Mange Ram vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

2025 INSC 962 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.10817 of 2024)

MANGE RAM ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER ...RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant is

the father-in-law of respondent No.2. In April 2017, respondent

No.2 came into contact with the appellant’s son through a

matrimonial website. What began as a digital acquaintance soon

developed into a personal relationship.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RADHA SHARMA Date: 2025.08.12 16:33:30 IST Reason: Page 1 of 23

3. The marriage between respondent No.2 and the appellant’s

son was solemnised on 23.12.2017 in accordance with the

provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, by April

2019, differences appear to have arisen between the couple. On

15.05.2019, respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home and

returned to her parental residence at Jabalpur. It is stated that

she informed her family of the mental and physical cruelty

allegedly meted out to her by her husband and his family

members.

4. Respondent No.2 approached the Mahila Police Station,

Jabalpur and pursuant to her complaint, both parties were called

for counselling. While the appellant’s son was to appear for the

first session of counselling which took place on 26.05.2019, he

was in fact present during the second session conducted on

02.06.2019. That session, which was also attended by members

of both families, culminated in an understanding that the

marriage would be solemnised again, this time through

customary Hindu rites, within two months.

Page 2 of 23

5. However, the accord reached did not last long. Disputes

appear to have resurfaced shortly thereafter. Respondent No.2

once again left the matrimonial home. On 21.07.2019, she lodged

First Information Report (“FIR”) No.58 of 2019 at Mahila Police

Station, Jabalpur, naming her husband i.e., the appellant’s son,

the appellant herein (her father-in-law), mother-in-law and sister-

in-law as accused under Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry

Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”). As per the contents of the

FIR, respondent No.2 alleged that soon after the counselling

sessions, fresh demands were made by the appellant and his wife,

including a sum of Rupees five lakhs in cash, gold ornaments, a

motor car, clothing, and other customary articles. It was further

alleged that they insisted upon the ceremonial Hindu marriage

being held at a respectable hotel.

6. While there was, at first, some indication of conciliation, the

situation deteriorated soon thereafter. The appellant is alleged to

have called respondent No.2 to Jabalpur Railway Station, where

he publicly admonished her, slapped her, and threatened to ruin

her life, expressing his displeasure at having been summoned to

Page 3 of 23 the police station. It is further alleged that he reiterated the dowry

demand, which, according to the complainant, was subsequently

enhanced to Rupees ten lakhs. Thereafter, the charge sheet was

filed on 18.08.2019 against the appellant, the appellant’s son and

other family members.

7. Being aggrieved by the continuation of the criminal

proceedings, the appellant herein, who is the father-in-law of

respondent No.2, along with his son, who is the husband of

respondent No.2 and other family members, approached the High

Court by filing Misc. Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022 and Misc.

Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), seeking quashing of FIR

No.58 of 2019 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana,

Jabalpur, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

8. By common order dated 07.05.2024, the High Court partly

allowed the petitions. The High Court quashed the criminal

proceedings against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of

respondent No.2 in Misc. Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 on the

ground that the allegations levelled against them were general in

nature and lacked specific attribution of any overt act. However,

Page 4 of 23 the High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings

pending against the appellant and the appellant’s son in Misc.

Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022. The High Court observed that

the FIR contained specific allegations against the appellant and

his son, including a demand for dowry and an incident where the

appellant allegedly slapped respondent No.2 at the railway

station. It is in these circumstances that the appellant herein has

preferred the present appeal.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned

counsel for the respondent No.1-State and perused FIR No. 58 of

2019 dated 21.07.2019 and other material on record. Respondent

No.2 has chosen not to appear before this Court.

