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Maninderjit Singh Bitta vs Union Of India & Ors

Supreme Court13 October 2011Swatanter Kumar · K.S. Radhakrishnan · S.H. Kapadia

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Civil contempt consists of wilful disobedience of a court order, and may consist of passive and dormant inaction as readily as active violation, provided the inaction is intentional and wilful; passive or dormant behaviour does not alter the offence of contempt but may be considered in assessing punishment. Every person and institution, including Government departments and their officials, is required to obey the orders of courts in their true spirit and substance; where a party neither obeys court orders nor approaches the court seeking extension of time or clarification, the legal inference is that the party is intentionally disobeying the order, and failure to comply cannot be excused by lethargy, ignorance, official delays or absence of motivation. Inordinate delay in complying with court orders—whether measured in years or months beyond stipulated periods—strikes at the rule of law and undermines the dignity and authority of the courts, and may constitute contempt even where the delay reflects a lackadaisical attitude rather than deliberate wilfulness. In public interest litigation before the Supreme Court, where the State has failed to discharge its statutory functions, contempt jurisdiction serves a dual purpose: to punish past disobedience and to enforce future compliance through orders such as conditional imprisonment, such that the contemnor "carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket" by ability to comply.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IA NO.10 of 2010
IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2005

Maninderjit Singh Bitta ...

Petitioner

Versus

Union of India & Ors. ...

Respondents

O R D E R

1. Government of India, on 28th March, 2001, issued a

notification under the provisions of Section 41(6) of the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') read with Rule

50 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for short, `the Rules')

for implementation of the provisions of the Act. This

notification sought to introduce a new scheme regulating

issuance and fixation of High Security Number Plates. In

terms of sub-section (3) of Section 109 of the Act, the

Central Government issued an order dated 22nd August,

2001 which dealt with various facets of manufacture, supply

1

and fixation of new High Security Registration Plates (HSRP).

The Central Government also issued a notification dated 16th

October, 2001 for further implementation of the said order

and the HSRP Scheme. Various States had invited tenders

in order to implement this Scheme.

2. A writ petition being Writ Petition (C) No.41 of 2003 was

filed in this Court challenging the Central Government's

power to issue such notification as well as the terms and

conditions of the tender process. In addition to the above

writ petition before this Court, various other writ petitions

were filed in different High Courts raising the same

challenge. These writ petitions came to be transferred to

this Court. All the transferred cases along with Writ Petition

(C) No. 41 of 2003 were referred to a larger Bench of three

Judges of this Court by order of reference dated 26th May,

2005 in the case of Association of Registration Plates v.

Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 364], as there was a difference

of opinion between the learned Members of the Bench

dealing with the case. The three Judge Bench finally

disposed of the writ petitions vide its order dated 30th

November, 2004 reported in Association of Registration

2

Plates v. Union of India Association of Registration Plates v.

Union of India [(2005) 1 SCC 679]. While dismissing the writ

petition and the connected matters, the Bench rejected the

challenge made to the provisions of the Rules, statutory

order issued by the Central Government and the tender

conditions and also issued certain directions for appropriate

implementation of the Scheme.

3. The matter did not rest there. Different States did not

comply with the Rules, scheme and/or statutory order

which resulted in filing of the present writ petition, being

Writ Petition (C) No.510 of 2005. This writ petition also came

to be disposed of by a three Judge Bench of this Court vide

its judgment titled as Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of

India [(2008) 7 SCC 328]. It will be appropriate to refer to

the operative part of the said judgment:

"5. Grievance of the petitioner and the intervener i.e.

All India Motor Vehicles Security Association is that

subsequent to the judgment the scheme of HSRP is yet

not implemented in any State except the State of

Meghalaya and other States are still repeating the

processing of the tender. The prayer therefore is that

the purpose of introducing the scheme should be

fulfilled (sic- in) letter and spirit. The objective being

public safety and security there should not be any

lethargy. It is pointed out that most of the States

floated the tenders and thereafter without any reason

the process has been slowed down...

3

XXX XXX XXX

9. Needless to say the scheme appears to have been

introduced keeping in view the public safety and

security of the citizens. Let

necessary decisions be taken, if not already taken,

within a period of six months from today. While

taking the decision the aspects highlighted by this

Court in the earlier decision needless to say shall be

kept in view."

