Mohd Zahid vs State, Through Ncb

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1457 OF 2021

Mohd Zahid ..Appellant(S)

VERSUS

State through NCB ..Respondent(S)

JUDGMENT

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the High

Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 879 of

2002, by which the High Court has dismissed the said

appeal preferred by the appellant herein ­ original accused

and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan learned Trial Court, convicting the appellant for the offence Date: 2021.12.07 17:13:08 IST Reason:

under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the Narcotics

1 Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter

referred to as the NDPS Act) and sentencing him to undergo

rigorous imprisonment (RI) for a period of 15 years with a

fine of Rs.1,50,000/­ for the aforesaid offence in view of the

provisions of Section 31(ii) of the NDPS Act, the original

accused has preferred the present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as

under:­

2.1 That the appellant herein – original accused faced the trial in

connection with FIR No.134/1999 for the offence under

Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act, PS Customs,

Amritsar, Punjab for recovery of 4 kg of heroin. He was

sentenced to undergo 12 years RI by the Amritsar Court. One

another FIR was also filed against the appellant herein –

original accused being FIR No.43/1999 at New Delhi for

recovery of 750 grams of heroin from Delhi. In the second

case also by judgment and order dated 30.01.2002, he was

held guilty for the offence under Section 29 read with Section

21(c) of the NDPS Act. The learned Trial Court at Delhi

imposed the sentence of 10 years RI (minimum sentence),

2 however, in view of the provisions of Section 31 (ii) of the

NDPS Act, which provides for an enhanced punishment for

offences after previous conviction, and considering the fact

that earlier appellant was convicted for the offence under the

NDPS Act in a case arising out of the FIR No.134/1999, the

learned Trial Court awarded minimum sentence of 15 years

RI. No specific order was passed by the learned Trial Court at

Delhi in the trial arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (subsequent

trial) that the sentence imposed of 15 years RI would run

concurrently or consecutively.

3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and

order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court at Delhi

in a case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 (second/subsequent

case), the appellant – original accused preferred the appeal

before the High Court. Before the High Court, it was mainly

submitted on behalf of the appellant – accused that as the

appellant – accused had already undergone 12 years

sentence in a case arising out of FIR No.134/1999, he

cannot be punished twice and that in a case arising out of

FIR No.43/1999 he has already undergone sentence of 6

3 years and 2 months, a lenient view may be taken and the

sentences imposed in both the cases/trials, one arising out

of FIR No.134/1999 (Amritsar Case) and another arising out

of FIR No.43/1999 (New Delhi Case) shall be held to run

concurrently. By the impugned judgment and order the High

Court has not accepted the above and has dismissed the

appeal. Hence, the accused has preferred the present appeal.

4. Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the

appellant, in her short written submissions, has stated that

the appellant is a foreign national, resident of Lahore,

Pakistan and has been behind bars for the last nearly 22

years as he was arrested on 15.06.1999 in respect of FIR No.

134 of 1999 by the Police Station, Customs, Punjab and he

was charged for the offences under Sections 21 and 23 of

NDPS Act, 1985, for import of 4kg heroin and was convicted

by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar,

dated 08.12.2000.

Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, learned

counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was

4 under trial for the period from 17.09.1999 to 14.02.2002 and

for the second offence the said period has not been taken

into consideration. It was submitted that if the sentences are

to run consecutively and if the aforesaid period is also taken

into consideration, then the number of years that the

appellant has to be behind bars, would have to be reduced.

4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

appellant was 30 years of age when he was convicted and

presently, he is 52 years old. His conduct in jail is good and

there is no adverse remark made against him by the Jail

Superintendent. Hence, the two sentences which the

appellant is now undergoing, may be held to run

concurrently under Section 427 Cr.P.C.

