M/S. Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd & Anr vs G. Jayarama Reddy & Ors

M/s. Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and another ... Appellants

Versus

G. Jayarama Reddy and others ... Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7589 OF 2005

Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation ... Appellant

Versus

G. Jayarama Reddy and others ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. Whether land acquired by the State Government at the instance of the

Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation (for short, `the Corporation')

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for the specified purpose i.e. Golf-cum-Hotel Resort near Bangalore Airport,

Bangalore could be transferred by the Corporation to a private individual and

corporate entities is the question which arises for determination in these appeals

filed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court whereby the acquisition

of land measuring 1 acre 3 guntas comprised in Survey No.122 of Kodihalli

village, Bangalore South Taluk was quashed.

The facts relating to the acquisition of land and details of the 3 cases decided

by the High Court in 1991:

2. On a requisition sent by the Corporation, the State Government issued

notification dated 29.12.1981 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 (for short, `the Act') for the acquisition of 39 acres 27 guntas land

comprised in various survey numbers including Survey No.122 of Kodihalli and

Challaghatta villages, Bangalore South Taluk. After considering the reports

submitted by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore under Section 5A(2)

and Section 6(1A) (added by the Karnataka Act No.17 of 1961), the State

Government issued declaration under Section 6 in respect of 37 acres 4 guntas

land. A combined reading of the two notifications makes it clear that the public

purpose for which land was sought to be acquired was to establish Golf-cum-

Hotel Resort near Bangalore Airport, Bangalore by the Corporation. The Special

Land Acquisition Officer passed award dated 7.4.1986. However, as will be

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seen hereinafter, instead of utilizing the acquired land for the purpose specified

in the notifications or for any other public purpose, the Corporation transferred

the same to private parties.

3. One Dayananda Pai, a real estate developer, who is said to have entered

into agreements with the landowners for purchase of land comprised in Survey

Nos.160/1, 160/2, 160/3, 160/4, 163/1, 163/2, 164/1, 164/2, 165/1, 165/2, 165/3,

165/4, 165/6, 166/1, 166/2, 166/3, 166/4, 153, 159, 167 for putting up a group

housing scheme and obtained approval from the Bangalore Development

Authority appears to be the person behind the move made by the Corporation for

the acquisition of land for execution of tourism related projects including Golf-

cum-Hotel Resort. This is the reason why his role prominently figured in the

meeting of senior officers of the Bangalore Development Authority and the

Corporation held on 13.1.1987 to discuss the steps to be taken for securing

possession of the acquired land. In that meeting, Managing Director of the

Corporation gave out that the Corporation does not have necessary finances for

deposit of cost of the acquisition and Dayananda Pai had agreed to provide funds

subject to the furnishing of bank guarantee by the Deputy Commissioner on

behalf of the Corporation and release of 12 acres 34 guntas in his favour for the

purpose of implementing the group housing scheme. In furtherance of the

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decision taken in that meeting, an agreement dated 8.5.1987 was executed by the

Corporation in favour of Dayananda Pai conveying him 12 acres 34 guntas of the

acquired land. Likewise, 6 acres 8 guntas land was transferred to Bangalore

International Centre and 5 acres including 2 acres 30 guntas land belonging to

respondent No.1 and his brothers, G. Ramaiah Reddy and G. Nagaraja Reddy,

was leased out to M/s. Universal Resorts Limited (predecessor of appellant No.1

in Civil Appeal No.7588 of 2005).

4. Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha and others, who owned different parcels of

land which were transferred by the Corporation to Dayananda Pai filed writ

petitions questioning the acquisition proceedings. The learned Single Judge

dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of delay. The Division Bench of the

High Court reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and quashed the

acquisition proceedings qua land of the appellants in those cases. The Division

Bench referred to the minutes of the meeting held on 13.1.1987, resolution dated

10.9.1987 passed by the Corporation and observed:

"...........We have made our comments then and there. Nevertheless

we cannot refrain our feelings in commenting upon the same once

over again. We cannot think of anything more despicable than the

candid admission by the Tourism Development Corporation that they

did not have the necessary funds required to meet the cost of

acquisition. If really there was no amount available, how the

acquisition was embarked upon, we are left to the realm of guess. Not

only that, this particular resolution makes it appear that respondent-5

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Dayanand Pai was the only saviour of the Karnataka State Tourism

Development Corporation from the difficult situation. For our part we

do not know what exactly was the difficulty then, Land acquisition

proceedings were complete in all material respects. All that required

was possession to be taken. Merely because there are Writ Petitions or

some cases pending, does it mean that the Tourism Development

Corporation must plead helplessness? Does not it have the

wherewithal to contest these litigations? Is it not a part of the

Government although it be a Corporation? What is it that it wants to

do? In consideration of the withdrawal of the cases which were thorns

in the flesh of the Tourist Development Corporation, he is given of a

silver salver an extent of 12 acres 31 guntas of land. To say the least,

it appears right from the beginning respondent-5 Dayananda Pai had

an eye on these lands. That would be evident because though he

entered into an agreement on 30-9-1981 with the land-owners it never

occurred to him to put forth any objection during Section 5A Enquiry,

nor again at any point of time did he take any interest. He was

patiently waiting for somebody to take chestnut out of the fire so that

he could have the fruits thereof. That is also evident from the

Resolution dated 13-1-1987 wherein it is stated as under:

"Sri Dayananda Pai was very particular that the block of land

comprising of 12 acres 34 guntas comprising the following

Sy.Nos. 160/1, 160/2, 160/3, 160/4, 163/1, 163/2, 164/1, 164/2,

165/1, 165/2, 165/3, 165/4, 165/6, 166/1, 166/2, 166/3, 166/4,

153, 159, 167 should be released to him as he has got a firm

commitment for putting up a Group Housing Scheme on this

land."

