Mahnoor Fatima Imran vs M/S Visweswara Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No…..…. of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (C) No.1866 of 2024)

MAHNOOR FATIMA IMRAN & ORS. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS

M/S VISWESWARA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD & ORS. RESPONDENT(S) With

Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3660 of 2024)

Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (C) No.3661 of 2024)

Civil Appeal No…….……. of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (C) No……….of 2024) (@Dy. No.19071 of 2024)

JUDGEMENT

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

Signature Not Verified

2. These appeals arise from the order of the Division Digitally signed by Nirmala Negi Date: 2025.05.08 14:00:05 IST Reason:

Bench of the High Court of Telangana in a writ appeal filed Page 1 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. from the judgment in a batch of writ petitions dismissed by a

common order. The appeal was only against the judgment in

W.P No.30855 of 2016; which writ petition essentially prayed

for restraining the Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure

Corporation Limited1, the first respondent therein from

attempting to enter into the land of the writ petitioners having

an extent of 53 acres, situated in Survey No.83/2 of Raidurg

Panmaktha, Village Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy

District, with prayers also against demolition of the fencing

and structures without any notice or without any right or

authority. The connected writ petitions also claimed similar

reliefs as against the first respondent, but with respect to

smaller extents of property, said to have been purchased

from the original owners. The appellants before the Division

Bench claimed that they are in possession of the subject

property on the strength of registered title deeds in which

the vendor is one M/s Bhavana Co-operative Housing Society

Ltd.2 who obtained possession of the land under an

1 For brevity ‘the TSIICL’ 2 Bhavana Society hereinafter Page 2 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. agreement of sale on 19.03.1982. We are not concerned with

the other writ petitions since the impugned judgment in the

SLPs are concerned with only an appellate order reversing

the judgment in WP No.30855 of 2016 and allowing the said

writ petition.

3. The learned Single Judge after dealing with the various

proceedings taken against the total extent of 525 acres 31

guntas in Survey No.83 of Raidurg Panmaktha Village,

Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, originally

belonging to 11 individuals, under the Andhra Pradesh Land

Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 19733 and

the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 19764 confined

the consideration to the 53 acres. It was noticed that the

agreement of sale dated 19.03.1982 was validated by

proceedings of the Assistant Registrar, Ranga Reddy District

on 11.09.2006 which validation was held to be fraudulent by

the District Registrar, Karimnagar by order dated 12.08.2015.

The No Objection Certificates issued by the Urban Land

3 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Land Reforms Act’) 4 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Land Ceiling Act’) Page 3 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Ceiling authorities against the writ petitioners also stood

cancelled, against which no proceedings were taken. There

was nothing to show a valid title having been conferred on

the writ petitioners and the vendor of the writ petitioners had

filed a suit for specific performance; O.S.No.248 of 1991

before the jurisdictional civil court which had been

dismissed for default on 06.04.2001 and the application for

restoration was also dismissed on 23.02.2004. Finding no

valid explanation as to how another agreement of sale of the

same date i.e., 19.03.1982 surfaced, relying on S.P.

Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) by LRs v. Jagannath (D) by LRs

and Ors.5 emphasised the fraud perpetrated by the

petitioners. The subject land was comprised in a total of 99

acres 17 guntas, covered by the agreement of sale dated

19.03.1982; stated to be in the possession of the Government

as on the date of the agreement, having vested in the

Government under the Land Reforms Act. The possession

was said to have been redelivered to the General Power of

5 (1994) 1 SCC 1 Page 4 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Attorney (GPA) of the original declarants, thus, negativing

the claim of possession with M/s. Bhavna Cooperative

Housing Society from 1982. The writ petition filed on the

ground of possession stood dismissed.

