that fraud vitiates all solemn acts and

that a person who approaches a forum with

falsehood cannot retain advantage obtained

thereby. Although that decision arose in the - 168 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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context of civil proceedings, the underlying

principle is of general application: an act

obtained by fraud is voidable at the instance of

the authority competent to regulate the subject

matter.

21.15. A visa obtained through material

misrepresentation does not acquire immunity

merely because it was initially granted by a

diplomatic mission. The regulatory authority

empowered to supervise continued stay must

necessarily possess the incidental power to act

when foundational representations are shown

to be false.

21.16. If the Petitioner's argument were accepted, it

would produce grave and untenable

administrative consequences. Consider a

scenario where a foreign national suppresses a

criminal antecedent, or where an employer

fabricates material facts to secure an - 169 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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employment visa, and the falsity is detected

after the individual has entered India. If

domestic authorities were compelled to refer

the matter back to the overseas mission and

await fresh adjudication, the following

consequences would inevitably ensue:

21.16.1. Indefinite delay: Diplomatic

correspondence across jurisdictions,

examination of records abroad, and re-

evaluation by the issuing mission would

consume considerable time. The statute

does not contemplate suspension of

enforcement pending such protracted

inter-governmental communication.

21.16.2. Undermining of domestic

enforcement: The statutory authority

charged with monitoring foreigners

within India would be rendered - 170 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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powerless to act promptly upon material

irregularity discovered within its

territorial jurisdiction.

21.16.3. Compromise of public order and

national security: Immigration control

is integrally linked with internal security.

Delay in response to detected

misrepresentation could expose the

State to avoidable risk.

21.16.4. Frustration of legislative intent:

Section 3(2)(c) would be rendered

ineffective if its invocation were

conditioned upon a prior overseas re-

determination by the issuing mission.

21.17. A further and more immediate difficulty arises,

what would be the legal status of such a foreign

national during the interregnum? If referral to

the overseas mission were mandatory, and if - 171 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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domestic authorities were disabled from acting

pending that decision, the individual would, in

effect, continue to remain in India under a

cloud of established misrepresentation.

21.18. Two possibilities then emerge, neither of which

is constitutionally or administratively tenable.

21.18.1. First, the person would be permitted to

remain at large, notwithstanding credible

material indicating that the visa was

procured by fraud. This would amount to

conscious toleration of illegality and

erosion of regulatory discipline.

21.18.2. Second, the person would be placed

under restraint or detention pending

foreign adjudication. Such detention, in

the absence of a domestic statutory

determination under Section 3, would

itself raise serious constitutional - 172 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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concerns under Article 21, for preventive

custody cannot be justified merely on

the basis of administrative uncertainty.

21.19. Thus, the Petitioner's proposed procedural

sequencing leads either to regulatory paralysis

or to disproportionate coercive restraint. Both

outcomes are inconsistent with the statutory

design of the Foreigners Act, which empowers

domestic authorities to act decisively and

proportionately within their jurisdiction.

21.20. The statute contemplates that the authority

responsible for regulating presence within India

must also possess the incidental power to

respond to discovered illegality. It would be

incongruous to hold that domestic authorities

may detect fraud but must suspend action until

validation from a foreign post is secured.

21.21. The interpretation urged by the Petitioner is

therefore not merely impractical; it is - 173 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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structurally incompatible with the statutory

framework and constitutional balance.

21.22. Accordingly, the power of the domestic

authority to act upon fraud detected within

India cannot be made contingent upon prior

adjudication by the visa-issuing mission.

21.23. Immigration control is dynamic and territorial.

The authority responsible for enforcement

within India must necessarily possess the

competence to act upon fraud detected within

its jurisdiction.

21.24. It is also important to distinguish between

cancellation of a visa as an administrative

endorsement and termination of stay under

statutory power. The FRRO did not purport to

"cancel" the visa stamp issued by the High

Commission. It exercised statutory power under

the Foreigners Act to direct that the foreigner

shall not remain in India. The two operate at - 174 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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different legal planes. The existence of

misrepresentation provided the factual basis for

invoking statutory power; it did not require

prior formal cancellation by the issuing mission.