4. Despite the above judgment of this Court, most of the

States have failed to implement the scheme and the

directions contained in the judgments of this Court. The

matter remained pending before this Court for a

considerable time and various orders passed by this Court

directing implementation of the scheme, were not complied

with. On 7th April, 2011, by a detailed order, we had taken

note of the intervening events and the fact that a large

number of States had not even implemented the scheme and

the directions contained in the judgments of this Court.

Before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court

for initiation of contempt proceedings against the concerned

authorities of the respective defaulting States, this Court

considered it necessary to require only presence of officers in

Court and provided them with another opportunity to

4

ensure compliance of the directions issued by this Court.

Despite assurance of an effective implementation of the

Court's orders, nothing substantial was done within the time

of six weeks granted by this Court vide its Order dated 7th

April, 2011. Certain Interim Applications (I.A.s) were filed

by some of the States for extension of time and in view of the

assurance given in court, this Court had also dispensed with

the personal appearance of the senior officers of those State

Governments. However, with some regret, we noticed that

still a few states had not complied with the directions of this

Court and the casual attitude of the State Government of

these States was obvious from their very conduct, inside and

outside the court. This attitude compelled us to pass a very

detailed Order on 30th August, 2011 classifying the States

into different categories. The first category of the states had

taken steps and even awarded the contract for supplying

`High Security Registration Plates' (HSRP). The second

category was of the States/U.T.s which had not followed the

correct procedure for selection and had approved all private

vendors with `Type Approval Certificate' (TAC) from the

Central Government to affix the `HSRP' at their own

premises or at the Office of the RTO. The third category was

5

of the defaulting States who had filed affidavits, assuring the

Court of taking steps and finalising the tender allotment

within the specified dates. On the basis of the affidavits filed

by them, they were granted further time and were required

to file affidavits of compliance. The last category was of the

States which had been persisting with the default and had

not taken any effective steps to comply with the directions of

this Court. Thus, vide Order dated 30th August 2011 we had

passed the following directions in relation to this category :

"9. From the record before us, it is clear that there is

apparent and intentional default on the part of the

concerned officers of these defaulting States.

Consequently, we issue notice to show cause why

proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

be not initiated, if found guilty, why they be not

punished in accordance with law and why exemplary

costs, personally recoverable from the erring

officers/officials, be not imposed. Notice shall be

issued to:

a. Secretary (Transport) of the defaulting States.

b. Commissioner, State Transport Authority of

the respective States."

5. The State of Haryana is one such state which has hardly

taken any step to implement the scheme. For their intentional

violation of the Court's Order, we were compelled to issue

notice as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts

6

Act of 1971 (for short `the 1971 Act') as well as costs,

exemplary or otherwise, be not imposed upon the States or its

officers, responsible for such inordinate delay in complying

with the orders of the Court.

6. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Haryana, it

was stated that a notice for inviting tender was published on

29th October 2002 which was challenged before the court and

finally, this Court vide its Order dated 13th November 2004,

had dismissed the petition raising challenge to the tender

process. Thereafter, draft `Request for Proposals' was

prepared only on 28th April, 2011 and the notice inviting

tender was published on 12th May, 2011. Pre-bid meeting was

held and amendments to the terms of the tender were made on

30th June, 2011. The constituted committee held a meeting

thereafter and apprised the concerned of the pre-qualification

bids. On 30th August, 2011, the bids were received and

evaluated. The technical bids were opened on 5th September,

2011 and financial bids were to be opened thereafter in the

month of September 2011 itself which, unfortunately, have not

been opened till date and the tender has not been awarded to

any bidder.

