M/S Deep Industries Ltd. vs Oil And Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9106 OF 2019 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22324/2018)

M/S DEEP INDUSTRIES LIMITED Appellant(s)

VERSUS

OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED & ANR. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The present appeal raises important questions relating

to the High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Article

227 of the Constitution of India when it comes to matters

that are decided under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (“the Act” for short).

3) In the present case, the respondent-Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation Limited (for short “ONGC”) awarded a contract to

the appellant for supply of one Mobile Air Compressor for a

period of five years. Shortly after entering into the

contract, the contract was terminated on 11.10.2017 by the

ONGC on the ground that some part of the equipment was not Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R new but only second hand. This position was disputed by the NATARAJAN Date: 2019.12.04 17:04:42 IST Reason: appellant. On the very next day, i.e. on 12.10.2017, the

Vendor Code of the appellant was blocked, meaning thereby, 2

that the appellant would be unable to bid for any other

further bids floated by the ONGC. On 18.10.2017, a Show

Cause Notice was issued by the ONGC to the appellant asking

the appellant why it should not be put “on Holiday” i.e.

black listed for a period of two years.

4) Since disputes had arisen between the parties, the

appellant invoked the arbitration clause contained in the

contract on 02.11.2017. This notice is the subject-matter

of dispute before the Arbitrator as well as before this

Court and will be adverted to subsequently. Pursuant to the

notice, one Justice J.C. Upadhyaya (Retd. High Court Judge)

was appointed as a Sole Arbitrator to decide the disputes

between the parties on 21.12.2017. On 02.02.2018, a claim

petition was filed by the appellant before the learned

Arbitrator in which the termination of the contract/show

cause notice was challenged and damages claimed. After this

claim petition was filed, on 15.02.2018, the appellant was

blacklisted by an order passed by the ONGC with effect from

11.10.2017 for a period of two years. Meanwhile, a Section

17 application was also been moved before the learned

Arbitrator. Applications were then moved by the appellant

to amend both the petition as well as the Section 17

application to challenge this order dated 15.02.2018, which

amendments were granted by the learned Arbitrator on

10.03.2018.

5) Meanwhile, a Section 16 application was before the

learned Arbitrator basically on the ground that since the 3

arbitration notice was confined only to termination of the

agreement, blacklisting would be outside the Arbitrator’s

ken. This Section 16 application was dismissed on

09.05.2018 by the learned Arbitrator, in which the learned

Arbitrator held that the notice dated 02.11.2017 was not

merely confined to termination of the contract but was also

in respect of the two year ban that was sought to be imposed

at that time. He further held that the ban order was

relatable to Clause 18 of the contract and that therefore

the validity of the 15.02.2018 office order could be decided

by him, and consequently dismissed the Section 16

application filed by the respondent.

6) On the same day i.e. 09.05.2018, the Section 17

application was separately disposed of by the learned

Arbitrator, in which the learned Arbitrator stayed the

operation of the order dated 15.02.2018 on condition that

the two year ban will only operate if the appellant

ultimately loses in the final arbitration proceedings.

7) An appeal against the Section 17 Order was filed and

disposed of by the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad on 31.05.2018

by which the learned Arbitrator’s order was upheld.

Consequently, the first appeal filed under Section 37 was

dismissed. At this stage, and which is the major bone of

contention between the parties before us, a Special Civil

Application being Application No. 9305/2018 was filed under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High

Court Gujarat at Ahmedabad in which the City Civil Court’s 4

order was challenged. By the impugned judgment dated

25.07.2018, the High Court of Gujarat referred to a

preliminary contention raised on behalf of the petitioner

that the petition filed under Article 227 should be

dismissed at the threshold as it did not raise any

jurisdictional issue. The High Court, without answering

this question, then went on to state that the ban order had,

in fact, been passed under a General Contract Manual and not

under Clause 18 of the Agreement as a result of which

serious disputes arose as to the jurisdiction of the

Arbitrator to deal with the same. It was also held on a

reading of the notice for arbitration that the notice did

not raise the issue of the ban for two years and was

confined only to illegal termination. The High Court

finally held that no stay could possibly have been granted

under Section 17 of the ban order as an injunction cannot be

granted in cases where the party can be compensated later in

damages. This being the case, the Writ Petition was allowed

and the Ahmedabad City Civil Court’s order was set aside.

8) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellant has argued that the High Court referred to the

preliminary objection before it but did not answer the same.

He took us painstakingly through the Act, in particular, to

the provisions of Sections 5 and 37 and argued that given

the non-obstante clause contained in Section 5 together with

the constricted right of first appeal under Section 37, and

the denial of the right of second appeal, that a second bite 5

at the cherry would not be permissible under any

circumstances, and that despite the fact that Section 5 of

the Act could not possibly interdict a constitutional

provision, namely, Article 227, yet the statutory scheme

ought to be taken into account in order to deny relief in

almost every case. For this purpose, he relied upon this

Court’s judgment in SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. &

Another, (2005) 8 SCC 618. He also relied upon Fuerst Day

Lawson Limited vs. Jindal Exports Limited, (2011) 8 SCC 333

for the proposition that the Act is a self-contained Code as

a result of which not only would second appeals be

interdicted expressly under Section 37(2) of the Act but

appeals filed under the Letters Patent would also be so

interdicted. He was at pains to point out that even under

Section 115 C.P.C. as amended, a revision would lie only in

cases where no appeal lies, and under the proviso inserted

with effect from 2002, no revision petition would be

maintainable against interlocutory orders. He then took us

through the impugned judgment, and stated that the

observations made on merits were themselves erroneous and

that “serious disputes as to jurisdiction” would not amount

to lack of jurisdiction. He also stated that, at best,

there can be stated to be a mere error of law, which could

not, in any case, be interfered with under Article 227 of

the Constitution of India.

9) Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General

appearing on behalf of the respondent, took us through the 6

facts and was at pains to point out that under the relevant

clause of the contract, which is Clause 27.1, the notice

invoking the arbitration must specify all points of dispute

with the details of the amount claimed at the time of

invocation of arbitration and not thereafter. He stressed

the fact that even a cursory reading of the notice dated

02.11.2017 would show that it was confined to illegal

termination and did not raise any plea as to the ban that

was imposed for two years. He further went on to

distinguish the SBP & Co. (supra) stating that it only

applied at a stage where an order of the Arbitral Tribunal

was sought to be interfered with directly under Article

226/227, in which context the seven-Judge bench made its

observations. The present is a case where the Tribunal’s

orders had travelled to the first appellate court, which

appeal was then dismissed, as a result of which the first

appellate court’s order came directly under the supervisory

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. He then

referred to Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Limited vs.

Kewal Singh Dhillon, (2008) 10 SCC 128 which is a judgment

which distinguished SBP & Co. (supra) in a case in which an

article 227 petition was held to be maintainable against an

order rejecting a Section 11 application for appointment of

an Arbitrator. He then referred to several judgments

stating that the power under Article 227, though to be

sparingly exercised, can certainly be exercised in cases of

patent lack of jurisdiction, and that the present case is 7

one such. He then defended the judgment under appeal

stating that the judgment under appeal correctly held that

in the circumstances of the present case no stay order could

possibly have been granted by the Arbitrator under Section

17 on the basis of fundamental principles contained in the

Specific Relief Act, in that damages could always be

granted, and that therefore, the injunction granted in the

facts of the present case should have been denied.

10) Having heard learned counsel for both parties, it is

first necessary to set out certain provisions of the

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Section 5 states:-

“5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”

Section 37 which is also material states as follows:-

“37. Appealable orders.- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:-

(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;

(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.

(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order granting of the arbitral tribunal.-

(a) accepting the plea referred in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order 8

passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”

What is also important to note is that under Section 29A of

the Act which was inserted by the Amendment Act, 2016 a time

limit was made within which arbitral awards must be made,

namely, 12 months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters

upon the reference. Also, it is important to note that even

so far as Section 34 applications are concerned, Section

34(6) added by the same amendment states that these

applications are to be disposed of expeditiously, and in any

event, within a period of one year from the date on which

the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the

other parties.

11) Given the aforesaid statutory provision and given the

fact that the 1996 Act repealed three previous enactments in

order that there be speedy disposal of all matters covered

by it, it is clear that the statutory policy of the Act is

that not only are time limits set down for disposal of the

arbitral proceedings themselves but time limits have also

been set down for Section 34 references to be decided.

