Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company LTD., Kalyan, THANE.AND Anr. vs M/S. D.S.CONTRUCTIONS, Ulhasnagar.
- Neutral2025:BHC-OS:677
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. A ground of challenge to an arbitral award that is explicitly raised in the reply to the statement of claim before the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being raised again in a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and cannot be rejected on the ground that it was not mentioned or pressed in the petition, where the record shows it was taken in the proceedings before the Tribunal. 2. An Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to state reasons in support of its award that are proper, intelligible and adequate; the absence or inadequacy of reasons makes an award legally flawed and subject to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 3. When an Arbitral Tribunal fails to frame issues, examine witnesses, or adequately consider and address pleas raised by a party at the initial stage (such as limitation or non-arbitrability), and instead passes an award with minimal or conclusory reasoning, a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 must consider whether such deficiencies render the award defective. 4. A Single Judge's dismissal of a Section 34 petition on the ground that grounds of limitation and non-arbitrability were not taken in the petition is erroneous where the record demonstrates these grounds were explicitly raised in the party's reply before the Tribunal.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
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Digitally signed IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY by KANCHAN KANCHAN VINOD MAYEKAR VINOD Date: ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION MAYEKAR 2025.01.16 14:36:10 +0530
APPEAL NO. 646 OF 2012 IN ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 398 OF 2008
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd., Kalyan, Thane & Anr. ..... Appellant
VERSUS
M/s. D. S. Constructions, Ulhasnagar ..... Respondent
Mr. A. Y. Sakhare, Senior Advocate i/b. Mr. Abhijeet A. Joshi for the Appellant.
Mr. Surel Shah, Senior Advocate (Through V.C.) a/w. Mr.Uday S. Samudrala, Mr. Shivesh J. Upadhyay for the Respondent.
Coram : A.S. Chandurkar & Rajesh S. Patil, JJ. Date on which the arguments were heard : 3rd DECEMBER 2024 Date on which the judgment is pronounced : 15th JANUARY 2025
JUDGMENT ( PER - RAJESH S.PATIL, J.) :
1. The present appeal is filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short the Act of 1996)
challenging the judgment and order dated 3 rd February 2012
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Arbitration
Petition No. 398 of 2008, thereby dismissing the arbitration
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petition which was filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
2. The appellant claimed that in a very short order of four
paragraphs, the learned Single Judge dismissed the petitioner's
arbitration petition filed under Section 34 which was challenging
the arbitration award passed without reasons. The petitioner has
come up with a case that the respondent was a contractor who
was awarded a contract for construction of the Chief Engineer's
Bungalow and Class 1 Junior Staff Quarters at Sector 19, Vashi
for a total cost of Rs.41,27,853.56 only. It was the respondent's
case that certain amount which was due and payable was not
paid. Therefore, they invoked the arbitration clause and claimed
the amount towards underutilization of overheads,
underutilization of machinery, underutilization of labour force,
underutilization of centring and shuttering, loss of business
opportunities, unpaid amount towards work done, damages,
extra work done, price variation. The Respondents filed their
statement of claim before the Arbitral Tribunal of three members.
The appellants herein, being the respondent before the Arbitral
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Tribunal filed their reply/ defence to the statement of claim on 7 th
May 2005. In the said statement of defence, a specific plea of the
claim being barred by limitation and claims not arbitrable was
taken, apart from other grounds. It is further submitted that
without framing any issue and without any witnesses being
examined by the claimant, so also admittedly certain fabricated
documents produced before the Tribunal which were later
withdrawn by the claimant though opposed by the appellant
herein, the arbitrator passed an award for a sum of Rs.
41,59,511.90.
3. Being dissatisfied by the award passed by the Tribunal, the
appellant herein filed a Section 34 petition challenging the award
on various grounds including the ground of the claim being
barred by law of limitation and that non arbitrable disputes being
considered by the Tribunal. The Single Judge while deciding the
Section 34 petition, dismissed the section 34 petition on the
ground that the challenge to the award was on three grounds,
out of which ground no.1 i.e. the claim being barred by law of
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limitation, ground no.2, that the claims were not arbitrable,
cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the petition,
as the said two claims according to the respondent (original
claimant) were not argued before the Tribunal and there is no
ground in the petition raising these two issues. As regards the
third ground, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 4 and in
ultimate paragraph has held that almost all claims arose out of
the delay in completion of the work.
