Maharana Pratap Singh vs The State Of Bihar

2025 INSC 554 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5497 OF 2025 [ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 9818/2017]

MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

THE APPEAL

2. This civil appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16 th

November 20161 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at

Patna2 allowing the respondents’ intra-court appeal3 arising from a writ

petition4 presented before the High Court by Maharana Pratap Singh5.

The judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 16 th July, 2013 was

set aside and resultantly, the writ petition of the appellant stood

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by impugned order 1 pant rashmi dhyani Date: 2025.04.23 17:40:10 IST Reason: 2 High Court 3 L.P.A. No. 516 of 2015 4 C.W.J.C. No. 471 of 2004 5 appellant

Page 1 of 30 dismissed. The Single Judge had quashed the order dismissing the

appellant from service and directed that he be reinstated in service with

all consequential benefits from the date of the dismissal.

FACTS

3. The appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the

Crime Investigation Department6 in 1973. He proceeded on earned leave

for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties on 8 th August,

1988. Incidentally, on 7th August 1988, a First Information Report7 was

registered on the complaint of one Prem Kumar Singh8 against unknown

persons, giving rise to Kotwali P.S. Case No. 882 of 1988 for offences

under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 18609. The FIR included a request for the formation

of a raiding party to apprehend those who had extorted money from the

informant by blackmailing him. A raiding party was formed, which

proceeded to raid the Rajasthan Hotel in Patna on 8th August, 1988. The

accused was expected to arrive there to collect ₹40,000/- (Rupees forty

thousand) from the informant. Meanwhile, the appellant was on his way

to the office to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when

the informant handed over the briefcase to the appellant. Subsequently,

the appellant was arrested and was brought to Kotwali Police Station.

6 CID 7 FIR 8 informant 9 IPC Page 2 of 30 On the same date, i.e., 08th August, 1988, the appellant was placed

under suspension by his superior authority.

4. On 14th June, 1989, disciplinary proceedings10 were initiated against the

appellant by drawing up a memorandum of charges. The memorandum,

duly served on the appellant, levelled 4 (four) charges as detailed under:

i. Based on the written complaint of the informant, a case was

registered under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419, and 34 of the

IPC. In connection with this case, the appellant was arrested while

receiving ₹40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from the informant,

in furtherance of an alleged act of cheating by impersonation and

extortion under duress, at gunpoint.

ii. On 30th June 1976, a case was registered against the appellant

for cheating the Manager of Elphinstone Cinema Hall by falsely

representing himself as a Sub-Inspector of the CID. The appellant

was found guilty of the offence and subsequently punished.

iii. After availing earned leave, the appellant failed to resume his duty

on 08th August, 1988 without any information although

subsequently, he was arrested by personnel of Kotwali Police

Station on the same day.

iv. The appellant failed to inform the CID Headquarters about his

arrest on 8th August, 1988.

5. In response to the memorandum, the appellant submitted a prayer

dated 15th March, 1990 requesting that the departmental proceedings

10 Proceeding No. 9 of 1989 Page 3 of 30 be conducted only after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The

appellant expressed concern that if the departmental proceedings were

held first and should the appellant cross-examine the witnesses during

the departmental inquiry, his defence is bound to be disclosed; and this

would gravely prejudice him in the criminal proceedings.

Notwithstanding the appellant’s prayer, an inquiry ensued culminating in

the Inquiry Officer submitting his report on 3rd May, 199511, finding the

appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him.

6. Later, the appellant was served with a second show cause notice by the

Superintendent of Police, CID12 on 23rd June, 1995 calling upon him to

show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. Copy of the

report of the Inquiry Officer was furnished. The appellant replied to the

second show cause notice on 11th March, 1996 seeking to point out the

illegalities committed by the Inquiry Officer in course of the inquiry

thereby vitiating the same. Nevertheless, the respondent no. 5 accepted

the Inquiry Report and, by order dated 14th June, 1996 contained in

Memo No. 1833 dated 21st June, 1996, dismissed the appellant from

service, with the additional direction that the appellant would not be

entitled to any payment for the period of suspension, except for the

amounts already disbursed to him.

7. Meanwhile, the appellant along with the co-accused was tried and

convicted by the trial court on 26th April, 1994. The appellant was found

11 Inquiry Report 12 respondent no. 5

Page 4 of 30 guilty of offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC and was

sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year.

However, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392 and 419

of the IPC.

8. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence having been carried

in an appeal13 by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI,

Patna14, on 16th February, 1996, set aside the judgment and order under

challenge. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, with the appellate

court holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.

9. The appellant, aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 21 st June, 1996

passed by the respondent no. 5, filed an appeal before the Deputy

Inspector General of Police15. However, by an order dated 14th July,

1997, the respondent no. 4 dismissed the appeal and upheld the

dismissal order passed by the respondent no. 5 dated 21 st June, 1996,

based on the report and the findings of the Inquiry Officer.

10. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision before the Director General-

cum-Inspector General of Police, C.I.D.16 on 24th September, 1997,

seeking to challenge the appellate order. However, as the revision

remained undecided, the appellant filed a writ petition17 before the High

Court. The said writ petition was disposed of on 13 th May, 2002 with a

direction to the respondent no. 2 to decide the appellant's revision within

13 Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1994 14 sessions judge 15 respondent no. 4 16 respondent no. 2 17 C.W.J.C. No. 5946 of 2002 Page 5 of 30 two months from the date of the order. In compliance with the said

direction, the respondent no. 5 on 06th August, 2003 dismissed the

revision, with the result that the dismissal order stood reaffirmed.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SINGLE JUDGE

11. Thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the revision, the appellant

laid a challenge to the revisional order (in which the appellate order and

the original order of dismissal had merged) in the writ petition out of

which this civil appeal arises. The appellant inter alia raised the following

objections: (i) the Officer-in-Charge18 was neither examined in the

appellant's presence nor permitted to be cross-examined, rendering the

disciplinary proceedings vitiated; (ii) both the departmental and criminal

proceedings having stemmed from the same facts based on the

informant’s written complaint and identical charges being involved, after

the appellant’s exoneration in the criminal proceedings, rendered the

disciplinary proceedings untenable and should have been dropped; (iii)

the order of dismissal violated principles of natural justice; (iv) the

respondent no. 4 upheld the order of dismissal without affording the

appellant an opportunity to be heard; and (v) the respondent no.2

having a duty to set right the wrong, failed to discharge such duty.

Issuance of a writ of certiorari was sought by the appellant to quash the

impugned orders. Additionally, the appellant sought the issuance of a

writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant him all

consequential benefits as if he had never been dismissed from service.

18 PW-1

Page 6 of 30

12. The Single Judge observed, upon an examination of the allegations

made by the informant — who had also submitted a written statement

against the appellant in the department — that the narrative presented

by the informant lacked credibility due to several apparent

inconsistencies. Notably, the question that seemed to trouble the Single

Judge was why a person would enter a hotel room solely for the purpose

of having tea, and why an acquaintance would escort both the informant

and Devnath Pathak19 to the hotel room while leaving a young girl in the

attached toilet. The Single Judge opined that the Inquiry Officer's

reliance on the testimony of PW-1, who was not allowed to be cross-

examined, raised concerns of undue influence. PW-1 had a matrimonial

connection with the family of Virendra Singh, who allegedly had a

strained relationship with the appellant's family, suggesting a personal

motive to act against the appellant. However, the Inquiry Officer failed

to examine or address the appellant’s contention regarding this potential

conflict of interest. The Single Judge further observed that the

respondents' claim, asserting the absence of a written request from the

appellant to the Inquiry Officer for permission to cross-examine PW-1,

was neither legally valid nor proper. The appellant was not required to

submit such a request; rather, it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to

ensure that the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine

the witness. As a result, testimony of PW-1 could not be relied upon in

the absence of such an opportunity being provided to the appellant.

19 PW-2

Page 7 of 30

13. The decision in Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan20 was relied on by

the Single Judge to hold that the charges were vague, indefinite and

lacking in material particulars.

14. The Single Judge further noted that the charges in the criminal

proceedings against the appellant and the evidence presented by the

prosecution to substantiate the same were largely identical to those in

the departmental proceedings. Placing reliance on the decision in G.M.

Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr.21, the Single Judge concluded that

charge no. 1 could not have been held to be proved by the disciplinary

authority since the respondents 5, 4, and 2 failed to provide reasoning

distinct from that of the relevant sessions judge who had acquitted the

appellant of the charges. The Single Judge further observed that it was

not open to the respondents to reopen charge no. 2 in subsequent

departmental proceedings, as the matter had already been concluded in

1976 and the appellant visited with punishment. Regarding charges 3

and 4, the Single Judge found them self-explanatory, noting that the

appellant's arrest on 8th August, 1988 and subsequent detention in the

police lock-up prevented him from resuming his duties and notifying the

CID, Headquarters, about his arrest.