Equally, in Union of India vs. M/s Varindera Const. Ltd.,

dated 17.09.2018, disposing of SLP (C) No. 23155/2013, this

Court has imposed the self-same limitation on first appeals

under Section 37 so that there be a timely resolution of all

matters which are covered by arbitration awards. 9

12) Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause

contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding

anything contained in any other law, in matters that arise

under Part I of the Arbitration Act, no judicial authority

shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.

Section 37 grants a constricted right of first appeal

against certain judgments and orders and no others.

Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at

the cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See

Section 37(2) of the Act)

13) This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that

if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section

37, the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would

not come to fruition for many years. At the same time, we

cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional provision

which remains untouched by the non-obstante clause of

Section 5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is

important to note is that though petitions can be filed

under Article 227 against judgments allowing or dismissing

first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High

Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the

same, taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated

by us herein above so that interference is restricted to

orders that are passed which are patently lacking in

inherent jurisdiction.

10

14) In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association

of India and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court referred

to several judgments and held:

“11. We have considered the respective arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261. However, it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its agency/instrumentality or any public authority or order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether different thing to say that each and every petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419, this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed:

"7… The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a 11

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."

13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433, this court observed:

"11. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CBNS 336 : 141 ER 486 in the following passage: ’... ‘… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute .... But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. .... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.’ The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. 1919 AC 368 : (1918-19) 10 All ER Rep. 61 (HL) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. (1939-40) 67 IA 222 : AIR 1940 PC

105. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine."

14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536, B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed:

"77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 - or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32

- is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 12

226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment."

15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which, by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, it has been held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge.

16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v.

Superintendent of Taxes (supra) and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for rederssal of grievance still holds the field.”

In SBP & Co. (supra), this Court while considering

interference with an order passed by an arbitral tribunal

under Article 226/227 of the Constitution laid down as

follows:-

“45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating his grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have 13

been passed by the arbitral tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal.

This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The arbitral tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the arbitral tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible.

46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.”

While the learned Additional Solicitor General is correct in

stating that this statement of the law does not directly

apply on the facts of the present case, yet it is important

to notice that the seven-Judge Bench has referred to the

object of the Act being that of minimizing judicial

intervention and that this important object should always be

kept in the forefront when a 227 petition is being disposed

of against proceedings that are decided under the Act. 14

15) It is true that in Punjab Agro Industries Corporation

Limited (supra), this Court distinguished SBP & Co. (supra)

stating that it will not apply to a case of a non-

appointment of an Arbitrator. This Court held:

“9. We have already noticed that though the order under Section 11(4) is a judicial order, having regard to Section 11(7) relating to finality of such orders and the absence of any provision for appeal, the order of the Civil Judge was open to challenge in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The decision in SBP & Co. does not bar such a writ petition. The observations of this Court in SBP & Co. that against an order under Section 11 of the Act, only an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution would lie, is with reference to the orders made by the Chief Justice of a High Court or by the designate Judge of that High Court. The said observations do not apply to a subordinate court functioning as designate of the Chief Justice.”

What is important to note is that the observations of this

Court in this judgment were for the reason that no provision

for appeal had been given by statute against the orders

passed under Section 11, which is why the High Court’s

supervisory jurisdiction should first be invoked before

coming to this Court under Article 136. Given the facts of

the present case, this case is equally distinguishable for

the reason that in this case the 227 jurisdiction has been

exercised by the High Court only after a first appeal was

dismissed under Section 37 of the Act.

16) One other feature of this case is of some importance.

As stated herein above, on 09.05.2018, a Section 16

application had been dismissed by the learned Arbitrator in

which substantially the same contention which found favour 15

with the High Court was taken up. The drill of Section 16

of the Act is that where a Section 16 application is

dismissed, no appeal is provided and the challenge to the

Section 16 application being dismissed must await the

passing of a final award at which stage it may be raised

under Section 34. What the High Court has done in the

present case is to invert this statutory scheme by going

into exactly the same matter as was gone into by the

arbitrator in the Section 16 application, and then decided

that the two year ban was no part of the notice for

arbitration issued on 02.11.2017, a finding which is

directly contrary to the finding of the learned Arbitrator

dismissing the Section 16 application. For this reason

alone, the judgment under appeal needs to be set aside.

Even otherwise, as has been correctly pointed out by Mr.

