Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali vs The Tahsildar-I, Special Cell
- Neutral2025 INSC 276
- SCR[2025] 2 SCR 1703
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A censused slum — one incorporated in land-owning authority records as having been censused in 1976, 1980, 1985, or prior to 1 January 1995 under Regulation 33(10)(II)(viii) of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 — falls within the definition of slums for purposes of redevelopment under Regulation 33(10) of those Regulations and may be redeveloped by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority thereunder without a separate notification under section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, even if the land is technically owned by another authority such as MHADA. Where the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee has rendered a final order on grounds of ineligibility and non-compliance with rehabilitation scheme prerequisites after a hearing at which the applicant participated, and that order is not challenged within a reasonable time, it attains finality and cannot be circumvented by filing a writ petition years later challenging a second notice for the same cause on substantially identical grounds. An order for eviction under sections 33 and 38 of the Slum Act, lawfully issued by the competent authority following an unchallenged final determination by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee, does not suffer legal infirmity and will not be set aside where the redevelopment project has reached an advanced stage and more than 70 per cent of eligible slum dwellers have consented to it.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 2025 INSC 276 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.1665 OF 2023)
MANSOOR ALI FARIDA IRSHAD ALI & OTHERS …APPELLANTS
Versus
THE TAHSILDARI, SPECIAL CELL & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO(S). OF 2025) DIARY NO.40035 OF 2024
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO(S). OF 2025) DIARY NO.49187 OF 2024
JUDGMENT
SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.
1. Delay condoned. I.A(s) seeking permissions to file Special Leave
Petitions are allowed.
2. Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
3. These appeals challenge the order dated 04.01.2023 where the Digitally signed by Jayant Kumar Arora Date: 2025.02.27 17:24:34 IST Reason:
High Court of Bombay dismissed a writ petition filed impugning a notice dated 06.12.2022, issued by Slum
Rehabilitation Authority (hereinafter ‘SRA’), directing
appellants to vacate their respective premises located in the
plot of land in question as the same is to be redeveloped.
4. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
a) The SRA issued a notice dated 28.01.2019 under sections
33 and 38 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement,
Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter ‘Slum
Act’) and directed appellants to vacate their respective
premises within 15 days for the reason that appellants were
occupying a slum area which was to be redeveloped.
b) The challenge to the notice dated 28.01.2019 before the
Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (hereinafter ‘AGRC’)
under section 35(1A) of the Slum Act was dismissed vide
order dated 12.06.2019.
c) Despite the affirmation of notice dated 28.01.2019 by the
AGRC, appellants did not handover their premises to the
developer for the redevelopment of the area and thus, SRA
issued another notice on 06.12.2022 under sections 33 and
38 of the Slum Act, directing appellants to vacate their
premises within 48 hours. This notice of 06.12.2022 was
challenged before the High Court by filing a Writ Petition 2 which has been dismissed vide the impugned order dated
04.01.2023. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants are
before us.
5. We have heard both sides and perused the material on record.
6. Before we deal with the facts of the present case, we would like to
discuss some of the provisions of the Slum Act which govern
the redevelopment of slum areas. The term ‘slum area’ is
defined under section 2(ga) of the Act, which reads as follows:
“slum area” means any area declared as such by the Competent Authority under subsection (1) of section 4; and includes any area deemed to be a slum area under section 4A.”
7. The Competent Authority, appointed under section 3 of the Slum
Act, is empowered to declare any area as a slum area under
section 4 of the Slum Act. The Slum Act is a welfare
legislation enacted in 1971 with the object of rehabilitating
slum dwellers in order to improve their living conditions. The
subsequent amendment to the Slum Act in the year 1996
inserted an entirely new Chapter i.e. Chapter IA for the
purpose of Slum Rehabilitation. Under Section 3A of this new
Chapter of the Slum Act, the State has appointed a Slum
Rehabilitation Authority (‘SRA’) which prepares and
implements Slum Rehabilitation Schemes as per section 3B
of the Slum Act.
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8. There is another State statute relevant here which is
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976
(‘MHAD Act’). The Act focuses on providing affordable
housing across the State of Maharashtra and like SRA which
is created under the Slum Act, Maharashtra Housing and
Area Development Authority (‘MHADA’) was formed under
MHAD Act. There are welldefined areas in which the MHAD
Act and Slum Act operate. However, there are some
overlapping areas as well. Be that as it may, we are not
required to get into the details of this aspect.