7 7. Let us now examine the conduct of the State and its

officers, responsible for not carrying out the directions of this

Court. It is undisputable from the record produced before us

that initially the steps were taken by the State of Haryana in

the year 2002 which could not be finalised because of court's

intervention and the said challenge was finally dismissed and

all controversies came to an end by the Order of this Court

dated 30th November, 2004. Admittedly, from the year 2004

till 2011, for a long period of seven years, no steps were taken

by the State of Haryana in compliance with the directions of

this Court and the statutory scheme under the provisions of

Rule 50 of the Rules. It was only with the pronouncement of

the Order dated 7th April, 2011 by this Court that the State of

Haryana appears to have woken up from slumber and made a

feeble attempt, which completely lacked both will and

sincerity, to comply with the orders of this Court. The

authorities were expected to comply with the directions and

implement the scheme effectively and expeditiously. Despite

the lapse of more than 5 months, tenders have still not been

awarded to any party. It is evident from the record that the

matters of public safety and urgent nature were taken as

routine files of the Department. This conduct of the

8

Department and its officers demonstrates a complete callous

attitude on their part, as they failed to take note of the

mandatory and self-contained directions of this Court in the

Order dated 7th April, 2011. Besides noticing that such

functioning of the departments was reprehensible, this Court

while recording a note of caution, required the authorities to

comply with such orders in future. Despite specific orders, it

has taken months for the State hierarchy to open the financial

bids and award the contract. In the Order dated 30th August,

2011, the State of Haryana was named amongst the states

which had taken no action or had merely initiated the process

without any effective steps and/or final results. They were

issued notice because the conduct of these States reflected

callousness and lack of will to obey the orders of this Court.

Their attitude was found to be one of disobedience and the

situation has hardly changed, not for the better in any case.

Not taking any steps, whatsoever, to implement the Scheme

and the orders of this Court for years together and now

inaction for months together in not opening the financial bids

and awarding the contract, is a glaring and flagrant violation

of the orders of this Court by the State and its responsible

officers.

9 8. Now, we would examine certain principles of law which

would normally guide the exercise of judicial discretion in the

realm of contempt jurisdiction. `Contempt' is an extraordinary

jurisdiction of the Courts. Normally, the courts are reluctant

to initiate contempt proceedings under the provisions of the

1971 Act. This jurisdiction, at least suo moto, is invoked by

the courts sparingly and in compelling circumstances, as it is

one of the foremost duty of the courts to ensure compliance of

its orders. The law relating to contempt is primarily dissected

into two main heads of jurisdiction under the Indian Law: (a)

Criminal Contempt, and (b) Civil Contempt. It is now well

settled and explained principle under the Indian contempt

jurisdiction that features, ingredients, procedure, attendant

circumstances of the case and the quantum of punishment are

the relevant and deciphering factors. Section 12 of the 1971

Act deals with the contempt of court and its punishment while

Section 15 deals with cognizance of criminal contempt. Civil

contempt would be wilful breach of an undertaking given to

the court or wilful disobedience of any judgment or order of

the court, while criminal contempt would deal with the cases

where by words, spoken or written, signs or any matter or

doing of any act which scandalises, prejudices or interferes,

10

obstructs or even tends to obstruct the due course of any

judicial proceedings, any court and the administration of

justice in any other manner. Under the English Law, the

distinction between criminal and civil contempt is stated to be

very little and that too of academic significance. However,

under both the English and Indian Law these are proceedings

sui generis. While referring to Justice J.D. Kapoor's Law of

Contempt of Court, Second Edition, 2010 which mentioned

the Phillimore Committee Report - Report of the Committee on

Contempt of Court, of which importantly the following passage

can be noticed:

"4. In England and Wales most forms of contempt

have been regarded as of criminal character, and as

such, are called "criminal contempts". In Scotland

contempt of court is not a crime nor is a distinction

between "criminal" and "civil" contempts recognised.

Scots law regards contempt of court as a chapter of

a law sui generis. This difference of approach is of

little more than academic significance in modern

practice, but the Scottish explain certain peculiar

elements in its operation and procedure. What is of

particular importance is that it is branch of the law

in which breaches are investigated by a special and

summary procedure and where, once established,

they may be severely punished."

9. Under the Indian Law the conduct of the parties, the act

of disobedience and the attendant circumstances are

11

relevant to consider whether a case would fall under civil

contempt or a criminal contempt. For example,

disobedience of an order of a court simplicitor would be civil

contempt but when it is coupled with conduct of the parties

which is contemptuous, prejudicial and is in flagrant

violation of the law of the land, it may be treated as a

criminal contempt. Even under the English Law, the courts

have the power to enforce its judgment and orders against

the recalcitrant parties.

10. In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the courts

are primarily concerned with enquiring whether the

contemnor is guilty of intentional and wilful violation of the

orders of the court, even to constitute a civil contempt.

Every party to lis before the court, and even otherwise, is

expected to obey the orders of the court in its true spirit and

substance. Every person is required to respect and obey the

orders of the court with due dignity for the institution. The

Government Departments are no exception to it. The

departments or instrumentalities of the State must act

expeditiously as per orders of the court and if such orders

postulate any schedule, then it must be adhered to.

