M/S. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited vs The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax
- Citation2019 SCC OnLine Mad 40108
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. A writ petition challenging a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the order rejecting objections to that notice is maintainable before a High Court, provided the assessee has followed the proper procedure of filing return, seeking reasons, filing objections, and having those objections rejected by the Assessing Officer through a speaking order, notwithstanding the availability of appeal as an alternative remedy. 2. The requirement in the proviso to Section 147 that income has escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to "disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment" is satisfied when the assessee furnishes all primary facts and documents before the Assessing Officer; it does not require the assessee to disclose the inferences which may be drawn from those facts, as the drawing of inferences is the duty of the Assessing Officer alone. 3. Reopening of a concluded assessment under Section 148 is barred by limitation and constitutes an impermissible review of the original assessment order where the assessee has made complete disclosure of all relevant facts along with the return of income and all material documents were available before the original Assessing Officer. 4. A reason to believe for reopening an assessment must be based on tangible material evidence and must have a live link with the formation of the belief; a mere change of opinion or belief founded on information that is generalized, vague, or lacking in specific details and transaction details does not constitute valid reason to believe that income has escaped assessment.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED : 30.10.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.GOVINDARAJ
W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018 and W.M.P.(MD)Nos.17030, 17605 and 17606 of 2018
W.P.(MD)No.19202 of 2018:
M/s.Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited, Represented by its Deputy Executive Director (Finance) and Authorized Signatory Shri.R.Gururajan, Dalmiapuram, Tiruchirapalli - 621 651. : Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirapalli-620 001.
2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle -2, New Delhi.
3.The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 1 - Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirappalli-620 001. : Respondents
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PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records on the file of the first respondent and quash the impugned order in PAN:AADCA9414C/ACIT/TRY/2011-12, dated 26.07.2018 along with notice in PAN:AADCA9414C, dated 31.03.2018 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Year 2011-12.
W.P.(MD)No.19825 of 2018:
M/s.Dalmia Bharat Limited, (Formerly Known as Dalmia Bharat Enterprises Limited), Dalmiapuram, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu - 621 651. : Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirapalli-620 001.
2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle -2, New Delhi.
3.The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 1 - Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirappalli-620 001. : Respondents
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PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records on the file of the first respondent and quash the impugned notice in PAN: AAJCS7366K, dated 31.03.2018 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Year 2011-12, along with the impugned order in PAN: AAJCS7366K/ACIT/TRY 2011-12, dated 30.07.2018.
W.P.(MD)No.19826 of 2018:
M/s.Dalmia Power Limited, (Amalgamated Company of DCB Power Ventures Limited), Dalmiapuram, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu - 621 651. : Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirapalli-620 001.
2.The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 1 - Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirappalli-620 001. : Respondents
PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records on the file of the first respondent and quash the impugned notice in PAN: AAJCS7367J, dated 31.03.2018 in notice number
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ITBA/AST/148/2017-18/1009600073(1) issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Year 2011-12, along with the impugned order in PAN:AAJCS7367J/AAJCS2658E/ACIT/TRY/2011-12, dated 31.07.2018.
For Petitioner : Mr.N.Venkataraman, in all WPs. Senior Counsel, For Mr.N.V.Balaji For Respondents : Mr.G.Rajagopalan, in all WPs. Additional Solicitor General of India For Mr.N.Dilip Kumar
******
COMMON ORDER
Since the issue involved in all the three Writ Petitions is one and the
same, they were heard together and are being disposed of by means of
this common order.
2. For the sake of convenience, the facts leading to the filing of the
Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.19202 of 2018 are taken into consideration
for deciding the issue at hand.
3. The Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No.19202 of 2018 challenges the
order passed by the first respondent in
PAN:AADCA9414C/ACIT/TRY/2011-12, dated 26.07.2018 along with
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notice in PAN:AADCA9414C, dated 31.03.2018, issued under Section 148
of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2011-2012.
4. The petitioner filed his original return on 29.09.2011. Thereafter,
vide F.No.ACIT/CC-2/2013-14, dated 14.10.2013, further details were
sought for by the second respondent, which, he submitted on 26.10.2013
and 09.11.2013. In that letter, it is disclosed as to which are the
companies holding shares above 10%. The petitioner has disclosed the
allotment of shares, opening share capital, share capital raised during the
year, closing share capital, total turnover, gross profit, net profit and all
other details as required by the second respondent. He filed Form 2 to
disclose all the details showing the shares allotted to other persons above
10%. After considering all these details, the second respondent passed an
assessment order on 31.03.2014, wherein, it was found that a sum of Rs.