10. During the course of the hearing, it was brought to the

notice of this Court that a decree of divorce had been granted

between the appellant’s son and respondent No.2 by the Family

Court at Bhubaneswar, by judgment and decree dated

24.08.2021.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the

appellant’s son had instituted a petition for divorce against

respondent No.2 on 20.06.2019. It was submitted that the filing

Page 5 of 23 of FIR No.58 of 2019, dated 21.07.2019, by respondent No.2 was

nothing but a counterblast, intended to pressurise the appellant’s

son and his family, and constituted an abuse of the process of

law. Drawing our attention to the nature of allegations, it was

submitted that respondent No.2 had alleged that the appellant

demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs by way of dowry and had slapped

her on 02.06.2019. However, no complaint or grievance was

raised immediately thereafter. The FIR, it was pointed out, came

to be lodged only after respondent No.2 received summons in the

divorce proceedings. Learned counsel further contended that if

such an incident had in fact occurred on 02.06.2019, respondent

No.2 would have raised it during the counselling session held at

the Mahila Police Station, Jabalpur, where both parties were

present. It was urged that the absence of any such complaint at

the relevant time renders the allegation baseless and motivated.

12. It was further submitted that the criminal proceedings have

been initiated by respondent No.2 solely with the intent to extort

money from appellant’s son, who is stated to have paid

substantial sums both prior to and after the marriage. Learned

counsel also drew our attention to the fact that the High Court,

Page 6 of 23 by the very same impugned order, had quashed the proceedings

as against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of respondent

No.2, yet declined to extend similar relief to the appellant, who

stands on an identical footing, being the father-in-law. It was,

therefore urged that the present case merited quashing of the

FIR, and that the impugned order dated 07.05.2024 be set aside.

A prayer was accordingly made for quashing the criminal

proceedings arising out of FIR No.58 of 2019 dated 21.07.2019,

insofar as they relate to the appellant.

13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1-

State opposed the prayer for quashing and submitted that the FIR

contains specific and detailed allegations not only against the

appellant but also against his son. It was submitted that the

appellant is alleged to have demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs

towards dowry at the time of marriage, along with other items,

including gold ornaments and a motor vehicle. The said demand

is further alleged to have been subsequently increased to Rs.10

lakhs. Learned counsel further submitted that the FIR contains

allegations of physical assault and wrongful confinement of the

complainant and that her mobile phone was allegedly taken away

Page 7 of 23 by appellant’s son, thereby preventing her from contacting her

family.

14. It was next submitted that specific incident is alleged to

have taken place at Jabalpur Railway Station, wherein the

appellant is said to have slapped the complainant and issued

threats. Pursuant thereto, a complaint was lodged at the Mahila

Thana, Jabalpur, and counselling proceedings were initiated.

Although a temporary settlement is stated to have been arrived at

during the said counselling, it is alleged that the demands and

harassment continued even thereafter.

15. Reliance was placed on the statements of five witnesses cited

in the chargesheet, including two brothers of the complainant-

respondent No.2 herein, who are stated to have supported the

allegations. The chargesheet was filed on 18.08.2019, and the

matter remains pending before the Court of the Judicial

Magistrate First Class at Jabalpur, though further proceedings

have been stayed by order dated 02.05.2025 passed by this

Court. It was submitted that the High Court, upon due

consideration of the material on record, rightly declined to quash

the proceedings as against the appellant and his son, while

Page 8 of 23 granting relief to the other co-accused in respect of whom no

specific role was attributed.

16. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and

upon perusal of the material placed on record, the only question

that arises for consideration is, whether, the allegations contained

in FIR No.58 of 2019 warrant quashing of the same having regard

to the facts and circumstances of the case.

17. In the present case, the allegations in FIR No.58 of 2019

pertain to offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the

IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. Section 498A of the

IPC relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives, including

the father-in-law, against the wife. Section 34 concerns acts done

by several person in furtherance of common intention. The

provisions read as under:

“34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.— When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

xxx

498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment

Page 9 of 23 for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

18. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the

penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.

“Section 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to—

(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Page 10 of 23 Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act;

(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act:

Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.

Section 4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”

19. Section 498A of the IPC prescribes punishment where a

woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives.

The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which

may extend to three years and also provides for fine. The

Page 11 of 23 Explanation appended to the provision defines "cruelty" in two

parts. Clause (a) refers to wilful conduct which is of such a

nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to

cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, whether

mental or physical. Clause (b) expands the scope of the term to

include harassment with a view to coercing the woman or her

relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable

security, or on account of failure to meet such demand.

20. Section 3 of the Dowry Act pertains to punishment for giving

or taking dowry. It prescribes a minimum sentence of five years

and imposes a fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand

rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is higher.