4. In the appeal, the Division Bench found that the State

was concerned with only 470 acres of land out of the total

525.31 acres, as per the learned Advocate General and

hence the 53 acres stood distinct and separate. The learned

Single Judge, according to the Division Bench, erred in so far

as looking into the title of the writ petitioners since the prayer

was against illegal dispossession, based merely on the

possession of the subject land. As far as the possession,

interim orders by co-ordinate benches were relied on. One

in WP No.29547 of 2011, wherein a Division Bench by interim

order dated 01.03.2011 restrained the Lok Ayukta from

proceeding further in an application filed by the Andhra

Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd.6, the

predecessor of TSIIC. The other order was passed on

6 The APIIC Page 5 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. 17.02.2012 in WP No.4466 of 2012 filed by the appellants

wherein there was a stay of demolition of the structures

raised by the writ petitioners (the appellants herein) in

Survey No.83/2 in Raidurg Panmaktha, Village

Serilingampalle Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Relying on

the settled legal position that a person in possession cannot

be dispossessed, except in accordance with law and finding

the actions of the TSIIC, to be in violation of the interim orders

issued, restrained the respondents from dispossessing the

appellants from 53 acres situated in Survey No.83/2 as also

from demolishing the fencing sheets and construction raised

by the appellants without taking recourse to law.

5. The appeals before us have been filed by the party

respondents in the writ petition who are the legal heirs of the

original owners and one, by individuals claiming smaller

extents of property. Before us, for the appellants Shri

Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appeared, Shri

Hiren P.Raval, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the

respondents who are the writ petitioners and Shri S. Niranjan

Page 6 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the State of

Telangana and the petitioners in SLP (C) Diary No.19071 of

2024 are represented by Shri P. Mohith Rao, Advocate on

Record, who adopted the arguments raised by the learned

Senior Counsel appearing in the other appeals.

6. At the outset, we notice that the writ petition is only one

filed seeking an order against dispossession, unless in

accordance with law, as noticed by the Division Bench.

However, we cannot but say that the learned Single Judge has

not decided the question of title and has only raised an

apprehension on the asserted title and possession by the writ

petitioners. The title was asserted to be validly obtained by

instruments of conveyance, but the title of the vendor was

suspect. Likewise, possession, on the ground, in reality, had

not been proved was the essence of the findings of the

learned Single Judge. Before we look at the sustainability of

the impugned judgment, we have to notice that the subject

land, rather the total larger extent; the original owners being

the 11 individuals, predecessors in interest of the appellants

Page 7 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. herein, had a chequered career as is seen from the decisions

produced in the records; State of A.P and Ors. v. N.

Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7 and Omprakash Verma v.

State of A.P.8

7. We notice the facts from Omprakash Verma8 which, at

the outset, found that one Mohd. Ruknuddin Ahmed and 10

others were the original owners of a land admeasuring

526.07 acres in Survey No.83 situated at Village Raidurg

(Panmaktha) of Ranga Reddy District in the State of Andhra

Pradesh; comprised in which is the subject land of this

litigation having an extent of 53 acres. On 07.07.1974, the

owners executed registered GPA in favour of a partnership

firm known as Sri Venkateswara Enterprises, represented by

its Managing Partners A. Ramaswamy and A. Satyanarayana.

On 01.01.1975, when the Land Reforms Act came into force,

the said land being an agricultural land, the owners filed 11

declarations under the Land Reforms Act. About 99.07 acres

was found surplus in the hands of 4 declarants and possession

7 (2002) 1 SCC 227 8 (2010) 13 SCC 158 Page 8 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. was taken on 11.04.1975, which vested in the State

Government. Later, the Land Ceiling Act came into force and

the owners through their GPA, filed declarations under

Section 6 (1) of the that Act, allegedly on a mistaken

impression, since the land in question was agricultural land

and it was not included in the Master Plan under that Act.

8. Draft statements were issued on 06.12.1979 and

25.01.1980 under the Land Ceiling Act. The final statements

under Section 9 were issued declaring the surplus area for

each of the declarants on 16.09.1980 and 30.01.1980. A

notification was issued by the competent authority under

Section 10 (1) by GOMS No.5013 dated 19.12.1980 vesting

the surplus land determined. The State Government under

Section 23 of the Land Ceiling Act allotted 470.33 acres to the

Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA), the

possession of which was not surrendered. Later, in exercise

of the powers conferred under Section 20(1) of the Land

Ceiling Act, certain exemptions were granted, entitling each

holder of excess land to hold 5 acres instead of 1000 sq.