Yes. He might have had a commitment. What then is the purpose of

eminent domain? Eminent domain, as we consider and as it is settled

law as was said by Nichols, is an attribute of sovereignty. Where the

Deputy Commissioner is convinced that the lands are to be acquired

for a public purpose notwithstanding the fact that the rights of the

private parties might be interfered with, the acquisition will have to be

gone through. In other words, the private purpose must be subservient

to public purpose. Forget all that. In order to enable Dayananda Pai to

fulfil his commitment if valuable portion of the lands acquired viz., 12

acres 31 guntas is transferred in his favour we cannot find a more

vivid case of fraud on power than this. We hold so because the

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apparent object as evidenced by Section 4(1) Notification is a public

purpose. If really as was sought to be made out by the Resolution

dated 13-1-1987 the Tourism Development Corporation was anxious

to have these lands and the delay was telling upon it, certainly selling

away the lands is not the solution as we could see. Therefore, there

has been a clear diversification of purpose. Not only an extent of 12

acres 31 guntas have been sold away in favour of respondent-5

Dayanand Pai as has been noted in the narration of facts, 8 acres had

come to be leased for Bangalore International Centre and another 5

acres had come to be leased for the amusement park. Why all these if

the Tourism Development Corporation does not have funds to meet

the cost of acquisition? Therefore it appears to us this is nothing more

than a conspiracy to deprive the owners of the lands by use of the

power of the eminent domain which is to be used for an avowedly

public purpose and for strong compelling reasons and not whimsically

or to satisfy the private needs of an individual."

(emphasis supplied)

The Division Bench then referred to some judicial precedents including

the judgment in Industrial Development & Investment Company Private Limited

v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1989 Bombay 156 and observed:

"...........But, in the case on hand what is most striking is negotiations

took place even before taking possession of lands. On 8-5-1987

agreement was entered into and in the wake of taking possession on

12-11-1987, transfers are made on 23-3-1988 and 24-3-1988. This is

where we consider that with the motive of securing lands to

respondent-5 Dayanand Pai, acquisition had come to be embarked

upon. This was the reason why we conclude that this is a case of

fraudulent exercise of power. It is no consolation to say that the

owners of lands have accepted the compensation because in Industrial

Development & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra it is

stated thus:

"...The State itself which has acted illegally and without

jurisdiction cannot plead that it should be allowed to retain the

sum awarded in its favour by the Land Acquisition Officer.

7

Respondent 5 who is described as the owner of the land has

conveyed to us that it would submit to the order of the Court.

We also record the submission of Mr. Dhanuka, learned

Counsel for the appellants, that in the event the other awardees

who were awarded paltry sums by the award under Section 11

Land Acquisition Act, do not refund sums withdrawn, the

appellants are prepared to refund and/or deposit the said sums.

Therefore, we conclude that on the ground of delay the

appellants could not be deprived of the relief to which they

were otherwise entitled."

The ratio of this case squarely applies here. Nor again, in our

considered opinion, the previous Decisions upholding the validity of

the acquisitions would be of any value because as we have observed

earlier the causes of action arose only on 23-3-1988 and 24-3-1988

when the transfers came to be effected, or on subsequent days when-

leases had come to be effected. Therefore, where in ignorance of these

transactions if compensation had come to be accepted we should not

put that against such of those land owners. But that question does not

arise in this case. Therefore, we shall relegate the same to the other

cases.

Lastly, what remains to be seen is what is the effect of fraud. Does it

render the entire acquisition bad or is it to be held to be bad only in so

far as these appellants are concerned? We are of the view that if fraud

unravels everything, it cannot be valid in part and invalid in other

parts. But, we need not go to that extent because there are other Writ

Petitions including a Writ Appeal in which this question may arise

direct. We do not want to prejudice those petitioners/appellants.

Therefore, this question we relegate to those cases."

(emphasis supplied)

5. Annaiah and others, who owned land comprised in Survey Nos.146/1,

156/1, 147/1, 147/2 and 156, filed Writ Petition Nos.9032 to 9041 of 1988

questioning the acquisition of their land. The same were dismissed by the

learned Single Judge on the ground of delay. Thereafter, they filed Writ Petition

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Nos.19812 to 19816 of 1990 for issue of a mandamus to the State Government

and the Corporation to return the land by asserting that the same had been

illegally transferred to private persons. They pleaded that the acquisition

proceedings were vitiated due to mala fides and misuse of power for oblique and

collateral purpose. Those petitions were allowed by the Division Bench of the

High Court vide order dated 18.9.1991, the relevant portions of which are

extracted below:

"In our considered view, it is one thing to say that acquisition is

actuated by legal malafides, but it is totally different thing to say that

acquisition for all intents and purposes is embarked on an apparent

public purpose and ultimately that purpose is not served. In other

words, what we mean is their where the lands have been acquired,

undoubtedly for public purpose for the benefit of the Karnataka State

Tourism Development Corporation and after acquisition, even before

taking possession, if agreements were entered into on the ground that

the Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation did not have

enough money to meet the cost of acquisition and that it would be

better to get rid of the litigation by selling away the same or leasing

away the properties and thereby give it to private individuals. We are

of the view that it is a clear case of diversification of purpose. It

requires to be carefully noted that it is not for any public purpose. But

it is a diversification to a private purpose. Therefore, to the extent the

acquisition proceeded with even up to the stage of declaration under

Section 6 or to certain point beyond that, it could not be validly

challenged on the ground that it is not for public purpose. But where

under the cover of public purpose, the owners are dispossessed and

there is diversifications, we hold that it is fraudulent exercise of the

power of eminent domain. This is exactly the view we have taken in

W.A. Nos.1094 to 1097 of 1987. This aspect of the matter was not

before our learned brother Justice Bopanna. All that was stated was

the acquisition, namely, Notification under Section 4(1) culminating

in Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was not actuated by legal

malafides. That is far different from diversification for public

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purpose. It might be that agreements dated 23.03.1988 and

24.03.1988 might have been buttressed in respect of legal malafides.

On that score we cannot conclude that the issue as dealt with by us in

W.A. Nos. 1094 to 1097 of 1987 was ever before Justice Bopanna.