21.25. The determination made by the FRRO is

administrative in character and subject to

judicial scrutiny. It is not a final criminal

adjudication of fraud; it is a regulatory decision

regarding continued stay. The threshold for

such administrative action is satisfaction based

on relevant material, not proof beyond

reasonable doubt.

21.26. In the present case, the admission by the

Employer in July 2018 constituted relevant and

substantial material. The authorities were

therefore competent to conclude that the

foundation of the visa stood compromised. The

action taken bears rational nexus to the - 175 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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objective of preserving the integrity of the visa

regime.

21.27. Accordingly, there is no statutory requirement

that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation in

procurement of an Employment Visa must first

be adjudicated by the overseas visa-issuing

authority before domestic regulatory action is

taken. The FRRO, acting within the delegated

framework of the Foreigners Act, is competent

to act upon such material when discovered

within India.

21.28. The Petitioner's argument would lead to a

dangerous proposition where domestic security

agencies are powerless to act against visa fraud

detected on Indian soil. The FRRO is the

competent authority to monitor foreigners

within India.

21.29. If a foreigner obtains a visa by suppressing a

criminal record, or as in this case, by the - 176 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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employer suppressing the availability of local

talent, and this fact is discovered after entry,

the FRRO is the competent authority to act. The

High Commission in Canberra is functus officio

once the visa is issued and the person enters

India. The jurisdiction to police the conditions of

the visa shifts to the domestic authorities

(FRRO/MHA).

21.30. I answer Point No. 7 by holding that the

allegations of fraud or misrepresentation can be

validly acted upon by the FRRO. There is no

requirement to refer the matter back to the

overseas visa-issuing authority for adjudication.

22. Answer to Point No, 8: Whether a show-cause notice issued to the employer can satisfy the requirements of natural justice, qua the employee against whom the adverse civil consequence is directed?

22.1. The Petitioner argues he is a separate legal

entity from the Employer and should have been

heard independently. - 177 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.2. It is argued that the Petitioner has distinct

rights. He has a lease, a bank account, and a

reputation in India. The Employer's admission

of fault cannot automatically bind the Petitioner

without him being given a chance to prove his

own bona fides or lack of complicity in the

Employer's fraud.

22.3. The Respondent argues that the visa is an

Employment Visa, inextricably linked to the

sponsorship of the Employer.

22.4. The learned ASGI submits that under the visa

rules, the employee is the "beneficiary" and the

employer is the "petitioner/sponsor". If the

sponsor withdraws support or if the sponsorship

is found invalid, the beneficiary's status

collapses automatically. There is no

independent right to the visa divorced from the

employment. - 178 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.5. The nature of the visa is of importance. An

Employment Visa (E-2) is a sponsored visa. It

is granted not just on the Petitioner's merit, but

on the Employer's certification that the post

cannot be filled by an Indian. The Employer

acts as the agent and sponsor of the Petitioner

for the purpose of the visa application.

22.6. Under the law of agency and the specific rules

of visa sponsorship, the employee stands in the

shoes of the employer regarding the

justification of the post. If the Employer, the

entity solely responsible for the market search,

admits that no search was done, the foundation

of the visa collapses. The Petitioner, as the

employee, cannot plausibly argue that he

knows more about the Company's HR

recruitment processes (advertisements,

interviews of Indians) than the Company itself. - 179 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.7. Therefore, the notice to the Employer was the

correct procedural step. Hearing the Petitioner

would have served no purpose as he could not

contradict the Company's own admission

regarding the lack of advertisements. The

principles of natural justice do not require futile

hearings.

22.8. The employee is the beneficiary of a

sponsorship-based representation made by the

Employer to the visa-issuing authority. The

Employer functions, in effect, as the petitioner

and sponsor, and the visa stands upon the

foundation of the Employer's declarations.

22.9. When the very foundation of that sponsorship is

shown to be defective, through the Employer's

admission that no advertisement was placed

despite a prior representation to the contrary,

the basis upon which the Employment Visa

rests is undermined. - 180 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner has

submitted that the Petitioner ought to have

been heard independently to demonstrate

absence of personal fraud or complicity. This

argument must be evaluated against the nature

of the misrepresentation.