4.2 It is submitted that the appellant – accused has already

completed 12 years RI in FIR No.134/1999 and if the

sentences imposed, in both the cases – arising out of FIR

No.134/1999 registered at Amritsar and arising out of FIR

No.43/1999 registered at New Delhi, are not held to run

concurrently and the appellant – accused is to undergo

5 sentences consecutively, in that case the appellant is

required to undergo in all 27 years of imprisonment. It is

submitted that therefore the sentences imposed in both the

cases are to be held to run concurrently.

4.3 It is submitted that as such in the case arising out of FIR

No.43/1999, the Delhi Court while imposing the sentence of

15 years RI has not passed any order whether the sentences

in both the cases to run concurrently or not. It is submitted

that therefore the appellant should be given benefit of

Section 427 of Cr.PC.

5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Ms. Akaanksha

Kaul, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State –

respondent. Heavy reliance is placed on Section 427 of

Cr.PC. It is submitted that in the present case the accused

faced two separate trials for separate offences and not arising

out of the same transaction and therefore the sentences

imposed in both the cases are to run consecutive only.

5.1 It is submitted that general rule is that sentences imposed in

two separate trials in separate offences will run consecutively

6 where there are two different transactions; different crime

numbers and cases have been decided by different

judgments. It is submitted that exceptions are cases falling

under proviso to Section 427(1) of Cr.PC; falling under

Section 427(2) of Cr.PC or when the court directs sentences

shall run consecutively.

5.2 It is submitted that even the power conferred on the court

under Section 427 of Cr.PC to order concurrent sentence is

discretionary, but the discretion ought to be exercised having

regard to the nature of the offence committed and the facts

situation in which the question arises.

5.3 It is submitted that in the present case, the sentencing court

did not direct the sentences to run concurrently. It is

submitted that in the present case appellant – accused faced

two separate trials for two separate offences and for two

different transactions (not arising out of the same

transaction) and therefore the submissions on behalf of the

appellant that the sentences imposed in both the cases to

run concurrently has no substance and cannot be granted.

7 5.4 In support of her above submissions, she has relied upon the

following decisions of this court:­ Mohd. Akhtar Hussain

alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti Vs. Assistant Collector of

Customs (Prevention), Ahmedabad & Anr. (1988) 4 SCC

183; Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh &

Anr. (1991) 4 SCC 304; V.K. Bansal Vs. State of Haryana &

Anr. (2013) 7 SCC 211; Neera Yadav Vs. Central Bureau of

Investigation (2017) 8 SCC 757; Vicky @ Vikas Vs. State

(NCT of Delhi) (2020) 11 SCC 540; Gurdev Singh Vs. State

of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Sharad Hiru Kolambe Vs.

State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 718 and Rajpal

Vs. Om Prakash & Anr. (2019) 17 SCC 809.

5.5 It is further submitted that in the present case, the appellant

– accused as such is a habitual offender. In connection with

FIR No.134/1999, he was convicted for the offence under

Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act for having in

possession/recovery of 4 kg of heroin and in another case

arising out of FIR No.43/1999, he has been convicted for the

8 recovery of 750 grams of heroin. It is submitted that

therefore the appellant – accused is not entitled to any

leniency as prayed.

6. Making the above submissions and relying upon the

decisions of this court, it is prayed to dismiss the present

appeal.

7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respective parties at length.

8. The short question which is posed for the consideration of

this Court is, whether, the sentences imposed against the

appellant – accused by two different courts in two different

trials but against the same accused/person should run

concurrently as submitted on behalf of the appellant –

accused or consecutively.

8.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present

case, the appellant – accused has been convicted by two

different courts in two different trials for the offences with

respect to the different transactions. In one case, he has

9 been sentenced to undergo 12 years RI for the offence under

Section 23 and Section 21 of the NDPS Act by Amritsar

Court and in another case arising out of FIR No.43/1999 he

has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI for the offence

under Section 29 read with Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act by

Delhi Court. In one case he has been convicted for having in

possession of 4 kg of heroin and in another case for having

750 grams of heroin. It is also required to be noted that

judgments have been delivered in both the cases one after

another and in the subsequent judgment and order of

conviction and sentence by the Delhi court there is no

specific order passed by the learned Trial Court (Court at

Delhi) that the sentences to run concurrently. In view of the

above facts, the question posed for the present appeal is

required to be considered.