Therefore, we are unable to agree with Mr. Datar that the earlier

ruling of Justice Bopanna in W.P. Nos.9032 to 9041 of 1988 dated 8 th

July 1988 would constitute res judicata so as to deprive the Petitioners

of the benefit of the Judgment.

The cause of action challenging the validity of acquisition arose not

after issue of final notification under section 6 but after the alienation

of lands in favour of third parties and thus the Corporation in whose

favour the lands have been acquired have been deviated. In my

opinion the decision rendered in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha is fully

applicable to the facts of this case. It is true that acquisition is

challenged after quite a long time to final notification. But challenge

is not made to the legality of the acquisition. The challenge is to

deviation of the purpose for which the land was acquired. That then is

the eminent domain was the question posed by the Division Bench

and answered in the words of Nichols as an attribute of sovereignty.

Acquisition in this case is actuated by malafides. Though lands were

acquired for public purpose as declared in 6(1) notification and

possession was taken for the said public purpose, agreements were

entered into even before possession was taken to part with substantial

portion of the land. Where object of providing lands to a private

individuals, if acquisition proceedings are reported to or power of

eminent domain comes to be exercised, it would nothing more than

fraud on power. There it is a case of fraud it would unreveal

everything. It cannot be valid in part and invalid in other parts (See

Lazarus Estates Ltd. VS. Gurdial Singh - AIR 1980 SC 319: Pratap

Singh v. State of Punjab - AIR 1964 SC 73: Narayana Reddy v. State

of Karnataka - ILR 1991 KAR. 2248.) Therefore the question of

limitation does not arise in such cases. Where the actions are found to

be mala fide, courts have not failed to strive down those actions as

laid down by the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab's

case cited supra."

(emphasis supplied)

The operative portion of the order passed in that case is extracted below: 10

"In the result, we allow these writ petitions quash the notification

issued under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 of the

Act and all subsequent proceedings."

6. Smt. H.N. Lakshmamma and others also questioned the acquisition of

their land comprised in Survey Nos.165/3 and 166/4 of Kodihalli village. The

writ petition filed by them was dismissed. On appeal, the Division Bench of the

High Court framed the following question:

"Whether in view of the judgment cited above, namely, W.A.

Nos.1094 & 1095/87 and W.P. 19812 to 19816/90 wherein we have

held that the land acquisition proceedings concerning the very same

notification and declaration are liable to be set aside on the ground of

fraudulent exercise of power, could be extended in favour of the

appellants?"

The Division Bench relied upon the passages from Administrative Law by

W.H.R. Wade and De Smith and Ker on Fraud and rejected the plea of the

respondents (appellants herein) that by having accepted the amount of

compensation, the writ petitioners will be deemed to have acquiesced in the

acquisition proceedings. The Division Bench then referred to the judgment of

the Bombay High Court in Industrial Development & Investment Company

Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and the order passed in Writ

Petition Nos. 19812 - 19816 of 1990 and held that the appellants are entitled to

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return of land subject to the condition of deposit of the amount of compensation

together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.

Facts relating to transfer of land owned by respondent No.1 and his

brothers and details of the cases filed by them:

7. After receiving compensation in respect of 2 acres 30 guntas land

comprised in Survey No.122 of Kodihalli village, respondent No.1 and his

brothers filed applications under Section 18 of the Act for making reference to

the Court for determination of the compensation. During the pendency of

reference, the Corporation invited bids for allotment of 5 acres land including 2

acres 30 guntas belonging to respondent No.1 and his brothers for putting up a

tourist resort. M/s. Universal Resorts Limited gave the highest bid, which was

accepted by the Corporation and lease agreement dated 21.4.1989 was executed

in favour of the bidder. Thereafter, the Corporation approached the State

Government for grant of permission under Section 20 of the Urban Land

(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for leasing out a portion of the acquired land

to M/s. Universal Resorts Limited. The State Government granted the required

permission vide order dated 17.6.1991. After 6 months, registered lease deed

dated 9.1.1992 was executed by the Corporation in favour of M/s. Universal

Resorts Limited through its Managing Director, Sri C.K. Baljee purporting to

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lease out 5 acres land for a period of 30 years on an annual rent of Rs.1,11,111/-

per acre for the first 10 years.

8. In the meanwhile, Shri C.K. Baljee, Managing Director of M/s. Universal

Resorts Limited filed suit for injunction against respondent No.1 and his brothers

by alleging that they were trying to forcibly encroach upon the acquired land.

He also filed an application for temporary injunction. By an ex parte order dated

29.10.1991, the trial Court restrained respondent No.1 and his brothers from

interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit

schedule property. After about two years, the brothers of respondent No.1 filed

Writ Petition Nos.2379 and 2380 of 1993 for quashing the acquisition of land

measuring 0.29 guntas and 0.38 guntas respectively, which came to their share in

the family partition effected in 1968. They relied upon the judgments of the

Division Bench in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha and others v. Special Land

Acquisition Officer (supra) and Writ Appeal No.2605 of 1991 - Smt. H.N.

Lakshmamma and others v. State of Karnataka and others decided on 3.10.1991

and pleaded that once the acquisition has been quashed at the instance of other

landowners, the acquisition of their land is also liable to be annulled. The

appellants, who were respondents in those cases, pleaded that the writ petitions

should be dismissed because 5 acres land had been leased out by adopting a

13

transparent method and there was no justification to nullify the acquisition after

long lapse of time. The learned Single Judge did notice the judgments of the

Division Bench on which reliance was placed by the writ petitioners but

distinguished the same by making the following observations:

"The dictum therein cannot be applied to the instant case. The land of

the petitioners were acquired for the public purpose of Golf-cum-

Hotel Resort near the Airport. The statement of objection filed by

respondents 4 and 5 clearly shows that the land was transferred to

them for the need of tourist industry namely construction of

Hotel/Tourist Complex. The order passed by the Government

exempting the 3rd Respondent from the purview of the Urban Land

(Ceiling & Regulation) Act 1976 also shows the intended transfer

being made by the 3rd respondent is for the establishing of

Hotel/Tourist Complex. This is also borne out from the lease deeds

executed by respondents 4 and 5. These materials are sufficient to

hold that the land is being put by the 3rd respondent for the purpose for

which it was acquired. These materials are sufficient for this court for

the present and indeed from conducting any further rowing enquiry on

the basis of the allegation made by the petitioners in this writ petition.

