Manoj Agarwal vs Sebi
- CitationAppeal No.66 of 2016
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a company has none of the officers listed in Section 5(a) to (c) of the Companies Act, 1956, and the Board has specified no director under Section 5(g), all directors of the company are "officers who are in default" for the purposes of Section 73(2), and are therefore jointly and severally liable with the company to repay money collected in contravention of the public issue requirements, with interest. A director's liability as an "officer who is in default" under Section 73(2) read with Section 5 does not depend on his responsibility for the issue of the securities, his knowledge of the contravening issue, his participation in the company's affairs or board meetings, or his having paid subscription money; a director who lent his name to the board remains within the category. An authority conferred on particular persons to raise funds through private placement, or to sign documents and make filings as authorised representatives, does not constitute an authorisation to discharge the obligations arising from a deemed public issue under Sections 56 and 73, so as to displace the liability of directors under Section 5(g). A director is not deemed to have vacated office under Section 283(g) unless he, despite notice, absents himself from three consecutive board meetings or from all meetings for a continuous period of three months; where no notice of board meetings was given to him, that provision has no application. The word "officer in default" in Section 73(2) must be read with its statutory definition in Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956, and an order that does not expressly cite Section 5(g) is not for that reason invalid where the liability it imposes is the one Section 5 creates.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
Order Reserved on: 4.7.2017 Date of Decision : 14.7.2017
Appeal No.66 of 2016
Manoj Agarwal, Non-Executive Director, Bhartiya Real Estate Development Ltd. 3, North Goalapara Road, Angus Bhadreshwar, Hooghly, West Bengal - 712 221. ...Appellant
Versus
The Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI Bhavan, Plot No. C-4A, G-Block, Bandra-Kurla Complex, Bandra (East), Mumbai - 400 051. ...Respondent
Mr. Subir Kumar, Advocate for the Appellant.
Mr. Mustafa Doctor, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rakesh Puri and Mr. Rohan Agrawal, Advocates i/b. MDP & Patners for the Respondent.
CORAM : Justice J.P. Devadhar, Presiding Officer Jog Singh, Member Dr. C.K.G. Nair, Member
Per : Justice J.P. Devadhar
1.
This appeal is filed to challenge the order passed by the Whole Time Member
('WTM' for short) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India ('SEBI' for short)
on 21.1.2016. By the said order the WTM of SEBI while confirming the ex-parte
order dated 2nd December, 2014 has directed that the Bharatiya Real Estate
Development Limited ('BREDL' for short) and its present and past directors
including the appellant shall jointly and severally refund the money collected by
BREDL through issuance of redeemable preference shares with interest at the rate of
15% p.a. compounded on half yearly intervals, from the date when the repayment
became due (in terms of Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956) to the investors
till the date of actual payment. Further, by the impugned order, BREDL and its 2
directors including the appellant are restrained from accessing the securities market
for a period of 4 years.
2. Appellant became a Director of BREDL on 19th August, 2010 and resigned as
Director of BREDL on 1.5.2012.
3. During the years 2011-12 and 2012-13 BREDL had collected Rs.40 lac and
Rs.59.06 lac (total Rs.99.06 lac) respectively from various preferential allottees.
Since the aforesaid amounts were collected without complying with the 'public issue'
norms stipulated under Section 56, 60 read with Section 2(36) and Section 73 of the
Companies Act, 1956, ex-parte order was passed on 2.12.2014 directing BREDL and
its directors not to mobilize funds from investors through the offer of Redeemable
Preference Shares/equity shares till further orders. By the said order, BREDL and its
directors including the appellant were prohibited from issuing prospectus or any
document soliciting money from the public until further orders. Thereafter, by the
impugned order dated 21.1.2016, BREDL and its directors including the appellant are
directed to refund jointly and severally the money collected by BREDL through the
issuance of Redeemable Preference Shares with interest at the rate specified therein.
4. In view of the fact that out of the amount of Rs.99.06 lakh, amount of Rs.59.06
lakh was collected by BREDL after the appellant ceased to be a Director of BREDL,
counsel for SEBI fairly stated on instruction that the obligation of the appellant to
refund the amount with interest jointly and severally with BREDL and other Directors
set out in the impugned order may be limited to Rs.40 lakh only, because, that was the
amount collected by BREDL during the period when the appellant was a Director of
BREDL.
