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Mohseen vs The State Of Up

Supreme Court22 May 2026Sanjay Karol

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. A High Court granting bail to an accused whose bail was previously cancelled by the Supreme Court must provide reasons demonstrating either changed circumstances or fresh grounds not considered by the Supreme Court at the time of cancellation; a bare grant without engagement with the Supreme Court's reasons constitutes manifest error warranting interference. 2. The conduct of an accused after bail cancellation is a crucial supervening circumstance relevant to determining whether bail should be granted afresh; in particular, an accused's defiance of a Supreme Court order to surrender forthwith, including absconding and evading arrest necessitating issue of a non-bailable warrant and Section 82 CrPC proceedings, weighs heavily against subsequent bail relief. 3. The filing of a Review Petition against a Supreme Court order does not operate as an automatic stay upon that order, and an accused bound by a direction to surrender immediately is not relieved of that obligation by the pendency of a review application. 4. At the bail stage, matters of credibility and detailed evaluation of evidence—such as whether CCTV footage unambiguously shows an accused firing—are properly matters for trial and cannot be considered determinative; however, the existence of prima facie evidence as a whole, including CCTV footage, eyewitness testimony, and recovery of weapons at an accused's instance, may support detention. 5. An offence under Section 307 IPC is constituted where an accused fires a weapon at a victim with intent to kill or knowledge that it can cause death, regardless of whether the victim sustains injury; the absence of firearm injuries does not negate the charge. 6. The principle of parity in bail is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied where the roles of co-accused are materially different; where an accused bears a specific and distinct role in the offence or additional charges, a claim of parity with a co-accused cannot succeed without independent scrutiny. 7. A bail order must be a reasoned order that engages with material evidence on record; a mere recitation of "facts and circumstances of the case" without identifying the factors that weighed with the court does not constitute a reasoned order and may constitute perversity warranting interference. 8. An unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by a superior court; bail can be revoked if courts below have ignored relevant material on record or failed to consider the gravity of the offence, the threat to witnesses, or the danger of justice being thwarted.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2026 INSC 526 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). _____ OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.16696 of 2025)

MOHSEEN ......APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ....RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

Leave Granted.

2. The present Special Leave Petition has been filed under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the

Appellant/Informant, challenging the order dated 22.09.2025

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date: 2026.05.22 16:19:38 IST Reason: Misc. Bail Application No. 18594 of 2025, whereby the Single

Page 1 of 22 Judge was pleased to enlarge Respondent No. 2/accused

Jeeshan on bail, during the pendency of the trial in connection

with FIR No. 179/2024, registered at Police Station Partapur,

District Meerut, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 452,

504, 506 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter

referred to as “IPC”), and Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act,

1959.

RELEVANT FACTS

3. The facts material to the adjudication of this matter, as

regards the prosecution case and as emerging from the record,

are that the Appellant's brother, one Aamir, was murdered by

certain accused persons, including Aabaad and Aurangzeb, in

connection with which FIR No. 143/2023 was registered at

Police Station Partapur, District Meerut, under Sections 147,

148, 149, 302, 307, 323, 341, 352, 504, 506, 34, 452 and 325

IPC. The co-accused Aabaad and Aurangzeb in the murder case

are also co-accused persons in the present case. It is pertinent

to note that both Aabaad and Aurangzeb were subsequently

convicted in the aforesaid murder case on 12.11.2025 and

sentenced to life imprisonment on 14.11.2025 in Sessions Trial

No. 729/2023, and further convicted on 01.11.2025 under the Page 2 of 22 Gangsters Act in Session Trial No. 270/2024 and sentenced to

five years’ imprisonment.

4. It is in this background that on 27.02.2024, when the

Appellant was attending the proceedings of the aforesaid murder

case before the Trial Court at Meerut, he was threatened by the

co-accused Aabaad and Aurangzeb within the court premises

itself on account of his refusal to compromise in the aforesaid

murder case. In connection with this episode of intimidation an

FIR bearing No. 67/2024, under Section 506 IPC, was registered

at Police Station Civil Lines, District Meerut, against the said co-

accused persons.

5. The current proceedings emanate from another incident

which took place on 12.05.2024, at approximately 4:30 PM,

when the Appellant's uncle Rihan and his cousin Afsar were

returning home from a neighbouring village. The accused

persons, namely Aurangzeb, Aabaad, Jeeshan (Respondent No.