4. In paragraph 8 of the award, the Arbitral Tribunal has given
reasons as to why it holds that the appellant herein alone
responsible for the delay in completion of the work. Various
claims made by the claimant have been awarded on the basis of
that findings. The learned Judge further held that what is further
to be seen is that the arbitrators were persons from the trade and
therefore was conversant with the nature of work carried out.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the award made by the learned
arbitrator is an unreasoned award. He has given reasons, though
in brief and not elaborately, but it cannot be said that there are
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no reasons given. Considering that, there is a clear finding of fact
recorded that for delay in completion of the work, it is the
petitioner alone who is responsible and all claims arose out of
that delay.
5. Mr. Sakhare, learned Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of
the appellant (original respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal)
and made his submissions :-
i. The Tribunal has allowed all the claims on its
purported observations in Paragraph No.8.2 of the
Award which merely states as follows: "8.2 After
careful consideration of the arguments on both
sides it is seen that there have been delays on the
part of the Respondents due to which the
completion period got extended from 12 months to
24 months. Against this background the claims of
the claimant are examined and decided upon as
below."
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ii. Apart from paragraph No.8.2, the Award is
devoid of any reasons as to why the Tribunal found
the Appellant responsible for the delay.
iii. There is no discussion about any averments,
arguments, or documents submitted by either party
to reach the conclusion in Paragraph No.8.2 of the
Award.
iv. As such the Award is devoid of merits.
6. He submitted on the issue of Non-Arbitrable Claims as
under :-
(i) As regards to Claim No.4 regarding PVC,
Appellant had specifically pleaded non-tenability
thereof by referring to Clause No.16 of the Work order
which states "The price-escalation clause and price
variation clause are not applicable to this contract". As
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such the said claim was not arbitrable having been
specifically barred by the Contract.
(ii) As regards to Claim 5 (Underutilization of
Overheads), Claim 6 (Underutilisation of Machinery),
Claim 7 (Underutilization of Labour force), Claim 8
(Underutilization of Centring and Shuttering), and
Claim 9 (Loss of Business Opportunities), Appellant
had specifically pleaded non-tenability thereof by
referring to Clause No.15 of the Work order (Pg C41)
which states that "The tendered rates for all the items
under Schedule 'B' shall remain firm irrespective of
the actual quantity of work executed under any sub-
item/item or in the overall quantum of work done
whether in excess or in deficit and to claim for
revision of rates on grounds of loss of profit or
increased overheads or whatsoever other ground shall
be entertained by the Board." As such the said claim
were not arbitrable having been specifically barred by
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the Contract.
7. Mr. Sakhare, learned Senior Advocate relied upon following
judgments :-
(a) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of Som
Datt Builders Limited vs. State of Kerala with
connected matter. 1
(b) The judgment of Delhi High Court in case of
Samrat Constructions Company vs. Union of India 2
(c) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of Dyna
Technologies Private Limited vs. Crompton Graves
Limited 3
(d) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of
Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority 4
(e) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of
McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co.
1 (2009) 10 SCC 259 2 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2599 3 (2019) 20 SCC 1 4 (2015) 3 SCC 49
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Ltd. & Ors., 5
8. Mr. Surel Shah, learned Senior Advocate appeared on
behalf of the Respondent (original respondent before the Arbitral
Tribunal) and made his submissions as under :-
i. The appeal seeks to take exception to the
judgment and order passed by the Hon'ble Single
Judge of this Hon'ble Court dated 03.02.2012 in
Arbitration Petition No. 398 of 2008 (page no. 15
to 17 to the Appeal).
ii. The Hon'ble Single Judge while dismissing the
petition has considered the fact that only three
grounds were raised in challenging the award
before it. The three grounds as raised before the
Hon'ble Single Judge can be discerned from para
no. 1 of the impugned judgment.
5 (2006) 11 SCC 181
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iii. The Hon'ble Single Judge in para no. 2 refers
to the fact that the first two grounds namely ,the
claim being barred by law of limitation and the
claims being non arbitrable were argued before the
Ld. Arbitrator and the Arbitrator has not decided
the same are not taken in the petition. Therefore,
the Hon'ble Single Judge refused to consider the
same in absence a specific statement being made
the arbitration petition.
iv. In absence of raising such a grievance before
the Hon'ble Single Judge or for that matter the
Arbitral Tribunal, the Appellant cannot raise the
said issue that it was argued before the Arbitral
Tribunal or that the ground was raised in the
petition u/s. 34.
v. The next contention of the Appellants is that
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the claims were not arbitrable.
vi. A bare perusal of the petitioner u/s.34 or for
that matter in this appeal would indicate that the
challenge is essentially to the claim being not
arbitrable as the agreement prohibits such a claim
being decided by the Arbitrator.
vii. It is pertinent to note the non-arbitrability of a
claim can be divided into two parts (1) is the
subject matter non arbitrability and the (2) being
non-arbitrable due to the restraint in the arbitration
agreement.
viii. Thus, the claim regarding non-arbitrability of
the claim raised by the Appellant for the first time
under section 34 cannot be raised under section 34
much less u/s. 37 of the Act.