5. Before setting out the arguments advanced by counsel on both sides, it would
be appropriate to quote Section 5 and Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956
which reads thus:-
3
"Meaning of "officer who is in default".
5. For the purpose of any provision in this Act which enacts that an officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to any punishment or penalty, whether by way of imprisonment, fine or otherwise, the expression "officer who is in default" means all the following officers of the company, namely :
(a) the managing director or managing directors;
(b) the whole-time director or whole-time directors;
(c) the manager;
(d) the secretary;
(e) any person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the Board of directors of the company is accustomed to act;
(f) any person charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with that provision:
Provided that the person so charged has given his consent in this behalf to the Board;
(g) where any company does not have any of the officers specified in clauses (a) to (c), any director or directors who may be specified by the Board in this behalf or where no director is so specified, all the directors: Provided that where the Board exercises any power under clause (f) or clause
(g), it shall, within thirty days of the exercise of such powers, file with the Registrar a return in the prescribed form."
"Allotment of shares and debentures to be dealt in on stock exchange
73. (1) .............................
(1A) .................................
(2) Where the permission has not been applied under sub-section (1), or, such permission having been applied for, has not been granted as aforesaid, the company shall forthwith repay without interest all moneys received from applicants in pursuance of the prospectus, and, if any such money is not repaid within eight days after the company becomes liable to repay it, the company and every director of the company who is an officer in default shall, on and from the expiry of the eighth day, be jointly and severally liable to repay that money with interest at such rate, not less than four per cent and not more than fifteen per cent, as may be prescribed, having regard to the length of the period of delay in making the repayment of such money.
2(A) .............................
2(B) .............................."
6. Arguments advanced by Mr. Subir Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant
may be summarized as follows:-
4
(a) Appellant was not the person responsible for issuance of redeemable
preference shares of BREDL so as to attract the penal provisions
contained in Section 56 and 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 read with
Section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992.
(b) Appellant had no knowledge about the real estate business and the
appellant had merely lent his name to be a director of BREDL at the
instance of Mr. Soumen Majumder and in fact for becoming a director
of BREDL, the appellant had neither paid any subscription money to
BREDL nor the appellant after becoming a director was involved in the
day to day affairs of BREDL. Appellant as a Non Executive Director of
BREDL had neither attended any of the board meetings to approve any
of the accounts, balance sheets and/or management/policy decisions of
BREDL. In these circumstances, the appellant could not be said to be
an "officer in default" under Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956.
(c) Section 2(26) of the Companies Act, 1956 defines the expression
"Managing Director" to mean a director who exercises substantial
power of management of the company. In the present case, the
substantial power of management of BREDL was always with Mr.
Soumen Majumder and Ms. Shipra Banerjee. Relying on various
documents signed and filings made by Mr. Soumen Majumder and Ms.
Shipra Banerjee it is submitted by counsel for the appellant that Mr.
Soumen Majumder and Ms. Shipra Banerjee would alone fall within the
purview of 'Officer who is in default' defined under Section 5(a) of
Companies Act, 1956.
(d) In the absence of a designated Managing Director appointed by
BREDL, admittedly Mr. Soumen Majumder and Ms. Shipra Banerjee
pursuant to the responsibility cast on them had signed and filed various 5
documents with the Registrar of Companies. On all the letters of
allotment issued by BREDL, Ms. Shipra Banerjee had signed as
"Authorised Signatory" and therefore Mr. Soumen Majumder and Ms.
Shipra Banerjee would only be the officer in default covered under
Section 5(e) and 5(f) of the Companies Act, 1956.
(e) Case of the appellant does not fall within Section 5(g) of the
Companies Act, 1956 as pleaded orally by the counsel for respondent,
even though there is no finding recorded to that effect in the impugned
order.
(f) As per Rule 4BB of the Companies (Central Government's)
General Rules and Forms 1956, within thirty days of exercising its
powers under section 5(f) or section 5(g) of the Companies Act, 1956,
BREDL was required to file with the Registrar of Companies a return in
Form 1AA duly signed by the Secretary or, where there is no secretary
by a director. In the documents annexed at page 46 to 49 of the affidavit
in reply filed by SEBI, Ms. Shipra Banerjee is shown as authorised
person to submit returns on allotment. Therefore, when there was a
authorised person appointed by BREDL, the WTM of SEBI could not
have applied Section 5(g) of the Companies Act and hold that for
violation of Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 committed by
BREDL all the directors including the appellant were liable to be
penalised.