84 Crores was treated as unexplained expenditure under Section 69C of
the Income Tax Act, 1961, and another sum of Rs.55 Crores was treated
as bribe on the basis of the documents seized by them, against which, the
petitioner preferred an appeal, in which, Rs.84 Crores as well as Rs.55
Crores, totalling to Rs.1,39,00,00,000/-, was reversed and for the rest of
the amount, penalty was imposed. This was given effect to by an order
under Section 250/154/153A/143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated
18.08.2015. Thereafter, on 31.03.2018, vide impugned proceedings in
PAN:AADCA9414C, a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act,
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1961, was issued, calling upon the petitioner to deliver the return in the
prescribed form for the assessment year 2011-2012, on the reason that
the Assessing Officer had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax
has escaped assessment. In response to this notice, the petitioner
submitted his xerox copy of the return for the year 2011-2012 with
acknowledgement due dated 13.04.2018, vide his letter dated 16.04.2018
and also sought for reasons to come to a conclusion to initiate action
under Section 148. The first respondent, by
PAN:AADCA9414C/ACIT/Circle-1/TRY/2011-12, dated 11.05.2018,
communicated the reasons. The allegation is that Rs.500 Crores, which
was invested by a Company called 'KKR' in the year 2010-2011 and held
15% equity shares issued to the petitioner's company, is nothing but the
black money of the petitioner's company and it has been circulated
through the said company called 'KKR' and it was brought back at a value
of more than Rs.1200 Crores. Further, on the basis of information, vide a
charge sheet issued to Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy, credible proof of criminal
conspiracy was obtained against Mr.Puneet Dalmia on account of a sum of
Rs.95 Crores in the nature of illegal gratification paid for allotment of
lime stone mining lease in favour of the petitioner company. Further
reason is that it was widely believed that the petitioner company has tacit
understanding with its distributors of cement by giving over discount on
sale of cement so as to receive kickbacks in personal names and that it
was widely believed that Dalmia Group has tacit understanding with its
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suppliers of coal, and other services to over invoice that charges so as to
receive kickbacks in personal names and Dalmia Group is in the habit of
booking bogus bills in the accounts. All these reasons are culminated in
the initiation of proceedings under Section 148 and it is observed in
closing paragraph as under:
"8. It is surprising as to why the Dalmia Bharat
Ltd., paid 2.4 times to KKR for the buyback of its
investment of Rs.500 crores in 2010 amounting to
approx. Rs.1218 crores.
As the transaction mentioned above is important
due to the sensitivity it attracts and for the
requirement of deep digging of data to retrieve the
final information through the means of exchange of
information forum the issue needs to be relooked
through reopening of the case for reassessment of
Dalmia Cement Bharat Ltd., Dalmia Bharat Ltd., Dalmia
Bharat Enterprises Ltd. and Avnija Properties Ltd.
9. Another allegation pertains to the Dalmia
Group investing around Rs.5000 crores by way of
capital expenditure on setting up cement
manufacturing facility and various part of the country
in "last 4 years". As the TEP was received in F.Y.2016-17
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in the office of DGIT (Inv.), Mumbai therefore the
aforementioned "last 4 years" may be considered as,
from F.Y. 2012-13 to F.Y.2015-16. However as this is a
generalized allegation therefore only the specific issue
in this allegation may be looked into. The specific issue
in this allegation is that "Calcom Cement India Limited,
one of the subsidiary of DCBL awarded a contract for
mechanical erection and fabrication to Gannon
Dunkerley & Co Limited at a rate almost double of
market rate. Copy of contract awarded, copy of
comparable contract and a comparison chart is
attached as Annexure - D where contract of Rs.21
Crores has been given at Rs.43 Crores. On going
through the Annexure - E, of this TEP name of other
contractors were found, however as no specific or
incriminating information or amount of transaction is
present against these parties, hence information in
their case is generalized in nature hence does not
invite any further action at this stage only in case of
Gannon Dunkerley & Co Limited, the issue is specific.