12 Whenever there are obstructions or difficulties in

compliance with the orders of the court, least that is

expected of the Government Department or its functionaries

is to approach the court for extension of time or

clarifications, if called for. But, where the party neither

obeys the orders of the court nor approaches the court

making appropriate prayers for extension of time or

variation of order, the only possible inference in law is that

such party disobeys the orders of the court. In other words,

it is intentionally not carrying out the orders of the court.

Flagrant violation of the court's orders would reflect the

attitude of the concerned party to undermine the authority

of the courts, its dignity and the administration of justice.

In the case of Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra [(1995) 2 SCC 584],

this Court held that `judiciary has a special and additional

duty to perform, viz., to oversee that all individuals and

institutions including the executive and the legislature act

within the framework of not only the law but also the

fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart from the

function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties

which is essential to peaceful and orderly development of

the society. Dignity and authority of the Courts have to be

13

respected and protected at all costs'.

11. Another very important aspect even of the Civil

Contempt is, `what is the attribution of the contemnor?'

There may be cases of disobedience where the respondent

commits acts and deeds leading to actual disobedience of

the orders of the court. Such contemnor may flout the

orders of the court openly, intentionally and with no respect

for the rule of law. While in some other cases of civil

contempt, disobedience is the consequence or inference of a

dormant or passive behaviour on the part of the contemnor.

Such would be the cases where the contemnor does not take

steps and just remains unmoved by the directions of the

court. As such, even in cases where no positive/active role

is directly attributable to a person, still, his passive and

dormant attitude of inaction may result in violation of the

orders of the court and may render him liable for an action

of contempt.

12. It is not the offence of contempt which gets

altered by a passive/negative or an active/positive

behaviour of a contemnor but at best, it can be a relevant

consideration for imposition of punishment, wherever the

14

contemnor is found guilty of contempt of court. With

reference to Government officers, this Court in the case of

E.T. Sunup v. Canss Employees Assoc.. [(2004) 8 SCC 683]

took the view that it has become a tendency with the

Government officers to somehow or the other circumvent the

orders of the Court by taking recourse to one justification or

the other even if ex-facie they are unsustainable. The

tendency of undermining the court orders cannot be

countenanced. Deprecating practice of undue delay in

compliance with the orders of the court, this Court again in

the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. [(2001) 5

SCC 309] observed :

".....clear lapse on the part of NCT and Municipal

Corporation. Even if there was not deliberate or

wilful disregard for the court orders, there has

clearly been a lackadaisical attitude and approach

towards them. Though no further action in this

matter need be taken for now, but such lethargic

attitude if continues may soon become

contumacious."

13. It is also of some relevancy to note that

disobedience of court orders by positive or active

contribution or non-obedience by a passive and dormant

conduct leads to the same result. Disobedience of orders of

15

the court strikes at the very root of rule of law on which the

judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a

democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of

law. If the Judiciary is to perform its duties and functions

effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are

sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts

have to be respected and protected at all costs (refer T.N.

Godavarman Thirumulpad's case [(2006) 5 SCC 1]. The

proceedings before the highest court of the land in a public

interest litigation, attain even more significance. These are

the cases which come up for hearing before the court on a

grievance raised by the public at large or public spirited

persons. The State itself places matters before the Court for

determination which would fall, statutorily or otherwise, in

the domain of the executive authority. It is where the State

and its instrumentalities have failed to discharge its

statutory functions or have acted adversely to the larger

public interest that the courts are called upon to interfere in

exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction, to ensure

maintenance of the rule of law. These are the cases which

have impact in rem or on larger section of the society and

not in personam simplicitor. Courts are called upon to

16

exercise jurisdiction with twin objects in mind. Firstly, to

punish the persons who have disobeyed or not carried out

orders of the court i.e. for their past conduct. Secondly, to

pass such orders, including imprisonment and use the

contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance of its orders

in future. This principle has been applied in the United

States and Australia as well. For execution of the orders of

the court even committal for an indefinite term has been

accepted under Australian law [Australasian Meat Industry

Employees Union v. Mudginberri Station Pty. Ltd. (1986) 161

CLR 98 (Australian High Court)] and American law, though

this is no longer permissible under English Law. While

referring to detention of a person for a long period to ensure

execution of the orders in Re Nevitt [117 F. 448, 461 (1902)]

Judge Sanborn observed that the person subjected to such

a term `carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.'

