Monty Goyal vs Navrang Singh

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 77 OF 2026

MONTY GOYAL ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

NAVRANG SINGH ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. The appellant1 herein has approached this

Court by way of a statutory appeal under Section 38

of the Advocates Act, 1961 for assailing the final

judgment dated 4th April, 2025 passed by the

Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India2

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RASHI GUPTA Date: 2026.01.29 1 Hereinafter, being referred to as “appellant-advocate”. 17:31:35 IST Reason: 2 Hereinafter, being referred to as “BCI”.

1 in BCI Transferred Case No. 455 of 2023 whereby,

the appellant-advocate was held guilty of professional

misconduct for alleged failure to act with reasonable

diligence and absence from Court hearing which led

to dismissal of the respondent’s quashing petition.

Brief Facts: -

3. Succinctly stated, the facts leading to the

present appeal are as follows:-

3.1 The respondent3 came to be arraigned as an

accused in FIR No. 150/2018 registered at police

station Samrala, Ludhiana, for offences under

section 451, 323, 506, 427, 148 and 149 of the Indian

Penal Code. Upon a compromise being arrived at

between the accused and the complainant in the

aforesaid FIR on 28th July, 2018, the appellant-

advocate was engaged by the respondent-

3 Hereinafter, being referred to as “respondent-complainant/respondent-

Navrang Singh”.

2 complainant to move a petition before the Punjab and

Haryana High Court4 for quashing the FIR based on

the compromise. The High Court vide order dated

28th September, 2018 allowed the quashing petition

and quashed the FIR subject to the respondent-

Navrang Singh depositing a cost of Rs.10,000/-

within two weeks. However, it transpires that the said

costs were not deposited within the stipulated time.

Consequently, due to the non-production of receipts

evidencing compliance, the High Court vide order

dated 16th November, 2018 recalled its earlier order

and dismissed the quashing petition for want of

prosecution, thereby reviving the criminal

proceedings against the respondent-Navrang Singh.

3.2 Subsequently, an application for recalling the

order dated 16th November, 2018 was filed by the

appellant-advocate. The High Court vide order dated

4 Hereinafer, being referred to as “High Court”.

3 14th January, 2020 recalled the dismissal order,

thereby restoring the quashing petition and revived

the order quashing FIR, subject to payment of costs

enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-.

3.3 It was, at this stage, that the respondent-

Navrang Singh, being aggrieved by the alleged

negligence and failure of the appellant-advocate to

deposit the initial costs, instituted a complaint under

Section 35 of the Advocates Act before the State Bar

Council of Punjab and Haryana5.

3.4 During the pendency of the disciplinary

proceedings, the appellant-advocate and respondent-

complainant arrived at an amicable settlement,

wherein the misunderstanding regarding the deposit

of costs was resolved. Taking note of this

development, the High Court, vide order dated 2nd

March, 2021 modified its earlier order by waiving the

5 Hereinafter, being referred to as “State Bar Council”.

4 enhanced costs of Rs.50,000/-. Subsequently, upon

compliance with the original direction to deposit cost,

the High Court vide final order dated 12th December,

2022 quashed the FIR and all consequential

proceedings against respondent-Navrang Singh.

3.5 Pursuant to the order dated 12th December,

2022 passed by the High Court quashing the FIR, the

respondent-complainant submitted a sworn affidavit

dated 15th December, 2022 to the State Bar Council,

stating that the complaint was filed due to a

misunderstanding regarding costs; that he was

satisfied with the appellant’s services, and desired to

withdraw the complaint.

3.6 Since the proceedings before the State Bar

Council could not be concluded within the statutory

period of one year, the matter stood transferred to the

Disciplinary Committee of the BCI. Despite the

affidavit praying for withdrawal of the complaint filed

5 by the respondent-complainant before the State Bar

Council, the Disciplinary Committee proceeded to

adjudicate the matter and vide judgment dated 4th

April, 2025, held the appellant-advocate guilty of

professional misconduct for failing to ensure the

timely deposit of costs and dereliction of his

professional duties. Accordingly, the Disciplinary

Committee imposed a penalty of Rs.1 Lakh, with a

further direction that failure to comply would entail

suspension of the appellant’s license to practice for a

period of one year. The said order of the BCI is subject

matter of challenge in the present appeal.

Findings

4. We have heard the arguments advanced by

learned counsel for the appellant-advocate as well as

learned counsel for the respondent-complainant and

have perused the material available on record.

6

5. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that, while

the disciplinary proceedings were still pending before

the State Bar Council, the respondent-complainant

presented a duly sworn affidavit dated 15th

December, 2022 before the State Bar Council,

wherein he categorically stated that he had

approached the State Bar Council out of frustration

on account of the imposition of costs of Rs.50,000/-

by the High Court. He clarified that the grievance

was not attributable to any professional lapse on the

part of the appellant–advocate.

6. The respondent-complainant further stated that

the appellant-advocate had thereafter resolved the

issue, pursuant to which the cost amount was

reduced to Rs.5,000/-, which stood duly deposited.

He also stated that the criminal proceedings, for the

quashing whereof the appellant–advocate had been

engaged, were ultimately quashed by the High Court.

7 In view of the said development, the respondent–

complainant unequivocally desired that he did not

wish to pursue the disciplinary complaint against the

appellant-advocate any further.

7. A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals

that the Disciplinary Committee of the BCI

completely glossed over the aforesaid material and

vital aspect while holding the appellant-advocate

guilty of professional misconduct. The Committee

failed to appreciate that the substratum of the

complaint had ceased to exist once the dispute was

amicably resolved and the complaint was sought to

be withdrawn by the respondent-complainant

himself by way of a duly sworn affidavit. The

impugned judgment neither adverts to the affidavit

filed by the respondent-complainant nor deals with

the categorical withdrawal of allegations and the

8 expression of satisfaction with the professional

conduct of the appellant-advocate.

8. Mr. J.S. Thakur, learned counsel appearing for

the respondent-complainant, has fairly submitted

that the respondent-complainant had indeed sworn

the aforesaid affidavit affirming that the dispute

stood resolved and that he did not desire any action

against the appellant-advocate in the disciplinary

proceedings initiated before the State Bar Council.

9. Furthermore, on-going through the impugned

judgment, we find that the same does not reflect that

any evidence was led by the respondent-complainant

to substantiate the allegations set out in the

complaint. It appears that the appellant-advocate has

been held guilty of professional misconduct merely

on the basis of bald allegations contained in the

complaint, without the complainant being examined

on oath and without affording the appellant-advocate

9 the indefeasible right of cross-examination, thereby

rendering the finding of professional misconduct

legally unsustainable.

10. Thus, considering the totality of the facts and

circumstances, particularly that the genesis of the

dispute was a mere misunderstanding regarding the

deposit of costs which stood resolved during the

pendency of the proceedings, the impugned judgment

cannot be sustained. Once the respondent-

complainant himself expressed complete satisfaction

with the professional services rendered by the

appellant-advocate and categorically sought to

withdraw the complaint, the very substratum of the

disciplinary proceedings ceased to exist. In these

circumstances, the order holding appellant-advocate

guilty of professional misconduct is considered

wholly unsustainable in facts as well as in law.

10

11. As a consequence of the above discussion, the

impugned judgment dated 4th April, 2025 is hereby

set aside.

12. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as

to costs.

13. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J. (VIKRAM NATH)

...…………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 29, 2026.

11