Manish Yadav vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

2025 INSC 151 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO(S). 15882 OF 2024)

MANISH YADAV .…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)

ORDER

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. The appellant through this appeal by special leave seeks to

assail the order dated 30th August, 2024 passed by the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad,1 whereby, it partially allowed the

Criminal Appeal No. 227/2024 preferred by the appellant, who had Signature Not Verified

sought to question the legality and validity of the order dated 24th Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2025.02.06 18:52:06 IST Reason:

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.

1 August, 2023 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Gazipur2

in Special Sessions Trial No. 760 of 2023, summoning the appellant

and his father, Rajnath Yadav, to face trial for the offences

punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian

Penal Code, 18603 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of

the Scheduled Castes and the Schedules Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 19894.

4. The High Court vide Impugned Order dated 30th August, 2024,

had partly allowed the criminal appeal, by quashing the summoning

order issued by the trial Court against the father of the appellant,

namely, Rajnath Yadav and upholding the summoning order issued

against the appellant. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.

5. Notice of the present special leave petition was served on

respondent No. 2 i.e., the complainant/victim5, but no one has

appeared on her behalf.

6. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the appellant

befriended the complainant over a social media website, namely

2 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘trial Court’. 3 Hereinafter, referred to as, ‘IPC’.

4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘SC/ST Act.’ 5 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Complainant’.

2 Instagram, which quickly bloomed into a romantic relationship. The

appellant allegedly promised the complainant that he would marry

her and they would live together as husband and wife. Under the

pretence of the said promise of marriage, the appellant established

physical relations with the complainant frequently at different places

viz. Gazipur, Banaras, etc. On account of the repeated physical

relations, the complainant conceived in December, 2022 and the

appellant forced her to undergo an abortion by taking medication.

Subsequently, the appellant began assaulting her and used

derogatory caste-based slurs, imputing that he would not marry her

since he was a Yadav, but she belonged to a lower caste. Following

a complaint from the complainant with these allegations, an FIR6

dated 5th August, 2023, came to be registered against the appellant

under Sections 376, 313, 323, 504, 506, IPC and Sections 3(1)(d),

3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act at the P.S. Kotwali, District Gazipur. After

investigation, a charge sheet for the aforementioned offences was

filed against the appellant, while leaving out the offence under

Section 313 IPC.

6 Crime No. 387 of 2023. 3

7. The trial Court, vide order dated 24th August, 2023, summoned

the appellant and his father for the aforesaid offences, which stands

partially affirmed by the High Court(supra).

8. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by

learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel

representing the State of Uttar Pradesh and have gone through the

material placed on record.

9. At the outset, we may note that the complainant is a major girl

and was working at a Diagnostic Centre in Varanasi when she came

in contact with the appellant on the social media website, namely,

Instagram.

10. It will be germane to reproduce the statement of the

complainant recorded during the course of investigation under

Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737 which provides

the substratum of allegations set out against the appellant in the

case at hand, and the same reads as follows: -

“Date: 09.08.2023

Victim’s Name: X.X.X.

X.X.X. stated under oath that she met Manish Yadav, son of Rajnath Singh, on Instagram in January 2022. Their friendship

7 For short, ‘CrPC’.

4 started with a message from Manish, which eventually led to mutual liking and in-person meetings. In May 2022, Manish called her to meet at his friend's place, where he behaved inappropriately with her. Despite her reservations about engaging in a physical relationship, she trusted him and had feelings for him. Manish later forced himself on her multiple times. In September 2022, X. X. X... moved to Varanasi for work, while Manish relocated to Prayagraj. He would visit her in Varanasi and engage in physical relations without her consent. By December 2022, she discovered she was pregnant. Manish made her take medication to terminate the pregnancy. When visiting, he would suggest eloping to get married, but she insisted on waiting until he secured a job. During this period, X. X. X. cousin, Vatika, came to live with her. Manish occasionally became abusive, verbally and physically, during his visits. In February 2023, X. X. X. witnessed Manish and Vatika in an inappropriate situation. Although Manish apologized after a confrontation, he continued his relationship with Vatika. To retaliate, Χ.Χ.Χ.. mentioned a friend named Ajay to make Manish jealous. Manish then questioned her character and refused to marry her, saying he wouldn't marry someone with whom he had been intimate.

X. X. X. visited Manish's home and informed his father, who initially appeared understanding. However, when she tried to follow up, his father dismissed her rudely. Manish continued to exploit her under the pretence of marriage, eventually abandoning her. When she confronted him about his past relationships with other girls, Manish demanded Rs. 50 lakh as a condition for marriage.

