M/S.Cosmo Ferrites Ltd vs State Of H.P. & Others
- Citation2016 SCC OnLine HP 3711
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
When a domestic inquiry is challenged before a Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground that no Defence Assistant was provided and the proceedings were conducted in English, absent any contemporaneous written objection by the workman to the language of proceedings or a written request for representation, and where the record shows the workman signed day-to-day inquiry proceedings without demur, the Labour Court cannot draw an inference that denial of Defence Assistant or language of proceedings vitiated the inquiry based on evidence of retrospective verbal claims made after the inquiry concluded. The right to be represented by a Defence Assistant in domestic disciplinary proceedings is not a statutory or absolute right but depends on the express terms of the organisation's standing orders or service rules; in the absence of such rules, an employer cannot be faulted for not providing representation. Where a domestic inquiry is conducted by a management officer and the workman fails to raise an objection to the appointment of that officer at the time of inquiry or to allege malafides against him during the proceedings, the High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot, on reviewing the record, hold that the inquiry was vitiated merely because the Inquiry Officer was not examined as a witness by the management, if the complete inquiry proceedings bearing the workman's daily signatures are placed on record before the Labour Court and the facts are established by documentary evidence. Where the workman's own testimony and admissions in cross-examination reveal that he signed day-to-day inquiry proceedings, received written communication about the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, participated in the inquiry on all days, and failed to lodge any contemporaneous written protest against the language of proceedings, a Labour Court's finding based on speculation that the workman could not understand English in contradiction of documented evidence that he read and signed English-language documents during and after the inquiry constitutes a misreading of the evidence warranting interference by a writ court on the ground of perversity.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
. Judgment Reserved on: 26.08.2016
Date of decision: 07.10.2016
M/s.Cosmo Ferrites Ltd. ....Petitioner
Versus State of H.P. & Others ....Respondents
of Coram
The Hon'ble Mr.Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. rt Whether approved for reporting ?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner: Mr.Rahul Mahajan, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1: Mr.Rupinder Singh Thakur, Additional Advocate General with Mr.Rajat Chauhan, Law Officer.
For Respondent No.2: Mr.Rohit Sharma & Mr.Anuj Gupta, Advocate.
Sandeep Sharma,J.
By way of present petition filed under Article 226/227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-Company has laid
challenge to the award dated 30th June, 2010 passed by Labour
Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Shimla, H.P. (for short `Tribunal')
in Ref.No.93 of 2000, whereby the learned Tribunal below, while
allowing the claim put forth on behalf of respondent-workman, has
held him entitled for reinstatement in service with seniority and
1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgement?
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 2 continuity alongtwith full back wages from the date of his illegal
termination i.e 19th January, 1999.
2. Documents available on record suggest that
.
appropriate government made reference under Section 10(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act')
in the following terms:
"Whether the termination of services of Shri Om Prakash ex worker by the Management of
of M/s.Cosmo Ferrities Ltd. Parwanoo, District Solan, HP w.e.f. 19.1.1999, without compliance of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by holding the enquiry ex parte without affording the reasonable opportunity of being rt heard to the worker in consonance with the principles of fair-play and natural justice, is legal and justified? If not to what relief of
service benefits and amount of compensation, Shri Om Prakash is entitled to?"
3. In nutshell, respondent-workman claimed that he had
joined services of the petitioner-Company in the month of June,
1989 and continued as such till 19th January, 1999, when his
services were dispensed with illegally without resorting to the
provisions of the Act. Respondent-workman further set up a case
before the learned Tribunal below that the Management of the
petitioner-Company always intended to dispense with his services
due to his involvement in Trade Unions. Accordingly,
Management in pre-planned manner constituted domestic inquiry
against him, which was merely an eyewash. Respondent-
workman further contended that even the charge-sheet issued vide
letter dated Ist November, 1998 was biased, unfair, vague and
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defective for the reason that it was in English language and as
such, he, being illiterate person, was unable to understand the
contents contained in the same. He also claimed that list of
.