Page 9 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. meters. A number of persons, including the appellants

purchased different extents of land which sale deeds were

directed to be cancelled by the Inspector General of

Registrations. The cancellation order passed by the Registrar

was challenged in a writ petition which was allowed. A

Division Bench rejected the appeal against which a SLP was

filed in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7, in which the

decision of the High Court was reversed. The State

Government then took a decision to allot the excess land to

third parties who were in occupation of such excess land on

payment of prescribed regular charges, upon which the

original declarants sought for a consideration providing

them to retain the excess land on payment of requisite

compensation.

9. The State Government without taking any action on the

representations allotted 424.13 acres of land in the name of

APIIC against which four writ petitions were filed in the High

Court by individual owners as well as one M/s. Chanakyapuri

Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Secunderabad which

Page 10 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Society claimed that the proceedings of the competent

authority under the Land Ceiling Act stood restored by the

judgment in N. Audikesava Reddy and Ors.7 The Division

Bench rejected the writ petitions against which SLPs were

filed which were decided in Omprakash Verma’s8 case. The

learned judges in Omprakash Verma’s8 case rejected the

contention that the original owners had filed the declaration

on a misconception and confusion. We extract paragraph 86

to 88 of the cited decision: -

“86. It is not in dispute that the panchnama has not been questioned in any proceedings by any of the appellants. Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society was in possession at one stage and Shri Venkateshawar Enterprises was given possession by the owners and possession was also given to Golden Hill Construction Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, the fact remains that the owners are not in possession. In view of the same, the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken by the State legally and validly through a panchnama is absolutely correct and deserves to be upheld.

Page 11 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.

87. It is relevant to point out the conduct of the appellants in the previous proceedings which were highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the State as well as APIIC. They are:

(a) the appellants themselves described the land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing land” in their declarations filed under Section 6(1);

(b) the appellants filed declarations under the Land Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;

(c) filing declarations under the ULC Act treating the land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land;

(d) the transaction of agreement of sale entered into between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society;

(e) owners and Society filed applications for exemptions which were rejected;

(f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against such rejection of exemption up to this Court in which the owners through their power of attorney were sailing with the Society.

In fact these instances were projected in their counter-affidavit before the High Court

Page 12 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. by the State and APIIC to non-suit the appellants. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants pointed out that these aspects were not highlighted before the High Court, the conduct of the appellants as regards the above aspects cannot be ignored.

88. It is pointed out that the owners themselves have described the land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing lands” and “vacant land” in the relevant columns of their declaration under Section 6(1) and, therefore, the proceedings of the competent authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid. Though the said aspect had not been disputed by the appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning of “grazing lands” in the said declaration is not conclusive. However, as observed earlier, their statements in the form of declarations before the authorities concerned cannot be denied. In fact, we were taken through those entries which are available in the paper book in the form of annexures.”

Page 13 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.

10. Hence, in so far as the land allotted to APIIC, now in the

possession of TSIIC, which is 424.13 acres, the vesting and

allotment has attained finality. There can be no dispute either

of title or possession raised on that land.

11. Now, we come to the 99.07 acres, vested under the

Land Reforms Act. While proceedings were continuing under

the Land Ceiling Act, which were also challenged on the

ground that the entire lands were agricultural lands, not

included under the Land Ceiling Act, the GPA of the original

declarants filed a petition before the Land Tribunal pointing

out the proceedings taken under the Land Ceiling Act,

asserting that the provisions of the Land Reforms Act are not

applicable since the entire land in Survey No.83 was treated

as vacant land under the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.

