Maharashtra University of Health Sciences vs Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal

of Health Sciences has been constituted under

Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998

(for short `the said Act'). The 2nd appellant is the

Committee constituted under Section 53 of the said

Act and the 3rd appellant is the Management Council of

the appellant No.1 and also constituted under the

said Act.

4. The 1st respondent in this appeal is a public

trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust

Act, 1950 and the said trust runs several

colleges including the 2nd respondent. The 3rd

respondent is the Principal of the said college

and the 4th respondent is a Lecturer therein.

Both the 5th and 6th respondents were appointed

Lecturers in the said college but their

appointments were not approved but they

2 continued to work as lecturers in the said

college.

5. On 7.8.05 a representation was made by the 5th

respondent to the effect that after she had

served the said college for the last three and a

half year suddenly she was informed on 6.8.05

that the college authorities accepted her

resignation. That was shocking to her since the

5th respondent could never resign as she had

several liabilities and had no other income. The

education of her two children had to be looked

after while her husband was disabled in view of

an accident and her father-in-law was a retired

person. In her representation to the Vice

Chancellor of the appellant-University she

stated that at the time of her appointment,

college authorities took her signature on a

resignation letter without mentioning any date

and that might have been used to remove her from

the college. The University on receipt of the

said representation sent a letter to the said

college on 19th August, 2005 for its explanation

3 and explanation was submitted by the said

college on 31.08.05.

6. Thereafter, the appellant-University formed a

Committee to look into the grievance of the 5th

respondent and the said Committee after visiting

the college and conducting an enquiry on

29.08.05, 01.09.05 and 02.09.05 submitted its

report to the appellant-University.

7. Again on 09.09.05, the 5th respondent submitted

another representation to the Grievance

Committee of the appellant-University which was

also forwarded to the said college for its

response. That was submitted by the said college

on 04.10.05 and 08.11.05. Thereafter, the

appellant-University gave the 5th respondent a

hearing in respect of her complaint which she

raised in her representation. The said meeting

was held before the Grievance Committee and the

Grievance Committee gave a detailed report on

the basis of its enquiry. Before the report was

given, the 5th respondent and the person against

whom complaint was lodged were examined along

4 with some witnesses. Thereafter, the Grievance

Committee took a decision to refer the matter to

the State Commission for Women for further

investigation and it was decided that the report

of the said Commission was to be considered in

the next meeting of the Committee.

8. Thereafter, on 18th January, 2006 the 6th

respondent lodged a further complaint with the

police station Sadar against the 4th respondent

as a result of which offence punishable under

Section 509 of I.P.C was registered against the

4th respondent and the Summary Criminal Case

No.4332/06 was registered in the Court of

J.M.F.C., Nagpur. On 19.01.06, 5th respondent

also lodged report with the police station and

on the basis of the said report an offence came

to be registered on 04.02.06 vide Crime No.22/06

under Sections 468, 471, 354, 509, 506 read with

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In

connection with the aforesaid criminal case, the

3rd and 4th respondents were arrested by the

police on 05.02.06 and were remanded to police

custody for two days. They were granted bail by

5 the Court of J.M.F.C., Nagpur on 08.02.06. The

Principal of the college was also granted

anticipatory bail on 06.02.06 and which order

was subsequently confirmed on 23.02.06.

9. Then on 18.02.06, the services of the 6th

respondent were terminated by the said college.

10. In view of the complaint of the 6th respondent,

the University called the 1st, 2nd and 4th

respondents for hearing on 08.03.06 before the

Grievance Committee and on 04.03.06 the 6th

respondent sent a complaint to the appellant-

University seeking action against the

respondents. In that complaint the 6th

respondent gave details of ill-treatment and

sexual harassment which she and other lady

lecturers and employees of the college including

the 5th respondent were subjected to by the

authorities of the said college. In view of

such complaints, the Grievance Committee of the

University met on 8th March, 2006 to consider the

issues in the light of complaints received by

the 6th respondent against the college

6 authorities. Pursuant to the meeting of the

Grievance Committee, the University by its

communication dated 21st March, 2006 directed the

1st and 2nd respondents to take steps against the

3rd and 4th respondents with a direction to

suspend them and it was also directed that the

5th respondent may be reinstated. It was also

directed that approval granted in respect of the

service of 3rd and 4th respondent be frozen. A

reply was sent by the 1st respondent to the order

of the appellant-University dated 21.03.06.