witnesses of the Management as well as documents in support of
charges were not supplied to him at any point of time by the
Management before initiating alleged disciplinary proceedings
against him. Respondent-workman further contended that in the
of charge-sheet, Management itself declared strike to be illegal for the
purpose of specifically framing charges against him. Moreover, rt Management of the petitioner-Company got appointed Senior
Manager of the Factory as an Inquiry Officer with a view to get
desired results. He further stated that Inquiry Officer conducted
the proceedings without settlement of procedure because at no
point of time he was made aware that what kind of procedure
would be adopted in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against
him at the behest of Management. He also alleged that no
opportunity of being heard was ever afforded to him because
despite his specific request, no Defence Assistant was provided to
him. Similarly, he claimed that Management despite knowing fully
well that respondent-workman was not conversant with English
language, Inquiry Officer conducted the proceedings in English, as
a result of which great prejudice is caused to him. Respondent-
workman further claimed that Management witnesses were partial
and at no point of time independent witnesses were examined and
as such inquiry, if any, conducted against him was eyewash and
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one side story put forth on behalf of the Management of the
petitioner-Company.
4. Apart from above, respondent-workman also claimed
.
that he was not afforded proper opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses of the Management solely for the reason that he could
not have known as to what had been written in the proceedings
which were in English. Since inquiry report was also prepared in
of English, he was not aware with regard to the discussion, if any,
qua the version put forth by him during alleged disciplinary
proceedings.
rt Respondent-workman claimed that since entire
inquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of principle of
natural justice, same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Respondent-workman also stated before the Tribunal below that
punishment imposed against him by the disciplinary authority is
not in consonance with the alleged charges leveled against him
and as such dismissal order issued vide order dated 19th
September, 1999 deserves to be quashed and set aside and he
deserves to be reinstated with seniority, continuity, full back
wages and other consequential service benefits by setting aside the
inquiry proceedings.
5. Petitioner-Company by way of counter claim/written
statement disputed the claim of respondent-workman by raising
preliminary objections qua the maintainability of dispute, if any,
before the Tribunal. On merits, petitioner-Company while refuting
the allegations made in the claim specifically stated that all the
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relevant material was duly supplied to respondent-workman
during the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Officer.
Petitioner-Company also contended that inquiry proceedings were
.
conducted in most fair and proper manner by following the
principles of natural justice and there is no merit in the claim put
forth on behalf of respondent-workman. Petitioner-Company
specifically stated before the Tribunal below that at no point of
of time during inquiry, objection, if any, was ever raised by the
workman that proceedings should be conducted in Hindi and he rt be allowed to be represented through authorized representative.
Similarly, petitioner-Company stated before Tribunal that no
objection was ever raised with regard to appointment of Inquiry
Officer and as such at this stage no objection, if any, with regard
to appointment of Mr.Yatish Khurana can be raised, who was
admittedly Senior Manager in the Company at that relevant time.
Petitioner-Company also contended that the petitioner had
participated in inquiry proceedings and he was duly supplied show
cause notice, charge sheet, list of witnesses and other relevant
record in Hindi also and as such it is not justified on his part to
allege that he had been condemned unheard, rather record would
go to show that fair and reasoned inquiry had been conducted and
due and admissible opportunity was afforded to respondent-
workman to defend himself. Petitioner-Company specifically
contended before Tribunal below that since respondent-workman
never objected for holding inquiry in English, there was no
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occasion for the Management to conduct inquiry proceedings in
Hindi. In the aforesaid back ground petitioner-Company sought
dismissal of the claim put forth on behalf of respondent-workman.
.
6. Respondent-workman, by way of rejoinder, reaffirmed
and reiterated his claim by denying the reply filed on behalf of the
petitioner-Company. Learned Tribunal on the basis of pleadings
available on record framed following issues:-
of "1. Whether the termination o the petitioner is illegal and unjustified as alleged?
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable rt as alleged?
3. Whether termination was ordered by respondent aftr holding a fair and legal
enquiry as alleged?
4. Relief."
7. Subsequently, learned Tribunal below vide impugned
award dated 30th June, 2010 upheld the claim of the respondent-
workman, as a result of which, present petitioner-Company was
directed to reinstate respondent-workman in service with seniority
and continuity alongwith full back wages from the date of his
illegal termination i.e. 19th January, 1999.
8. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-
Company, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
award, approached this Court by way of present writ petition,
praying therein for quashing and setting aside of award dated 30th
June, 2010 passed in reference no.93/2000 by learned Tribunal
below by issuing writ in the nature of certiorari.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 7 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the record of the case.
10. Close scrutiny of material available on record clearly
.
suggests that respondent-workman was engaged by the petitioner-
Company in the month of June, 1989, where he continued to work
till 19th January, 1999, when he was ordered to be dismissed from
his service, pursuant to disciplinary proceedings initiated against
of him. It also emerge from the record that since respondent-
workman was involved in illegal strike, disciplinary proceedings rt were initiated against him and on the basis of material adduced
therein by the Management, Inquiry Officer held him guilty of
misconduct, as a result of which he was awarded penalty of
dismissal from service vide order dated 19th January, 1999.
11. Careful perusal of impugned award passed by learned
Tribunal below suggests that learned Tribunal below, on the basis
of evidence led on record by respective parties, came to the
conclusion that petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to get
his case defended through Defence Assistant. Learned Tribunal
below also came to the conclusion that proper opportunity of
cross-examining the witnesses of Management, who were not
independent, was also not afforded to respondent-workman.
Accordingly, learned Tribunal, while upholding the claim put forth
on behalf of the respondent-workman, came to the conclusion that
inquiry conducted against respondent-workman cannot be said to
have been conducted by following the principle of natural justice.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 8 Similarly, learned Tribunal below, while examining the letter dated
26th November, 1998 (Ex.RC), whereby Shri Yatish Khurana was
appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct inquiry into the charges
.
leveled against respondent-workman, observed that since
Mr.Yatish Khurana was not examined as witness by the petitioner-
Company in support of its contentions, inquiry proceedings, if any,
conducted by petitioner-Company cannot be said to have been
of proved in accordance with law for the reasons that Shri Yatish
Khurana, Inquiry Officer, was the best person to depose before the rt Court that whether proper procedure was followed at the time of
inquiry or not.
12. Similarly, Tribunal below came to the conclusion that
Inquiry Officer had not made known to respondent-workman as to
what procedure he was to follow while conducting the inquiry. In
this regard learned Tribunal, on the basis of material made
available to it, came to the conclusion that no statement of
respondent-workman had been recorded that he did not
choose/opt to get the services of Defence Assistant despite the fact
that in this regard, request was made by respondent-workman.
Similarly, Tribunal came to the conclusion that there is nothing in
the inquiry proceedings that respondent-workman had agreed to
get conducted the inquiry proceedings in English, which he was
unable to understand. Learned Tribunal below, while placing
reliance upon school leaving certificate Ex.P-2, concluded that it
stands duly proved on record that the respondent-workman had
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studied up to 3rd standard and as such it can be safely inferred
that he was unable to understand English. Tribunal below, while
allowing claim put forth on behalf of the respondent-workman,
.
also came to the conclusion that no counter evidence has been led
by petitioner-Company in order to show that respondent-workman
was qualified enough to know English language and as such great
prejudice was caused to him.
of
13. At this stage, it may be noticed that petitioner-
Company, by way of placing entire inquiry proceedings, made an rt attempt to prove before Tribunal below that copies of day to day
proceedings, including statements of the witnesses, were supplied
to the respondent-workman, on which he appended his
signatures, but learned Tribunal was of the view that it was
obligatory upon the Inquiry Officer to have supplied to the
respondent-workman, copies of those proceedings. For the failure
of the Inquiry Officer to supply the copies, great prejudice has
been caused to the respondent-workman, who was unable to
defend himself in the enquiry, which was conducted against him.
14. Similarly, Tribunal concluded that perusal of Ex.PB,
copy of charge-sheet, itself suggests that no documents as well as
list of witnesses of the Management were supplied to respondent-
workman and as such, it cannot be said that due and proper
procedure was followed by the petitioner-Company while
conducting disciplinary proceedings against respondent-workman.
Apart from above, Tribunal also observed that it is revealed from
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the record that Management examined witnesses i.e. Ashok
Dhiman (MRW-1), Ved Ram (MRW-2), Rajinder Tahkur (MRW-3)
and Bhim Dutt (MRW-4), during enquiry proceedings. Perusal of
.
their statements clearly shows that the same were recorded in
question and answer form, which were in English. Hence, it
cannot be said that the respondent-workman was afforded
opportunity to cross-examine them in question and answer form,
of which were admittedly in English.