The GPA sought release of the extent of 99.07 acres which

was rejected. Four appeals were filed before the Land

Reforms Appellate Authority-cum-District Judge, Ranga

Reddy in which there was a remand. The Land Tribunal on

remand accepted the plea of the declarants and directed the

Page 14 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. extent of 99.07 acres to be released to the declarants; which

according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

State was not permissible.

12. Subject of the present appeals; 53 acres, is said to be

comprised in the 99.07 acres of land allegedly reverted to the

declarants on 25.04.1990, the possession allegedly having

been handed over to the GPA of the declarants. In so far as

the remaining 46.20 acres, there is said to be a writ petition

pending before the High Court in which the High Court has

permitted the State to protect the total 470.33 acres, including

the 424.32 acres earlier allotted to APIIC, now with the TSIIC.

While the appellants herein, the legal representatives of the

original owners/declarants asserted their possession and

ownership, the respondents who are the writ petitioners

equally assert their possession on the strength of title deeds

which have not been challenged at all.

13. All the parties have filed their detailed written

submissions. On the arguments, suffice it to notice that Shri

Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

Page 15 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. appellants submitted that there could be no conveyance

effected by the sale agreement of 19.03.1982 and the title

deeds executed cannot confer any title on the vendees since

the vendor did not have a valid title. The vendor in the said

title deeds had sought for specific performance which suit

stood dismissed for default and the application for

restoration was also rejected. Based on the sale deeds, the

writ petitioners had taken loans from banks, offering the said

lands as collateral security, which had led to a CBI

investigation where the sale deeds were found to be

fraudulent. Proceedings were initiated under the criminal

law against the writ petitioners and their Directors. In so far

as the 46.20 acres, the appellants would agitate their cause in

the writ petition pending before the High Court. The

remaining 53 acres was admittedly taken possession by the

GPA of the original declarants, which possession is with the

appellants, the ownership having devolved upon them.

14. Shri Hiren P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the respondents on the other hand submits that there is no

Page 16 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. challenge to the sale deeds and the entire exercise is

experimental, especially considering the development

agreement entered into with a builder as is produced by the

Respondent No.1 to 7 through I.A. No.83765 of 2025. Behind

the scenes, the developer is funding the litigation in the hope

that the appellants who are all living abroad would obtain

possession of the disputed land on which the developer

could carry out their activities. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy,

learned Senior Counsel on the other hand submits that the

State is concerned with 99.07 acres of land which had vested

in the State under the Land Reforms Act. The land having

vested with the State, there is no reason for reverting it back

to the original declarants who had claimed the said lands to

be agricultural lands when the Land Reforms Act came into

force. Shri S. Niranjan Reddy also points out Section 9-A of

the Land Reforms Act which provides for reopening of cases.

It is also pointed out that though the Land Ceiling Act, 1976

has been repealed in 1999, the vesting cannot be disturbed

and the decisions of this Court on the earlier two occasions

Page 17 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. has brought about a finality to the vesting under the repealed

Act.

15. The respondents herein who were the writ petitioners

have emphasised their claims on the basis of the decision in

Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana &

Anr.9. The said decision has been cited to argue that the title

deeds; registered instruments of conveyance, are to be

deemed valid unless set aside or declared void by a Civil

Court of competent jurisdiction. There is no such dictum in

the said decision wherein a Division Bench of this Court was

concerned with conveyances made on the strength of

agreements of sale, General Power of Attorney and Wills.

The issue addressed was avoidance of execution and

registration of deed of conveyances as a mode of transfer of

a free hold immovable property, especially in the teeth of

Section 17 and Section 49 of the Registration Act. The

tendency to adopt Power of Attorney sales along with

execution of sale agreements and a bequeath by way of will,

9 (2012) 1 SCC 656 Page 18 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. instead of execution and registration of proper deeds of

conveyance on receipt of full consideration was deprecated.

We extract paragraphs 15 to 17 of an earlier order dated

15.05.2009 in the said case, extracted as such in para 15 of

the aforesaid decision:

“15. The Registration Act, 1908 was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration.

16. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future ‘any right, title or interest’ whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs.100 and upward to or in immovable property.

17. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised Page 19 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. therein or received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed.”

16. The observation that registration of a document gives

notice to the world that such a document has been executed

is not to confer an unimpeachable validity on all such

registered documents. Even the respondents/writ

petitioners accept that the presumption coming forth from a

registered deed of conveyance is rebuttable. While

reserving the right of persons who had obtained sale

agreement/general power of attorney/will executed, to

complete confirmation of title on them by getting registered

deeds of conveyance, the conclusion of the cited decision,

which acts as a binding precedent, is available in para 24,

which we extract hereunder: -

“24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of “GPA Page 20 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. sales” or “SA/GPA/will transfers” do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognised or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognised as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53-A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in municipal or revenue records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/will transactions known as GPA sales.”

17. It is in this context that we must examine the document

of 19.03.1982, an agreement which is said to have been

validated in the year 2006. We immediately notice that the

very contention of the writ petitioners is only that they have

obtained proper conveyances by registered sale deeds from Page 21 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Bhavana society, whose claim is under the agreement of

1982, which has not till date been registered and hence

cannot be recognized as a valid mode or instrument of

transfer of immovable property, going by the above

decision.

18. We refer to the documents from the memorandum of

appeal in SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024. The agreement of sale

executed by the GPA holder of the original declarants, in

favour of M/s. Bhavana Society is produced as Annexure P-

33. The agreement is dated 19.03.1982 and the extent of the

property agreed to be sold is 125-35 acres. Clause (2) of the

agreement clearly indicates only a payment of Rs.50,000/- by

cheque towards part of sale consideration, the balance sale

consideration to be paid within six months from the date of

obtaining permission under the provisions of the Land

Ceiling Act. The original declarants represented through the

GPA, termed as the vendors in the agreement, also spoke of

the delivery of vacant possession of the land to the intending

purchaser. The plaint in the suit filed by the Bhavana Society

Page 22 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. is produced as Annexure P-32 which, while asserting actual

physical possession having been handed over to the plaintiff

sought only for a direction to the defendants 1 to 9 through

the defendants 10 and 11 to execute a sale deed in favour of

the plaintiff society in respect of the scheduled land

admeasuring 125-35 acres. Hence Bhavana Society was

aware that they obtained no valid title from the agreement of

sale. The suit filed in 1991 after possession of 99.07 acres was

taken under the Land Reforms Act, was stood dismissed for

default on 06.04.2001. The petition filed under Order IX Rule

9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190810 was rejected on

23.02.2004 as seen from Annexure P-36. After this, the

revalidation was done on the agreement of sale, as is

produced at Annexure P-37, a copy of which also has been

produced by respondents Nos.1 to 7 as Annexure 2 in IA No.

83765 of 2025; but without registration, which in any event is

not possible at this distance of time.

10

(for brevity, ‘the CPC’) Page 23 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.

19. Moreover, though the agreement of sale dated

19.03.1982 is said to be one based on which the suit for

specific performance was filed and later revalidated, both

differ considerably. The agreement produced as Annexure

P-37, though of the same date and the very same vendors and

vendees, as is seen from Annexure P-34, the extent differs in

so far as it refers to 99.17 acres out of the total extent of 525.35

acres. Here, we must specifically notice that there was a

demarcation of 99.17 acres of land out of the total extent when

the land had been declared vested in the State under the

Land Reforms Act and possession taken by the State in 1975.

In 1982 when the agreement of sale validated subsequently

was executed, that extent had vested in the State and was in

the State’s possession. The alleged reversion of such land to

the original declarants occurred only in the year 1990 and

hence there was no reason for the sale of the specified extent

as seen from Annexure P-37 at that point of time. These are

not two separate transactions since the consideration paid is

Rs.50,000/- by cheque issued on Andhra Bank,

Page 24 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad. However, the cheque

numbers differ in so far as Annexure P-33 showing the

number of 738569 while Annexure P-37 indicates it to be

238569; obviously a printer’s devil.