(g) In the complaint filed by a complainant which is set out at page
107 of the affidavit in reply filed by SEBI, Mr. Soumen Majumder is
shown as Managing Director of BREDL. Therefore, for the violation of
Section 73(2) the Managing Director of BREDL could be said to be an 6
"officer in default" under Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956 and not
all the directors of BREDL.
(h) BREDL had not intended to raise funds by issuing redeemable
preference shares to the general public. However, on account of issuing
redeemable preference shares to more than 50 entities, as per settled
law, issuance of redeemable preferential shares became a deemed public
issue covered under Section 56 of the Companies Act, 1956. Section 56
of the Companies Act, 1956 which is akin to Section 27 of SEBI Act
casts certain obligation on the specified directors or on any other person
to whom the responsibility of issuing the prospectus was entrusted. In
the present case, the special resolution for issuance of redeemable
preferential shares was signed by Ms. Shipra Banerjee and notice of
extra ordinary meeting was signed jointly by Ms. Shipra Banerjee and
Mr. Soumen Majumder. Section 56(4) of the Companies Act, 1956
provides that a director or other person responsible for the prospectus
shall not incur any liability by reason of any non compliance or any
contravention if he satisfies the three conditions set out therein. In the
present case, appellant had no knowledge about issuance of redeemable
preference shares and therefore the appellant could not be penalized for
the failure on part of BREDL and other directors.
(i) Before issuance of redeemable preference shares, it was obligatory
on part of the authorised person of BREDL to make an application to
the stock exchanges seeking permission for issuance of redeemable
preference shares, however, no such application was made. Thus,
there was contravention of Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956,
which is akin to Section 27 of the SEBI Act. In the present case the
appellant had neither participated in any of the board meetings nor any 7
notice of such meeting were received by the appellant and therefore the
appellant was neither aware of the acts done by other directors nor the
appellant was signatory to any of the board resolution or documents. In
such a case, for failure of BREDL to refund the amount to the investors,
the appellant could not be held to be an officer in default and made
liable to refund the amount jointly and severally. In support of the
above contention reliance is placed on a decision of the Bombay High
Court in case of H. Nanjundiah vs. V. Govindan reported in (1986) 59
Company Cases 356 (BOM) and a decision of the Supreme Court in
case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and others
reported in (2005) 3 BLJR 2018 (SC).
(j) Relying on the master circular issued by the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs on 29.7.2011 it is submitted that a Company Secretary
could also be treated as an officer in default. In the present case, it is
submitted that Mr. Jayakrushan Das was the Company Secretary of
BREBL and therefore, for non compliance of Section 73(2), the
Company Secretary of BREDL ought to have been held to be an officer
in default. As per the master circular, status of a director and the timing
of commission of the offence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration for holding a person to be an officer in default. In the
present case, it is submitted that neither the status of the appellant nor
the timing of issuance of preferential allotment shows that the appellant
could be considered as an officer in default.
(k) As BREDL had not issued any notice of board meeting to the
appellant, the appellant is deemed to have vacated the office of a
director under Section 283(g) of the Companies Act, 1956. Therefore, 8
the appellant who is deemed to have vacated the office of director could
not be declared to be an officer in default.
(l) In the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs, BREDL is still
shown as an active company and Mr. Soumen Majumder is still shown
as a Director of BREDL. In these circumstances counsel for the
appellant submitted that the impugned order be quashed and set aside
qua the appellant and amount due to the investors be directed to be
refunded jointly and severally by BREDL and other directors of
BREDL.
7. We see no merit in the above contentions.
8. In the present case, fact that Rs.40 lac was collected by BREDL through
issuance of redeemable preference shares during the period when the appellant was a
director of BREDL is not in dispute. Similarly fact that the redeemable preference
shares were issued to more than 50 entities and as a result BREDL and its directors
were obliged to follow the public issue norms laid down under Section 56 of the
Companies Act, 1956 is also not in dispute.