2), Arbaz and Shahnawaz intercepted them on the road. The

accused persons stopped the victims and demanded that they

withdraw the murder case by abusing and threatening them. As

per the FIR which was registered as FIR No. 179/2024 (supra),

and the statements of the injured persons, the accused persons

Page 3 of 22 then assaulted the victims with lathi, danda, knife and

tamancha (country-made pistol). The victims ran towards their

houses to save their lives; the accused followed them and forcibly

entered the premises, continuing the assault.

6. In the said incident, the Respondent No. 2/accused

Jeeshan was seen in the CCTV footage obtained from the

cameras installed near the location, arriving on a motorcycle,

entering his house, retrieving a country-made pistol, and

thereafter, brandishing it on the road. Subsequently, the CCTV

footage revealed the Respondent No. 2 going to the roof of the

adjacent house with the pistol, after which the sound of multiple

gunshots was recorded. The eyewitnesses including Saheba,

Adil, Afsar and the victim Rihan himself have categorically

deposed that Jeeshan fired at them with the intent to kill,

although the bullets fortunately did not strike them, resulting in

no firearm injuries.

7. During the investigation, the Respondent No. 2/accused

Jeeshan, in his statement before the Investigating Officer,

admitted to having taken a pistol from his house, firing several

rounds from the roof of the adjoining house, collecting the empty

cartridges thereafter to destroy evidence, and then concealing

Page 4 of 22 the pistol and cartridges by hiding them beneath a brick in a

ruined building on the road to Saidpur upon learning of the

police's arrival.

8. Pursuant thereto, a .315 bore pistol in working

condition, along with a live cartridge of .315 bore 8mm KF, both

wrapped in foil and concealed in grass behind a wall, were

recovered at the instance of Respondent No. 2/accused Jeeshan.

Consequently, Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 were

also added against him.

9. The Respondent No. 2/accused Jeeshan filed an

Anticipatory Bail application before the High Court of Judicature

at Allahabad (Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application No.

6855 of 2024). The Single Judge vide order dated 11.09.2024

rejected the application, expressly holding that a prima facie

case of the offence was made out against the applicant and that

no extraordinary circumstances had been demonstrated

warranting the protection of liberty.

10. Subsequently, after his arrest the Respondent No. 2

filed a Regular Bail Application (Criminal Misc. Bail Application

No. 38998 of 2024) before the High Court, which was allowed by

the Single Judge vide order dated 23.10.2024 on the ground that

Page 5 of 22 only a "vague and general role" had been assigned to the

applicant and that there was no substantive evidence against

him.

11. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant challenged the said

order before this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 18256/2024. This Court,

vide a speaking order dated 27.01.2025, found the High Court

to have committed a grave error in passing the bail order and set

aside the same and directed the Respondent No. 2/accused to

surrender forthwith. This Court specifically noted that the High

Court had erroneously characterised the role of the Respondent

No. 2 as “vague and general” and had failed to consider the

findings of the Trial Court in the bail rejection order.

12. Despite the passing of the bail cancellation order dated

27.01.2025 by this Court and service of the show cause notice,

the Respondent No. 2 did not surrender before the Trial Court.

Thereafter, the Appellant filed an application before the

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut for the arrest of the

Respondent No.2 in terms of the order of this Court. The ACJM

then issued a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) vide order dated

10.02.2025, against the Respondent No. 2 for his continued

defiance. Despite the issuance of the NBW and raids conducted

Page 6 of 22 by the police at his residence and other likely locations, the

Respondent No. 2 could not be traced and deliberately evaded

the process of law.

13. Thereafter, vide order dated 28.02.2025, the ACJM

initiated proceedings under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (Hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”) against the

Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 ultimately surrendered

on 10.03.2025, i.e., approximately 42 days after this Court's

order dated 27.01.2025 cancelling his bail.

14. After his surrender, the Respondent No. 2 filed a second

Regular Bail Application before the Trial Court, which was

rejected vide order dated 19.05.2025 noting that no new grounds

have been raised and considering the serious nature of the

offence, the evidence available on record, there is likelihood of

the accused absconding and tampering with evidence if released.