Without anything more it can be held that the dictum of the decision

of this Court referred to supra is inapplicable to the facts of the

present case. Hence, the petitioners cannot take shelter under the said

decision viz. ILR 1991 Karnataka 3556 and successfully challenge the

land acquisition proceedings."

The learned Single Judge finally dismissed the writ petitions by observing

that even though the writ petitioners were aware of the order of injunction passed

by the Civil Court in the suit filed by the Managing Director, M/s. Universal

Resorts Limited - C.K. Baljee, they did not question the acquisition for a period

of almost two years and approached the Court after long lapse of time counted

14

from the date of acquisition. Writ Appeal Nos.4536 and 4541 of 1995 filed by

G. Ramaiah Reddy and G. Nagaraja Reddy were dismissed by the Division

Bench of the High Court on 1.1.1996 by a one word order and the special leave

petitions filed by them were summarily dismissed by this Court vide order dated

26.2.1996.

9. In a separate petition filed by him, which came to be registered as Writ

Petition No.34891 of 1995, respondent No.1 prayed for quashing notifications

dated 29.12.1981 and 16.4.1983 insofar as the same related to 1 acre 3 guntas

land comprised in Survey No.122/1 of Kodihalli village and for issue of a

mandamus to respondent Nos.3 to 5 (the appellants herein) to redeliver

possession of the said land. He pleaded that in the garb of acquiring land for a

public purpose, the official respondents have misused the provisions of the Act

with the sole object of favouring private persons. In the counter affidavits filed

on behalf of the appellants, it was pleaded that the writ petition was highly

belated and that by having accepted the compensation determined by the Special

Land Acquisition Officer, respondent No.1 will be deemed to have waived his

right to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

10. The writ petition filed by respondent No.1 was decided in two rounds. In

the first round, the learned Single Judge rejected the objection of delay raised by

15

the appellants. He referred to the judgments of the High Court in Mrs. Behroze

Ramyar Batha and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) and Writ

Appeal No.2605 of 1991 - Smt. H.N. Lakshmamma and others v. State of

Karnataka and others (supra) declined to follow the course adopted by the

coordinate Bench, which had dismissed the writ petitions filed by the brothers of

respondent No.1 and observed:

".........................The cause of action challenging the validity of

acquisition arose not after issue of final notification under section 6

but after the alienation of lands in favour of third parties and thus the

Corporation in whose favour the lands have been acquired have been

deviated. In my opinion the decision rendered in Mrs. Behroze

Ramyar Batha is fully applicable to the facts of this case. It is true

that acquisition is challenged after quite a long time to final

notification. But challenge is not made to the legality of the

acquisition. The challenge is to deviation of the purpose for which the

land was acquired. That then is the eminent domain was the question

posed by the Division Bench and answered in the words of Nichols as

an attribute of sovereignty. Acquisition in this case is actuated by

malafides. Though lands were acquired for public purpose as

declared in 6(1) notification and possession was taken for the said

public purpose, agreements were entered into even before possession

was taken to part with substantial portion of the land. Where object of

providing lands to a private individuals, if acquisition proceedings are

reported to or power of eminent domain comes to be exercised, it

would nothing more than fraud on power. There it is a case of fraud it

would unreveal everything. It cannot be valid in part and invalid in

other parts (See Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Gurdial Singh - AIR 1980 SC

319: Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab - AIR 1964 SC 73: Narayana

Reddy v. State of Karnataka - ILR 1991 Kar. 2248). Therefore the

question of limitation does not arise in such cases. Where the actions

are found to be mala fide, courts have not failed to strive down those

actions as laid down by the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh v. State of

Punjab's case cited supra."

16

11. The writ appeals filed by the appellants were allowed by the Division

Bench on the ground that the learned Single Judge was not justified in ignoring

the order passed by the coordinate Bench. The Division Bench observed that

merits of the case could have been considered only if he was convinced that the

writ petitioner had given cogent explanation for the delay and, accordingly,

remitted the matter for fresh disposal of the writ petition.

12. In the second round, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition

by observing that even though fraud vitiates all actions, the Court is not bound to

give relief to the petitioner ignoring that he had approached the Court after long

lapse of time. Writ Appeal No.7772 of 1999 filed by respondent No.1 was

allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. While dealing with the

question whether the learned Single Judge was justified in non suiting

respondent No.1 on the ground of delay, the Division Bench referred to the

explanation given by him, took cognizance of the fact that even after lapse of

more than a decade and half land had not been put to any use and observed:

".................It is the definite case of the appellant that he came to

know of the fraud committed by the 3rd respondent in diverting the

acquired land clandestinely in favour of Respondents 4 and 5 and

certain others, that too, for the purpose other than the purpose for

which the land was acquired, only in the year 1993. It is his further

case that even then, he did not approach this Court for legal remedies

immediately after he came to know of the fraud committed by the 3rd

17

respondent and also the judgment of this Court in the case of Batha

(supra), because, under a wrong legal advice, he filed I.A.I. in L.A.C.

No. 37 of 1988. In other words, even after the appellant came to know

of the fraud committed by the 3rd respondent, under a wrong advice,

he was prosecuting his case before a wrong forum. The question for

consideration is whether that circumstance can be taken into account

for condoning the delay. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court

in the case of Badlu and another. v. Shiv Charan and others., (1980) 4

SCC 401 where a party under a wrong advice given to them by their

lawyer was pursuing an appeal bonafide and in good faith in wrong

Court, held that the time taken for such prosecution should be

condoned and took exception to the order of the High Court in

dismissing the second appeal. Further, the Supreme Court in M/s

Concord of India Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Nirmala Devi

and Others., [1979] 11 8 ITR 507 (SC) has held that the delay caused

on account of the mistake of counsel can be sufficient cause to

condone the delay and the relief should not be refused on the ground

that the manager of company is not an illiterate or so ignorant person

who could not calculate period of limitation.