15. In light of the aforementioned findings and conclusions, the Single Judge

found the charges against the appellant to be frivolous and unfounded,

with the Inquiry Officer failing to adhere to due process. Consequently,

20 AIR 1986 SC 995 21 AIR 2006 SC 2129

Page 8 of 30 by judgment and order dated 16th July 2013, the Single Judge quashed

the dismissal order dated 21st June 1996 (upheld by the respondents 4

and 2 on 14th July 1997 and 6th August 2003, respectively), and directed

the respondents to grant the appellant all consequential benefits from

the date of dismissal.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DIVISION BENCH

16. The respondents, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single

Judge, appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court.

17. The Division Bench, relying on a series of precedents and quoting

therefrom extensively, observed that exercise of jurisdiction by the

Single Judge evinced exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the decision

of the departmental authorities, whereas judicial review of departmental

orders should focus solely on the decision-making process and not on

the merits or demerits of the findings. The Division Bench, relying on

Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran22, held that the Single Judge's re-

appreciation of evidence, which led to the conclusion of the appellant’s

innocence, was unsustainable due to the lack of a justifiable basis for

such an approach. It also emphasized that the strict rules of evidence

do not apply to departmental proceedings, as declared in T.N.C.S.

Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai23. The Division Bench further

distinguished the decision in Sawai Singh (supra) relied on by the

Single Judge, based on differing factual circumstances. It concluded that

22 (2015) 2 SCC 610 23 (2006) 2 SCC 255

Page 9 of 30 the charges against the appellant were specific, and the procedural

requirements during the inquiry had been properly followed, with

sufficient opportunities provided to the appellant.

18. The Division Bench also referred to several decisions of this Court

regarding legal principles, including the admissibility of hearsay

evidence in departmental proceedings, rules of natural justice, the right

to cross-examine, opportunities to lead evidence, and the scope of

natural justice in disciplinary proceedings. Also, upon reviewing the

proceedings file maintained by the department24, the Division Bench

found the respondents' claims to be substantiated. It was concluded that

there was no procedural error or breach of natural justice during the

inquiry. Consequently, the Single Judge's interference with the order of

dismissal was not warranted.

19. Resting on such conclusions, the Division Bench set aside the judgment

and order of the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.

CONTENTIONS

20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant, while assailing the impugned

judgment, submitted that the following points merit consideration by

this Court:

A. First, in light of the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), the Division

Bench erred in failing to recognize that both the criminal and

disciplinary proceedings were based on the same allegations, the

same facts, the same evidence and the same witnesses. The

24 departmental file

Page 10 of 30 appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge on merits, and as such

he could not have been found guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.

B. Secondly, the appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge based

on a merits-based evaluation and not on technical grounds. This is

further substantiated by the informant’s failure to identify the

appellant in the criminal proceedings, who had not been made a

witness in the inquiry. Additionally, PW-2 denied the appellant's

involvement in both the inquiry and the criminal case, refusing to

identify him.

C. Thirdly, the findings in the Inquiry Report holding the appellant guilty

and which were upheld by the respondents 5, 4, and 2, lack

credibility. Consequently, these findings are not only perverse but

also influenced by extraneous factors and mala fide intentions.

D. Fourthly, PW-1 harboured a personal vendetta against the appellant,

a fact brought to the attention of the respondents. However, this

issue was neither examined nor considered by them, although the

same did deserve thorough examination and proper consideration

being fact finding authorities.

E. Fifthly, regarding charge no. 2, the appellant had already faced

disciplinary proceedings and been penalized; hence, proceeding

against him again for the same misconduct was barred on the ground

of double jeopardy. Furthermore, a review of the Inquiry Report

reveals a complete lack of evidence substantiating the said charge.

Page 11 of 30 F. Sixthly, charges 3 and 4 are derived from charge no. 1 and are driven

by extraneous motives. Following his arrest on 8th August 1988, the

appellant’s repeated requests to the Officer-in-Charge to inform the

CID authorities were deliberately ignored. The Inquiry Report itself

acknowledges the lack of evidence for charge no. 4. Moreover, the

appellant could only have been suspended on 8th August 1988 if the

authorities had not been informed of his arrest.

