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Manisha Satish Mahale and others vs The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and another

Bombay High Court10 December 2025Vibha Kankanwadi

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a reference application under Section 64 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is filed with a delay of a short duration (such as 11 days), and the applicant furnishes a reasonable explanation for the delay arising from procedural matters inherent in acquisition proceedings, the Collector is bound by the proviso to Section 64(2) to adopt a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach in exercising discretion to condone the delay, rather than applying a hyper-technical construction that would mechanically reject the application on limitation grounds and deprive the landowner of their statutory right to seek determination of fair compensation.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025:BHC-AUG:36145-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 13634 OF 2025

Manisha Satish Mahale and others VERSUS The State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and another

Mr. A. B. Kale, Advocate for petitioners Mr. R. S. Wani, AGP for respondent-State

CORAM : Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi & Hiten S. Venegavkar, JJ. DATE : 10th December, 2025

ORDER (Per: Hiten S. Venegavkar) :

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1. The present proceedings instituted under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, assails the order dated 22.04.2025, passed by the

Collector, whereby the petitioner's reference application under Section 64

of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2023, (hereinafter referred to as

"the 2013 Act") has been rejected solely on the ground of delay. The

petitioners further seek a direction to the Collector to restore and

adjudicate the reference on its own merits.

2. The material facts are not in dispute. The petitioner's land

came to be acquired for the construction of the Surat-Dhule Bypass

Road. In the acquisition proceedings, the competent authority issued

notices under Section 21 of the Act on 18.01.2023 and thereafter, a final

award was passed on 03.05.2023. By the said award, compensation of

WP-13634-2025.odt 1 of 6 Rs. 6,94,00,000/- only was granted. The petitioner received part

compensation on 24.05.2023 and the balance on 24.07.2023. Being

satisfied with the quantum of compensation, the petitioners submitted a

Reference Application bearing No. 710 of 2024, on 14.09.2023, seeking

enhancement under Section 64 of the 2013 Act. It is the petitioners' case

that due to the involvement of several contesting parties and the

consequential delay in completion of stamp duty formalities, certain

procedural delays occurred in filing the reference, which ultimately

resulted in a delay of only 1 week and 4 days beyond the prescribed

limit.

3. The record indicates that notices came to be issued by the

Collector on 31.12.2024 calling upon the petitioner to submit their

response in the matter. A detailed reply was accordingly filed on

09.01.2025, explaining the factual circumstances surrounding the minor

delay and setting out the grounds for seeking reference.

However, by the impugned order dated 22.04.2025, the Collector

rejected the reference holding that it was barred by limitation and that

no sufficient cause for condonation has been established. It is also

evident that the collector proceeded to pass the impugned order without

affording the petitioners any opportunity of personal hearing.

4. The learned advocate for the petitioners contended that the

WP-13634-2025.odt 2 of 6 short delay of merely 11 days ought to have been condoned in view of

the proviso to section 64(2) of the 2013 Act, which empowers the

Collector to entertain a delayed reference upon being satisfied that the

applicant had sufficient cause. It was urged that the statutory scheme

itself contemplates a liberal construction, as the proviso authorizes

condonation for a further period of one year beyond the primary

limitation. Reliance was placed upon the well-settled principles

enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land

Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katiji, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107,

wherein the Court held that a justice oriented approach must be adopted

while considering application for condonation of delay and that

substantial justice must prevail over technicalities. In the said judgment,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that refusal to condone delay may

result in meritorious matters being thrown out at the threshold and

therefore, a pragmatic and liberal interpretation should inform the

exercise of discretion. The Court emphasized that litigants do not stand

to benefit by filing delayed appeals and that Court should not take a

pedantic approach that defeats substantive rights.

5. The petitioners further relied upon the Hon'ble Supreme

Court's judgment in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7

SCC 123 wherein it was held that the length of delay is immaterial so

long as sufficient cause is shown and that a short delay particularly

WP-13634-2025.odt 3 of 6 deserves liberal condonation unless malafides or dilatory tactics are

evident. The Court clarified that the primary function of limitation law is

not to destroy rights but to ensure timely prosecution. Hence, a

reasonable and justice-oriented assessment must govern condonation of

application. In land acquisition matters, courts have adopted the

principles that minor delays in filing reference under Section 18 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is pari materia with Section 64 of the

2013 Act, should ordinarily be condoned when no negligence or malafide

can be attributed and when refusal to condone would result in grave

prejudice to the landowners whose lands have been compulsorily taken.

6. The learned AGP appearing for the State supported the

impugned order and submitted that although the delay was short, the

petitioners had failed to expressly and satisfactorily explain every day's

delay and had even denied the existence of delay. It was contended that

the Collector is bound by the statutory limitation and cannot exercise

discretion in absence of a clear explanation.

7. Having heard both the sides and upon perusal of the material

on record, this Court is of the considered view that the approach adopted

by the Collector is unsustainable. The delay involved is only of one week

and four days. The Hon'ble Supreme Court through a consistent line of

authorities, beginning with Katiji (supra), has laid down that Court

WP-13634-2025.odt 4 of 6 should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and justice oriented approach in

matters of condonation, particularly where the delay is short and the

litigant stands to suffer severe prejudices if technicalities are allowed to

prevail. The Collector, being a statutory authority exercising quasi-

judicial powers, is equally bound to apply these principles. The proviso to

section 64 of the 2013 Act vests the Collector with ample power to

condone delay up to a further period of one year. Conditional only upon

satisfaction regarding the cost shown. Thus, the legislature itself has

mandated a flexible and equitable approach.

8. In the present case, the explanation of procedural delays

arising out of the nature of acquisition proceedings, involvement of

multiple parties, and time consumed in completion of stamp duty

formalities cannot be said to be fanciful or insufficient, especially when

the delay is merely of 11 days. The Collector was duty bound to examine

the reasons in liberal spirit and to ascertain whether substantial justice

required condonation. Instead, the Collector has adopted a hyper

technical view by mechanically computing the delay and rejecting the

reference without considering the over arching objective of the statute,

which is to ensure fair compensation to landowners whose properties

have been compulsorily acquired. Furthermore, the denial of a personal

hearing, despite the quasi-judicial character of the decision, reinforces

the infirmity in the impugned order.

WP-13634-2025.odt 5 of 6

9. In light of these circumstances, and in view of the law

decided by declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and consistently

followed by this Court, the impugned order dated 22.04.2025 cannot be

sustained. The delay of one week and four days in filing the reference

application deserves to be condoned. Failure to do so would unjustly

deprive the petitioners of their statutory right to seek determination of

fair compensation.

10. Accordingly the order dated 22.04.2025 passed by the

Collector is quashed and set aside. The delay caused in filing the

petitioners' reference under section 64 of the 2013 act is hereby

condoned. The collector shall restore Reference Application No. 710 of

2024 to file and shall adjudicate the same on its own merits and in

accordance with law, after granting due opportunity of hearing to all

parties concerned. The petition is allowed in the above terms.

11. There shall be no orders as to costs.

(Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.) (Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, J.)

B. S. Joshi

WP-13634-2025.odt 6 of 6

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