15. Learned Tribunal, after perusing the inquiry record, rt also found that one Shri S.C. Katoch, who had conducted inquiry
proceedings on behalf of the Management, was also not examined
as a witness and as such Management was not able to prove
inquiry proceedings, which as per them was conducted in most
fair manner after following due procedure. As per Tribunal, had
the Management examined Shri S.C. Katoch, Inquiry Officer, it
could have been known that whether the Inquiry Officer had
followed the proper procedure while conducting the inquiry or not.
16. If the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal
below is read in its entirety, it clearly emerge that following factors
weighed heavily with the Tribunal while allowing the claim of the
respondent-workman:-
1. Charge sheet served upon the respondent-
workman was not accompanied with any document or list of witnesses.
2. Respondent-workman was not informed about the procedure which was to be followed by the Inquiry Officer in order to conduct the inquiry.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 11 3. Inquiry proceedings were conducted in English by Inquiry Officer fully knowing that respondent- workman is only studied up to 3rd standard.
.
4. Despite there being specific request by the
respondent-workman, he was not provided with Defence Assistant during inquiry proceedings.
5. Shri Yatish Khurana, Inquiry Officer was not examined by the petitioner-Company before the Tribunal below, who could prove that inquiry proceedings placed on record by the petitioner-
of Company was conducted in fair and proper manner by following due procedure as laid down.
6. Lastly petitioner-Company failed to examine Shri rt S.C. Katoch, representative of the Management, who could depose before the Tribunal below that Inquiry Officer had followed due procedure while
conducting inquiry.
7. No proper opportunity was afforded to respondent-workman to cross-examine the witnesses of petitioner-Company since they all
were examined and their statements were recorded in question and answer form, which was in English
17. On the aforesaid points, as have been culled out by
this Court, after reading award of the Labour Court in its entirety,
learned Tribunal below accepted the claim of the respondent-
workman and held him entitled for reinstatement with benefit of
continuity of service and seniority with full back wages.
18. Now, this Court would be examining the aforesaid
illegalities pointed out by Tribunal in the light of the defence taken
by the petitioner-Company before learned Tribunal below as well
as submissions having been made on behalf of Shri Rahul
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Mahajan, learned counsel representing the petitioner-Company
before this Court.
19. If, in nutshell, written statement of petitioner-
.
Company is perused, it emerge that the petitioner-Company
submitted before the Tribunal below that inquiry was conducted in
most proper and fair manner and due opportunity of being heard
was afforded to the respondent-workman by the Inquiry Officer
of and as such there is no violation of principle of natural justice.
Petitioner-Company also claimed that since charge against the rt respondent-workman was duly proved and thereafter on having
served a notice upon him and receiving reply, his services were
discharged by imposing lesser punishment. Petitioner-Company
also contended before the Tribunal below that respondent-
workman was served with charge-sheet alongwith documents and
he was afforded opportunity to examine defence witnesses and
further opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and it cannot
be said that Inquiry Officer had not followed the prescribed
procedure. Close scrutiny of written statement filed on behalf of
petitioner-Company suggests that it stated before the Tribunal
that since respondent-workman at no point of time objected
during inquiry proceedings before the Inquiry Officer that the
same should not be conducted in English. At no point of time he
made any request to authorities to conduct inquiry in Hindi and
as such there was no occasion for them to conduct the enquiry
proceedings in Hindi.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 13 20. Shri Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel representing the
petitioner-Company, vehemently argued that bare perusal of
impugned award dated 30th June, 2010 suggests that the same is
.
wrong, illegal, bad in law based upon surmises and conjectures,
non-appreciation and mis-appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence on record and as such same deserves to be quashed and
set aside.
of
21. Mr.Mahajan, further contended that learned Tribunal
has miserably failed to appreciate that respondent-workman was rt issued charge-sheet in respect of misconduct, which was serious
in nature of inciting, instigating the workers of the petitioner-
Company to restrain from work, abetting, organizing meeting and
demonstration inside the petitioner-company/industrial
establishment with a view to intimidate the Management so that it
concedes to the unreasonable, unjustified demand of the
workmen, shouting and slogans against the executive of the
company in abusive defamatory language and to resort to illegal
tool down/strike and to threaten the workers to stop works, as
such he was rightly dismissed from service that too after
completion of disciplinary proceedings, which were conducted in
most fair and proper manner as is evident from the complete
inquiry proceedings placed on record by the petitioner-Company.