G. Seventhly, the procedure followed in the inquiry was neither fair nor

proper, as an interested witness (PW-1) was examined in the

appellant's absence, despite this being brought to the attention of

the Inquiry Officer and the respondents. Moreover, the appellant was

denied the opportunity to cross-examine the said witness.

H. Eighthly, the charges framed against the appellant were utterly

vague and lacking in material particulars; hence, reliance was

correctly placed by the Single Judge on the decision in Sawai Singh

(supra).

I. Finally, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents erred in law by

recording findings against the appellant without any admissible

evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the

dismissal from service and denial of consequential benefits are

clearly erroneous and perverse.

21. Per contra, Mr. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,

contented that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench suffers

Page 12 of 30 from no error or infirmity either of law or on facts, far less manifest error

or infirmity, and hence does not call for any interference. He sought

upholding of the impugned judgment asserting that there were no

procedural irregularities or violations of natural justice in the process of

inquiry.

22. The arguments of the appellant were sought to be strongly rebutted by

advancing the further following points:

A. First, PW-1 was examined in the appellant's presence, and despite

being given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the

appellant knowingly chose not to do so. The Inquiry Officer's

inference that PW-2, who refused to identify the appellant during

cross-examination, was likely to have been influenced by the

appellant because of the lapse of time since he was examined-in-

chief and cross-examined, and such inference being accurate did not

call for any interference.

B. Secondly, the charges in the disciplinary proceedings are distinct

from those in the criminal case. Charges 1 and 2 were sufficiently

substantiated, while charges 3 and 4 were not contested by the

appellant. Additionally, charge no. 2 does not constitute double

jeopardy, as it pertains to the appellant's prior conduct rather than

a separate offence.

C. Thirdly, the standards for establishing evidence of guilt in disciplinary

proceedings differ from those applied in criminal proceedings and

Page 13 of 30 that decisions are legion declaring the law that mere acquittal in

criminal proceedings does not result in automatic reversal of the

departmental decision of taking disciplinary action for proved

misconduct.

D. Fourthly, the Division Bench was absolutely right in observing that

the Single Judge had exceeded its writ jurisdiction as if it were sitting

in appeal on the administrative decisions of the respondents.

E. Fifthly, the appellant being the member of a disciplined force was

found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming of a police

officer and, therefore, the Division Bench was right in interfering with

the injudicious exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.

23. Mr. Khan, therefore, urged that the impugned order of the Division Bench

deserves affirmation and dismissal of the appeal ought to be ordered.

ANALYSIS AND REASONS

24. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at length

and examined the materials on record.

25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are:

(i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the

appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service

is justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that have

unfolded before us?

(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and

circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal

proceedings are substantially identical to those in the Page 14 of 30 departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the

criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary

proceedings vulnerable?

(iii) Whether the impugned judgment, which allowed the appeal

of the respondents and dismissed the writ petition of the

appellant, deserves to be upheld?

(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to any relief, should the

aforesaid questions be answered in his favour?

26. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that considering the nature of

arguments advanced which required ascertaining facts by looking into

the records of inquiry, which are not on record, we had required the

respondent-State of Bihar vide order dated 17th December, 2024 to

submit scanned copy of the complete departmental file by 10th January,

2025.

27. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a party fails

to produce evidence that is within its control, it is presumed that the

withheld evidence would be unfavourable to it. Though reference to any

authority is not required, we may profitably refer to the decision in State

(Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri25 in this behalf.

28. We regretfully record that neither has the departmental file been

submitted for our perusal nor has the respondent-State of Bihar prayed

for any extension of time. The consequence of non-compliance of such

order is fatal, as would appear from our discussion hereafter.

25 (2006) 7 SCC 172

Page 15 of 30

29. The issues arising for decision are now taken up for consideration.

ISSUE NO. 1

30. The specific statutory rule in terms whereof the chargesheet against the

appellant was drawn up or the inquiry conducted, cannot be ascertained

as copy of the chargesheet in its entirety is not part of the paper book.

This is precisely the reason why we called for the departmental file

concerning the disciplinary proceedings which, unfortunately, has not

been provided to us. Nonetheless, and given the circumstance that the

appellant was dismissed from service on 21st June, 1996, it is reasonable

to infer that the relevant rules in this case would likely be the Bihar and

Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 193526

and/or the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,

193027. These were adopted through Notification No. III/63-8051-A

dated 3rd July, 1963, and were subsequently repealed by the Bihar

Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.