Therefore, the contract awarded and payment received
by Gannon Dunkerley & Co Limited may be verified by
passing on the information to its jurisdictional
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assessing officer to take an appropriate action under
the relevant section of I.T. Act, 1961.
10. There is another allegation that Subhshri
Road Carriers Pvt. Ltd., a known and related entity of
Dalmia Group has been given the contracts of major
transportation work by the Dalmia Group. The
contracts are given at the higher rates than the
prevailing market rates and kickbacks are received in
the personal name of the promoters."
5. Against the reasons given by the first respondent, the petitioner
company filed his objections by communication dated 19.06.2018, stating
that the proceedings initiated is,
(a) barred by limitation;
(b) without jurisdiction; and
(c) vague and bereft of specific details.
6. The first respondent, by his proceedings in
PAN:AADCA9414C/ACIT/TRY/2011-12, dated 26.07.2018, rejected the
objections, against which, the present Writ Petition came to be filed.
7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would
submit that the relevant assessment year is 2011-2012. The petitioner
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submitted all the books of accounts and all other details, as sought for by
the respondents even at the time of processing the assessment. Once all
the required documents are given, it is for the Assessing Authority with
due diligence, to mention, what is not disclosed and the definite reason to
arrive at a decision as to the escaped assessment. It cannot be based on
the information generally known by believing or on wild belief. In support
of his contention, he would rely on the following judgments:
(1) Asianet Star Communications (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT
(2019) 106 Taxmann.Com 293 (Mad-HC);
(2) Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2008)
305 ITC 339 (Mad HC);
(3) Fenner (India) Ltd. vs. DCIT (2000)241 ITR
672 (Mad HC);
(4) CIT vs. Schwing Stetter India P. Ltd. (2015) 378
ITR 380 (Mad HC);
(5) NuPower Renewables (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2019)
104 Taxmann.com 307 (Bom HC);
(6) CIT vs. S & S Power Switchgear Ltd. (2018) 92
Taxmann.com 429(Mad);
(7) PCIT v. Manzil Dineshkumar Shah (2018) 406
ITR 326 (Guj);
(8) Krupesh Ghanshyambhai Thakkar vs. DCIT
(2017)77 Taxmann.com 293(Guj HC);
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(9) CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Limited (2010) 320
ITR 561 (SC);
(10) Rubix Trading vs. ITO [W.P.No.3130 of 2018,
dated 20.12.2018] (Bom HC);
(11) CIT vs. Usha International Ltd. (2012) 253
CTR 113 (Del-HC);
(12) Ganga Saran & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. ITO [(1981)
130 ITR 1 (SC)];
(13) South Yarra Holdings vs. ITO (2019) 104
Taxmann.com 216 (Bom HC);
(14) PCIT vs. Meenakshi Overseas (P) Ltd. (2017)
395 ITR 677 (Del-HC);
(15) ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das (1976) 103 ITR
437 (SC);
(16) SMCC Construction India Ltd. vs. ACIT (2014)
220 Taxman 354 (Del.HC);
(17) Novo Nordisk India (P) Ltd. (2018)95
Taxmann.com 225 (Kar-HC);
(18) Mahesh Kumar Gupta vs. CIT (2014) 363 ITR
300 (All-HC);
(19) Haryana Acrylic Manufacturing Co vs. CIT
(2009) 308 ITR 38 (Del);
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(20) CIT, Delhi vs. Kelvinator India Ltd. 256 ITR 1
(Del);
(21) Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO 41 ITR
191(SC);
(22) Jindal Photo Films Ltd. vs. DCIT 234 ITR
170(Del);
(23) Garden Silk Mills P. Ltd. vs DCIT 237 ITR 668
(Guj);
(24) PCIT vs. Santech Solutions P Ltd 97 Taxmann.
com 179 (Mad);
(25) Union of India vs. Ajit Jain 260 ITR 80(SC);
(26) Ajit Jain vs. Union of India 242 ITR 302 (Del);
(27) CIT vs. Indo Arab Air Services 283 CTR 92
(Del);
(28) PCIT vs. Shodiman Investments (P) Ltd. 93
Taxmann. com 153 (Bom);
(29) CIT vs. Sfil Stock Broking Ltd 325 ITR 285
(Del);
(30) CIT vs. Batra Bhatta Company 321 ITR 526
(Del);
(31) Vipan Khanna vs. CIT 255 ITR 220 (Pun &
Har);
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(32) National Dairy Development Board vs. DCIT
356 ITR 413 (Guj);
(33) Ashkjyot Oxygen (P) Ltd. vs. H.N.Patel, ITO
346 ITR 199 (Guj);
(34) Madras Suspension Ltd. vs. DCIT 88
Taxmann.com 256 (Madurai);
(35) Sri. C.M.Mahadeva S/o.Sri Manche Gowda vs.