21. Section 4 of the Dowry Act penalises the act of demanding

dowry. It provides that any person who, directly or indirectly,

demands dowry from the parents, relatives, or guardians of either

party to a marriage, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than six months but may extend to

two years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten

thousand rupees.

Page 12 of 23

22. A bare perusal of the FIR and the materials placed on record

reveals that the specific allegation against the appellant is that,

on 02.06.2019, he slapped the complainant at Jabalpur Railway

Station, reiterated a demand for dowry in the sum of Rs.5 lakhs,

and threatened to ruin her life. It is further alleged that the said

demand was later increased to Rs.10 lakhs. However, the FIR

came to be registered only on 21.07.2019. It appears to this Court

that the FIR lodged by respondent No.2 is highly belated and is

not free from doubt.

23. The complainant is stated to have left the matrimonial home

on 15.05.2019 and returned to her parental residence. Thereafter,

both parties were summoned to the Mahila Police Station,

Jabalpur, for counselling. Sessions were held on 26.05.2019 and

02.06.2019, attended by the appellant’s son and members of both

families. Notably, there is no material to indicate that any

allegation of physical assault or dowry demand by the appellant

was raised by the complainant during these sessions. On the

contrary, the record indicates that the counselling held on

02.06.2019 culminated in a mutual understanding that the

parties would remarry in accordance with Hindu rites within two

Page 13 of 23 months. This conduct is wholly irreconcilable with the allegations

that were subsequently made. FIR No.58 of 2019 came to be

lodged on 21.07.2019, nearly two months after the counselling

proceedings had concluded. In this FIR, allegations were levelled

not only against the husband but also against the appellant, the

mother-in-law, and the sister-in-law. It is alleged that the

appellant slapped the complainant in public at Jabalpur Railway

Station and reiterated the demand for dowry. However, no

explanation is forthcoming as to why such serious allegations

were not disclosed earlier, particularly when the parties were

engaged in conciliation. The complaint has been made

subsequent to the steps taken for filing a divorce petition by

respondent No.2’s husband.

24. It is not in dispute that the appellant’s son and respondent

No.2 have since parted ways pursuant to the decree of divorce

dated 24.08.2021 which has attained finality. Once the marital

relationship between the principal parties stands legally

dissolved, the continuation of criminal proceedings arising out of

the discord of that relationship serves little purpose. The

appellant before us is the father-in-law of respondent No.2. With

Page 14 of 23 the marriage of appellant’s son and respondent No.2 having come

to an end, the continuation of proceedings against the appellant

would neither advance the cause of justice nor serve any practical

purpose. On the contrary, it would only perpetuate hostility

between the parties who appear to have otherwise moved on with

their lives.

25. This Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of

Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735, has made it clear that family

members of the husband ought not to be unnecessarily roped into

criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord. The

Court observed that it has become a recurring tendency to

implicate every member of the husband’s family, irrespective of

their role or actual involvement, merely because a dispute has

arisen between the spouses. It was further held that where the

allegations are bereft of specific particulars, and particularly

where the relatives sought to be prosecuted are residing

separately or have had no connection with the matrimonial home,

allowing the prosecution to proceed would amount to an abuse of

the process of law. The Court noted that criminal law is not to be

Page 15 of 23 deployed as an instrument of harassment, and that judicial

scrutiny must be exercised to guard against such misuse.

26. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view that

where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by way of

divorce, and the parties have since settled in their respective

lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship

ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of harassment. In

the cases of Mala Kar vs. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal

Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated 19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and

Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of Delhi, Special Leave Petition

(Criminal) No.9178 of 2018 dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”),

this Court, while exercising its powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings arising

out of matrimonial discord against the husband. The Court took

note of the fact that the couple therein had divorced and held that

in such a situation, to continue with criminal prosecution would

amount to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted

therein applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in Arun

Jain are extracted respectively as under:

Page 16 of 23

“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant case, we have already noted that there has been a decree of divorce passed between the parties dated 18.10.2014. It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014. More significantly, both the appellant No.2 and respondent No.2 have since remarried and are leading their independent lives. Therefore, both parties have accepted the decree of divorce passed by the Family Court on 18.10.2014. Moreover, the appellant No.2- former husband of the respondent No.2 has agreed to pay a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex- gratia to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this Court to do complete justice in this matter and for invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”

xxx

“Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it is noted that the appellants and respondent No.2 were married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the appellants that appellant No.1 left the matrimonial home on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No.2 sought divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on 04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that respondent No.2 filed the complaint against the appellants herein and the FIR was registered on 13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.