It is the further case of the appellant that only in the month of

September, 1995 he was advised by another counsel that the appellant

was wrongly prosecuting his case before the Civil Court by filing

I.A.I. in L.A.C. No. 37 of 1988 and that the civil court has no

jurisdiction to quash the notification issued under Section 4(1) and

declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act and for that relief, he should

necessarily file writ petition in this Court. The appellant on receiving

such advice from the counsel, without any further loss of time, filed

the present Writ Petition No. 34891 of 1995 in this Court on 18-9-

1995. It further needs to be noticed that the pleading of the appellant

would clearly demonstrate that but for the fraud committed by the 3rd

respondent in diverting the acquired land in favour of respondents 4

and 5 and others clandestinely for the purposes other than the purpose

for which it was acquired, perhaps, the appellant would not have

challenged the land acquisition proceedings at all. It is his definite

case that he was approaching this Court under Article 226 for

quashing the impugned notifications only because the acquired land

was sought to be diverted by the 3rd respondent-beneficiary in favour

of third parties, that too, for the purposes other than the one for which

it was acquired and the acquisition of the entire extent of land under

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the same notification in its entirety is already quashed by this Court as

fraud on power and tainted by malafide. Therefore, the Court has

necessarily to consider the question of delay and laches in the premise

of the specific case of the appellant and it will be totally unfair and

unjust to take into account only the dates of Section 4(1) notification

and Section 6(1) declaration. It is also necessary to take into account

the fact that well before the appellant approached this Court, the

Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 2605 of 1991 and

Writ Petition Nos. 19812 to 19816 of 1990 preferred by certain other

owners of the acquired land vide its orders dated 18-9-1991 and 3-10-

1991 had already quashed Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6(1)

declaration in their entirety and directed the State Government and the

LAO to handover the acquired land to the owners concerned on red

positing of the compensation money received by the owners with 12%

interest p.a. In that view of the matter, it is trite, the acquisition of the

schedule land belonging to the appellant also stood quashed by virtue

of the above judgments of the Division Bench. Strictly speaking, the

State Government and the LAO even in the absence of a separate

challenge by the appellant to the land acquisition proceedings, in

terms of the orders made in the above writ appeal and writ petitions,

ought to have handed over the schedule land to the appellant by

collecting the amount of money received by him as compensation

with interest at 12% p.a. Be that as it may, the appellant as an

abundant caution separately filed writ petition for quashing of the

notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act with

regard to the schedule land. The relief cannot be refused to the

appellant, because, the appellant herein and the appellants in Writ

Appeal Nos. 1094-1097 of 1987 and W.A. No. 2065 of 1991 and the

petitioners in Writ petition Nos. 19812 to 19816 of 1990 are all

owners of the acquired land under the same notifications and all of

them belong to a 'well-defined class' for the purpose of Article 14 of

the Constitution. There is absolutely no warrant or justification to

extend different treatment to the appellant herein simply, because, he

did not join the other owners at an earlier point of time. It is not that

all the owners of the acquired land except the appellant instituted the

writ petitions jointly and the appellant alone sat on fence awaiting the

decision in the writ petitions filed by the other owners. Some writ

petitions were filed in the year 1987 and other writ petitions in the

year 1990 as noted above. Since the appellant came to know of the

fraud committed by the 3rd respondent only in the year 1993 after this

19

Court delivered the judgment in Batha's case (supra) and since he was

prosecuting his case before a wrong forum under a wrong legal advice

and therefore, the time so consumed has to be condoned in view of the

judgment of the Supreme Court already referred to above, we are of

the considered opinion that the learned single Judge is not justified in

dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.

It needs to be noticed further that admittedly, no developments have

taken place in the schedule land despite considerable passage of time.

Further more, admittedly, no rights of third parties are created in the

schedule land. The schedule land being a meagre extent of land

compared to the total extent of land acquired for the public purpose,

cannot be put to use for which it was originally acquired. Looking

from any angle, we do not find any circumstance on the basis of

which we would be justified in refusing the relief on the ground of

delay and laches even assuming that there was some delay on the part

of the appellant before approaching this Court by way of writ petition

in the year 1995."

The Division Bench then referred to orders dated 18.9.1991 and 3.10.1991

passed in Writ Petition Nos.19812 to 19816 of 1990 - Annaiah and others v.

State of Karnataka and others and Writ Appeal No.2605 of 1991 - Smt. H.N.

Lakshmamma and others v. State of Karnataka and others (supra) respectively

and held:

".............................Since the appellant herein and the appellants

and writ petitioners in W.A.No. 2605 of 1991 and W.P. Nos. 19812 to

19816 of 1990 are the owners of the acquired land under the same

notification and similarly circumstanced in every material aspect, they

should be regarded as the persons belonging to a 'well-defined class'

for the purpose of Article 14 of the Constitution. In other words, the

appellant herein is also entitled to the same relief which this Court

granted in Writ Appeal No. 2605 of 1991 and W.P. Nos. 19812 to

19816 of 1990 to the owners therein. Apart from that, as already

20

pointed out, the schedule land is a very meagre land compared to the

total extent of land acquired and except the schedule land the

acquisition of the remaining land has been set at naught and the

possession of the land has been handed over to the owners. The

schedule land being a meagre in extent, cannot be used for the

purpose for which it was acquired. That is precisely the reason why

the schedule land is kept in the same position as it was on the date of

Section 4(1) notification without any improvement or development."