The CIT, Mysore (2015) Taxcorp (DT) 62455 (KAR);
(36) CIT vs. Elgi Tread (India) Ltd 96 Taxmann.com
254 (Mad);
(37) JCIT vs. Kalanithi Maran 366 ITR 453
(Madras);
(38) Jeans Knit P Ltd vs. DCIT Banglore 390 ITR 10
(SC);
(39) CIT vs. M/s.Spice Enfotainment Ltd., Civil
Appeal No.285 of 2014-SC;
(40) Spice Infotainment Ltd. vs. CIT 65 DTR 391
(Delhi);
(41) Jitendra Chandrala Navlani vs. Union of India
386 ITR 288 (Bom);
(42) PCIT New Delhi vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
397 ITR 681 (Delhi); and
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(43) Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax [1979]2 Taxman 197(SC).
8. Secondly, on the point of limitation, the learned Senior Counsel
would draw the attention of this Court to proviso to Section 147, which
contemplates only three circumstances in which the assessment can be
re-visited within four years i.e.,
(a) failure on the part of the assessee to make a
return under Section 139; or
(b) in response to a notice issued under sub-
section (1) of section 142 or section 148; or
(c) to disclose fully and truly all material facts
necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year.
9. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that in respect
of required things, namely (a) and (b), the assessee has filed his return
under Section 139 and he has filed his reply in response to the notice
issued under Section 142 as well as Section 148.
10. The only issue, which is to be decided, is as to whether the
assessee has disclosed fully and truly what material facts necessary for
his assessment, for that assessment year or not.
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11. In that aspect, the petitioner would submit that he has
submitted all the necessary details in Form-2 with all other attachments
including the reply given to the notice issued under Section 142. Against
the order passed by the Assessing Authority, the petitioner also filed an
appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax, in which, all these points were
elaborately discussed and thereafter, the order charging tax under
Section 139 was set aside and the appeal was partly allowed and
consequent upon the order, it was given effect to by the other
consequential order under Section 250/154/153A/143(3) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961. In those circumstances, it should be construed that the
petitioner has given all the materials fully and truly. As per the
explanation to Section 147, if at all the Assessing Officer with his due
diligence discovers that there is some escaped assessment, then, on the
basis of that, he can initiate proceedings. But the impugned orders do not
disclose the main reasons given by the Assessing Authority and the same
also do not disclose any escaped assessment. Further, the assessment
order for 2011-2012, ended with 31.03.2012. As per Section 147,
proceedings, if any, should have been commenced within four years from
the date of end of the assessment year. But, in the instant case, the
proceedings were initiated on 31.03.2018. Therefore, it is barred by
limitation.
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12. It is contended that the further reason given pertains to the
Calcom Cement India Limited, which is an independent legal entity and
that does not have any connection with the return filed for the
assessment year 2011-2012. Even assuming that it is a sister concern,
then, for the transaction done by the sister concern, proceedings should
have been initiated against that independent legal entity and it cannot be
initiated against the petitioner company. Therefore, the impugned orders
are barred by limitation.
13. Further, in respect of the allegation given with respect to the
contracts, Paragraph 10 of the reasons that the contracts are given at the
higher rates than the prevailing market rates and kickbacks are received
in the personal name of the promoters, does not disclose any specific
transaction which happened between the petitioner and other company.
The date of transaction, the amount which said to have been received
higher than the market value, the quantum of kickbacks that was
received in the personal name of the promoters, the date and time when
it was received and all other specific details, are missing. Therefore, he
prays that the impugned proceedings are likely to be quashed.
14. The learned Senior Counsel would also contend that once in a
concluded assessment where the Assessing Authority discovers
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undisclosed material evidence and has a reason to believe that there is an
escaped assessment, then only, he can initiate proceedings. Whereas, in
the cases at hand, the impugned proceedings are based on wild belief
without any materials.