9. In view of the fact that BREDL failed to follow the public issue norms
contained in Section 56 of the Companies Act, 1956 before issuance of redeemable
preference shares to more than 50 entities and no officer was authorised by BREDL to
comply with the public issue provisions contained in the Companies Act, 1956
including the obligation to refund the amount under Section 73(2), the WTM of SEBI
has held that all directors of BREDL were "officer in default" and accordingly
directed BREDL and all its directors including the appellant to refund the amount
collected from the investors with interest at the rate as more particularly set out in the
impugned order.
9
10. Argument that the appellant was not a person responsible for issuance of
redeemable preference shares and therefore for failure on part of BREDL and its
directors to comply Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 the appellant could not
be made liable is without any merit. In the present case, even though the intention of
BREDL was to collect Rs.40 lac by issuance of redeemable preference shares through
private placement and not by the general public, admittedly allotments were made to
more than 50 entities and therefore BREDL was obliged to follow the public issue
norms specified under the Companies Act, 1956. Since the said norms were not
followed, under Section 73(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 it was obligatory on part of
BREDL to refund the amount collected within the time stipulated therein. As the
amounts were not refunded to the investors it is held that BREDL and every director
of BREDL who is an "officer in default" shall refund jointly and severally the amount
with interest. Therefore, fact that the appellant was not responsible for issuance of
redeemable preference shares does not absolve the obligation of all the directors of
BREDL including the appellant to refund the amount collected from the investors
with interest as set out in the impugned order.
11. Argument of the appellant that he could not be said to be an "officer in default"
is without any merit. Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956 defines the expression
'officer who is in default' to mean the officers named therein. Section 5(g) provides
that where any company does not have any of the officers specified in clauses (a) to
(c) of Section 5, then any director who may be specified by the Board in that behalf or
where no director is so specified then all the directors would be "officer who is in
default". In the present case, no material is brought on record to show that any of the
officers set out in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 5 or any specified director of BREDL
was entrusted to discharge the obligation contained in Section 73 of the Companies
Act, 1956. In such a case, as per Section 5(g) of the Companies Act, 1956 BREDL
and all the directors of BREDL are liable. Therefore, decision of the WTM that all 10
directors of BREDL including the appellant would constitute "officer in default"
cannot be defaulted.
12. Fact that appellant had merely lent his name to be a director of BREDL at the
instance of Mr. Soumen Majumder and for becoming a director of BREDL the
appellant had neither paid any subscription money to BREDL and the fact that the
appellant was not involved in the day to day affairs of BREDL would not absolve the
appellant from his obligation to refund the amount to the investors in view of the
specific provisions contained in Section 73(2) read with Section 5 of the Companies
Act, 1956. Admittedly, the appellant was a director of BREDL when amounts were
collected by BREDL in contravention of the public issue norms and there is nothing
on record to suggest that any particular officer/director was authorised to comply with
the public issue norms. In such a case, all directors of BREDL including the appellant
would be "officer in default" under Section 73(2) read with Section 5 of the
Companies Act, 1956.
13. Fact that Mr. Soumen Majumder and Ms. Shirpa Banerjee had signed various
documents and made filings before various authorities as authorised representatives of
BREDL would not mean that they were authorised to discharge the obligation arising
on account of deemed public issue. In other words, fact that Mr. Soumen Majumder
and Ms. Shipra Banerjee were authorised to perform various other functions could not
be a ground to infer that they were also authorised to discharge the public issue
obligation contained in Section 56 & 73 of the Companies Act, 1956. Therefore, fact
that Mr. Soumen Majumder and Ms. Shipra Banerjee had signed certain documents as
authorised person of BREDL cannot be a ground to presume that they were authorised
to discharge the obligation arising on account of deemed public issue.
14. Fact that the impugned order does not specifically refer to Section 5(g) of the
Companies Act, 1956 would not render the impugned order invalid. In the impugned
order it is specifically recorded that for non compliance of Section 73(2), obligation to 11
refund the amount with interest is on BREDL and the "officer in default". Expression
"officer in default" used in Section 73(2) has to be read with Section 5 of Companies
Act, 1956 which defines the expression "officer who is in default". Therefore,
argument of the appellant that impugned order does not refer to Section 5(g) of the
Companies Act, 1956 is without any merit.