The arguments:

13. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil and Shri S.S. Naganand, learned senior

counsel appearing for the appellants criticized the impugned judgment and

argued that the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by

entertaining and allowing the writ appeal filed by respondent No.1 despite the

fact that the writ petitions, the writ appeals and the special leave petitions filed

by his brothers had been dismissed by the High Court and this Court. Learned

counsel submitted that even though judgments and order passed by the Division

Bench in other cases had become final, relief could not have been given to

respondent No.1 by overlooking the unexplained delay of 12 years. They further

submitted that the cause of action for challenging the transfer of land in favour of

M/s. Universal Resorts Limited accrued to respondent No.1 in 1992 when

registered lease deed was executed by the Corporation and the Division Bench of

the High Court was not at all justified in entertaining the prayer of respondent

No.1 after lapse of more than three years. Shri Naganand relied upon the

21

judgment of this Court in Om Parkash v. Union of India (2010) 4 SCC 17 and

argued that quashing of notifications by the High Court in three other cases

would enure to the benefit of only those who approached the Court within

reasonable time and respondent No.1, who had kept quiet for 12 years cannot

take advantage of the same. Shri Naganand lamented that even though his

clients had given highest bid in May, 1987 and lease deed was executed in

January, 1992, they have not been able to utilize the land on account of pendency

of litigation for last more than 16 years and have suffered huge financial loss.

14. Shri Mahendra Anand, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent

No.1 supported the impugned judgment and argued that the Division Bench of

the High Court did not commit any error by directing return of land to

respondent No.1 because acquisition thereof was vitiated by fraud. Learned

senior counsel emphasised that in view of the unequivocal finding recorded in

Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer

(supra) and other cases that land acquired for the specified public purpose, i.e.

Golf-cum-Hotel Resort could not have been transferred to private persons and

that there was conspiracy to deprive the owners of their land by use of the power

of eminent domain, the Division Bench rightly annulled the action of the

Corporation.

22

15. Before dealing with the arguments of the learned counsel, we may

mention that the Committee of the Karnataka Legislature on Public Undertakings

had in its Fifty-Second Report severely criticized the exercise undertaken by the

Corporation in the matter of acquisition of 39 acres 27 guntas land. This is

evident from paragraph 2.24 of the Report, which is extracted below:

"2.24. After full examination, the Committee makes the following

observations and recommendations.:

(i) Most of the projects envisaged to be taken up in 1981 and

subsequently by the Company were farfetched and grandiose ones

lacking in the basic sense of realism as regards details and specifies

assured modes of financing, benefits and income to be derived and

viability. By no stretch of imagination, could they be deemed to meet

the main objectives of the Company to promote and maximise tourism

by offering catering, lodging, recreational, picnic and other facilities

to as broad a spectrum of tourists as possible. In fact, they were

designed mainly to cater to the requirements of a small number of

elitist and affluent tourists and could never have boosted tourism in

the State. For these grave dereliction of duties, the Committee holds

the then Managing Directors and the then Government nominees on

the Board of Directors, as responsible.

(ii) The proper and sound objections raised by Government in

August, 1984 went unheeded by successive Boards of Directors of the

Company who pursued with reckless abandon their fanciful schemes

and led the Company on a wild goose chase. As a result, ultimately,

the Company has been left virtually holding the sack with none of

these schemes materialising and the Company having been put to an

infructuous expenditure of Rs.18.97 lakhs towards interest on the

bank borrowings to finance land acquisition, not to speak of the

wasted precious time and effort of the whole Management and organi-

sation of the Company for nearly 10 years. The then Managing

23

Director of the Company, Sri K. Sreenivasan and the Boards of

Directors of the Company at the relevant periods have to bear

responsibility in this regard.

(iii) In the opinion of the Committee, the Company had an

opportunity to reconsider and give up these unnecessary schemes

when it encountered difficulties in acquiring the required land of 39

acres in 1986-87 as a result of the land owners/power of attorney

holders moving the Courts for stay of the acquisition proceedings.

Instead, the Company opted to pursue the acquisition of land even at

the cost of surrendering 14 acres and 8 guntas of land (out of 23 acres

36 guntas acquired) to Sri Dayananda Pai, a power of attorney holder,

for a group housing scheme for employees of public/private sector

undertakings, which was a purpose/scheme not contemplated by the

Company and in no way connected with the Company's objectives.

The so-called compromise Agreement of March 1987 with Sri

Dayananda Pai had the effect of only compromising the Company's

interests in that it contained no provisions regarding commitment and

penalties on Sri Dayananda Pai to assist the Company to acquire the

entire lands of 39 acres 27 guntas while he was presented with 14

acres 8 guntas of land on a platter as it were for executing the group

housing scheme for his purpose and pecuniary benefits.

Whether Sri Dayananda Pai has really implemented the Group

Housing Scheme in Challaghatta for the employees of Public and

Private Undertakings is not clear. The Committee wants Government

to find out the true position in this regard and intimate the Committee.

In the end, with all this compromise, the Company could acquire and

take possession of only 23 acres and 36 guntas (as against 39 acres

and 27 guntas envisaged) of which 14 acres and 8 guntas were parted

to Sri Dayananda Pai, and the Company was left with only 9 acres 28

guntas for its schemes. Further, to go through with the acquisition, the

Company has to borrow Rs. 43.54 lakhs from the Canara Bank for

depositing with the land acquisition authorities and had to incur

interest charges of Rs.18.97 lakhs, which have become infructuous.

There were highly injudicious acts leading to avoidable loss of

Rs.18.97 lakhs.

24

(iv) The Committee notes that out of more than seven projects

envisaged in 1981, the Company, is a result of the tortuous and

adverse developments, omissions, commissions and irregularities

described in the preceding paragraphs, could manage to initiate only

two schemes, viz., International Centre and Tourist Complex and, that

too only to the extent of handing over land to the concerned parties,

viz. Bangalore International Centre and M/s. Universal Resorts

Limited. Even these two schemes have remained non-starters because

in the first case the Board of Directors of the Company did not

approve the leasing of land and in the second case the initial

formalities like registration of sale deed, urban land clearance etc.

have dragged on.

