Mohammed Imran vs The State Of Maharashtra

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 10571 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.6599 of 2018)

MOHAMMED IMRAN ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant, a successful aspirant for judicial service, is

aggrieved by the order dated 04.06.2010 cancelling his selection for

appointment due to the character verification report of the police, and

the refusal of the High Court to interfere with the same.

Signature Not Verified

3. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date: 2018.10.12 17:44:45 IST Reason:

appellant, submits that the denial of appointment on grounds of moral

turpitude is wrong and unsustainable. The appellant has been 2

acquitted of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34, I.P.C. on

28.10.2004 much before he cleared the examination for appointment in

the year 2009. He had truthfully and honestly disclosed his prosecution

and acquittal by the Sessions Court, Sangli. According to the

allegations, the appellant was in an auto­rickshaw along with another,

following the auto­rickshaw in which the main accused was travelling

with the girl. The main accused has also been acquitted of the charge

under Section 376. In similar circumstances, another aspirant Sudhir

Gulabrao Barde, who was prosecuted in Case No.3022 of 2007 under

Sections 294, 504, 34, I.P.C. but acquitted on 24.11.2009, has been

appointed. The appellant has therefore been subjected to arbitrary and

hostile discrimination. Reliance in support of the submissions was

placed on Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and

others, 2015 (2) SCC 377.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant

being an aspirant for judicial service, the standards of behaviour and

conduct, to consider suitability for appointment will have to be different

from any other service. He was involved in an act of moral turpitude in

kidnapping of the girl in question. The acquittal, because the 3

prosecutrix turned hostile, cannot come to the aid of the appellant. The

candidate referred to, for contending hostile discrimination, was not

involved in an act of moral turpitude. Mere empanelment for

appointment creates no rights to seek mandamus for appointment. The

fact that he may have disclosed the alleged involvement in the

attestation form, cannot be considered sufficient to ignore his conduct

involving moral turpitude.

5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The

only allegation against the appellant in Sessions Case No.173 of 2000 is

that he along with another was travelling in an auto­rickshaw that was

following the auto­rickshaw in which the prime accused Bilal, who was

charged under Section 376, IPC, was travelling with the girl in question.

All the accused were acquitted because the prosecutrix did not support

the allegations. The appellant was 21 years of age on the date of

occurrence i.e. 25.05.2000.

6. Employment opportunities is a scarce commodity in our country.

Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited

number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for

grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious 4

questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly,

judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of

suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a

judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical

incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service

simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual

deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move

ahead in life by self­improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of

all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may

not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact

situation of a case.

7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise

definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and

another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:

“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity….”

8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at

the competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was 5

selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public

Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had

duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an

appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in

employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in

the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so

recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was

annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character verification report of

the police.

9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who

had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under

Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,

that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant

could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both

the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection

procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were

acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that

the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave

us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows: 6

“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of this criminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted, there is no other material on record to indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to the post….”

10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called

for a confidential report of the character verification as also the

antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals

that except for the criminal case under reference in which he has been

acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse

material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a

competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no

reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can

come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the

appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer.

An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature,

if it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny

appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and

parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well settled

in this regard in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8 7

SCC 471. If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally

there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.

11. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of

the considered opinion that the consideration of the candidature of the

appellant and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision, blurred by

the spectacle of what has been described as moral turpitude, reflecting

inadequate appreciation and application of facts also, as justice may

demand.

12. We, therefore, consider the present a fit case to set aside the order

dated 04.06.2010 and the impugned order dismissing the writ petition,

and direct the respondents to reconsider the candidature of the

appellant. Let such fresh consideration be done and an appropriate

decision be taken in light of the present discussion, preferably within a

maximum period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and production

of the copy of the present order. In order to avoid any future litigation

on seniority or otherwise, we make it clear that in the event of

appointment, the appellant shall not be entitled to any other reliefs. 8

13. The appeal is allowed as above.

.....……………………….J. (Kurian Joseph)

.…………………………...J. (Sanjay Kishan Kaul)

….………………………..J. (Navin Sinha) New Delhi, October 12, 2018.