15. The Respondent No. 2 then preferred a Criminal Misc.

Bail Application No. 18594 of 2025 before the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad. The Single Judge, vide the impugned

order dated 22.09.2025, granted bail primarily on the following

grounds:

(i) there was a delay of seven hours in lodging the FIR;

Page 7 of 22

(ii) no firearm injury was sustained by the injured

persons notwithstanding the allegation of firing;

(iii) the co-accused Aurangzeb had been enlarged on

bail by a coordinate bench.

16. The Appellant, being the informant and an eyewitness

in the murder case of his brother who has been allegedly

persistently targeted by the accused persons, is before this Court

challenging the aforesaid impugned order.

17. For ease of reference, the material portion of the

impugned order dated 22.09.2025 passed by the High Court is

extracted hereinbelow:

“19. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, nature of offence, severity of punishment and considering the delay of seven hours in lodging the FIR coupled by the fact that there being no medical corroboration of the incident as no firearm injury was sustained by the injured as the applicant was assigned the role of firing and also taking into consideration the fact that the main accused person Aurangzeb has been enlarged on bail, prima facie I find it a fit case to release the applicant on bail. The bail application is allowed.”

18. This Court had, in its earlier order dated 27.01.2025,

while cancelling the first bail granted to the Respondent No. 2,

observed as follows:

Page 8 of 22

“4. We are of the considered view that the High Court committed grave error in allowing the application filed by the Respondent No. 2 herein.

5. The High court ignored the specific role assigned to the accused-Respondent No. 2 in the FIR. the Court erred in recording that a vague and general role has been assigned to the accused Respondent No. 2 (bail-Appellant).

6. ***

7. We have noticed that the High Court in a case of a serious nature had granted bail to the respondent, who was in custody for a period of just one month. The High Court also failed to take notice of the findings returned by the Trial Court, dismissing the bail application.”

19. The learned counsel for the Appellant advanced the

following submissions before us:

(i) The High Court while passing the impugned order

failed to appreciate the order dated 27.01.2025

passed by this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 18256/2024.

(ii) The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 after the

cancellation of bail by this Court was contumacious.

He failed to surrender, compelling the Trial Court to

issue an NBW and thereafter to initiate Section 82

CrPC proceedings.

(iii) The CCTV footage of the incident

incontrovertibly establishes the presence of the

Respondent No. 2 at the scene of occurrence with a

country-made pistol in hand.

Page 9 of 22

(iv) The Respondent no. 2 in his own statement to

the Investigating Officer, admitted to have fired

multiple rounds from the roof and to have taken steps

to conceal the weapon and spent cartridges. The

recovery of pistol and live cartridge at his instance

corroborates his active role.

(v) The motive of accused persons’ to intimidate

prosecution witnesses in the murder case of

Appellant's brother in which both Aabaad and

Aurangzeb have since been convicted with life

imprisonment, is a crucial circumstance that

magnifies the threat posed to the Appellant and his

family if the Respondent No. 2 is enlarged on bail and

remains at large.

20. The learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh on

the other hand submitted that:

(i) The investigation conclusively established the

active role of the Respondent No. 2, who accompanied

the co-accused, participated in the assault and fired

multiple shots with the intent to kill. His role stands

established under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 323,

Page 10 of 22 324, 504, 506, 307 IPC read with Sections 3, 25 and

27 of the Arms Act.

(ii) A .315 bore pistol in working condition and a live

cartridge, both wrapped in foil and concealed in grass

behind a wall, were recovered at the instance of the

Respondent No. 2.

(iii) Statements of eye-witnesses along with the

CCTV footage consistently and collectively establish

the Respondent No. 2’s presence and his active

involvement.

(iv) The chargesheet has been filed and the Trial

Court took cognizance on 10.02.2025. Charges were

framed on 10.10.2025. A total of 12 prosecution

witnesses have been cited, and the trial is at its

commencement stage.

(v) Reliance was placed upon Ajwar v. Waseem &

Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768, wherein this Court held

that an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always

open to interference and that bail can be revoked if

the courts below have ignored relevant materials on

record or the gravity of the offence.

Page 11 of 22

21. The learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 contended

as follows:

(i) The Respondent No. 2 was never formally

declared a “proclaimed offender”. Proceedings under

Section 82 CrPC were initiated on 28.02.2025, and

the Respondent No. 2 surrendered on 10.03.2025,

i.e., within 12 days of the Section 82 order well before

the expiry of the 30-day period required for a formal

declaration of being a proclaimed offender. The

representation by the State that he had been declared

a proclaimed offender was factually incorrect.