Thereafter, the appellant-University further

informed the college authorities that the

decision to freeze the approval of the 3rd and 4th

respondents was taken under the provision of

Clause 25.2 of the University Direction No.25/01

and it was done in accordance with Section 16

(8) of the said Act. The governing body of the

respondent college in its meeting held on

27.03.06 refused to comply with the direction

issued by the University by its letter dated 21st

March, 2006 and this fact was communicated to

the appellant by the said college. On 1st April

2006, the 1st and 2nd respondents addressed a

7 letter of the same date and contended therein

that the appellant-University does not have the

power to freeze the approval of appointment of

permanent teachers like the 3rd and 4th

respondents and the appellant was asked to

withdraw its communication dated 29th March,

2006.

11. Assailing those communications dated 21st March,

2006 and 29th March, 2006 of the appellants, the

respondents namely, the Trust, the College

Authorities and those two teachers filed a writ

petition being 1976/06 contending therein that

the appellant-University has no authority to

issue those communications. That writ proceeding

was heard on contest by the Hon'ble High Court.

12. By the impugned judgment dated 08.06.07, the

Hon'ble High Court partly allowed the writ

petition and quashed the orders passed by the

University in respect of action taken against

those respondents on the basis of the

allegations of 5th and 6th respondent of sexual

harassment at the work place.

8

13. Challenging the said judgment, this Court has

been moved.

14. The main question on which the matter was argued

by the appellants was that the High Court was in

error in deciding that the Grievance Committee

constituted under Section 53 of the said Act,

has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any

complaint filed by the 5th and 6th respondent, as

they are not approved teachers of the respondent

college.

15. In order to appreciate the legal issues involved

in this argument, it is better to set out the

definition of `teacher' under Section 2(35) of

the said Act. Section 2(35) of the said Act

runs as under:-

"2(35) "teachers" means full time approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant Lecturers, Lecturers, Readers, Associate Professors, Professors and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the university;"

16. Section 53 of the said Act provides as follows:

9

"53. (1) There shall be a Grievances Committee in the University to deal with the grievances of teachers and other employees of the University, Colleges, institutions and recognised institutions and to hear and settle grievances as far as may be practicable within six months, and the committee shall make a report to the Management Council.

(2) It shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints and report to the Management Council for taking such action as it deems fit and the decisions of the Management Council on such report shall be final.

(3) The Grievances Committee shall consist of the following members, namely:

(a) The Pro-Vice Chancellor, - Chairperson

(b) Four members of the management council nominated by the Management Council from amongst themselves - Members

(c) The Registrar - Member Secretary

(4) The Registrar shall not have a right to vote."

17. Construing the aforesaid two Sections, the High

Court, following the principle of "ejusdem

generis" held that 5th and 6th respondent, being

unapproved teachers, do not come within the

definition of `teachers' under Section 2(35)

quoted above.

10

18. This Court cannot accept the aforesaid decision

of the High Court for various reasons indicated

hereinafter.

19. If the definition of teachers, as quoted above,

is properly perused it would appear that within

the definition of teachers not only full time

approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant

Lecturers, etc., are included but the definition

is wide enough to include "and other persons

teaching or giving instructions on full time

basis in affiliated colleges or approved

institutions in the university." Similarly, the

Grievance Committee which is established under

Section 53 of the said Act has also been given

wide powers to deal with not only the grievances

of teachers but also of other employees of the

University, college, institution and to settle

their grievances as far as may be practicable

within a certain time-frame. Sub-section (2) of

Section 53 of the said Act provides for

consequential steps which the Grievance

Committee may take after entertaining the

grievances of the category of persons named in

11 Section 53(1). Section 53(3) provides for the

constitution of the Grievance Committee and

Section 53(4) is procedural in nature.