22.11. The alleged fraud in the present case does not

concern falsification of the Petitioner's

educational qualifications or concealment of his

personal antecedents. It concerns the

Employer's certification that no suitable Indian

candidate was available and that due market

search had been conducted. The factual matrix

relating to recruitment, advertisements,

interviews, search process, is exclusively within

the knowledge and control of the Employer. The

employee cannot reasonably claim superior

knowledge regarding the Employer's internal

human resource procedures. - 181 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.12. The Employer, having been issued notice and

having admitted that no advertisement was

placed, effectively conceded the factual premise

on which the visa was justified. Once that

admission was on record, the regulatory

consequence flowed from the collapse of

sponsorship conditions.

22.13. Natural justice requires a meaningful

opportunity to respond to adverse material. It

does not require multiplication of hearings

where the foundational facts are admitted and

lie outside the knowledge domain of the person

seeking separate hearing.

22.14. Principles of natural justice are flexible and

context-dependent. They do not mandate

ritualistic compliance where the outcome would

remain unaltered. A hearing that would serve

no useful purpose need not be insisted upon as

an empty formality. - 182 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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22.15. In the present case, what could the Petitioner

have meaningfully asserted? He could not

dispute whether advertisements were placed;

that fact lay within the Employer's domain and

stood admitted. He could not independently

validate the recruitment process undertaken by

the Company. His lack of personal involvement

in the alleged misrepresentation, even if

assumed, would not revive a visa whose

foundational condition was shown to be

unfulfilled.

22.16. It is also important to distinguish between

culpability and regulatory consequence. The

impugned action does not impose penal liability

upon the Petitioner for fraud. It regulates his

continued stay based upon the collapse of

sponsorship conditions. The absence of

personal wrongdoing does not transform a - 183 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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sponsored visa into an independent right to

remain.

22.17. The Employment Visa regime operates on the

principle that sponsorship validity is a

continuing condition. If sponsorship is

withdrawn, invalidated, or shown to be

fundamentally defective, the beneficiary's

status correspondingly lapses. This is inherent

in the nature of sponsored visas across

immigration systems.

22.18. The Petitioner's argument that he possesses

independent civil attributes, leasehold interest,

bank accounts, professional associations, does

not alter the legal character of the visa. These

are consequences of his presence in India, not

sources of independent entitlement to remain.

22.19. It must further be emphasised that natural

justice is concerned with fairness in decision-

making. The Employer, who was solely - 184 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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responsible for the statutory declaration

forming the basis of the visa, was issued notice

and responded. The factual issue relevant to

the visa, whether due recruitment process was

undertaken, was addressed at the appropriate

source. Once that issue was clarified through

the Employer's admission, there remained no

separate factual controversy requiring

independent adjudication vis-à-vis the

Petitioner.

22.20. The principles of natural justice do not compel

authorities to conduct parallel inquiries where

the material facts stand admitted by the party

exclusively competent to speak to them.

22.21. Accordingly, in cases of Employment Visa

sponsorship where the alleged

misrepresentation pertains to the Employer's

statutory declarations, issuance of a show-

cause notice to the Employer satisfies the - 185 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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procedural requirement of fairness. The

beneficiary employee cannot claim an additional

independent hearing where the determinative

facts lie beyond his personal domain and stand

admitted by the sponsor.

22.22. The impugned action therefore does not suffer

from violation of natural justice on this ground.

22.23. I answer Point No. 8 by holding that a show-

cause notice issued to the employer satisfies

the requirements of natural justice qua the

employee in cases of Employment Visa fraud

where the misrepresentation relates to the

employer's statutory declarations (Justification

Letter).

23. Answer to Point No. 9: Whether the writ petition has been rendered infructuous or academic on account of the petitioner's exit from India, expiry of the Employment Visa, and subsequent grant of business and tourist visas, or whether the impugned LIN continues to have civil, reputational, or legal consequences warranting judicial review? - 186 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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23.1. The Petitioner argues the petition is not

infructuous because of the "stigma" affecting

future travel.