Lethargy, ignorance, official delays and absence of

motivation can hardly be offered as any defence in an action

for contempt. Inordinate delay in complying with the orders

of the courts has also received judicial criticism. It is

inappropriate for the parties concerned to keep the

execution of the court's orders in abeyance for an inordinate

17

period. Inaction or even dormant behaviour by the officers

in highest echelons in the hierarchy of the Government in

complying with the directions/orders of this Court certainly

amounts to disobedience. Inordinate delay of years in

complying with the orders of the court or in complying with

the directed stipulations within the prescribed time, has

been viewed by this Court seriously and held to be the

contempt of court, as it undermines the dignity of the court.

Reference in this regard can be made to Maniyeri Madhavan

v. Inspector of Police, Cannanore [AIR 1993 SC 356] and Anil

Ratan Sarkar and Ors. v. Hirak Ghosh and Ors. [(2002) 4

SCC 21]. Even a lackadaisical attitude, which itself may not

be deliberate or wilful, have not been held to be a sufficient

ground of defence in a contempt proceeding. Obviously, the

purpose is to ensure compliance of the orders of the court at

the earliest and within stipulated period.

14. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it

is undisputed that for years together the State of Haryana

has failed to comply with the directions of this Court and

implement the scheme. It has not only caused prejudice to

the public at large but has even undermined the dignity of

18

this Court. The attitude of the State of Haryana and the

respective officers has been lackadaisical and of wilful

disregard. Despite repeated orders they have failed to take

effective steps and whatever steps were taken the same are

not in conformity with law. The repeated Orders of this

Court have failed to bring any results from the recalcitrant

State. The repeated opportunities and extension of time did

not help in expeditious progress in the matter. On the

contrary, there is apparent disobedience of the Orders of

this Court and no compliance with the Orders of this court,

by their completely passive and dormant behaviour. This

behaviour, besides causing serious problems in the effective

implementation of statutory scheme, has even undermined

the dignity of this Court and impinged upon the basic rule

of law. At the cost of repetition, we may notice that there is

not even a word of explanation as to why no steps were

taken by the State of Haryana for a long period of seven

years and why tender has not been awarded till date. The

vague averments made in the affidavit are nothing but a

lame excuse to somehow avoid the present proceedings.

The State of Haryana and the concerned officers, namely,

the Secretary, Transport and the Commissioner, State

19

Transport Authority have violated the Orders of this Court

and are liable for the consequences of such disobedience.

15. It was expected of the officers in-charge and

particularly the Secretary, Transport and Commissioner,

State Transport Authority of the State of Haryana to at least

carefully read the orders of this Court and ensure their

implementation in their correct perspective. We would have

expected such high officers of the State to act fairly,

expeditiously and in accordance with the orders of this

Court. If the concerned State would have taken timely and

appropriate steps in accordance with the law and the orders

of this Court, it would have not only saved the time of the

Court, which it had spent on repeated hearings, but would

have also saved the public money that it had spent so far.

16. We have no hesitation in coming to the

conclusion that the Secretary, Transport and the

Commissioner, State Transport Authority of the State of

Haryana is guilty of wilful disobedience/non-compliance of

the orders of this Court, particularly the orders dated 30th

November 2004, 7th April 2011 and 30th August 2011.

Having found them guilty under the provisions of the 1971

20

Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India, we

punish the Secretary, Transport and Commissioner, State

Road Transport Authority of the State of Haryana as under :

i) They are punished to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and

in default, they shall be liable to undergo simple

imprisonment for a period of fifteen days;

ii) We impose exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- on the State

of Haryana, which amount, at the first instance, shall

be paid by the State but would be recovered from the

salaries of the erring officers/officials of the State in

accordance with law and such recovery proceedings be

concluded within six months. The costs would be

payable to the Supreme Court Legal Services

Committee.

iii) In view of the principle that the courts also invoke

contempt jurisdiction as a tool for compliance of its

orders in future, we hereby direct the State

Government and the respondent/contemner herein

now to positively comply with the orders and

implement the scheme within eight weeks from today.

21

Copy of this order be circulated to the Chief

Secretary/Competent Authority of all the States/U.T.s.

It is ordered accordingly.

.............................................CJI.

(S.H. Kapadia)

................................................J.

(K.S. Radhakrishnan)

................................................J.

(Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi

October 13, 2011

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