20. Further clause (2) in the said agreements also differ

which stands extracted hereunder:

Annexure P-33: -

“2) That in pursuance of the above said offer and acceptance, the Second party purchaser has this day paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousands only) by cheque no. 738569 on Andhra Bank, Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad towards part of sale consideration and agreed to pay the balance of sale consideration within six months from the date of obtaining permission under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976.” (para-2, page 872) Annexure P-37 :

“That in pursuance of the above said offer and acceptance, the Second party purchaser has paid the total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- this

Page 25 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. day and out of which a sum of Rs. 50,000/-

(Rupees Fifty thousands only) by cheque no. 238569 on Andhra Bank, Mukharamjahi Road, Hyderabad.” (para-2, page-906)

The very recital in Annexure P-37 is anomalous and

does not with certainty declare that the entire consideration

was paid or only Rs. 50,000/ as part payment by cheque.

21. Annexure P-33 speaks only of a consideration of Rs.

50,000/- and the balance consideration to be paid within six

months from the date of obtaining permission under the

provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. Annexure P-37 speaks of

payment of total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,350/- out of

which Rs.50,000/- has been paid by cheque; the recital not

really lending any assurance of the payment. Though the

extents differ, the schedule of the property in both the

agreements shows the very same boundaries, another

anomaly which raises a suspicion on the actual demarcation

and reversion to the original declarants.

Page 26 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.

22. Further, an instrument of conveyance is compulsorily

registrable as required under the Registration Act. Section 23

prescribes four-months’ time for presenting a document for

registration from the date of its execution. Section 24

provides that if there are several persons executing a

document at different times, such document may be

presented for registration or re-registration within four

months from the date of such execution. In the instant case,

all the executants, parties to the agreement, have signed on

the day shown in the agreement. The proviso to Section 34

also enables the Registrar to condone the delay, if the

document is presented within a further period of four months,

on payment of a fine. The validation of the sale agreement,

which clearly is shown to be not one executed by the

declarants, by reason of it materially differing from that

produced as Annexure P-33, on the strength of which a suit

for specific performance was filed by the vendor, the

Bhavana Society, which is also the intended purchaser in the

sale agreement of 1982, it smacks of fraud. The agreement of

Page 27 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. 1982, the original one and the revalidated one, cannot result

in a valid title, merely for reason that the subsequent

instrument had been registered. As we noticed at the outset,

the learned Single Judge did not decide the title but only

raised valid suspicion insofar as the title of the vendor in the

deed of conveyance. Even according to the writ petitioners,

their claim stems from a sale agreement, which is not a

proper deed of conveyance, especially since it is not a

registered document.

23. The Division Bench has found possession on the

appellants and the writ petitioners by virtue of two interim

orders passed by Co-ordinate Benches of the High Court.

The first one is in W.P. No. 29547 of 2011, wherein the Lok

Ayukta was directed not to pass any further orders but the

State Government and the APIIC Ltd. were not restrained

from taking any action in accordance with law. The interim

order in W.P. No. 4466 of 2012 also does not establish

possession on the writ petitioners. Undoubtedly, the 53 acres

would be comprised in the 99.07 acres alleged to have been

Page 28 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. resumed to the possession of the original declarants through

their GPA, but there is nothing on record indicating the

possession, either of the respondents/writ petitioners or the

appellants/respondents in the writ petition.