15. Similarly, argument of the appellant that Mr. Soumen Majumder who was
instrumental in raising funds through issuance of redeemable preference shares and
Ms. Shipra Banerjee who had signed all the letters of allotment issued by BREDL
would be covered under the expression "officer in default" set out in Section 5(e) and
5(f) of the Companies Act, 1956 is also without any merit. Specific case of the
appellant is that BREDL had no intention to raise funds by offering redeemable
preference shares to the general public. In such a case, authority given to Mr. Soumen
Majumder and Ms. Shipra Banerjee to raise funds by issuing redeemable preference
shares through private placement could not be considered as authority given for
discharging the obligation arising on account of deemed public issue.
16. From the documents brought on record it is seen that BREDL had filed with
the Registrar of Companies an annual return form, wherein, designation of all the
persons named therein including the appellant are shown as directors of BREDL,
which obviously means that BREDL had not appointed any person as Managing
Director or Whole Time Director or Secretary or Manager. Moreover, there is no
material to show that any director was authorised to discharge the obligation arising
on account of deemed public issue. In these circumstances, decision of the WTM of
SEBI that all directors of BREDL were "officer in default" and that they are jointly
and severally liable to refund the amount with interest to the investors cannot be
faulted.
17. Fact that one complainant in his complaint had considered Mr. Soumen
Majumder to be a Managing Director of BREDL would not mean that Mr. Soumen 12
Majumder becomes a Managing Director of BREDL. Right to appoint a Managing
Director is with the Company and not with any complainant.
18. Reliance was placed by counsel for appellant on a decision of Bombay High
Court in case of H. Nanjundiah (supra). That decision has no relevance to the present
case, because that decision was rendered in context of Section 5 of the Companies Act
as it stood prior to its amendment in the year 1988. Section 5 of the Companies Act,
1956 as amended in the year 1988 does not contain the words "knowingly and
wilfully" to describe the officer of the company who is deemed to be an "officer in
default". Hence the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of H. Nanjundiah
(supra) rendered in the context of unamended Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956 is
not relevant to the facts of present case.
19. Reliance was also placed by the counsel for the appellant on a decision of the
Supreme Court in case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra). That decision dealt
with the expression "officer in default" referred to in Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. In the present case we are concerned with the expression
"officer who is in default" as defined under Section 5 of the Companies Act, 1956. Since the expression "officer in default" defined under Section 5 of the Companies
Act, 1956 is not pari materia with that expression defined under the Negotiable
Instruments Act, the Apex Court decision in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
(supra) would have no relevance to the fact of the present case.
20. Relying on a master circular issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs on
29.7.2011 it was contended that in the present case, Since Mr. Jaykrushan Das was
appointed as a Company Secretary by BREDL the said Company Secretary could be
an officer in default for non compliance of Section 73(2). We see no merit in the
above contention, because, there is nothing on record to suggest that Company
Secretary was authorised to comply with the obligations relating to the deemed public 13
issue. Hence the argument that the Company Secretary of BREDL ought to have been
made liable cannot be accepted.
21. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the appellant had not
attended any board meeting of BREDL and therefore, the appellant is deemed to have
vacated the office under Section 283(g) of the Companies Act and consequently no
action could be taken against the appellant is also without any merit. Section 283(g)
of the Companies Act, 1956 applies only to a director who inspite of notice absents
himself from three consecutive meetings of the Board of Directors or absents himself
from all the meetings of the Board for a continuous period of three months. In the
present case, it is the case of the appellant that no notice of Board meeting was issued
to him. In such a case, question of the appellant remaining absent from the Board
meetings does not arise and consequently question of applying Section 283(g) of the
Companies Act, 1956 to the case of the appellant does not arise.
22. For all the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in the appeal and the same is
hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. However, it is made clear that the liability
of the appellant under the impugned order is restricted to refunding the amount of
Rs.40 lac with interest jointly and severally with BREDL and other directors of
BREDL.
Sd/-
Justice J.P. Devadhar Presiding Officer
Sd/-
Jog Singh Member
Sd/-
Dr. C.K.G.Nair Member
14.7.2017 Prepared and compared by RHN
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