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ix. The further contention that the claim filed by
the Respondent before the Tribunal was time
barred is also fallacious.
x. It would be necessary to consider the defence
raised by the Appellant before the Tribunal. Except
a one liner contention that the claim is barred by
the limitation there are no details given as to why
the claim is barred by limitation. The said plea is
nothing but a vague and evasive denial. In view of
the settled law, vague and evasive denial cannot
amount to a denial in the eyes of law. Therefore, in
the humble submission of the Respondent such a
plea may not be entertained.
xi. Even otherwise without Prejudice to the
above contention it is necessary to consider the
claim which was raised by the Petitioner dated
15.02.2000. The said claim was raised towards the
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additional amount as well as the balance due.
xii. The proceedings before the Hon'ble single
judge were u/s. 34 of the Act as it existed prior to
the 2015 amendment. Thus, the scope of challenge
to arbitral award under Section 34 is restricted only
if the award is against a public policy. The Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of S.V. Samudram vs. State
of Karnataka, reported in (2024) 3 SCC page 623,
has considered the scope of section 34 in para 16 to
30 onwards.
xiii. It is also pertinent to note that the award
passed by the Tribunal is not by a judicial trained
mind but by technical experts who are appointed
by the Appellant themselves. Therefore, to contend
that the award is not a reasoned award as is
excepted from a judicial trained mind is fallacious.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.V.
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Samudram in para 20 to 22 has considered the said
aspect.
xiv. The award if perused clearly considers the
claims and considering the factors such as delay in
issuance of contractual drawings, change in site etc.
has come to conclusion after consideration of
argument of both sides, that there is a delay on the
part of the Appellants, then such a finding cannot
be scrutinized with the microscopic lens as if it was
an Award of a judicially trained mind. Therefore,
the appellant cannot take a mileage of the fact that
detailed reasoning for arriving at a conclusion is
required, especially when the award refers to the
fact that they have considered the arguments of
both sides and passed the award.
xv. The impugned order u/s. 34 deals with all
the aspects, and therefore there is no failure to
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exercise the jurisdiction u/s. 34.
xvi. If the arguments of the appellants are to be
considered the same would amount to
reappreciation of evidence and facts which is not
permissible under section 34 and 31, given the
summary nature of proceeding u/s. 34.
xvii. Having participated before the Tribunal
without raising the ground of non-arbitrability of
the claims in view of the agreement, the appellants
have acquiesced, abandoned their plea regarding
non-arbitrability especially when they could have
filed an application u/s. 16 and invited a finding
which could have been challenged u/s. 34.
xviii. In view thereof the appeal should be
dismissed.
9. Mr. Shah relied upon following judgments to buttress his
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submissions :-
(a) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of S. V.
Samudram vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. 6
(b) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of
Mohd. Akram Ansari vs. Chief Election Officer & Ors.
With connected matter. 7
(c) The judgment of Supreme Court in case of Pam
Developments Private Limited vs. State of West
Bengal & Anr. 8
10. We have heard learned counsel for both the sides and have
gone through the documents on record. The learned Judge of
this Court while deciding the Section 34 petition, has passed his
order dismissing the Section 34 petition by recording reasons in
just four paragraphs. The learned Judge has arrived at a
6 (2024) 3 SCC 623 7 (2008) 2 SCC 95 8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2247
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conclusion as if the award is passed by a sole arbitrator, whereas
the Arbitral Tribunal consisted of three members. It is a matter of
record that neither issues were framed by the Tribunal nor any
witnesses were examined by the parties to prove their claim and
counter claim. In the Section 34 Arbitration petition, the
appellant herein had mentioned ground no.(I) "claim of
respondent not arbitrable" and ground no.(II) "claims are barred
by limitation".
11. In the reply to the statement of claim, in paragraph nos. 22,
23, 26(i), 27(i), 28(i), 29(i), 30(ii) have raised the issue of claim
being 'barred of limitation'. So also, as regards the grounds of
'claim not arbitrable', has been taken up by the appellant in
ground nos. 30(1), 31(1), 31(2).