22. Mr.Mahajan further contended that once respondent-
workman failed to reply to the charge sheet, he was given reminder
and ultimately he filed reply, which was found unsatisfactory and
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therefore domestic inquiry was conducted, wherein charges in
respect of the charge-sheet Ex.RB stood duly proved and
thereafter 2nd show cause notice was issued and services of
.
respondent-workman were dispensed with after receipt of his
reply, which was found unsatisfactory.
23. Mr.Mahajan further contended that learned Tribunal
below has fallen in grave error while not appreciating that it had
of very limited power under the Act to interfere in the matter of
punishment imposed upon the delinquent workers as far as rt penalty qua the major misconduct is concerned. In the present
case, it stood duly proved on record that respondent-workman
insisted or abetted his fellow workers in the Company against the
Management and as such there is no illegality and infirmity in
dismissal order issued against him by the Management which was
passed after following due procedure of law. While adverting to
the findings returned by the Tribunal below that Defence Assistant
was not made available to respondent-workman despite his
request, Mr.Mahajan strenuously argued that aforesaid finding is
contrary to documentary and oral evidence available on record
because respondent-workman at no point of time ever asked to be
represented through the Defence Assistant. To substantiate his
aforesaid arguments, he invited the attention of this Court to the
cross-examination conducted on respondent-workman, wherein he
specifically admitted that he had not given in writing to the Inquiry
Officer to provide a Defence Assistant but orally requested him.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 15 Similarly, Mr.Mahajan stated that right to be represented in an
inquiry by Defence Assistant is not a statutory right, rather, the
same depends upon the Rules and Regulations. Thus, it is evident
.
from the statement of respondent-workman himself, who appeared
as PW-1, that at no point of time he ever made any request to be
represented through a Defence Assistant and as such learned
Tribunal below has fallen in grave error while concluding that no
of Defence Assistant was made available to respondent-workman on
his behalf.
24. rtSimilarly, Mr.Mahajan stated that learned Tribunal
failed to appreciate that just, fair and proper domestic inquiry was
conducted, wherein day to day inquiry proceedings were duly
signed by respondent-workman, the representatives of petitioner-
Company and Inquiry Officer. He also invited the specific
attention of this Court to the cross-examination conducted on
respondent-workman wherein he stated that "charge sheet was
received and reply was given". In his cross-examination,
respondent-workman also admitted that "when inquiry was
started, I signed every day inquiry proceedings and all the
proceedings bear my signatures as the Inquiry Officer used to take
my signatures in the proceedings every day." Similarly,
Mr.Mahajan invited the attention of this Court to the admission
made by respondent-workman in cross-examination, wherein he
stated that "it is correct that he was I was informed by the
Management about the Enquiry Officer and I received the letter."
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 16 25. Mr.Mahajan forcefully contended that since
respondent-workman in his cross-examination himself admitted
his signatures on the cross-examination of the witnesses, Suresh,
.
Mukesh at point B & C, findings returned by the learned Tribunal
below cannot be said to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence, wherein it has been concluded that no opportunity of
cross-examination was afforded to respondent-workman while
of cross-examining the witnesses produced on behalf of the
petitioner-Company. Mr.Mahajan made this Court to travel rt through inquiry proceedings Ex.RD-1 to RD-16 to demonstrate
that on each and every order respondent-workman has appended
his signatures, meaning thereby that he was made aware of each
and every order passed on day to day basis during inquiry
proceedings.
26. Mr.Mahajan also contended that bare perusal of
proceedings, as referred hereinabove, nowhere suggests that at
any point of time, objection, if any, was raised by the respondent-
workman with regard to conducting of disciplinary proceedings in
English.