20. On a combined reading of Section 2(35) with

Section 53 of the said Act, this Court is of the

opinion that in respect of unapproved teachers

also Grievance Committee has the jurisdiction to

entertain complaint and undertake the statutory

exercise conferred on it under Section 53 of the

said Act.

21. The definition of teachers under Section 2(35)

is wide enough to include even unapproved

teacher. In fact the said definition has two

parts, the first part deals with full time

approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant

Lecturers, Lecturers etc. and the second part

deals with other persons teaching or giving

instructions on full time basis in affiliated

colleges or approved institutions in the

University.

12

22. Even though the approved teachers and those

`other persons' who are teaching and giving

instructions fall in two different classes both

are encompassed with the definition of teacher

under Section 2(35) of the Act. The word `and'

before `other persons' is disjunctive and

indicate a different class of people.

23. A class is a conceptual creation taking within

its fold numerous categories of persons with

similar characteristics. Here in the group of

`other persons' fall those who, on full time

basis, are teaching or giving instructions in

colleges affiliated with the University and they

are also teachers even if they are unapproved.

This seems to be the purport of Section 2(35) of

the Act.

24. It cannot be disputed that 5th and 6th respondent

were engaged in teaching on full time basis in

the respondent college, which is an affiliated

college of the appellant-University.

13

25. This Court is constrained to observe that the

Hon'ble High Court has not properly appreciated

the principle of ejusdem generis in

understanding the scope of Section 2(35) read

with Section 53 of the Act.

26. The Latin expression "ejusdem generis" which

means "of the same kind or nature" is a

principle of construction, meaning thereby when

general words in a statutory text are flanked by

restricted words, the meaning of the general

words are taken to be restricted by implication

with the meaning of restricted words. This is a

principle which arises "from the linguistic

implication by which words having literally a

wide meaning (when taken in isolation) are

treated as reduced in scope by the verbal

context." It may be regarded as an instance of

ellipsis, or reliance on implication. This

principle is presumed to apply unless there is

some contrary indication (See Glanville

Williams, `The Origins and Logical Implications

of the Ejusdem Generis Rule' 7 Conv (NS) 119).

14

27. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the

principle of Noscitur a sociis. The Latin maxim

Noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory

term is recognised by its associated words. The

Latin word `sociis' means `society'. Therefore,

when general words are juxtaposed with specific

words, general words cannot be read in

isolation. Their colour and their contents are

to be derived from their context [See similar

observations of Viscount Simonds in Attorney

General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover,

(1957) AC 436 at 461 of the report]

28. But like all other linguistic canons of

construction, the ejusdem generis principle

applies only when a contrary intention does not

appear. In instant case, a contrary intention

is clearly indicated inasmuch as the definition

of `teachers' under Section 2(35) of the said

Act, as pointed out above, is in two parts. The

first part deals with enumerated categories but

the second part which begins by the expression

"and other" envisages a different category of

persons. Here `and' is disjunctive. So, while

15 construing such a definition the principle of

ejusdem generis cannot be applied.

29. In this context, we should do well to remember

the caution sounded by Lord Scarman in Quazi v.

Quazi - [(1979) 3 All-England Reports 897]. At

page 916 of the report, the learned Law Lord

made this pertinent observation:-

"If the legislative purpose of a statute is such that a statutory series should be read ejusdem generis, so be it; the rule is helpful. But, if it is not, the rule is more likely to defeat than to fulfil the purpose of the statute. The rule, like many other rules of statutory interpretation, is a useful servant but a bad master."

30. This Court while construing the principle of

ejusdem generis laid down similar principles in

the case of K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras and

Kerala, [AIR 1960 SC 1080]. A Constitution

Bench of this Court in Kochuni (supra) speaking

through Justice Subba Rao (as His Lordship then

was) at paragraph 50 at page 1103 of the report

opined:-

16

"...The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by decided cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or category. It is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary."