24. We also take serious notice of the submission made by

the State insofar as the invocation of Section 9-A of the Land

Reforms Act, as of now against the 99.07 acres vested in the

State, which would ideally remain in the possession of the

State. As far as 46.20 acres is concerned, it would depend

upon writ petitions pending before the Telangana High Court

and the proceedings sought to be initiated by the State under

the Land Reforms Act. But we cannot ignore the submission

of the State that the Land Ceiling Act permits retention of only

1000 Sq. m. with each declarant. At the same time, we must

notice that Omprakash Verma8 speaks of an exemption

granted to the original declarants to hold 5 acres each

instead of 1000 Sq.m. We notice this not as an entitlement

which exemption will have to be proved in accordance with

the Act when a claim is raised or an action against the land is

Page 29 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. resisted. Even then the declarants cannot have possession of

99.07 acres; the reversion of which, physically is not clearly

established. The fate of 53 acres comprised in 99.07 acres

also would be subject to a proposed action by the State under

the Land Reforms Act.

25. We make it clear that we have not said anything about

the possession of 99.07 acres which will have to be agitated

in appropriate proceedings. As far as the writ petition

praying for a direction not to dispossess, we find that the writ

petitioners to have not established a valid title. We prima

facie find the title to be suspect, which would disentitle them

from claiming a rightful possession, which also has not been

proved.

26. In this context, we refer to the judgment of this Court in

Balkrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rambharose

Gupta11. The dispute was with respect to a tenant and

landlord and the bone of contention was possession. In the

suit for permanent injunction filed by the tenant, the Trial

11 (2020) 19 SCC 119 Page 30 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. Court, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence

found that the plaintiff failed to prove his actual and physical

possession over the suit property. The finding of the Trial

Court based on the oral and documentary evidence was

overturned by the First Appellate Court and the High Court

drawing inference of possession from applications filed in an

earlier suit. This Court restored the order of the Trial Court,

finding that actual and physical possession must be proved,

which principle would apply even in a writ petition under

Article 226, more strictly since there is no evidence led and

the consideration is only based on documents produced on

affidavit.

27. When dispossession by the State is alleged on the

strength of possession, mere reliance on interim orders

passed in writ petitions earlier filed cannot establish such

actual and physical possession. We have also noticed that the

validated agreement of 19.03.1982, based on which

conveyance is claimed by the writ petitioners, cannot be

sustained on the clear terms in the two agreements. We

Page 31 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. noticed on a comparison of the actual agreement on which a

suit for specific performance was filed and the latter

agreement, which stood validated but not registered even

now that the original declarants and the writ petitioners have

been approbating and reprobating. The power of absolute

right over lands is on the State and the person in occupation,

is only there, by virtue of the grants, which can be brought to

an end by the State which has the power of eminent domain.

Here there is a statutory vesting of property and prima facie,

guile employed in making conflicting claims before the

authorities under the Land Reforms Act and the Land Ceiling

Act as also entering into multiple transactions to defeat the

statutory vesting with successive litigations, all in vain, which

travelled up to this Court twice earlier.

28. The cloud on title and the doubts raised on possession

by the learned Single Judge, as affirmed by us are merely

prima facie observations to deny discretion to invoke the

extra ordinary power under Article 226. So are the

misgivings expressed on the claim of repossession by the

Page 32 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc. original declarants through their GPA and the skepticism

regarding their very right to obtain repossession of property

already vested in the State, under a Statute, which Statute also

does not provide for any review of the notification issued

under the Act; the notification having merely affirmed the

statutory vesting. The reservation in favour of the State also

arises only from our anxiety to preserve the property,

without creation of any third-party interest, to avoid any

hindrance of the State’s power to invoke the provisions under

the Land Reforms Act, if done within a reasonable period,

which would also be subject to legitimate legal scrutiny. It

goes without saying; then, the parties would be entitled to

agitate their respective causes, in the appropriate civil forum

or if statutorily prohibited, avail of the remedies made

available under the statute which proceedings will not be

governed by the findings in our judgment, we having only

prima facie declined invocation of the discretionary,

extraordinary jurisdiction.

Page 33 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.

29. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored,

and the appeals stand disposed of, with the above

observations and reservations.

30. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

….……….……………………. J.

(SUDHANSHU DHULIA)

………….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 07, 2025.

Page 34 of 34 CA @ SLP (C) No. 1866 of 2024 etc.