23.2. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner

submits that the LIN is a permanent blot. He

produces visa application forms for the USA,

UK, and Japan, which ask: "Have you ever been

ordered to leave any country?" The Petitioner

must answer "Yes" because of the LIN. This will

prejudice his future travel.

23.3. Relying on Union of India v. Narendra Singh

and M. Sudhakar v. V. Manoharan, he argues

that even if the order is executed, the Court

can examine its legality to remove the stigma.

He also cites Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union

of India regarding the need for transparency

and disclosure to fight stigma.

23.4. The Respondent argues the Petitioner has left

India, the visa expired in 2020, and he has - 187 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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since been granted new visas

(Business/Tourist), proving no permanent

blacklist exists.

23.5. The learned ASGI points out that the Petitioner

voluntarily left India in November 2019. The E-

2 visa expired in January 2020. Subsequently,

the Petitioner applied for and was granted a

Business Visa (2020) and a Tourist Visa (2024).

This conduct by the Government of India

proves there is no permanent ban. The LIN has

"spent itself".

23.6. The Respondent relies on Minerva Mills Ltd.

v. Union of India, to contend that the Court

should not decide academic questions. Since

the Petitioner has already left and the visa has

expired, the validity of the LIN is now an

academic question.

23.7. In the present case, the primary relief sought

by the Petitioner was to quash the Leave India - 188 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Notice so as to enable him to remain in India

under the Employment Visa. That relief has

become incapable of grant. The Petitioner has

already left India. The Employment Visa expired

more than six years ago. A writ directing the

Respondents to permit continuation of a visa

that has expired by efflux of time would be

legally untenable.

23.8. This Court must therefore consider whether

any surviving civil consequence justifies

continued adjudication.

23.9. The Petitioner relies upon the concept of

stigma. The Respondents have placed on record

that subsequent Business and Tourist visas

were granted to the Petitioner. These grants

are significant. They demonstrate that the

Government of India has not imposed a

permanent ban, blacklist, or enduring disability

upon the Petitioner. - 189 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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23.10. The very authority that issued the impugned

LIN subsequently cleared the Petitioner for re-

entry into India on fresh visa categories. This

conduct negates the assertion of continuing

stigma within the Indian immigration

framework.

23.11. The underlying rationale for the issuance of the

Leave India Notice is not difficult to discern.

The action was precipitated by material

misrepresentation made by the Employer in the

course of securing the Employment Visa. The

foundation of the visa rested upon the

Employer's certification that statutory

conditions had been fulfilled, including the

assertion that no suitable Indian candidate was

available. Once that representation was shown

to be factually incorrect, the legal substratum

of the visa stood vitiated. - 190 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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23.12. Though the regulatory action was formally

directed against the Petitioner, its necessity

arose from the Employer's misrepresentation.

The Petitioner's entitlement to remain in India

under the Employment Visa was derivative in

character; it flowed from, and was inseparably

linked to, the validity of the Employer's

sponsorship and declarations. When the

foundational representation collapsed, the

superstructure built upon it could not survive.

23.13. It is immaterial, in this regulatory context,

whether the Petitioner personally participated in

or had knowledge of the misrepresentation. The

action taken is not penal in nature; it does not

attribute criminal culpability to the Petitioner.

Rather, it addresses the continuing validity of

the visa status. A person claiming benefit under

a representation subsequently shown to be

materially false cannot insist upon retention of - 191 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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that benefit merely on the ground of absence of

personal complicity.

23.14. The principle that no person can retain

advantage obtained through misrepresentation

applies irrespective of whether the beneficiary

was the author of the falsehood. Once the

statutory condition underpinning the

Employment Visa is demonstrated to be

unfulfilled, the derivative status of the

employee cannot subsist independently of that

defect.

23.15. Accordingly, the Petitioner cannot retain the

benefit of a visa whose very foundation was

compromised by material misrepresentation of

the sponsoring Employer.