31. Our abovesaid inference is bolstered by Rule 824A (e) of the Bihar Police

Manual, 1978, which stipulates that for experts and other ranks officials

— i.e., barring members of the Indian Police Services, Deputy

Superintendents and their equivalent ranks, ministerial officers and

members of the Bihar Sashastra Police—the Rules of 1935 would be

applicable if the official is non-gazetted and the Rules of 1930 would be

applicable if gazetted. It is noteworthy that the post of Constable in the

26 Rules of 1935.

27 Rules of 1930.

Page 16 of 30 CID is a non-gazetted post and, hence, the Rules of 1935 provided the

source of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant

by drawing a chargesheet.

32. Note 1 attached to Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935 underlines that the

procedure stipulated in Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 must be followed

prior to the issuance of a dismissal order against the charged official.

Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the proposed

disciplinary action must be clearly articulated in the form of specific

charges, accompanied by a detailed statement outlining the allegations

supporting each charge.

33. On perusal of whatever is available on record, it is found that allegations

had been levelled against the appellant under 4 (four) distinct charges.

A specific objection having been taken on behalf of the appellant that

the charges were vague, indefinite, not specific and lacking in material

particulars, we felt it all the more necessary to have a look at the nature

and wording of the chargesheet from the departmental file. However, in

view of withholding of the departmental file, the presumption that can

legitimately and validly be drawn and which we do hereby draw is that

the respondents did not deliberately produce the departmental file lest

the illegality in proceeding against the appellant from the inception is

exposed.

34. Based on the foregoing discussion, the version of the appellant that the

charges drawn up against him were vague, indefinite, unspecific and

lacked essential particulars has to be accepted. The decision of this Court

Page 17 of 30 in Sawai Singh (supra), thus, does apply on all fours in this case. This,

in turn, reinforces the finding that the chargesheet contravened Rule 55

of the Rules of 1930, as made applicable by Note 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules

of 1935.

35. If there is a flaw from the inception of the disciplinary proceedings, i.e.,

the charge-sheet is not issued conforming to the relevant rules and the

charged officer finds it difficult to meet the charges because it is vague,

indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars, the charge-

sheet itself becomes susceptible to vulnerability. We are reminded of the

decision of this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of

West Bengal28 where this Court ruled that:

6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently understood and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated before, that the charge should be accompanied by a statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. … The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement of allegations containing the material facts and particulars not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in decreeing the suit.

(emphasis supplied)

28 (1970) 3 SCC 548

Page 18 of 30

36. Moving further, the appellant had raised an allegation that PW-1 was not

allowed to be cross-examined. Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 provides

that the witnesses may be cross-examined by the charged individual.

Had the departmental file been placed on record, it would have

facilitated a more thorough analysis of this sub-issue. Nevertheless,

based on the available material, the question remains whether it can be

determined if the appellant was provided with a sufficient opportunity to

cross-examine PW-1, or if the appellant chose not to exercise that

opportunity.

37. The respondents' counsel contended before this Court that the appellant

deliberately chose not to cross-examine PW-1 and it is not their

contention that opportunity of cross-examination could not have been

given, particularly in light of the fact that PW-2 was made available for

cross-examination by the appellant. However, the Single Judge’s

observations reveal that the respondents claimed there was no record

of any request or indication from the appellant expressing an intent to

cross-examine the said witness. This demonstrates that the respondents

have altered their position on the issue of cross-examination of PW-1,

as reflected in their submissions both before the Single Judge and this

Court.

38. Furthermore, on perusal of the materials before this Court,

preponderance of probability favours the appellant for a finding to be

returned that he was denied his right to cross-examine PW-1. The

respondents' assertion that the appellant deliberately refrained from

Page 19 of 30 cross-examining PW-1, given his request to cross-examine PW-2, is

untenable for three reasons: first, the respondents have changed their

position on this issue; second, no reasonable person would voluntarily

forgo a right of cross-examination, particularly when PW-1 was one of

only two witnesses who testified from a list of seven, and there were

allegations of a personal vendetta against him; and third, the

respondents have never claimed that cross-examination was not part of

the prescribed inquiry procedure or that it was optional, or that the

appellant abandoned the enquiry or failed to appear on the relevant

date.

39. Next, the Inquiry Officer expressed disbelief at the version of PW-2 in

course of cross-examination when he unequivocally denied the

appellant's involvement in the alleged offences and failed to recall

whether the seizure list relating to ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand)

had been prepared in his presence. The Inquiry Officer suggested that

PW-2 might have been unduly influenced or persuaded by the appellant,

noting that the cross-examination occurred after a substantial delay of

nine (9) months from the date of PW-2's testimony in-chief, which had

previously affirmed hinted at the involvement of the appellant.