8.2 While considering the issue in the present appeal Section

427 of Cr.PC is required to be referred to which reads as

under:­

427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.

10 (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

Therefore on a fair reading of Section 427 of Cr.PC, when a

person who is already undergoing a sentence of

imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to

imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment

or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of

the imprisonment to which he has been previously

sentenced. Meaning thereby the sentences in both the

conviction shall run consecutively. However, there is an

exception to that, namely unless the Court directs that the

subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such

previous sentence. There is one another exception. As per

11 Sub­section (2) of Section 427 of Cr.PC when a person

already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is

sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a

term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall

run concurrently with such previous sentence. Therefore, in

aforesaid two cases only the subsequent sentence shall run

concurrently with previous sentence. Otherwise the

subsequent sentence shall run consecutively and the

imprisonment in subsequent sentence shall commence at the

expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been

previously sentenced.

8.3 At this stage, few decisions of this court on whether the

subsequent sentence should run concurrently or

consecutively are required to be referred to.

8.3.1 In the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (Supra), it is

observed and held that if the transaction relating to

offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two

offences are quite different in that case the subsequent

sentence should run consecutively.

12 In the case of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain, this Court

observed that the broad expanse of discretion left by

legislation to sentencing Courts should not be narrowed

only to the seriousness of the offence. No single

consideration can definitively determine the proper

sentence. In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the court

must consider, and sometimes reject, many factors. The

court must ‘recognise, learn to control and exclude’ many

diverse data. It is a balancing act and tortuous process to

ensure reasoned sentence. In consecutive sentences, in

particular, the Court cannot afford to be blind to

imprisonment which the accused is already undergoing.

Mohd. Akhtar Hussain is a case which arose under

Gold (Control) Act, 1968 involving a Pakistani national, the

sentence in the first case was imprisonment for 7 years

and fine of Rs. 10 lakhs awarded by the court of Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in CC No. 1674 of

1982. Upon appeal, the High Court confirmed the sentence

but reduced the fine to Rs. 5 lakhs. The special leave

petition filed by the appellant therein was dismissed by 13 this Court and the conviction and sentence became final.

When the appellant was under judicial custody in the

aforesaid case, there was further investigation with regard

to his smuggling activities. It revealed widespread racket of

smuggling gold and silver in collusion with several

persons. The appellant therein was again prosecuted along

with 18 others under Section 135 of the Customs Act,

1962. The appellant therein was convicted and sentenced

for 4 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. Two

lakhs and default sentence in case of non­payment of fine.

Thereafter, the State as well as the appellant therein

approached the High Court. The High Court accepted the

State’s appeal and it enhanced the sentence from 4 years

to 7 years and made it consecutive. Consequently, the

High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant. The

result was that he had to serve in all 14 years

imprisonment which he had challenged before this Court.

Ultimately, this Court restored the sentence imposed by

the Trial Court and set aside the sentence enhanced by the

High Court by allowing the appeal.

14 8.3.2 In the case of Ranjit Singh (Supra) in paragraph 8, it is

observed and held as under:­

“8. Sub­section (1) of Section 427 CrPC provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, sub­section (1) of Section 427 CrPC deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made. Sub­ section (1) says that in such a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases covered by sub­ section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub­section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender “already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse [Ranjit Singh v. U.T. of Chandigarh, (1984) 1 SCC 31 following Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 277 and reiterated in Maru Ram [(1981) 1 SCC 107 that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub­ section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as a

15 sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub­section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub­section (1) thereof is that without the court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub­section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub­section (1) if there be no express direction of the court to that effect. Sub­ section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in sub­section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the court directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub­ section (2) is, therefore, clear.”