12. According to us, the appellant had at the initial stage while
replying to the statement of claim raised both the issues, 'barred
by the law of limitation' and 'the claim not being arbitrable'. So
also raising the said two issues in the petition filed under Section
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34, the learned Judge in the impugned order had recorded a
perverse findings that both these grounds were not taken in the
petition.
13. As regards the third contention of delay, we are of the view
that the appellant's case is that they had specifically raised this
ground and the Arbitral Tribunal had neither framed any issue
nor any witness was examined by the claimant as regards to the
documents in the form of receipt tendered by the claimant. The
appellant had raised the plea that these were fraudulent
documents. Hence, these documents be sent to the Government
Press at Nashik for stamps and to the CID, Mumbai for
verification. Once the report of the Security Press, Nashik came
up on record, the claimant withdrew all these receipts, which was
opposed by the appellant herein. However, even this point was
not considered by the Arbitral Tribunal or by the learned Single
Judge.
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14. On behalf of the appellant, the ratio of three judgments were
relied upon. In Som Datt Builders Limited (supra), the Supreme
Court held that it is obligatory on part of Arbitral Tribunal to
state reasons in support of its award and that the lack of reasons
makes an award legally flawed. In Dyna Technologies Private
Limited (supra), the Supreme Court held that the passing of a
reasoned award is not an empty formulation under the
Arbitration Act. Further, the requirements of a reasoned order are
that the reasons/reasoning should be: proper, intelligible and
adequate. The Court while exercising jurisdiction under section
34 has to adjudicate the validity of an award based on the degree
of particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature
of issues falling for consideration. In Associate Builders (supra),
the Supreme Court held that the 1996 Act was enacted to replace
the 1940 Arbitration Act in order to provide for an arbitral
procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the
needs of arbitration; also to provide that the Tribunal gives
reasons for an arbitral award; to ensure that the Tribunal remains
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within the limits of its jurisdiction; and to minimise the
supervisory roles of courts in the arbitral process.
The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in all of the above
judgments are squarely applicable to the present proceedings.
15. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Shah on three Supreme
Court Judgments. In S. V. Samudram (supra), in which the
Supreme Court, set aside the Order passed by the High Court in
Section 37 and Section 34, and the Award passed by the Tribunal
was confirmed. In para no. 33, the Supreme Court held that they
had carefully perused that Award passed by the Arbitrator in
which materials on record were entirely considered and after due
application of mind by assigning reasons, conclusion was arrived
at. However, the High Court reversed that decision of the Arbitral
Tribunal. In our opinion, the facts in the present proceedings are
quite different. Therefore, the ratio of S. V. Samudram (supra)
does not apply to the present proceedings.
15.1. In Mohd. Akram Ansari (supra) the Supreme Court was
dealing with Wakf Act proceedings, in which it held that though
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several points are taken in Memorandum of Appeal, but at the
time of arguments, only some are pressed. However, the judge
will deal only with points which are pressed before him in
arguments and it will be presumed that the Appellants gave up
the other points. In the present proceedings, the Learned Single
Judge held that there was no ground in the petition raising the
issue of limitation and claims not arbitrable. Bare perusal of the
proceedings show that both the issues of limitation and claims
not being arbitrable, were raised before the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, the facts before the Supreme Court in Mohd. Akram
Ansari (supra) and present proceedings are different. 15.2 In Pam Developments Private Limited (supra), the
Supreme Court was mainly dealing with the issue of power of
Arbitrator to award granting of pre-reference and pendente lite
interest. In the present proceedings, the learned Judge had held
that there was no ground taken up by the Appellants in the
proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal as regards "limitation"
and "claims not arbitrable". Therefore, the ratio of Pam
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Developments Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), which is mainly dealt with the
issue of granting Interest in Arbitration Proceedings will not be
applicable to the present proceedings.
16. Therefore, according to us the impugned order dated 3 rd
February, 2012 requires to be quashed and set aside and the
arbitration proceedings filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
deserves to be re-considered on merits.
Order:
17.1. The order dated 3rd February 2012 passed by the learned
Single Judge is quashed and set aside.
17.2. The arbitration petition filed under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 shall be decided afresh in accordance with law. It is
clarified that all issues of fact and law are kept open for being
considered afresh on their own merits.
17.3. The Arbitration Appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms with
no order as to costs.
[ RAJESH S. PATIL, J. ] [ A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. ]
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