40. Before delving further into this sub-issue, it is once again essential to

fall back on withholding of the departmental file pertaining to the

disciplinary proceedings, thereby preventing an ascertainment of the

cause of the delay in production by the prosecution of PW-2 for cross-

examination by the appellant. In any event, can the appellant be held

Page 20 of 30 liable for such a prolonged gap? Likely not, as it is the responsibility of

the prosecution to produce the witness. Moreover, in the absence of the

departmental file, we cannot conclusively attribute the delay to the

appellant either. Consequently, the lapse, without anything more before

us, has to be attributed to the prosecution.

41. Nonetheless, we are of the view that dismissing PW-2’s cross-

examination as incredible, solely due to the delay in its conduct, would

not be a reasonable conclusion. PW-2 had also denied the appellant’s

involvement in the criminal proceedings and, during his cross-

examination in the inquiry, he explained that he had previously disclosed

the appellant’s name based on hearsay from individuals within the

department.

42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the approach

he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to be returned by

him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the

basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking

through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C.

Goel29 pointed out that in carrying out the purpose of rooting out

corruption, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of

proof even in domestic enquiries. Although technical rules which govern

criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary

proceedings, nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty

scrupulous care should be taken to see that the innocent is not punished,

29 AIR 1964 SC 364

Page 21 of 30 applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held

under statutory rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled position of

law for decades and bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to

hold that the reason for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of

PW-2 in his cross-examination was not available to be assigned without

first returning a finding attributing the fault for the delay to the

appellant.

43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the chargesheet

against the appellant was issued based on the written complaint of the

informant. Law is again clear to the effect that mere production of a

document does not constitute proof. If chargesheet is issued on the basis

of a written complaint, the author/complainant has to be produced. The

decision of this Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs.

Workmen & Ors.30 is an authority for this proposition. Notably, in the

instant case, the informant/complainant had not been examined. This,

we hold is one other glaring error in the decision-making process.

44. Upon reviewing the materials at our disposal and considering the

aforementioned anomalies in the issuance of the chargesheet and the

procedural lapses, none of which can be attributed to the appellant, and

in light of the absence of the departmental file pertaining to the

disciplinary proceedings, we are compelled to conclude beyond any cavil

of doubt that due process was not followed in dismissing the appellant

from service, rendering the dismissal unjustified.

30 (1971) 2 SCC 617

Page 22 of 30

45. While we agree with the Division Bench that the Single Judge, to a large

extent, exercised appellate jurisdiction, on its part, the Division Bench

failed to take into account the aforementioned vices that infected the

decision-making process. One could call it an inadvertent slip or

oversight; but, whatever be it, in our opinion, such slip or oversight

resulted in a failure of justice.

ISSUE NO. 2

46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the

respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect of this

issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same.

47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the

accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public

service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that

when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the

departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or

substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such

cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be

unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision

in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in

Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31.

48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence,

witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal

proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before

31 (2024) 1 SCC 175

Page 23 of 30 the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of

the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same.

49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available on

record only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely resembled

the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary

proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint of the

informant.

50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution

"miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the

informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This

discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere

technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like

"benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as

formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the

judgment, rather than the terminology used.

51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also

declined to identify the appellant during cross-examination, and the

informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings.

This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both the

criminal and disciplinary proceedings.

52. Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the principle of adverse

inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents

deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which

was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence,

Page 24 of 30 and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental proceedings

were substantially similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the

potential adverse consequences.

53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that is

available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being

guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the

criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar

or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.

ISSUE NO. 3

54. The Division Bench and the Single Judge differed in their views on the

appellant's dismissal following disciplinary proceedings. Whereas the

Single Judge found the inquiry report flawed due to unlawful procedures

and untenable findings, the Division Bench, upon reviewing the "original

file of the departmental proceedings," concluded that there was no

procedural irregularity or breach of natural justice; and, therefore, held

that the Single Judge's interference with the inquiry officer's findings—

particularly by evaluating the merits of those findings in its writ

jurisdiction—was unwarranted.