9. Coming back to the facts of the case, SRA sanctions a
rehabilitation scheme in 2010 and appoints Respondent No.3
(‘developer’) to redevelop the area for Respondent No.9 i.e. the
proposed society named Bharat Ekta CoOperative Society
(‘Bharat Ekta Society’) in terms of the Slum Act and
Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991
(‘hereinafter DCR’). Under the scheme, the plot in question
was joined with two other adjoining plots and an
amalgamated scheme for slum rehabilitation was to be
implemented. The developer initiated the redevelopment
project in two phases. After completing PhaseI, when the
developer sought to vacate the present plot in PhaseII during 4 construction, the present appellants did not cooperate and
consequently, the developer requested the competent
authority to initiate necessary action against the appellants
among others under sections 33 and 38 of the Slum Act. The
relevant portions of these sections are as follows:
“33. Power of eviction to be exercised by Chief Executive Officer.— Where the Competent Authority is satisfied either upon a representation from the owner of a building or upon other information in its possession that the occupants of the building have not vacated it in pursuance of any order or direction issued or given by the Authority, the Authority shall, by order, direct the eviction of the occupants from the building in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the order, and for the purpose of such eviction, may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary: Provided that, before making any order under this section, the Competent Authority shall give a reasonable opportunity to the occupants of the building to show cause why they should not be evicted therefrom.
38. Order of demolition of buildings in certain cases.— (1) Where the erection of any building has been commenced, or is being carried out, or has been completed, in contravention of the provisions of section 8 or of any restriction or condition imposed under sub section (10) of section 12, or a plan for the redevelopment of any clearance area or in contravention of any notice, order or direction issued or given under this Act, the Competent Authority may, in addition to any other remedy that may be resorted to under this Act or under any other law, make an order directing that such erection shall be demolished by the owner thereof within such time not exceeding two months as may be specified in the order, and on
5 the failure of the owner to comply with the order, the building so erected shall be liable to forfeiture or to summary demolition by an order of the Competent Authority and the expenses of such demolition shall be recoverable from the owner as arrears of land revenue: Provided that, no such order shall be made unless the owner has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard…”
In exercise of its power under the abovementioned sections,
the competent authority issued the initial notice dated
28.01.2019 by which appellants were directed to vacate the
premises within 15 days.
10. Against this notice, appellants filed an application before AGRC
questioning the entire slum rehabilitation project on the
grounds that the plot is a MHADA layout and only MHADA
can redevelop the said plot of land as per Regulation 33(5) of
DCR. In other words, as per the appellants, it is not a project
that can be undertaken by the SRA under Regulation 33(10)
of DCR. In other words, the appellants tried to raise doubts
about the legality of the slum rehabilitation project itself.
Appellants also raised a question that the scheme was being
implemented without obtaining the consent of 70% of
occupants which is mandatory under the DCR. Moreover, the
Appellants claimed that they are the tenants of MHADA and
are residing there by paying rent to MHADA.
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11. AGRC in its wellconsidered order dated 12.06.2019 dealt with all
the points raised by appellants and dismissed their
application. It was rightly held that the contention of the
appellants to the effect that the said plot is a MHADA layout
and thus, required to be redeveloped by MHADA as per
Regulation 33(5) of DCR instead of SRA under Regulation
33(10) of DCR, has no substance because MHADA has been
consistent in its stand that the plot was never a MHADA
layout. Moreover, the appellants were never the tenants of
MHADA and they were just staying there as transit camp
tenants. There is no landlordtenant relationship between the
appellants and MHADA and what the appellants were paying
to MHADA was not rent but transit fee and other service
charges. AGRC also observed that appellants are ineligible
slum dwellers and some of them along with others had filed a
Writ Petition before the High Court way back in the year
2010 raising identical issues and that petition was dismissed
on 20.07.2011.
12. The AGRC order dated 12.06.2019 was never challenged before
any forum. After four years of passing of this order when SRA
issued the second notice dated 06.12.2022 the appellants
7 approached the High Court in writ jurisdiction leading to the
impugned order dated 04.01.2023.
13. The High Court notes that the appellants did not approach the
Court with clean hands inasmuch as they did not disclose
the earlier notice even when the later notice of 2022 refers to
the previous notice of 2019.
14. There is no satisfactory explanation on behalf of the appellants as
to why they never challenged the AGRC order, except for
making a bald statement that they were not aware of that
order. The High Court rightly disbelieves this and further
notes that AGRC order has attained finality. In fact, from
2019 to 2022, instead of challenging the AGRC order,
appellants were busy filing complaints against Bharat Ekta
Society i.e., respondent no.9 here, and made an unsuccessful
attempt to question the credibility of the society by calling it
a ‘bogus society’. The appellants had challenged the order of
AGRC where they had participated in the proceeding and
ACRC had closed the proceedings and reserved its order.