8.3.3 In the case of V.K. Bansal (Supra) after relying upon the

decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Akhtar (Supra)

in paragraph 10 it is observed and held as under:­

“10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the nature of power available to the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general rule to be followed except in three situations: one falling under the proviso to sub­section (1) to Section 427; the second falling under sub­section (2) thereof; and the third where the court directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along the judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of

16 exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises.”

8.3.4 In the case of Neera Yadav (Supra) while

interpreting/considering Section 427 of Cr.PC it is

observed and held that Section 427 of Cr.PC deals with

sentence passed on an offender who is already sentenced

for another offence and the power conferred on the Court

under Section 427 to order concurrent sentence is

discretionary. It is further observed that the policy of the

legislature is that normally the sentencing should be done

consecutively. It is further observed that only in

appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the

court can make the sentence concurrently with an earlier

sentence imposed. It is further observed that the discretion

exercised by the sentencing court to direct the concurrency

will have to be exercised on sound principles and not on

whims. Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a

given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or

offences committed. It is further observed and held in the

17 said decision that it is well settled that where there are

different transactions, different crime numbers and the

cases have been decided by the different judgments,

concurrent sentences cannot be awarded under Section

427 of Cr.PC. It is further observed that however, the

general rule that there cannot be concurrency of sentences

if conviction relates to two different transactions, can be

changed by an order of the court.

8.3.5 In the case of Sharad Hiru Kolambe (Supra), it is observed

and held that unless the court directs that the punishment

for such two or more offences at same trial should run

concurrently, the normal principle is that the punishments

would commence one after the expiration of the other.

Similarly, in a case where a person already undergoing a

sentence is later imposed sentence in respect of offence

tried at subsequent trial, the general rule is that the

subsequent sentence imposed run consecutively unless

there is a specific order passed by the court while imposing

any subsequent sentence, exercising discretion conferred

under Section 427 of Cr.PC that in the facts and

18 circumstances the subsequent sentence should run

concurrently, the sentence imposed in both the cases shall

run consecutively.

8.3.6 In the case of Gulam Mohammad Malik Vs. State of

Gujarat and Anr. (2018) 14 SCC 473, this Court

considered two appeals. One from the judgment of the

High Court of Gujarat and the other from the High Court of

Bombay in respect of the same appellant. In both cases,

the appellant was charged for the offences under Section

8(c), 20(b) and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985. Insofar as the

case filed in Gujarat was concerned, registered as NDPS

Case No. 1 of 2002, the appellant was convicted and

directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years

and to pay fine of Rs. 1 lakh and in default to undergo

further rigorous imprisonment for one year in case the fine

was not paid. Appellant therein preferred an appeal

challenging the aforesaid conviction and sentence before

the High Court which dismissed his appeal. In fact, the

appeal by the State for enhancement of sentence was

dismissed.

19 In the second case, the appellant therein was tried by

the Special Judge for NDPS, Court of Sessions, Greater

Bombay in Special Case No. 60 of 2002, culminating in the

conviction and sentence of appellant therein under Section

8(c), 20(b)(ii) read with Section 31A of the NDPS Act and

was sentenced to death. Death reference had been sent for

confirmation before the High Court. The appellant therein

had also filed an appeal against the aforesaid conviction

and sentence in the High Court of Bombay. The High Court

rejected the Confirmation Case no. 2 of 2008, filed by the

State by not affirming the death sentence and dismissed

the appeal of the appellant and the death sentence was

converted into thirty years rigorous imprisonment and a

fine of Rs.3 lakhs. The matter pertaining to the conversion

of the death sentence was considered before this Court and

on considering Section 31 of the NDPS Act on the facts of

the said case, it was held that the appellant therein had to

be given maximum punishment and thereafter multiplier

of one and a half times applied. Minimum term of

imprisonment prescribed under Section 31 is 10 years, on

20 that reckoning, when it is enhanced by one and a half

times, the minimum sentence comes to 15 years.