X.X.X. concluded that she had nothing further to add.” (emphasis supplied)

11. As per the case set out by the prosecution, the appellant

allegedly forced himself upon the complainant on multiple

occasions, however on going through the aforesaid statement

rendered by the complainant on oath, we find that she had herself

admitted that despite her reservations about engaging in a physical

5 relationship with the appellant, she trusted him and had feelings for

him.

12. Furthermore, as per the prosecution case, in September, 2022,

the complainant moved to Varanasi for work, whereas the appellant

relocated to Prayagraj. Despite that, the appellant continued to visit

her in Varanasi and engaged in physical relations with the

complainant, allegedly without her consent. In December, 2022, the

complainant discovered that she had become pregnant and

thereupon, the appellant forced her to take medications in order to

terminate the pregnancy. However, the theory put forth by the

complainant regarding the appellant forcing her to terminate the

pregnancy has not been established, and thus, the offence under

Section 313 IPC, stands dropped from the chargesheet.

13. The complainant further stated that later on, her cousin Vatika

had also come to reside with her. She alleged that in February, 2022,

she saw the appellant and Vatika engaged in an inappropriate

position. In retaliation, she befriended a person, namely, Ajay to

make Manish jealous. Thereafter, Manish cast aspersions on her

character and refused to marry her stating that he was not willing

to marry someone with whom he had been intimate once.

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14. In our opinion, it is clearly discernible that both the appellant

and the complainant were major and thus, both were competent

enough to make rational decisions. As per the statement of the

complainant(supra), their initial physical relations were consensual

in nature, and without there being any promise of marriage being

offered by the appellant. While it can be said that initially the

relationship between the complainant and appellant had developed

on the basis of mutual attraction and affection, the same cannot by

any stretch of imagination fall within the ambit of a relationship

flowing from a promise to marry.

15. The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of 'consent' in cases

where sexual intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has

been well established through a catena of judgments by this Court.

In Uday v. State of Karnataka8, this Court acquitted the accused

based on the reasoning that the prosecutrix, a mature college

student, consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her

own free will. The Court found that she was fully aware of the

consequences of her actions and held that her consent was not

8 (2003) 4 SCC 46.

7 based on any misconception of fact. In Uday(supra), the Court noted

that:

“21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. This Court, in the case of Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana9,

while discussing the nature of the ‘consent’ in cases where sexual

intercourse occurs on the promise of marriage, distinguished

between a mere ‘breach of promise’ and ‘not fulfilling a false

promise’. The Court held as follows:

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is

9 (2013) 7 SCC 675

8 an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (emphasis supplied)

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17. Moreover, in Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar,10 the Court

acquitted and set aside the conviction of the accused while holding

that while there was a breach of promise to marry, it was not a case

of false promise to marry. The relevant extract is produced

hereinunder:

“35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case[(2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775 : (2003) 2 Scale 329] at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant.” (emphasis supplied)

18. Applying the above principle to the case at hand, it is clearly

discernible that in the present case, the complainant had agreed to

10 (2005) 1 SCC 88.

10 indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her

own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage

made by the appellant. Therefore, while the present case may involve

a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently

false promise to marry. Based on the circumstances, it cannot be

concluded that the appellant obtained the complainant’s consent to

engage in a physical relationship under the pretext of a false promise

of marriage.

19. Admittedly, during his visit to Varanasi, the appellant himself

had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but

it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job.

Therefore, while the prosecution story primarily rests on the fact that

the appellant had lured the complainant to develop physical

relations with him on the promise to marry her in future, this very

statement of the complainant suggests the contrary. The

complainant’s act of declining the appellant’s proposal of marriage

shows that it was not the appellant who failed to stand firm upon

his promise if any such promise was made by the appellant at any

point in time.

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20. Thus, the theory put forth by the prosecution in the chargesheet

that the appellant induced the complainant to indulge in physical

relations under a false promise of marriage is neither corroborated

nor established by the best evidence available on record, which is in

the form of the statement of the complainant recorded under Section

164 CrPC.

21. Moreover, in her statement, the complainant has not uttered a

single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the

appellant for belonging to a particular caste. Therefore, we are of the

firm view that the ingredients of the offences alleged under the

SC/ST Act, against the appellant are ex-facie not made out from the

highest allegations as set out in the charge sheet.

22. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the

present case appears to be one where a consensual physical

relationship between two adults has turned sour due to certain

intervening events. Hence, allowing the prosecution of the appellant

for the offences mentioned above would tantamount to sheer abuse

of the process of law and nothing else.

23. Resultantly, the summoning order dated 24th August, 2023

passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act Gazipur, and all the

12 proceedings sought to be taken thereunder against the appellant for

the offences punishable under Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506, IPC

and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act

deserve to be, and are hereby quashed. Thus, the impugned order is

set aside.

24. The appeal is allowed, accordingly.

25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………….……….J. (VIKRAM NATH)

.………………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) New Delhi;

January 22, 2025.

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