Marsh India Insurance Brokers Private Limited vs M/S Atkins Special Risks Ltd.
- Neutral2023 INSC 292
- SCR[2023] 8 SCR 496
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a regulatory authority investigating a complaint of bribery finds a lack of evidence to substantiate the allegations, and the materials on record consist only of emails and a hearsay account of a telephonic conversation that do not constitute cogent material to trigger an inquiry into the alleged corrupt conduct, an appellate tribunal cannot set aside the regulator's dismissal of the complaint and order a fresh investigation merely on the basis that suspicion has been raised regarding the transaction; the existence of a commercial contract alone, without more, is insufficient to warrant a detailed investigation into allegations of bribery.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).4678-4681 OF 2018
MARSH INDIA INSURANCE BROKERS PRIVATE LIMITED …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S ATKINS SPECIAL RISKS LTD. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The appellant before us is an Insurance and Re-insurance
Brokerage firm questioning the legality of an order passed by the
Securities Appellate Tribunal (“Tribunal”), Mumbai on 16 th March
2018. By that order, the Tribunal has set aside a decision of the
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (“IRDA”)
dismissing a complaint made by the first respondent alleging
adoption of illegal means by the appellant in obtaining business of
international re-insurance cover of another firm, Jagson
International Limited (“Jagson”) on yearly brokerage/commission. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SNEHA DAS Date: 2023.04.05 16:27:27 IST Reason: The first respondent had such business with Jagson for the years
between 2002-2012.
2. By the impugned order, the Tribunal has directed the IRDA, in
effect, to revisit the complaint made by the respondent no.1 and
pass a fresh order. Substance of the complaint made by the first
respondent, also an Insurance and Re-insurance Brokerage entity
was that the appellant had paid bribe to one Mr. Jagdish Gupta
(“respondent no.5”), the Chairman of Jagson for obtaining the
brokerage contract. Jagson is involved in the business of oil
exploration and such insurance is mainly with regard to its
exploration equipments.
3. The basis of complaint of the first respondent was certain
emails referred to by the first respondent by which the respondent
no.5 allegedly had made demand for illegal gratification in exchange
of handing over the brokerage contract to the appellant. There is
also allegation against the respondent no.5 of informing the
respondent no.1, through telephonic conversation, about demand of
bribe from the appellant. We find from pleadings that there was
increase in the number and size of rigs of Jagson subsequent to the
year 2012, which required enhanced coverage. Contention of the
respondent represented by Mr. T. Srinivasa Murthy, learned counsel
is that the appellant has used an India based direct insurance broker to pay money to respondent no.5, as part of the appellant’s
commission to India. The case of the first respondent is that the
payment, as is alleged to have been made to the respondent no.5, is
violative of the provisions of Section 41(1) of the Insurance Act,
1938 as also Clause 37(1) of the Insurance Regulatory and
Development Authority (Insurance Brokers) Regulations, 2013.
4. A complaint to that effect was made with the IRDA on 11 th
August 2015 on behalf of the first respondent, which was followed
by a writ petition in the High Court (at that time it was the High
Court for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh)
seeking an inquiry in respect of the said complaint. This writ
petition, registered as W.P. No. 27220 of 2017, was disposed of on
19th September 2017 with a direction on the IRDA to consider the
complaint of M/s. Atkins Special Risk Limited by following due
process; preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of
receipt of copy of the Order. In the ensuing hearing, IRDA disposed
of the complaint finding lack of any evidence substantiating the
complaint. In its order passed on 9 th January 2018, P.J. Joseph,
Member (Non-Life) of IRDA who heard the complaint recorded that it
was established that no proof of evidence had been brought in by
the representative of the first respondent to prove his allegations
and the authority could not further proceed with the complaint.
5. The Insurance Regulator i.e., IRDA, represented by Mr. Arvind
Datar, learned senior counsel has reiterated this stand before us.
6. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant has argued that there was no foundation of the
complaint made by the first respondent. As a result, there was no
scope of interference by the Tribunal with the order of the IRDA.
Drawing our attention towards various e-mails referred to by Mr.
Murthy, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that none of
them related to any illegal demand made by the appellant from
Jagson or respondent no.5. Barring a statement of a telephonic
conversation of one Mr. Graham Atkins, managing director of the
respondent no.1, in which respondent no.5 was alleged to have
mentioned that appellant had agreed to pay him certain sum of
money to obtain the business, there was no other material showing
any illegality being committed by his client in obtaining the contract
from Jagson.
7. Mr. Murthy on the other hand submitted that the scope and
power of the investigation of IRDA is very wide and his client had
obtained an investigation report by a private investigator which
hinted at ‘illegality’ being committed by the appellant.
8. Argument was also made as to whether the IRDA could enter
into this controversy having regard to the scope of their intervention
delineated in Section 14(2) of the Insurance Regulatory and
Development Authority Act, 1999.
9. In this judgment, however, we are not getting into that
controversy as regards jurisdiction of the IRDA to conduct
investigation as such investigation was directed by an order of the
High Court, particulars of which we have given earlier. So far as
jurisdiction or power of IRDA is concerned, we accept the
submission of Mr. Murthy that it is of wide amplitude.
10. But, on going through the materials made available before us
at the time of hearing, we are of the opinion that there was no
occasion for interfering with the order of the IRDA by the Tribunal.
It is a fact that the order of the Tribunal is in the nature of a
remand order and this order in effect has only directed a fresh
inquiry. Mr. Murthy had argued that so far as his client’s complaint
is concerned, they had discharged their onus by raising sufficient
suspicion as regards the deal between the respondent no.5 and the
appellant. But, we find that barring the fact that the appellant had
been given the brokerage contract, there is no other cogent material
which would warrant a detailed investigation. The Tribunal has, ex- facie, gone wrong in observing that the respondent no.5 had relied
on documentary evidence in support of the complaint. We have
referred to the nature of the documents but we accept the argument
of Mr. Datar that these cannot constitute materials to trigger off an
inquiry on the aspect of bribery being indulged into by the appellant
to obtain the business from Jagson.
11. The fact finding body has already come to its conclusion on
lack of evidence. In the given circumstances, we do not find any
useful purpose that would be served in subjecting the appellant or
their contract with Jagson to another round of inquiry. In the order
under appeal, the Tribunal has observed that the complaint showed
that the appellant had relied on documentary evidence in support
of the contention that Jagdish Gupta had sought bribe and was
bribed by the officers of Marsh for diverting their re-insurance
business. But we fail to find any such document from which such a
conclusion could be reached.
12. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order of the
Tribunal and allow the present appeals. The order of the IRDA
passed on 9th January 2018 is sustained.
13. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE]
…………………………………………J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 24, 2023.
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