23.16. The apprehension expressed by the Petitioner

regarding potential prejudice in future foreign

visa applications remains, at its core,

speculative and contingent upon decisions of - 192 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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independent sovereign jurisdictions. The

function of this Court under Article 226 is to

examine the legality, validity, and constitutional

sustainability of State action within its own

territorial and statutory domain. It is not the

province of this Court to render advisory

declarations for the collateral purpose of

influencing or facilitating responses in

immigration questionnaires administered by

foreign governments.

23.17. Each sovereign nation frames and applies its

immigration policies in accordance with its own

domestic law. How a foreign authority may

interpret, contextualise, or weigh a historical

regulatory action taken by Indian authorities

lies entirely outside the adjudicatory reach of

this Court. Judicial review cannot be extended

into the realm of anticipatory reputational

management before other sovereign states. - 193 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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The mere possibility that the Petitioner may be

required to disclose a prior Leave India Notice

in a foreign visa application does not, in itself,

create a subsisting legal injury within the

jurisdiction of this Court.

23.18. More importantly, the material on record

demonstrates that the Government of India has

subsequently granted fresh Business and

Tourist visas to the Petitioner. This conduct

evidences the absence of any continuing

adverse classification, blacklist, or prohibition

within the Indian immigration framework. The

regulatory action was specific to the

Employment Visa context and did not translate

into a permanent exclusion. In the absence of

an enduring legal disability within India, the

alleged reputational consequence abroad

cannot sustain a live writ remedy. - 194 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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23.19. It is also necessary to address the Petitioner's

attempt to distance himself from the

misrepresentation that formed the basis of the

impugned action. The record indicates that the

Employment Visa was granted on the strength

of statutory declarations made by the

sponsoring Employer, particularly the

representation that no suitable Indian candidate

was available for the post. The Petitioner's

entitlement to remain in India under that visa

was derivative and conditional; it flowed

directly from the validity of the Employer's

sponsorship.

23.20. When it emerged that the representation

regarding recruitment efforts was factually

unsustainable, the legal foundation of the

Employment Visa stood compromised. The

regulatory consequence that followed was not

punitive in nature but corrective and - 195 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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preventive. It addressed the continuing validity

of immigration status rather than attributing

criminal culpability.

23.21. The Petitioner may not have been the author of

the misrepresentation. However, he was

undeniably the beneficiary of the

representation. Immigration law, particularly in

the context of sponsored visas, operates on the

principle that the beneficiary's status is

inseparable from the sponsor's compliance with

statutory conditions. When the foundational

declaration collapses, the derivative benefit

cannot survive in isolation.

23.22. To permit the Petitioner to retain the advantage

of a visa secured upon a materially defective

sponsorship would undermine the integrity of

the visa regime and dilute regulatory discipline.

The law does not countenance retention of

benefits flowing from misrepresentation, - 196 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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irrespective of whether the beneficiary

personally orchestrated the falsehood. The

issue is not moral blameworthiness but

regulatory validity.

23.23. The Employment Visa was not an autonomous

personal right divorced from its sponsorship

matrix. It was contingent upon the truthfulness

and completeness of the Employer's

declarations. Once that matrix was shown to be

flawed, the consequent regulatory action was a

lawful response to the collapse of conditions

precedent.

23.24. In that sense, the consequences that ensued

were not imposed arbitrarily upon the Petitioner

but were inherent in the structure of the visa

category under which he sought entry and stay.

The Petitioner cannot now disassociate himself

from the consequences that inevitably follow

when the very basis of his derivative - 197 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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immigration status is shown to be

unsustainable.

23.25. The Petitioner's reliance on Narendra Singh

and Sudhakar does not advance the case.

Those decisions recognise that execution of an

order does not automatically render a matter

infructuous where substantive rights continue

to be affected. However, here, the foundational

right asserted, the right to remain under the

Employment Visa, has itself expired by efflux of

time. The statutory basis of stay has ceased

independently of the impugned action.