It is also to be noted that the proceedings initiated under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in the year 2008 by respondent No.2 herein culminated in the dismissal of the said proceeding on merits by order dated 28.07.2017 which has attained finality. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar and crucial aspects of the present case and by following the order dated 19.03.2024, the appeal is liable to be allowed as we find that this is a fit case where we can exercise powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”

Page 17 of 23

27. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635, while considering quashing of

proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in the context of the

provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the

fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the

parties in the said case and therefore, exercising jurisdiction

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed the

complaint and the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings

against the accused therein. The relevant portion of the said

judgment is at paragraph 15, which is extracted as under:

“15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr., (1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as follows:

“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It Page 18 of 23 is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”

28. We now turn to the facts at hand as already noted as

under:

(i) the complainant and the appellant’s son have been

separated by a decree of divorce dated 24.08.2021, which

has attained finality and has not been assailed by either

side.

(ii) Both parties are stated to be leading their independent

lives.

(iii) The inevitability of separation has thus been accepted by

both sides.

In such a scenario, the continuation of criminal proceedings

against the appellant (father-in-law of the respondent No.2),

Page 19 of 23 which emanate solely from the erstwhile matrimonial relationship,

in our view, would serve no useful purpose. In our considered

view, further prosecution would only prolong bitterness and prove

counterproductive to the ends of justice.

29. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. vs.

Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed in paragraph 15.5

thereof that while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable

offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious

impact on society, on the ground that there is a

settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, it is

necessary to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct

of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and

why he was absconding, how he had managed with the

complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.

30. Applying the aforesaid to the present case, we find that the

appellant herein would not come within the scope of the aforesaid

observations by which the plea of the appellant for quashing of

the FIR and consequent proceedings against him could be

declined.

Page 20 of 23

31. We also refer to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10

SCC 303 wherein this Court observed that where the High Court

quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the

dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled,

although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its

opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise

in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute

between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored,

securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. In

this regard, a specific reference was made to offences arising out

of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family

dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim but the

offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them

amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been

made compoundable. The High Court may, within the framework

of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal

complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such

settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being

convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice

shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. Page 21 of 23

32. In Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78, one of

us (Viswanathan, J.) observed in paragraph 32 that proceeding

with the trial, when the parties have amicably resolved the

dispute, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the

settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would

be a grave abuse of process particularly when the dispute is

settled and resolved.

33. In the considered opinion of this Court, the power under

Article 142 must be invoked to advance the cause of complete

justice in matters of this nature. Once the marital relationship

has ended in divorce and the parties have moved on with their

lives, the continuation of criminal proceedings against family

members, especially in the absence of specific and proximate

allegations, serves no legitimate purpose. It only prolongs

bitterness and burdens the criminal justice system with disputes

that are no longer live. The law must be applied in a manner that

balances the need to address genuine grievances with the equally

important duty to prevent its misuse. In appropriate cases, the

power to quash such proceedings is essential to uphold fairness

Page 22 of 23 and bring about a quietus to personal disputes that have run

their course. In this regard, we follow the abovesaid dicta.

34. Accordingly, in order to do complete justice between the

parties, this Court deems it appropriate to invoke its powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, allow

the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated

07.05.2024 in MCRC No.30559 of 2022 filed under Section 482

CrPC. The said petition filed under Section 482 CrPC stands

allowed. Consequently, FIR No.58 of 2019 registered at Mahila

Police Station, Jabalpur, dated 21.07.2019, under Sections 498A

and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as well

as the charge sheet dated 18.08.2019 filed before the Court of the

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur against the appellant

herein, are hereby quashed.

…….……………………………..J. (B. V. NAGARATHNA)

.…………………………………..J. (K.V. VISWANATHAN) NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 12, 2025.

Page 23 of 23