In this connection, the Committee takes serious note of the fact that

possession of lands was given by the Company to Bangalore

International Centre and M/s. Universal Resorts Ltd., prematurely

without obtaining approval of the Board of Directors or completing

even the initial formalities etc., as the case may be."

16. The first question which needs consideration is whether the High Court

committed an error by granting relief to respondent No.1 despite the fact that he

filed writ petition after long lapse of time and the explanation given by him was

found unsatisfactory by the learned Single Judge, who decided the writ petition

after remand by the Division Bench.

17. Although, framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period of

limitation for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and

the power conferred upon the High Court to issue to any person or authority

including any Government, directions, orders or writs including writs in the

25

nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari is

not hedged with any condition or constraint, in last 61 years the superior Courts

have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint including the one that the

High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to the

petitioner if he is found guilty of laches. The principle underlying this rule is

that the one who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court

within reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged

violation of constitutional, legal or other right is not entitled to relief under

Article 226 of the Constitution. Another reason for the High Court's refusal to

entertain belated claim is that during the intervening period rights of third parties

may have crystallized and it will be inequitable to disturb those rights at the

instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and

there is no cogent explanation for the delay. We may hasten to add that no hard

and fast rule can be laid down and no straightjacket formula can be evolved for

deciding the question of delay/laches and each case has to be decided on its own

facts.

18. In Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board,

Bhojpur (1992) 2 SCC 598, this Court set aside the judgment of the Patna High

Court whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant against the demand notice

26

issued for levy of cess for the period 1953-54 to 1966-67 was dismissed only on

the ground of delay. The facts of that case show that the writ petition filed by

the appellant questioning the demand for 1967-68 to 1971-72 was allowed by the

High Court. However, the writ petition questioning the demand of the earlier

years was dismissed on the premise that the petitioner was guilty of laches.

While dealing with the question of delay, this Court observed:

"The question thus for consideration is whether the appellant should

be deprived of the relief on account of the laches and delay. It is true

that the appellant could have even when instituting the suit agitated

the question of legality of the demands and claimed relief in respect of

the earlier years while challenging the demand for the subsequent

years in the writ petition. But the failure to do so by itself in the

circumstances of the case, in our opinion, does not disentitle the

appellant from the remedies open under the law. The demand is per se

not based on the net profits of the immovable property, but on the

income of the business and is, therefore, without authority. The

appellant has offered explanation for not raising the question of

legality in the earlier proceedings. It appears that the authorities

proceeded under a mistake of law as to the nature of the claim. The

appellant did not include the earlier demand in the writ petition

because the suit to enforce the agreement limiting the liability was

pending in appeal, but the appellant did attempt to raise the question

in the appeal itself. However, the Court declined to entertain the

additional ground as it was beyond the scope of the suit. Thereafter,

the present writ petition was filed explaining all the circumstances.

The High Court considered the delay as inordinate. In our view, the

High Court failed to appreciate all material facts particularly the fact

that the demand is illegal as already declared by it in the earlier case.

The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and

stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound

and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its

own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental

right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle

27

on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is

denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the

delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed

unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to

determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the

writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is

not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical

running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct

exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole

ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case relied on is

distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on

the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority

and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though

belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the

High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being

the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole

ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was

wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant

the relief sought for."

(emphasis supplied)

19. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra (1974) 1 SCC

317, the Court overruled the objection of delay in filing of a petition involving

challenge to the seniority list of Mamlatdars and observed:

".......Moreover, it may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of

the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Art. 16 is itself a

fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 32 and this Court which has

been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of

the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to

refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like."

20. In Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M. Prabhakar and

others (2011) 5 SCC 607, this Court considered the question whether the High

28

Court should entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution after

long delay and laid down the following principles:

"(1) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay,

the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule

of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each

case must be dealt with on its own facts.

(2) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of

laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in

filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable

explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent

parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the

petitioners.

(3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application

under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been

seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after

a remedy not provided in the statute or the statutory rules, it is not

desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial

what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy.

(4) No hard-and-fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case

shall have to be decided on its own facts.

(5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take

care of the delay."

21. Another principle of law of which cognizance deserves to be taken is that

in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court would be

extremely slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court to

entertain a belated petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Interference in such matters would be warranted only if it is found that the

29

exercise of discretion by the High Court was totally arbitrary or was based on

irrelevant consideration. In Smt. Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar [C.A.

No.140 of 1964 decided on 22.9.1964], Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, speaking

for the Constitution Bench observed:

"It is well-settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court

to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt

that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends

that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive

action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but

even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and

there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be

inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative

jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that

the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt

that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article

226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law

of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed,

the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction.

No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court

should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who

moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.

That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court

and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter

too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably."

(emphasis supplied)

22. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the discretion exercised

by the Division Bench of the High Court to ignore the delay in filing of writ

petition is vitiated by any patent error or the reasons assigned for rejecting the

appellants' objection of delay are irrelevant and extraneous. Though it may

30

sound repetitive, we may mention that in the writ petition filed by him,

respondent No.1 had not only prayed for quashing of the acquisition

proceedings, but also prayed for restoration of the acquired land on the ground

that instead of using the same for the public purpose specified in the notifications

issued under Sections 4(1) and 6, the Corporation had transferred the same to

private persons. Respondent No.1 and other landowners may not be having any

serious objection to the acquisition of their land for a public purpose and,

therefore, some of them not only accepted the compensation, but also filed

applications under Section 18 of the Act for determination of market value by

the Court. However, when it was discovered that the acquired land has been

transferred to private persons, they sought intervention of the Court and in the

three cases, the Division Bench of the High Court nullified the acquisition on the

ground of fraud and misuse of the provisions of the Act.

23. Insofar as land of respondent No.1 is concerned, the same was advertised

in 1987 along with other parcels of land (total measuring 5 acres) and

Corporation executed lease in favour of M/s. Universal Resorts Limited in 1992.