23.26. The Court must also note that the subsequent

grant of visas materially alters the landscape. If

the impugned LIN had resulted in permanent

exclusion, blacklisting, or statutory disability,

the argument of enduring consequence might

merit closer examination. The record reflects

the contrary. - 198 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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23.27. The Petitioner has also relied upon State of

Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George to

suggest that strict liability principles must be

tempered by fairness. However, that decision in

fact upheld strict enforcement of statutory

obligations upon foreigners and recognised that

absence of mens rea does not necessarily

invalidate regulatory action. The reliance is

therefore misplaced and, if anything, reinforces

the State's regulatory competence.

23.28. Judicial discipline requires that courts refrain

from deciding academic issues. The controversy

that once existed, whether the Petitioner could

continue under the Employment Visa, has

ceased to exist in fact and in law. The

impugned LIN operated within a finite temporal

framework. That framework has concluded.

23.29. In assessing whether the petition retains

vitality, the Court must examine whether any - 199 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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enforceable right presently survives for

adjudication. None does. The Petitioner is not

presently under restraint. He has re-entered

India under subsequent visas. There is no

subsisting order prohibiting his entry or

imposing a continuing disability.

23.30. In these circumstances, the writ petition has

been rendered infructuous. The challenge to the

impugned Leave India Notice now presents an

academic question devoid of operative

consequence.

23.31. I answer Point No. 9 by holding that the writ

petition has been rendered infructuous and

academic. The Petitioner has exited India, the

visa has expired, and the subsequent grant of

new visas by the Respondents negates the

claim of enduring stigma or permanent

disability.

24. Answer to Point No. 10: What order? - 200 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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24.1. A visa is a conditional permission to enter India

and does not confer an indefeasible or vested

right to remain for its entire duration. The

issuance of a Leave India Notice under Section

3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 is an

independent statutory exercise of sovereign

power to regulate presence of foreigners. It

does not amount to an impermissible indirect or

de facto cancellation of the visa.

24.2. The Foreign Regional Registration Officer,

acting as the designated Civil Authority under

valid statutory notifications issued pursuant to

Section 12 of the Foreigners Act and the

Foreigners Order, 1948, possesses statutory

jurisdiction to issue a Leave India Notice within

his territorial jurisdiction.

24.3. The power under Section 3(2)(c) vests in the

Central Government and its duly authorised

delegates. Where the competent delegate (Joint - 201 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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Director - Immigration) takes the decision and

directs a subordinate officer to issue and serve

the notice, such action constitutes lawful

administrative execution and not impermissible

sub-delegation. Internal administrative

directions need not be published in the Official

Gazette.

24.4. The impugned Leave India Notice does not

suffer from arbitrariness or non-application of

mind. It is founded on relevant documentary

material, including the Employer's admission

regarding irregular recruitment, and bears a

rational nexus to the objective of preserving the

integrity of the visa regime.

24.5. Allegations of fraud or misrepresentation

detected after entry into India can be acted

upon by domestic immigration authorities.

There is no statutory requirement that such

matters must first be adjudicated by the - 202 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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overseas visa-issuing authority. Once entry is

effected, regulatory jurisdiction over continued

stay vests in domestic authorities.

24.6. In cases of Employment Visa sponsorship,

where the alleged misrepresentation pertains to

the Employer's statutory declarations forming

the foundation of the visa, issuance of a show-

cause notice to the Employer satisfies the

requirements of natural justice. A separate

hearing to the employee is not mandated where

the determinative facts lie exclusively within

the Employer's domain and stand admitted.

24.7. The Petitioner has exited India, the

Employment Visa has expired by efflux of time,

and the Petitioner has subsequently been

granted Business and Tourist visas. The

primary relief sought has become incapable of

grant, and no enduring civil, legal, or

reputational disability subsists. The writ petition - 203 - NC: 2026:KHC:8290 WP No. 26412 of 2019

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has therefore been rendered infructuous and

academic.

24.8. In view of the above findings, I pass the

following

ORDER

i. The writ petition is dismissed.

ii. In any event, the writ petition has been rendered infructuous due to subsequent events, including the Petitioner's departure from India, expiry of the Employment Visa, and grant of fresh visas.

iii. The impugned Leave India Notice does not suffer from illegality, lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, arbitrariness, or constitutional infirmity.

SD/-

(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ) JUDGE

PRS List No.: 2 Sl No.: 54