15. In response to the arguments, the learned Additional Solicitor
General of India appearing for the respondents would contend that after
issuance of notice under Section 148, the petitioner has not chosen to
challenge the same in time. But, whereas, he has submitted himself to the
proceedings and filed returns, as directed by the authorities and also filed
his objections. Once he submitted himself to the jurisdiction, he shall
await the orders of the Assessing Authority and he cannot rush to the
Court without awaiting the orders. Therefore, once the matter is
subjudice before the fact finding authority, challenging the notice issued
under Section 148 is without cause of action and hence, the Writ Petitions
are not maintainable.
16. In support of the contention, he would rely on the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd., vs.
Income Tax Officer and others reported in 2003(1) SCC 72, wherein
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the proper course of action for
the noticee is to file return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for
issuing notices and on receipt of notice, he can file objection and he
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cannot rush to the Court without awaiting for the orders to be passed in
the matter.
17. He would further submit that against the order passed by the
authority, there is an appeal provision available to the petitioner and
without exhausting the alternative remedy, the petitioner shall not rush to
the Court. In this regard, he would rely on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in 2014(1)
SCC 603, wherein it is held that when there is an efficacious alternative
remedy available, the High Court should not interfere in the proceedings
of Income Tax Department, pursuant to a notice issued under Sections
246, 246-A, 143, 144, 147 and 148. Therefore, the Writ Petitions are not
maintainable.
18. Further, explanation to Section 147 would clarify the position
that there are material evidences, which were discovered by the
Assessing Authority, for which, action should be initiated. Paragraph 8 of
the reasons adduced by the Assessing Authority clearly shows that there
is suppression of income to the tune of Rs.1218 crores for the investment
of Rs.500 Crores, which definitely is the re-circulation of black money. As
there are material evidences, it cannot be said that it is without reason.
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19. Insofar as the issue at hand is concerned, it is a disputed
question of fact and it can be decided only by the authority and the Writ
Court cannot delve into the disputed questions of facts and, therefore, the
Writ Petition shall not be entertained.
20. I have considered the rival submissions made by both parties.
21. This Court has dealt with the issue of change of opinion after
considering the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the
other Courts, in Asianet Star Communications (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT
(2019) 106 Taxmann.Com 293 (Mad-HC). The relevant portion reads
thus:
"26. In similar circumstances, the Supreme
Court, in the case of ACIT v. ICICI Securities Primary
Dealership Ltd. ([2012] 348 ITR 229) has held as
follows:
The assessee had disclosed full details in the
Return of Income in the matter of its dealing in stocks
and shares. According to the assessee, the loss
incurred was a business loss, whereas, according to
the Revenue, the loss incurred was a speculative loss.
Rejection of the objections of the assessee to the re-
opening of the assessment by the Assessing Officer
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vide his Order dated 23rd June, 2006, is clearly a
change of opinion. In the circumstances, we are of the
view that the order re-opening the assessment was not
maintainable.
27. The Supreme Court, in Commissioner of
Income Tax v. Corporation Bank [254 ITR 791] has had
occasion to consider a similar issue holding as follows:
Turning attention to the first question as regards
the provisions under Section 147(a) be it noted and as
the facts depict, there is no failure on the part of the
assessee in furnishing the particulars pertaining to the
above noted sum as not recoverable for the relevant
accounting year and the statements filed along with
the original return disclosed the full details of the
aforesaid account. There is, therefore, no failure on
the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly the
material facts necessary for the assessment years for
the respective years and as such Section 147(a) has no
manner of application and is not attracted in the facts
of the matter under consideration. The High Court on
consideration of the facts came to the conclusion that
the Tribunal was justified in coming to the said finding
and we also record our concurrence therewith.
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28. The Supreme Court in the case of
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India
Ltd., and another ([2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC)] has held
thus:
However, one needs to give a schematic
interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing
which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary
powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments
on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot
be per se reason to re-open. We must also keep in
mind the conceptual difference between power to
review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer
has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess.
But re-assessment has to be based on fulfilment of
certain pre-condition and if the concept of "change of
opinion" is removed, as contended on behalf of the
Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the
assessment, review would take place. One must treat
the concept of "change of opinion" as an in-built test
to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer.
Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has
power to re-open, provided there is "tangible material"
to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of
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income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link
with the formation of the belief.
29. I am thus of the view that, in the light of the
proviso to section 147, the assessee having made a
complete disclosure of all relevant facts along with the
return of income, the impugned proceedings are
barred by limitation and also constitute a review of the
original order of assessment, impermissible in law. In
fact, the Assessing Officer is seen to have applied his
mind to the issue in question and the original order of
assessment confirms the position that various
materials have been called for, such as accounts,
financials, tax audit report, etc. and the assessee has
also engaged in discussions with the Assessing Officer
in regard to the issues that arise therefrom. The full
and true disclosure of the assessee is thus not in
doubt.
35. The Full Bench has specifically gone into the
question whether an order of assessment must contain
detailed discussion in regard to a specific issue in
order that the Assessing Authority may be said to have
initially 'considered the issue'. The Bench cites the
provisions of section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act
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1872 to bring home the position that all acts
performed by a Judicial Officer in the discharge of his
regular functions would be legally presumed to have
been properly and regularly performed and executed.
Thus, even in cases where there is no discussion in
regard to specific issues, if it is established by the
assessee that all material relevant and germane to that
issue were available before the Assessing Officer,
easily discernible and part of the record, reassessment
is impermissible. Then again, it does not stand to
reason that an officer, once convinced by the
submissions of an assessee, will proceed to devote time
to recording is agreement in a detailed and reasoned
fashion. The legitimate and reasonable expectation is
that a detailed and speaking order is passed in cases
where he differs and dissents from the stand of the
assessee. On this score, the arguments of
Mr.J.Narayanasamy in this regard have no merit and
are rejected.
41. In fine, all relevant, primary particulars have
been produced/filed/furnished by the petitioner at the
first instance before the authorities, in a transparent
fashion. It is for the officer to have appreciated the
http://www.judis.nic.in 23/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
same and arrived at the necessary and appropriate
inferences at that juncture. Having missed the bus at
that point, the Department cannot seek to re-assess
the income as culled from material already on record,
as this constitutes a review of the original assessment.
Admittedly, and even as per the reasons stated, there is
no new material that has come to the notice of the
authorities and the impugned exercise is undertaken
solely on the basis of the materials already supplied by
the petitioners and available on the records of the
department. This argument of the revenue is also
consequently rejected."
22. It is pertinent to note that insofar as the judgments relied on by
the respondents that the Writ Petitions are not maintainable against the
notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are
concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment reported in
[2017] 77 taxmann.com 176 (SC) [Jeans Knit (P.) Ltd. vs. Deputy
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bangalore], has held as under:
"2. We find that the High Courts in all these cases
have dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the
appellant/assessee herein challenging the issuance of
notice under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961
http://www.judis.nic.in 24/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
and the reasons which were recorded by the Assessing
Officer for reopening the assessment. These writ
petitions are dismissed by the High Courts as not
maintainable. The aforesaid view taken is contrary to
the law laid down by this Court in Calcutta Discount
Ltd. Co. v. ITO [1961]41 ITR 191 (SC). We, thus, set
aside the impugned judgments and remit the cases to
the respective High Courts to decide the writ petitions
on merits.
3. We may make it clear that this Court has not
made any observations on the merits of the cases, i.e.
the contentions which are raised by the appellant
challenging the move of the Income Tax Authorities to
re-open the assessment. Each case shall be examined
on its own merits keeping in view the scope of judicial
review while entertaining such matters, as laid down by
this Court in various judgments."
In the above referred judgment, it was observed that the judgment
referred to by the High Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [2013]
357 ITR 357/217 Taxman 143/36 taxmann.com 36, does not apply to
the case. Therefore, a writ against the notice issued under Section 148 is
maintainable.
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23. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that the assessee
shall await for the orders to be passed by the Assessing Officer, as held
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd., vs.
Income Tax Officer and others reported in 2003(1) SCC 72, is
concerned, Paragraph No.5 of the order, the Supreme Court has observed
as under:
"5. We see no justifiable reason to interfere with
the order under challenge. However, we clarify that
when a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax
Act is issued, the proper course of action for the
noticee is to file return and if he so desires, to seek
reasons for issuing notices. The assessing officer is
bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time.
