M/S Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd vs Nashik Workers Union & Ors

Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India was justified in reversing

the award of the Industrial Court of Maharashtra and directing

reinstatement of 72 workers? That is the question which is presented

before us.

Three complaints filed before the Industrial Court under the

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair

Labour Practices Act (for short 'the Act')—two of them by the workers

unions and the other by the Management of the industry—both

alleging unfair labour practices under various clauses of the

schedules to the Act, have eventually led to these appeals.

It is apparent from the record that the persons concerned (who,

according to the Management, were only trainees) were not allowed

to resume work on and from 14.8.1989 unless an undertaking on the

terms imposed by the employer was given. According to the

Management, their 'traineeship' was terminated with effect from

15.11.1989. Some other workmen were later on employed by the

appellant. The details of allegations and counter allegations as to

what prompted the Management to dispense with their services need

not be gone into. Each side tried to shift the blame on the other for

the ultimate action taken. It should however be noted that despite the

interim order dated 25.4.1990 passed by the Industrial Court, the

appellant did not take them back to duty, as seen from the report of

Investigation Officer appointed by the Industrial Court.

The core question before the industrial Court as well as the

High Court was whether the persons whose engagement was

terminated were the employees within the meaning of Section 3(5) of

the Act read with Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The

industrial Court upheld the plea of the Management that they were

trainees. In recording the conclusion that they were trainees, the

industrial Court adverted to two factors: (1) Neither the Complainant

Union nor the Management had placed on record the appointment

letters that would have been issued when the concerned persons

were recruited in 1988. (2) On the Complainant Union's own showing,

the Management started issuing appointment letters appointing them

as trainees only after 23.6.1989, which itself would negative the case

of the Union that they were employed as labourers. The learned

presiding officer of Industrial Court then observed thus: "I may say

that merely because the trainees were employed for performing

regular nature of work, would not by itself make them workmen".

Then, the Court observed that a trainee is not equivalent to a

workman "unless there is sufficient evidence of existence of

employer-employee relationship". The Industrial Court ultimately held

that the Management's action terminating the training programme

resulting in their unemployment from 14.8.1989 cannot confer on

them the right to resume work and claim back wages.

On these findings/observations, the complaints of the workers'

union were dismissed. The complaint petition filed by the

Management was also dismissed.

The High Court, conscious of its limitations under Article

226/227 of the Constitution of India, went into the question whether

the conclusions reached by the Industrial Court were legally

sustainable. Incidentally, it went into the question whether the

Industrial Court ignored the material evidence on record. The one and

only view that could be taken on the basis of the evidence on record,

according to the High Court, is that the concerned persons whose

engagement was terminated were not trainees but they were

'Workmen' and therefore, their services could not have been

terminated without following the due procedure. The High Court held

that the action taken by the Management was an unfair labour

practice within the meaning of the Act and directed reinstatement

without backwages.

The learned senior counsel for the appellant has contended

that it was not open to the High Court to appreciate the evidence and

take its own view on the crucial factual aspects emerging in the case.

The learned counsel also submitted that there is no legal error

apparent on the face of the order passed by the Industrial Court and

reminded us of the proposition that even a grossly erroneous finding

of fact reached by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with by High

Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India. In this context, the learned counsel has

endeavoured to draw support from the observations in Syed Yakoob

Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Others [(1964) 5 SCR 64].

We are of the view that the High Court has not transgressed the

limitations inherent in the grant of the writ of certiorari. The High Court

had rightly perceived of patent illegality in the impugned award

warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The High

Court is right in pointing out that the material evidence especially the

admissions of the witness examined on behalf of the Management

were not considered at all. Moreover, the conclusions reached are

wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on

record. For instance, the fact that no appointment letters were issued

or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the

Management's version must be true. Similarly, if the workers' unions

had taken the stand that ante-dated appointment letters were issued

describing the employees as trainees after the dispute had arisen, it

is difficult to comprehend how that would demolish the case of the

Union that the concerned persons were really employed as workmen

(helpers) but not as trainees. The Industrial Court makes a bald

observation that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to

suggest that these persons were employed by the respondents as

'regular' employees at any point of time. This bald

conclusion/observation, as rightly pointed out by the High Court,

ignores the material evidence on record. In fact, the evidence has not

been adverted to at all while discussing the issues. There was total

non-application of mind on the part of the Tribunal to the crucial

evidence. The Management's witness categorically stated that the

concerned workers were engaged in production of goods and that no

other workmen were employed for production of goods. In fact, one of

the allegations of the Management was that they adopted go-slow

tactics and did not turn out sufficient work. According to the Industrial

Court, the fact that the 'trainees' were employed for performing the

regular nature of work would not by itself make them workmen. The

question then is, would it lead to an inference that they were

trainees? The answer must be clearly in the negative. No evidence

whatsoever was adduced on behalf of the Management to show that

for more than one and half years those persons remained as

'trainees' in the true sense of the term. It is pertinent to note the

statement of the Management's witness that in June-July, 1989, the

Company did not have any permanent workmen and all the persons

employed were trainees. It would be impossible to believe that the

entire production activity was being carried on with none other than

the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been

trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false

plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to

summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts

and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that

the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice. There

would have been travesty of justice if the High Court declined to

interfere with the findings arbitrarily and without reasonable basis

reached by the Industrial Court.

Before parting with the case, we may record that opportunity

was given to the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement. But it has

been reported that the quantum of compensation offered by the

Management is utterly inadequate and therefore the settlement could

not be reached.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we find no legal infirmity

in the order of the High Court. The appeal is therefore dismissed. No

costs.