27. This Court, after hearing aforesaid submissions
having been made on behalf o of Mr.Mahajan as well as
documents referred by him, is of the view that learned Tribunal
has fallen in error while concluding that no fair and proper
domestic inquiry was held, wherein day to day inquiry proceedings
were not supplied to respondent-workman because this Court had
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an occasion to peruse Ex.RD-1 to RD-16 i.e. inquiry proceedings,
perusal whereof clearly suggests that on each and every day
proceedings, respondent-workman had appended his signatures
.
alongwith Inquiry Officer and other relevant persons. Similarly,
this Court nowhere finds that at any point of time respondent-
workman raised objection with regard to holding of inquiry in
English. If respondent-workman had any difficulty in
of understanding proceedings in English, he could always lodge his
protest in writing to the Inquiry Officer with a request to conduct rt inquiry in Hindi but same was not done by him. Similarly, careful
perusal of cross-examination conducted on this witness itself
suggests that when inquiry was started respondent-workman
signed everyday inquiry proceedings and he was also informed by
the Management with regard to appointment of Inquiry Officer.
Respondent-workman categorically admitted in his cross-
examination that he received letter in this regard. Hence, in view
of candid admission having been made on behalf of respondent-
workman, this Court really finds it difficult to accept the
conclusion drawn by the learned Tribunal below, while allowing
the claim of the respondent-workman, wherein it concluded that
inquiry was not conducted in proper and fair manner and no
opportunity of being heard was afforded to respondent-workman.
Similarly, respondent-workman himself in his cross-examination
admitted that at no point of time he i.e. PW-1 made request to be
represented through the Defence Assistant. In his cross-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 18 examination he specifically admitted that he never made any
request in writing but orally he requested the Inquiry Officer, but
after perusing the entire evidence and proceedings, this Court
.
really find it difficult to accept the version put forth on behalf of
respondent-workman that he had orally asked the Inquiry Officer
to provide him Defence Assistant.
28. Mr.Mahajan vehemently argued that the impugned
of award is not based on the correct appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence produced on the record. He also stated rt that bare perusal of impugned award itself suggests that the same
is contrary to the facts as well as material placed on record by the
petitioner-Company and as such same deserves to be quashed and
set aside. Mr.Mahajan, with a view to demonstrate that learned
Tribunal has fallen in grave error while returning the findings
contrary to record, invited the attention of this Court to various
documents available on record. Apart from above, Mr.Mahjajan
made various submissions to prove that the impugned judgment is
perverse and is a result of misreading and misinterpretation of
facts as well as of law, which are not being reproduced for the sake
of brevity and same would be dealt with specifically by this Court
while examining the correctness and genuineness of the impugned
award passed by the Tribunal below.
29. Mr.Mahajan further argued that respondent-workman
was not able to prove on record that he was not gainfully employed
during period of termination and as such learned Tribunal below
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had no reason to grant him full back wages while holding him
entitled for reinstatement.
30. Mr. Mahajan stated that respondent-workman himself
.
admitted that during period of termination he was doing
agricultural work at home, meaning thereby that he was gainfully
employed in terms of the aforesaid judgment.
31. In this regard Mr.Mahajan placed reliance on North-
of East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs.
M.Nagangouda, (2007)10 SCC 765, wherein the Hon'ble
"17.
rt Supreme Court has held as under:-
On the said question, we are unable to accept the
reasoning of the Labour Court that the income received by the respondent from agricultural pursuits could not be equated with income from gainful employment in any establishment. In our view, "gainful employment" would also include self- employment wherefrom income is generated.
Income either from employment in an establishment or from self- employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same. Since the
respondent was earning some amount from his agricultural pursuits to maintain himself, the Labour Court was not justified in holding that
merely because the respondent was receiving agricultural income, he could not be treated to be engaged in "gainful employment".
32. Per contra, Mr.Anuj Gupta vehemently argued that
bare perusal of the award passed by Tribunal below itself suggest
that same is based upon correct appreciation of the evidence
adduced on record by the respective parties and as such no
interference, whatsoever, of this Court warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the case. While referring to the impugned award,
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Mr.Gupta forcefully contended that each and every aspect of the
matter has been dealt with meticulously by the Tribunal below
while answering the reference referred to by the appropriate
.