However, no material has been placed on record to show that the said exercise

was undertaken after issuing notice to the landowners. When respondent No.1

discovered that his land has been transferred to private entity, he made grievance

31

and finally approached the High Court. During the intervening period, he

pursued his claim for higher compensation. Therefore, it cannot be said that he

was sleeping over his right and was guilty of laches.

24. A reading of the impugned judgment, the relevant portions of which have

been extracted hereinabove shows that the Division Bench of the High Court

adverted to all the facts, which had bearing on the issue of delay including the

one that on the advice given by an advocate, respondent No.1 had availed other

remedies and opined that the delay had been adequately explained. Thus, it

cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the High Court to entertain and

decide the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 on merits is vitiated by any

patent legal infirmity. It is true that the writ petitions filed by the brothers of

respondent No.1 had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground

of delay and the writ appeals and the special leave petitions filed against the

order of the learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Division Bench of the

High Court and this Court respectively, but that could not be made basis for

denying relief to respondent No.1 because his brothers had neither questioned

the diversification of land to private persons nor prayed for restoration of their

respective shares. That apart, we find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to

approve the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge in dealing with Writ

32

Petition Nos. 2379 and 2380 of 1993 filed by the brothers of respondent No.1.

He distinguished the judgments of the Division Bench in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar

Batha and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) and Smt. H.N.

Lakshmamma and others v. State of Karnataka and others, without any real

distinction and did not adhere to the basic postulate of judicial discipline that a

Single Bench is bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. Not only this, the

learned Single Judge omitted to consider order dated 3.10.1991 passed in Writ

Petition Nos. 19812 to 19816 of 1990 - Annaiah and others v. State of Karnataka

and others in which the same Division Bench had quashed notifications dated

28.12.1981 and 16.4.1983 in their entirety. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of

the High Court went a step further and dismissed the writ appeals filed by the

brothers of respondent No.1 without even adverting to the factual matrix of the

case, the grounds on which the order of the learned Single Judge was challenged

and ignored the law laid down by the coordinate Bench in three other cases. The

special leave petitions filed by the brothers of respondent No.1 were summarily

dismissed by this Court. Such dismissal did not amount to this Court's approval

of the view taken by the High Court on the legality of the acquisition and

transfer of land to private persons. In this connection, reference can usefully be

made to the judgment in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359. 33

25. The next question which merits examination is whether the High Court

was justified in directing restoration of land to respondent No.1. In Mrs.

Behroze Ramyar Batha and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra),

the Division Bench of the High Court categorically held that the exercise

undertaken for the acquisition of land was vitiated due to fraud. The Division

Bench was also of the view that the acquisition cannot be valid in part and

invalid in other parts, but did not nullify all the transfers on the premise that

other writ petitions and a writ appeal involving challenge to the acquisition

proceedings were pending. In Annaiah and others v. State of Karnataka and

others (supra), the same Division Bench specifically adverted to the issue of

diversification of purpose and held that where the landowners are deprived of

their land under the cover of public purpose and there is diversification of land

for a private purpose, it amounts to fraudulent exercise of the power of eminent

domain.

26. The pleadings and documents filed by the parties in these cases clearly

show that the Corporation had made a false projection to the State Government

that land was needed for execution of tourism related projects. In the meeting of

officers held on 13.1.1987, i.e. after almost four years of the issue of declaration

under Section 6, the Managing Director of the Corporation candidly admitted

34

that the Corporation did not have the requisite finances to pay for the acquisition

of land and that Dayananda Pai, who had already entered into agreements with

some of the landowners for purchase of land, was prepared to provide funds

subject to certain conditions including transfer of 12 acres 34 guntas land to him

for house building project. After 8 months, the Corporation passed resolution for

transfer of over 12 acres land to Dayananda Pai. The Corporation also

transferred two other parcels of land in favour of Bangalore International Centre

and M/s. Universal Resorts Limited. These transactions reveal the true design of

the officers of the Corporation, who first succeeded in persuading the State

Government to acquire huge chunk of land for a public purpose and then

transferred major portion of the acquired land to private individual and corporate

entities by citing poor financial health of the Corporation as the cause for doing

so. The Courts have repeatedly held that in exercise of its power of eminent

domain, the State can compulsorily acquire land of the private persons but this

proposition cannot be over-stretched to legitimize a patently illegal and

fraudulent exercise undertaken for depriving the landowners of their

constitutional right to property with a view to favour private persons. It needs no

emphasis that if land is to be acquired for a company, the State Government and

the company is bound to comply with the mandate of the provisions contained in

Part VII of the Act. Therefore, the Corporation did not have the jurisdiction to

35

transfer the land acquired for a public purpose to the companies and thereby

allow them to bypass the provisions of Part VII. The diversification of the

purpose for which land was acquired under Section 4(1) read with Section 6

clearly amounted to a fraud on the power of eminent domain. This is precisely

what the High Court has held in the judgment under appeal and we do not find

any valid ground to interfere with the same more so because in Annaiah and

others v. State of Karnataka and others (supra), the High Court had quashed the

notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 in their entirety and that judgment

has become final.

27. The judgment in Om Parkash v. Union of India (supra) on which reliance

has been placed by Shri Naganand is clearly distinguishable. What has been

held in that case is that quashing of the acquisition proceedings would enure to

the benefit of only those who had approached the Court within reasonable time

and not to those who remained silent. In this case, respondent No.1

independently questioned the acquisition proceedings and transfer of the

acquired land to M/s. Universal Resorts Ltd. In other words, he approached the

High Court for vindication of his right and succeeded in convincing the Division

Bench that the action taken by the Corporation to transfer his land to M/s.

Universal Resorts Limited was wholly illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. 36

28. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. Respondent No.1 shall, if he has

already not done so, fulfil his obligation in terms of the impugned judgment

within a period of 8 weeks from today. The appellant shall fulfil their obligation,

i.e. return of land to respondent No.1 within next 8 weeks.

...............................................J.

[G.S. Singhvi]

...............................................J.

[Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]

New Delhi

September 29, 2011.