Ultimately, sentence ordered by this Court was rigorous

imprisonment of 16 years. The Court also had in mind that

the appellant therein was 65 years of age and suffering

from various ailments. It was also ordered that the

sentence would run concurrently and so far as with regard

to both the cases, fine of Rs. 1 lakh which was imposed by

the Trial Court in Gujarat was concerned, the same would

remain. As far as fine of Rs. 3 lakhs in Bombay case was

concerned, the same was reduced from Rs. 3 lakhs to Rs. 2

lakhs. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed.

9. Thus from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the

principles of law that emerge are as under:­

(i) if a person already undergoing a sentence of

imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent

conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent

term of imprisonment would normally

commence at the expiration of the

21 imprisonment to which he was previously

sentenced;

(ii) ordinarily the subsequent sentence would

commence at the expiration of the first term of

imprisonment unless the court directs the

subsequent sentence to run concurrently with

the previous sentence;

(iii) the general rule is that where there are different

transactions, different crime numbers and cases

have been decided by the different judgments,

concurrent sentence cannot be awarded under

Section 427 of Cr.PC;

(iv) under Section 427 (1) of Cr.PC the court has the

power and discretion to issue a direction that all

the subsequent sentences run concurrently

with the previous sentence, however discretion

has to be exercised judiciously depending upon

the nature of the offence or the offences

committed and the facts in situation. However,

22 there must be a specific direction or order by

the court that the subsequent sentence to run

concurrently with the previous sentence.

10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions and the principles of law enumerated hereinabove

to the facts of the case on hand, the submissions on behalf

of the appellant – accused that his subsequent sentence to

run concurrently with the previous sentence is to be rejected

outright. In the present case the appellant has been

convicted with respect to two different transactions, there are

different crime numbers and the cases have been decided by

the different judgments. Therefore, the appellant is not

entitled to any benefit of concurrent sentence under Section

427 of Cr.PC. As observed hereinabove, there is no specific

order or direction issued by the court while imposing the

subsequent sentence that the subsequent sentence to run

concurrently with the previous sentence.

23

11. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove under Section 427

(1) of Cr.PC, the Court has the power and discretion to issue

a direction that the subsequent sentence to run concurrently

with the previous sentence in that case also, the discretion

has to be exercised judiciously depending upon the nature of

offence or the offences committed. In the present case the

appellant – accused has been convicted for the offences

under the NDPS Act. He has been convicted in one case for

recovery of 4 kg heroin and sentenced to undergo 12 years RI

and in another case there is a recovery of 750 grams of

heroin and considering the Section 31 (ii) of the NDPS Act,

he has been sentenced to undergo 15 years RI. No leniency

should be shown to an accused who is found to be guilty for

the offence under the NDPS Act. Those persons who are

dealing in narcotic drugs are instruments in causing death

or in inflicting death blow to a number of innocent

young victims who are vulnerable. Such accused causes

deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society. They are

hazard to the society. Such organized activities of clandestine

smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and

24 substances have a deadly impact on the society as a whole.

Therefore, while awarding the sentence or punishment in

case of NDPS Act, the interest of the society as a whole is

required to be taken into consideration. Therefore, even while

applying discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC, the

discretion shall not be in favour of the accused who is found

to be indulging in illegal trafficking in the narcotic drugs and

psychotropic substances. As observed hereinabove, even

while exercising discretion under Section 427 of Cr.PC to run

subsequent sentence concurrently with the previous

sentence, the discretion is to be exercised judiciously and

depending upon the offence/offences committed. Therefore,

considering the offences under the NDPS Act which are very

serious in nature and against the society at large, no

discretion shall be exercised in favour of such accused who

is indulging into the offence under the NDPS Act.

12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

submissions on behalf of the appellant – accused to direct

the subsequent sentence in case arising out of FIR

No.43/1999 to run concurrently with the previous sentence

25 arising out of FIR No.134/1999 is hereby rejected. In view of

the above and for the reasons stated above the present

appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is

accordingly dismissed.

…………………………………J. (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J. (B. V. NAGARATHNA) New Delhi, December 07, 2021

26