Under these circumstances their contention of being
unaware of the final order, would only commend us to
conclude that the appellants were not diligent enough. 8 Further they cannot feign ignorance of the structures raised
before their own eyes, wherein settlement of other slum
dwellers was carried out.
15. The appellants have only been using dilatory tactics to delay the
project as they were found to be ineligible slum dwellers
since they were transit camp tenants, who were given transit
accommodation during the widening of the Western Express
Highway. Some of the appellants, who were earlier not
eligible though have now been found to be eligible and have
been offered accommodation under the present scheme.
However, they have not accepted the offer and have stuck to
their argument that this being a MHADA layout, it should be
developed separately and not under Slum Act. The reason for
this is that in case MHADA develops it, appellants would get
a larger accommodation which is not generally provided for
slum dwellers in the redeveloped buidlings.
16. The appellants have also raised a point that no notification has
been issued under the Slum Act declaring it to be a slum
area. This contention is totally misconceived because the
project in the present case relates to a ‘censused slum’ and it
is included in the definition of slums under Regulation 33(10) 9 of DCR for the purpose of redevelopment. As per Regulation
33(10)(II)(i) of DCR, slums for the purpose of redevelopment
are defined as follows:
“…slums shall mean those censused, or declared and notified, in the past or hereafter under the Slum Act. Slums shall also mean areas/pavement stretches hereafter notified as Slum Rehabilitation Areas.”
‘Censused Slums’ are defined under Regulation 33(10)(II)(viii)
of DCR as ‘those slums located on lands belonging to
Government, any undertaking of Government, or Brihan
Mumbai Municipal Corporation and incorporated in the records
of the land owning authority as having been censused in
1976, 1980 or 1985 or prior to 1st January, 1995’.
In the present case, MHADA has submitted before us as well
as before the High Court and AGRC that it is their property
but it is not as MHADA layout and it has granted a No
Objection Certificate to SRA for the redevelopment of the land
under Regulation 33(10) of DCR because the site is a slum
which had been declared as ‘censused slum’ way back in the
year 1981. Reading of the above regulations also makes it
clear that if a slum is a ‘censused slum’ then it is already
included in the definition of slums for the purpose of
redevelopment under Regulation 33(10) of DCR and no 10 separate notification is required under the Slum Act. In other
words, a censused slum is also a slum as per Regulation
33(10) DCR and a separate notification under section 4 of the
Slum Act is not required. MHADA has also never declared
this slum as a part of its layout. It may be a MHADA property
technically but over the years it has grown as a slum and
therefore, for purely practical reasons, it needed to be
developed by SRA under Regulation 33(10) of DCR and not as
a MHADA layout under Regulation 33(5) of DCR. In fact, as
discussed earlier, a No Objection Certificate to SRA for the
development of the said property has already been granted by
the MHADA.
At the risk of repetition, we would like to note that clearly
there is no force in the appellants’ arguments that it is a
MHADA layout and had to be redeveloped under Regulation
33(5) of DCR rather than Regulation 33(10) of DCR. In our
view, this redevelopment, which is being carried out under
the Slum Act and Regulation 33(10) of DCR, does not suffer
from any legal infirmity.
17. For the present slum area, SRA had pointed out before the High
Court that there were as many as 2965 slum structures 11 which were surveyed and out of these, 2625 were found to be
eligible for rehabilitation. Also, the record shows that Bharat
Ekta Society is a bona fide society consisting of 261 slum
dwellers and more than 70% of the eligible slum dwellers of
the Society have taken a considered decision that they want
redevelopment of their slums, and a great deal of progress
has already been made in this regard so far. The project has
not only been sanctioned but has reached an advanced stage
and at this stage, the appellants cannot be allowed to disturb
this ongoing project as it would defeat the whole purpose of
the redevelopment which is going to benefit a large number of
eligible slum dwellers.
18. Only four of the present appellants were there before the High
Court and rest of the appellants are fence sitters who have
directly approached this Court claiming that they are also
affected by the order of the High Court, even though they
were never a party before the High Court. In any case, we
find no merit in their case.
19. No relief can be granted to these appellants as prayed. These
appeals are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.
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20. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
21. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
……...……….………………….J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
..….....………………………….J. [KRISHNAN VINOD CHANDRAN]
New Delhi.
February 27, 2025.
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