Mahesh Chand (Dead) Through Lr(S) vs Brijesh Kumar

2025 INSC 1005 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10256 OF 2025

MAHESH CHAND (DEAD) THROUGH LR(S) … Appellant (s)

VERSUS

BRIJESH KUMAR & ORS. … Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Rajesh Bindal, J.

1. The appellant-landlord has filed the present appeal

impugning the judgment of the High Court1 in Second Appeal No.1623

of 19922. Vide aforesaid judgment, the appeal preferred by the

appellant was partially accepted while setting aside the judgment of

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2025.08.19 17:56:36 IST Reason: 1 High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 2 Dated 15.02.2024

1 the First Appellate Court3. However, the High Court passed an order

under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC4 directing return of plaint to the

appellant for presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

The Trial Court5 had decreed the suit filed by the appellant for

possession and recovery of rent. An appeal was preferred by the

respondent nos.1 to 3 - tenants. The First Appellate Court had reversed

the findings while holding that the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction

to entertain the lis because the land in question is agricultural.

2. Brief facts of the case as available on record are that a

tenancy agreement was entered into between the parties on

31.07.1970, vide which portion of land was taken on rent by the

predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 to 3 @ ₹150/- per month.

The land was taken for the purpose of setting up of Indian Oil petrol

pump by the predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 to 3. It was

mentioned in the tenancy agreement that on failure by the tenant to pay

rent regularly, the appellant shall have the right to evict him and

recover the arrears of rent. The aforesaid tenancy agreement was duly

registered on 31.07.1970.

3 Court of Special Judge & Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr 4 Hereinafter referred to as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 5 Court of Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr

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3. As the predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 to 3

failed to pay rent regularly, a suit for eviction was filed by the appellant

in the year 1974. In the aforesaid suit, an application was filed by the

predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 to 3 contending that the

Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. It was claimed that land in question is

agricultural. Hence, only the Revenue Court will have jurisdiction to

deal with the issue. The aforesaid application was rejected by the Trial

Court vide order dated 14.08.1976 as the land in question, since the

very beginning, was let out for non-agricultural purpose for setting up

of a petrol pump, hence, Civil Court will have jurisdiction. The order

was not challenged by the predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1

to 3.

4. Finally, after trial, the suit for possession and arrears of rent

filed by the appellant, was decreed vide judgment dated 30.11.1981.

Aggrieved against the same, both the parties preferred appeals before

the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court, referring to

various provisions of the UPZALR Act6, opined that the land in question

was not declared non-agricultural in terms of Section 143 of the UPZALR

Act. Hence, the Civil Court will not have jurisdiction. The judgment

and decree of the Trial Court was set aside. In the appeal preferred by

6 The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 3 the appellant, the claim was for increase of mesne profit. However, the

same was dismissed.

5. Against the judgment of the First Appellate Court, the

appellant preferred second appeal before the High Court. The High

Court allowed the appeal in part. The judgment and decree of the First

Appellate Court was set aside and substituted by an order, under

Order VII Rule 10 of CPC, directing return of the plaint to the appellant

for presentation before the appropriate forum. The High Court opined

that there being no declaration under Section 143 of the UPZALR Act for

the land in question to be non-agricultural, the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court is barred.

6. The aforesaid judgment is impugned before this Court.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that from the

very beginning, the land in question was let out to the predecessor-in-

interest of respondent nos.1 to 3, way back in the year 1970, for setting

up of a petrol pump, which was non-agricultural purpose. Nothing lies

in the mouth of the respondent nos.1 to 3 to claim that the land is

agricultural, just with a view to defeat the rightful claim of the appellant.

He further submitted that initial approval was granted by the

competent authority under Section 143 of the UPZALR Act for use of

land for non-agricultural purposes on 10.12.1975. However, after

4 litigation, finally vide order dated 14.03.1986 passed by the Deputy

Collector, Khurja, the land was declared non-agricultural. The same

attained finality. No doubt, civil suit for eviction was filed prior to

aforesaid declaration of the land as non-agricultural. However, the

nature of the land having been changed in terms of the provisions of

UPZALR Act during the pendency of the proceedings, the suit filed by

the appellant could not have been dismissed on account of jurisdiction

as appeals are continuation of proceedings and subsequent events also

have to be taken note of. The First Appellate Court, while adjudicating

the appeal of the respondent nos.1 to 3, failed to take notice of this

development.

8. In the case in hand, suit was filed seeking eviction on

account of non-payment of rent, which was due from 01.07.1972

onwards. Infact, it was admitted by the respondent nos. 1 to 3 that rent

was paid to the appellant only up to 30.06.1972. Thereafter, claim of

payment of rent to a third person was of no relevance as that person

had no concern with the land in question. Since day one, the

respondent nos. 1 to 3 knew that the land had been taken by them on

rent for commercial purpose. They had taken all the permissions from

different departments for setting up of a petrol pump. Hence, their

argument is totally misconceived.

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9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent nos.

1 to 3 submitted that the declaration made by the competent authority

under Section 143 of UPZALR Act is required to be registered in terms

of Section 145 thereof. In the case in hand, there was no registration.

Any declaration without registration is merely a paper, which cannot

be relied upon to claim that the land was declared as non-agricultural.