55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227

of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are

available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that

falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can rectify errors of

law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest

miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural justice. Law

Page 25 of 30 is also well-established that the standards for establishing a guilt in

disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to criminal

proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental authorities

are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties involved, and

what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined based on the

facts and circumstances of each case, as has been laid down in State

of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur32.

56. It is well-established that any action resulting in penal or adverse

consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice.

To sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of

opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation must

show that prejudice was caused, as affirmed by this Court in L.K.

Tripathi v. State Bank of India33.

57. Upon perusal of the decisions of this Court in the preceding paragraphs,

it is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine PW-1 caused

prejudice to the appellant, who should have been afforded the

opportunity for cross-examination for three reasons: first, had PW-1

been cross-examined, particularly regarding the appellant’s claim of

personal animosity, it is plausible that such examination could have

influenced the Inquiry Officer’s findings, potentially leading to a different

conclusion; second, the Inquiry Officer placed significant reliance on

PW1's testimony to substantiate proof of the charges against the

32 AIR 1963 SC 375 33 AIR 1984 SC 273

Page 26 of 30 appellant which could have been demolished had a chance of cross-

examination been extended; and third, PW-2, the only other witness,

refused to identify the appellant during cross-examination.

58. Further, we observe that the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4,

and 2 have compromised their ability to reach a fair conclusion by

considering factors extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case,

viz., the fact that charge 2 was made part of the charge-sheet although

the appellant had been punished therefor previously.

59. Also, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have

disregarded that the informant, whose complaint initiated the

disciplinary proceedings, was not made a witness. The testimonies of

PW-1 and PW-2 reflect a failed attempt to establish the contents of the

informant’s written complaint, as the former was not cross-examined,

and the latter failed to identify the appellant during cross-examination.

Additionally, the potential bias of PW-1 as an interested witness, was not

given proper consideration or weight.

60. Regarding charge no. 2, while a previous finding in respect of a guilt can

form part of a subsequent charge-sheet to award enhanced punishment,

the law requires the disciplinary authority to give sufficient notice to the

charged employee of such intention to take the same into consideration

for deciding the question of punishment. Useful reference could be made

to the decisions in State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda34 and

34 AIR 1964 SC 506

Page 27 of 30 Nicholas Piramal India Limited v. Harisingh35. The argument of the

appellant to the contrary is overruled. Since, however, the disciplinary

proceedings have been found to be suffering from incurable defects,

assessment of the appellant’s conduct for deciding on the punishment

does not really survive.

61. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant

was arrested on 8th August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that

the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after his

earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have not

raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant's arrest.

62. Finally, what remains is charge no. 4. Having been arrested, the

appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact of

his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed that

he requested PW-1 to notify the CID authorities of his arrest, but PW-1

failed to do so due to personal animosity. This appears to be probable,

in the absence of any contra-material on record.

63. Accordingly, this Court concludes based on the materials available on

record that the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted against

the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as natural justice

which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned order, thus, is

unsustainable.

35 (2015) 8 SCC 272

Page 28 of 30 Issue No.4

64. Now, we need to consider the relief that ought to be granted to the

appellant.

65. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16th

November, 2016 is set aside together with the orders dated 21st June,

1996, 14th July, 1997, and 6th August, 2003, issued by the respondents

5, 4, and 2, respectively.

66. The order passed by the Single Judge dated 16th July, 2013 is partly

upheld. The direction for release of full back wages is, however, set

aside.

67. Before granting further relief, it is pertinent to note that the date of the

alleged incident giving rise to the charge-sheet is 7th August, 1988, and

the appellant was dismissed from service on 21st June, 1996. Based on

the records available, the appellant was 53 years old when he

approached the Single Judge in 2004. Therefore, he would be

approximately 74 years old in 2025 and around 45 years old in 1996,

evincing that he had nearly 14/15 (fourteen/fifteen) years of service

remaining at the time of his dismissal. The relief of reinstatement in

service cannot be granted now. We are left to consider the quantum of

monetary relief that would meet the ends of justice.

68. Having bestowed serious consideration, we are of the clear opinion that

ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment of a

lumpsum compensation of ₹ 30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the appellant

Page 29 of 30 inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents within 3

(three) months from date. Ordered accordingly.

CONCLUSION

69. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of.

70. The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at ₹ 5 lakh (Rupees five

lakh), to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.

…………………………….J. [DIPANKAR DATTA]

………..…………………………....J. [PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA] NEW DELHI;

April 23, 2025.

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