On receipt of reasons, the noticee is entitled to file
objections to issuance of notice and the assessing
officer is bound to dispose of the same by passing a
speaking order. In the instant case, as the reasons
have been disclosed in these proceedings, the
assessing officer has to dispose of the objections, if
filed, by passing a speaking order, before proceeding
with the assessment in respect of the abovesaid five
assessment years."
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24. In the instant cases, notices under Section 148 are issued,
against which, the petitioner filed the return of the particular assessment
year and also filed his reply seeking reasons. The first respondent has
given the reasons for the same, against which, the petitioner filed his
objections, which were rejected by the Assessing Authority by a speaking
order. That particular orders are under challenge.
25. It is pertinent to note that all the requirements, as observed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, have been followed by the petitioner and it is
only the rejection order which is challenged now, against which, in the
opinion of this Court, the Writ is maintainable and it cannot be said that
the petitioner has rushed to the Court without availing the alternative
remedy.
26. Further, insofar as the contention raised by the respondents that
as per explanation 1, once the Assessing Authority with due diligence has
discovered some material evidence, it will not amount to disclose the
same within the meaning of Section 147 is concerned, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that it is the assessee who can only produce the
documents and he cannot be expected to give inference to the disclosure.
Once all the primary facts are before the Assessing Authority, he requires
no further assistance by way of disclosure and it is not possible for the
http://www.judis.nic.in 27/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
assessee to draw any particular inference and communicate the same to
the Assessing Authority and explanation given to Section 147, does not
cast a duty upon the assessee to disclose the inferences in the following
lines:
"Does the duty, however, extend beyond the full
and truthful disclosure of all primary facts? In our
opinion, the answer to this question must be in the
negative. Once all the primary facts are before the
assessing authority, he requires no further assistance
by way of disclosure. It is for him to decide what
inferences of facts can be reasonably drawn and what
legal inferences have ultimately to be drawn. It is not
for somebody else - far less the assessee - to tell the
assessing authority what inferences, whether of facts
or law, should be drawn. Indeed, when it is
remembered that people often differ as regards what
inferences should be drawn from given facts, it will be
meaningless to demand that the assessee must
disclose what inferences - whether of facts or law - he
would draw from the primary facts.
If from primary facts more inferences than one
could be drawn, it would not be possible to say that
the assessee should have drawn any particular
http://www.judis.nic.in 28/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
inference and communicated it to the assessing
authority. How could an assessee be charge with
failure to communicate an inference, which he might
or might not have drawn?
It may be pointed out that the Explanation to
the sub-section has nothing to do with "inferences"
and deals only with the question whether primary
material facts not disclosed could still be said to be
constructively disclosed on the ground that with due
diligence the income-tax Officer could have
discovered them from the facts actually disclosed.
The Explanation has not the effect of enlarging the
section, by casting a duty on the assessee to disclose
"inferences" - to draw the proper inferences being the
duty imposed on the income-tax officer."
27. In the instant cases, the assessee has submitted Form-2
disclosing all the materials giving all the explanations. In such
circumstances, it cannot be said that he has not submitted all the
materials fully and truly. Therefore, once the assessee has submitted
reply; once he submitted the returns for the assessment year; and once
he has filed a reply to the notice under Section 148 and files his
objections to the reasons for issuance of 148 notice before the very same
http://www.judis.nic.in 29/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
authority, Section 147 is fully complied with. Further, the objections
raised by the assessee had been considered and rejected by the Assessing
Authority, but the reasons given by the first respondent are contrary to
the well settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.
28. In view of the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the view
that the impugned orders along with notices dated 31.03.2018, are liable
to be set aside and accordingly, set aside and consequently, the Writ
Petitions are allowed. No costs. Consequently, the connected
miscellaneous petitions are closed.
30.10.2019 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No SML To
1.The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 1, Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirapalli-620 001.
2.The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle -2, New Delhi.
http://www.judis.nic.in 30/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
3.The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax 1 - Trichy, No.44, Williams Road, Cantonment, Tiruchirappalli-620 001.
http://www.judis.nic.in 31/32 W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
M.GOVINDARAJ, J.
SML
Common Order made in W.P.(MD)Nos.19202, 19825 and 19826 of 2018
Dated: 30.10.2019
http://www.judis.nic.in 32/32
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