The declaration had to be on the date of filing of the suit. He further

referred to various provisions of UPZALR Act to claim that the tenant

will become owner without transferable rights in the facts and

circumstances of the case. There is no error in the order passed by the

High Court. The appeal deserves to be dismissed.

10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

relevant documents on record.

11. The basic facts that have been noticed above, which are not

in dispute, are that a registered tenancy agreement was entered into

between the parties on 31.07.1970. From day one, the land of the

appellant was taken by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent

nos.1 to 3 for setting up of a petrol pump, which is a commercial and

non-agricultural purpose. The suit was filed in the year 1974 seeking

possession and arrears of rent. An application filed by the

predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos.1 to 3 raising issue of

6 jurisdiction, was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated

14.08.1976. The order was not challenged and the Trial Court decreed

the suit. During pendency of the suit, initial approval was given to the

appellant under Section 143 of the UPZALR Act vide order dated

10.12.1975. However, after litigation, the issue was finally resolved by

order dated 14.03.1986. The aforesaid fact is not in dispute. Meaning

thereby, the initial order was passed when the civil suit was pending.

However, the finality was attained during the pendency of the appeal

before the First Appellate Court. Without even noticing the factum of

the land in question being non-agricultural, declared vide order dated

14.03.1986, the First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the

Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis and only a

Revenue Court is the competent forum. Impugned judgment and

decree of the Trial Court was set aside and the suit of the appellant was

dismissed.

12. The High Court framed the following substantial questions

of law vide order dated 20.02.2020:

“1. Whether the provisions of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act, 1950 would apply to the (sic) land let out for non agricultural purposes?

2. Whether the provisions of U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act, 1950 would apply to the (sic) agricultural land located in an area that has fallen within the limits of a town area upon extension of boundaries after the date of vesting?

7 3. Whether the land situate in an urban area utilized for to (sic) a non agricultural purposes would still be deemed to an agricultural land in the absence of a declaration under Section 143 U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act?

4. Whether a tenant is estopped from disputing the nature of the land demised after utilizing the same for non agricultural purposes?

5. Whether the provisions of Section 165 U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act would be attracted either in its amended form or un-

amended, to land that has been found to be utilized for non agricultural purposes post letting?”

13. While dealing with question nos.1 to 3 together, the High

Court opined that unless there is mandatory declaration under Section

143 of the UPZALR Act, the land will retain its character of being

agricultural. Hence, the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court

regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court were upheld. It may be

relevant to add here that even the High Court had not noticed the fact

that the land in question was declared to be non-agricultural initially

vide order dated 10.12.1975, which was finally passed on 14.03.1986.

It happened during the pendency of the litigation.

14. The High Court while upholding the judgment and decree

of the First Appellate Court on the issue of jurisdiction, was of the

opinion that in the circumstances, the plaint of the appellant deserved

to be returned, hence, passed an order under Order VII Rule 10 of CPC

directing the same.

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15. There is no quarrel on the proposition of law that appeal is

continuance of proceedings and any developments which may take

place during pendency of the appeal or suit, going to the root of the

case, can always be taken notice of to avoid multiplicity of litigation. It

remained an undisputed fact that finally vide order dated 14.03.1986,

the land in question was declared non-agricultural. In the case in hand,

from the very beginning, vide registered tenancy agreement, the land

was taken by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent nos.1 to 3

for non-agricultural purposes. This fact also cannot be denied that on

the date when the First Appellate Court passed the judgment on

27.07.1992, which was upheld by the High Court on 15.02.2024, the land

in question had already been declared as non-agricultural under

Section 143 of the UPZALR Act. After return of plaint in terms of

judgment of the High Court dated 15.02.2024, the Revenue Court will

not have the jurisdiction to entertain the lis, as the land has been

declared non-agricultural during pendency of the litigation. The Civil

Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

16. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the

respondent nos. 1 to 3 is that on the date of filing of the suit, declaration

under Section 143 of the UPZALR Act being not available, hence, the

suit was not maintainable, is liable to be rejected.

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17. His further argument that because of non-registration of the

declaration of the section 143 of the Act, it was a waste paper and could

not be relied upon, is also of no consequence. Section 145 of the

UPZALR Act, on which reliance is sought to be placed, in support of the

arguments, does not cast any duty on the land owner to get it

registered. As per Section 145 of the UPZALR Act, it is the duty of the

Assistant Collector-in-charge of the Sub-Division to forward a copy of

the declaration made under Section 143 of the UPZALR Act to the Sub

Registrar to do the needful. Such registration is to be made free of cost

notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act,

1908. Meaning thereby, no duty is cast on the appellant to get the same

registered. Apparently, it is merely a procedure. No fee has to be paid

as the relevant registration was free of cost. Merely on account of

deficiency by the officers, the appellant cannot be deprived of the

benefits of the declaration so made.

18. For the reasons mentioned above, in our opinion, there is

merit in the present appeal. The same is accordingly allowed. The

impugned judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside.

As the merits of the controversy were not dealt with by the First

Appellate Court or the High Court, the case is remitted back to the First

Appellate Court to be considered and decided on merits. Litigation

10 being more than 50 years old, we direct the First Appellate Court to

hear and decide the appeal within a period of six months from the date

of receipt of the copy of this order.

19. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of

with no order as to costs.

.........................................J. (RAJESH BINDAL)

..........................................J. (MANMOHAN)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 19, 2025.

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