Rohatgi, the judgment under appeal goes into the merits of

the case and states that the action of putting the

Contractor and his Directors “on holiday” is not a

consequence of the termination of the agreement. This is

wholly incorrect as it is only because of the termination

that the show cause notice dated 18.10.2017 proposing to

impose a two year ban was sent. Even otherwise, entering

into the general thicket of disputes between the parties

does not behove a court exercising jurisdiction under

Article 227, where only jurisdictional errors can be

corrected. Therefore to state that the ban order was passed

under a General Contract Manual and not Clause 18 of the 16

Agreement, besides being incorrect, would also be incorrect

for the reason that the General Contract Manual does not

mean that such order was issued as an administrative order

invoking the executive power, but was only as an order which

emanated from the contract itself. Further to state that

“serious disputes” as to jurisdiction seem to have cropped

up is not the same thing as saying that the Arbitral

Tribunal lacked inherent jurisdiction in going into and

deciding the Section 17 application. In point of fact, the

Arbitral Tribunal was well within its jurisdiction in

referring to the contract and the ban order and then

applying the law and finally issuing the stay order. Even

if it be accepted that the principle laid down by Section

41(e) of the Specific Relief Act was infracted, in that

damages could have been granted, as a result of which an

injunction ought not to have been issued, is a mere error of

law and not an error of jurisdiction, much less an error of

inherent jurisdiction going to the root of the matter.

Therefore, even otherwise, the High Court judgment cannot be

sustained and is set aside.

17) We reiterate that the policy of the Act is speedy

disposal of arbitration cases. The Arbitration Act is a

special act and a self contained code dealing with

arbitration. This Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Limited

(supra), has specifically held as follows:

“89. It is, thus, to be seen that Arbitration Act, 1940, from its inception and right through to 2004 (in P.S. Sathappan v. Andha Bank Ltd., (2004) 17

11 SCC 672 was held to be a self-contained code.

Now, if the Arbitration Act, 1940 was held to be a self-contained code, on matters pertaining to arbitration, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which consolidates, amends and designs the law relating to arbitration to bring it, as much as possible, in harmony with the UNCITRAL Model must be held only to be more so. Once it is held that the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code and exhaustive, then it must also be held, using the lulcid expression of Tulzapurkar,J., that it carries with it “a negative import that only ‘such acts as are mentioned in the Act are permissible to be done and acts or things not mentioned therein are not permissible to be done”. In other words, a letters patent appeal would be excluded by the application of one of the general principles that where the special Act sets out a self-contained code the applicability of the general law procedure would be impliedly excluded.”

What becomes clear is that had the High Court itself

disposed of the first appeal in the present case, no article

227 petition could possibly lie - all that could perhaps

have been done was to file an LPA before a Division Bench of

the same High Court. This, as we have seen, has

specifically been interdicted by Fuerst Day Lawson Limited

(supra). Merely because, on the facts of this case, the

first appeal was disposed of by a court subordinate to the

High Court, an article 227 petition ought not to have been

entertained.

18) Mr. Rohatgi is also correct in pointing out that the

legislative policy qua the general revisional jurisdiction

that is contained by the amendments made to Section 115

C.P.C. should also be kept in mind when High Courts dispose

of petitions filed under under article 227. The legislative 18

policy is that no revision lies if an alternative remedy of

appeal is available. Further, even when a revision does

lie, it lies only against a final disposal of the entire

matter and not against interlocutory orders. These

amendments were considered in Tek Singh vs. Shashi Verma

and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 168 in which this Court

adverted to these amendments and then stated:

7. A reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999, revision petitions filed under Section 115 CPC are not maintainable against interlocutory orders.

8. Even otherwise, it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to correct jurisdictional errors only. This is well settled. In D.L.F. Housing & Construction Company Private Ltd., New Delhi v.

Sarup Singh and Others (1970) 2 SCR 368 this Court held:

“The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this clause 19

may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under Section 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision under Section 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.” at Pg.373

19) For all these reasons, the appeal stands allowed with

no order as to costs. Accordingly, the arbitration

proceedings may now be disposed of as expeditiously as

possible, in accordance with the mandate contained in the

Act.

.......................... J.

(ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

.......................... J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

.......................... J.

(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

New Delhi;

November 28, 2019.