(Emphasis supplied)

31. Again this Court in another Constitution Bench

decision in the case of Amar Chandra Chakraborty

v. The Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura,

Agartala and others, AIR 1972 SC 1863, speaking

through Justice Dua, reiterated the same

principles in paragraph 9, at page 1868 of the

report. On the principle of ejusdem generis,

the learned Judge observed as follows:-

"...The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent."

(Emphasis supplied)

17

32. As noted above, in the instant case, there is a

statutory indication to the contrary.

Therefore, where there is statutory indication

to the contrary the definition of teacher under

Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of

ejusdem generis nor can the definition be

confined to only approved teachers. If that is

done, then a substantial part of the definition

under Section 2(35) would become redundant.

That is against the very essence of the doctrine

of ejusdem generis. The purpose of this

doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility

between specific and general words so that all

words in a Statute can be given effect and no

word becomes superfluous (See Sutherland:

Statutory Construction, 5th Edition, page 189,

Volume 2A).

33. It is also one of the cardinal canons of

construction that no Statute can be interpreted

in such a way as to render a part of it otiose.

18

34. It is, therefore, clear where there is a

different legislative intent, as in this case,

the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be

applied to make a part of the definition

completely redundant.

35. By giving such a narrow and truncated

interpretation of `teachers' under Section

2(35), High court has not only ignored a part of

Section 2(35) but it has also unfortunately

given an interpretation which is incompatible

with the avowed purpose of Section 53 of the

Act.

36. The purpose of setting up the Grievance

Committee under Section 53 of the Act is to

provide an effective grievance redressal forum

to teachers and other employees. Any

interpretation of `teachers' under Section 2(35)

of the Act which denies the persons covered

under Section 2(35) an access to the said forum

completely nullifies the dominant purpose of

creating such a forum. It goes without saying

that unapproved teachers need the protection of

19 this forum more than the approved teachers. By

creating such a forum the University virtually

exercised its authority and jurisdiction as a

loco-parentis over teachers-both approved and

unapproved and who are working in various

colleges affiliated with it. The idea is to give

such teachers and employees a protection against

any kind of harassment which they might receive

in their work place. The creation of such a

forum is in tune with protecting the `dignity of

the individual' which is one of the core

constitutional concepts.

37. Therefore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis

cannot be pressed into service to defeat this

dominant statutory purpose. In this context we

may usefully recall the observations of the

Supreme Court of United States in Guy T.

Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 US

84, 88-89, 79 L Ed 211, 55 S Ct 50, 52 (1934),

as under:-

"while the rule is a well-established and useful one, it is, like other canons of statutory construction, only an aid to

20 the ascertainment of the true meaning of the statute. It is neither final nor exclusive. To ascertain the meaning of the words of a statute, they may be submitted to the test of all appropriate canons of statutory construction, of which the rule of ejusdem generis is only one. If, upon a consideration of the context and the objects sought to be attained and of the act as a whole, it adequately appears that the general words were not used in the restricted sense suggested by the rule, we must give effect to the conclusion afforded by the wider view in order that the will of the Legislature shall not fail."

(Emphasis supplied)

38. Therefore, with great respect, this Court is

constrained to hold that the Hon'ble High Court

possibly fell into an error by holding that the

Grievance Committee has no jurisdiction to

entertain the complaints made by 5th and 6th

respondent since they are not approved teachers.

39. Various other factual aspects were considered by

the High Court but since the High Court has come

to a clear erroneous conclusion that Grievance

Committee has no jurisdiction in dealing with

the complaint filed by the 5th and 6th respondent,

21 the very basis of the High Court judgment is

unfortunately flawed and cannot be sustained.

40. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is

allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set

aside.

41. The High court shall now dispose of the writ

petition filed before it in the light of the

observations made hereinbefore about the

jurisdiction of the Grievance Committee.

However, this Court makes it clear that the

order of reinstatement made in respect of 5th and

6th respondent shall be maintained and their

continuity in service cannot be disturbed

without following the provision of University

Acts and Statutes.

42. The appeal is allowed with the directions

mentioned hereinabove. Parties are left to bear

their own costs.

.......................J.

22 (G.S SINGHVI)

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi February 25, 2010

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