(ii) The reason for the delay in surrender was that

the Respondent No. 2 had preferred a Review Petition

against the order dated 27.01.2025, which was

ultimately dismissed on 25.03.2025. The filing of a

Review Petition evinced his bona fide intention to

engage with the process of law.

(iii) The CCTV footage transcript does not show the

Respondent No. 2 firing at any person. He appears in

the footage approximately 11 minutes after the initial

altercation began. The complete CCTV footage from

Page 12 of 22 multiple cameras, including that from cameras

installed at the house of the Respondent No. 2

himself, does not establish that he opened fire.

(iv) The injuries sustained by the alleged victims

Rihan and Saheba are only scratch marks and small

bruises consistent with simple injuries from a

blunt/hard object, and not incised wounds or firearm

injuries. The offence under Section 307 IPC is

therefore not made out on the evidence on record.

(v) A cross-FIR was registered after an application

under Section 156(3) CrPC, inasmuch as the family

members of the Respondent No. 2 (including

Shahnawaz, who sustained a gunshot wound, and

Arbaz, who sustained an incised wound) were

themselves victims of the Appellant's family

members, who were the aggressors in the incident.

(vi) The principle of parity operates in favour of the

Respondent No. 2. The challenge to the bail of co-

accused Aurangzeb (who bore criminal antecedents

including Section 302 IPC and Gangsters Act cases)

Page 13 of 22 was dismissed as withdrawn by the Appellant himself

on 21.11.2025 in SLP (Crl.) No. 16404/2025.

(vii) The Respondent No. 2 had undergone

incarceration for approximately 7.5 months, and

there is no prospect of an early conclusion of trial

given that 12 witnesses remain to be examined.

(viii) The Respondent No. 2 is not an accused in

the murder case (FIR No. 143/2023), and the

criminal history attributed to him consists of only one

additional case (FIR No. 433/2022, under Sections

323, 504, 506 IPC), which is pending at the stage of

summoning.

22. Having heard the learned counsel for all parties at

length and having perused the record with care, this Court is of

the considered view that the impugned order dated 22.09.2025

passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad suffers from a manifest error of law and fails to apply

the well-settled principles governing the grant and cancellation

of bail, warranting interference by this Court.

23. The first and most fundamental infirmity in the

impugned order is the complete absence of any engagement with

Page 14 of 22 the order dated 27.01.2025 passed by this Court in SLP (Crl.)

No. 18256/2024, whereunder the first bail of the Respondent

No. 2 was cancelled. The impugned order does not advert to the

reasons that impelled this Court to cancel bail, nor does it

identify any supervening circumstances or changed factual

matrix that might justify a departure from the position adopted

by this Court in the earlier round.

24. While there is no absolute bar against a High Court

granting bail to an accused whose bail was previously cancelled

by this Court, the grant of bail must be supported by reasons

demonstrating either a change in circumstances or the existence

of fresh grounds not considered by this Court at the time of

cancellation.

25. The conduct of an accused after the cancellation of bail

is another crucial factor in determining whether bail ought to be

granted afresh. This Court in Ajwar (supra) observed as:

“28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail...”

26. In the instant case, the Respondent No. 2, despite being

directed to surrender forthwith by this Court vide order dated

Page 15 of 22 27.01.2025, failed to comply with the mandate of this Court. He

absconded, compelling the Trial Court to issue an NBW on

10.02.2025. Even thereafter, he continued to evade arrest,

necessitating initiation of Section 82 CrPC proceedings on

28.02.2025. He ultimately surrendered only on 10.03.2025 i.e.,

approximately 42 days after this Court's order.

27. The argument advanced by the Respondent No. 2 that

his delay in surrendering was occasioned by the pendency of a

Review Petition does not commend itself to this Court. The filing

of a Review Petition does not operate as an automatic stay upon

the original order. This Court by order dated 27.01.2025 directed

immediate surrender, and the Respondent No. 2 was bound to

comply with the direction forthwith.

28. The CCTV footage, which forms part of the record, was

examined by the Investigating Officer. The footage records the

Respondent No. 2 arriving on a motorcycle, entering his house,

retrieving a country-made pistol, waving it on the road,

proceeding to the roof of the adjacent house, and the sound of

gunshots being recorded. Multiple eyewitnesses have specifically

attributed the act of firing to the Respondent No. 2. The CCTV

evidence, the eyewitness accounts, the recovery of the weapon

Page 16 of 22 and cartridge at his instance collectively constitute a prima facie

case against the Respondent No.2 which finds no reference in

the impugned order passed by the High Court.

29. The argument of the Respondent No. 2 that the CCTV

footage does not show him firing is a matter of evaluation in the

trial and cannot be considered to be determinative at the bail

stage. Equally, the absence of firearm injuries does not negate

the charge under Section 307 IPC. This Court has consistently

held that what Section 307 IPC requires is the doing of an act

with intent or knowledge that it can cause death. If an accused

fires a weapon at victim with the intent to kill and or the

knowledge that it can kill, but the victims escape by chance, the

commission of the offence under Section 307 IPC is made out.

30. The High Court granted bail principally on the ground

of parity with co-accused Aurangzeb. This reasoning is

manifestly erroneous for the following reasons:

(i) The role attributed to Aurangzeb in the present FIR (No.

179/2024) is primarily that of assault by knife. On the

other hand, specific role of firing with the country-made

pistol is attributed to the Respondent No. 2. The cases are

accordingly not identically placed.

Page 17 of 22

(ii) The recovery of a .315 bore pistol and live cartridge at

the instance of the Respondent No. 2, and addition of

offences under Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act

against him further distinguish his case from that of

Aurangzeb.

(iii) It is significant that the SLP filed by the Appellant

challenging the bail of Aurangzeb (SLP (Crl.) No.

16404/2025) was withdrawn on 21.11.2025 on account of

Aurangzeb having been convicted in the murder case (FIR

No. 143/2023) and the Gangsters Act case. The dismissal-

as-withdrawn of that SLP is not a dismissal on merits and

creates no precedent in favour of the Respondent No. 2.

(iv) This Court has held that the principle of parity in bail

is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically

applied when the roles of the accused persons are

materially different. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.,

(2014) 16 SCC 508, this Court held that when an accused

is a history sheeter or has a specific and distinct role in

the offence, a claim of parity with a co-accused cannot

succeed without independent scrutiny.

Page 18 of 22

31. This Court cannot be oblivious to the broader context in

which the present crime was committed. As it appears from the

record before us, the present offence was not an isolated incident

but is said to be a premeditated attempt to terrorise the

Appellant and his family members who are eyewitnesses and

victims in the murder case of the Appellant's brother and to

coerce them into withdrawing or compromising in the said

murder case against their will.

32. This Court, in Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

& Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781, observed that:

“11. There is no doubt that liberty is important, even that of a person charged with crime but it is important for the courts to recognise the potential threat to the life and liberty of victims/witnesses, if such accused is released on bail.”

33. This Court has repeatedly emphasised that bail orders

must be reasoned orders that engage with the material on

record. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, this

Court held that bail orders must reveal the factors that weighed

with the Court for granting relief, and that a mere recitation of

“the facts and circumstances of the case” without more does not

constitute a reasoned order. Further, in Prasanta Kumar

Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 this Court laid

Page 19 of 22 down the principles guiding the assessment of correctness of an

order granting or rejecting bail:

“9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

34. In the instant case, the impugned order fails to engage

with: (i) the order of this Court dated 27.01.2025 in the first

round; (ii) the conduct of the Respondent No. 2 in absconding

and threatening witnesses post bail-cancellation; (iii) the CCTV

evidence and the recovery of the country-made pistol at the

instance of the Respondent No. 2; and (iv) the rejection of the

second bail application by the Trial Court. An order that

overlooks such crucial and weighty materials on record is

Page 20 of 22 perverse and cannot be sustained and is liable to be interfered

with, as this Court held in Ajwar (supra):

“27.....an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegation against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order….”

35. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the impugned order dated 22.09.2025

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal

Misc. Bail Application No. 18594 of 2025 granting bail to

Respondent No. 2/accused Jeeshan suffers from a manifest

error of law and is liable to be set aside.

36. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The

impugned order dated 22.09.2025 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.

18594 of 2025 is set aside and consequently, the bail granted to

Respondent No. 2 is hereby cancelled.

37. The Respondent No. 2 is directed to surrender before the

Trial Court forthwith, failing which the Trial Court shall take

Page 21 of 22 necessary steps including issuance of NBW to secure his

custody.

38. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………J. (SANJAY KAROL)

….…………….…………………………J. (NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 22, 2026.

Page 22 of 22

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