Government and as such present petition deserves to be dismissed
being devoid of merit. Mr.Gupta also reminded this Court of its
limited powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to re-
appreciate evidence as well as findings of fact recorded by the
of learned Tribunal below while examining the genuineness and
correctness of the petition preferred under Article 226 of the
33. rt Constitution of India.
This Court is conscious of the fact that it has very
limited jurisdiction to re-appreciate the findings of fact returned by
learned Tribunal below, while exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in terms of judgment
passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi
vs. M/s.Hindalco Industries Ltd. 2014 AIR SCW 315, wherein
the Court held as under:-
"16. .........The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of
certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
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the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
.
exercising it is no entitled to act as an Appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened for questioned in
writ proceedings. nA error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ
of of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the rt impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and
material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a
writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.
17. The judgments mentioned above can be read with the judgment of this Court in Harjinder Singh's case (supra), the relevant paragraph of which reads as under:
21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and / or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are
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required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which
.
mandate that the State should secure a
social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the
common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
10.... The concept of social and economic
of justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.
18.
rt A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower Courts
has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting
evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant."
[Emphasis added]
34. However, careful perusal of the aforesaid judgment
suggests that if Court, while examining the award, comes to the
conclusion that same is perverse and is not based upon the
correct appreciation of evidence/material available on record, it
can look into the evidence with a view to ensure that the award
passed by the Tribunal below is not perverse and same is based
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upon correct appreciation of evidence. In the present case, this
Court, after hearing the submissions having been made on behalf
of petitioner-Company and perusing documentary evidence
.
available on record, is of the firm view that learned Tribunal below
has fallen in grave error while not appreciating the material
evidence adduced on record by the petitioner-Company to
substantiate that due and proper procedure was followed by the
of Management of the petitioner-Company before dismissing
respondent-workman.
35. rt At this stage, this Court solely with a view to examine
correctness of the award passed by learned Tribunal below deems
it fit to reproduce here-in-below the statement of PW-1
respondent-workman:
"I was appointed as Operator in the respondent company since January, 1989, as per my appointment letter Ex.P-1. I was removed from the service on 20.1.1999 after holding the enquiry. I am educated
upto 3rd standard, as per my certificate Ex.P-2. Our union was formed in 1997 and I was elected as a Joint Secretary. Again said the union was already
existing in the factory prior to my joining. We were demanding the over time as per law as the company was not making the payment as per norms. We have gone with this demand to the Labour Officer who did
nothing. The strike was called for non payment of over time. The matter was compromised on 20.11.1998 as per compromise Mark-X. (Objected to). Rs.1500/- were paid to us and we were asked to join the duties. Objected to nothing has been mentioned in the settlement. After two months the re-conciliation enquiry was instituted against me and Factory Manager, Mr.Yatish Khurana was the Inquiry Officer. No procedure of enquiry was explained to me by the Inquiry Officer. No document was given to me by the Inquiry Officer even no document was supplied alongwith the Charge-sheet. No list of witness was supplied to me. No witness was recorded in my presence. I was not afforded any opportunity to
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examine my witnesses. My statement was not recorded in the enquiry. I am unable to read the enquiry proceedings given to me. No quarrel had taken place during the strike period. I had given application Mark-X-1 to the Inquiry Officer. The
.
Inquiry Officer had not supplied me the hindi version
of the show cause notice. I had given the reply of the show cause notice which is the original and is Ex.P-3. Similar charge sheet was given to Pammi Dutt, who was the President of the Union. Pammi Dutt was
retained after enquiry, but I was removed. Enquiry of Pammi was also conducted. No proper enquiry was conducted against me. All the allegations leveled against me are false. I may be re-instated with all benefits.
of Xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
All the documents Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-14 are received by me and bears my signatures. I was aware about my salary and could read the figure. rt Volunteered I could not read that what is written in Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-14. It is correct that I received the charge-sheet and given the reply, but it had not
written by me that I am unable to read English and I may be given the Hindi version of the document. When the enquiry was started, I signed the every day enquiry proceeding. All the proceedings bear my signatures as the Inquiry Officer was taking the
signatures on the proceedings every day. Volunteered I told the Inquiry Officer that it may be written in Hindi, as I could not understand English. There is no document vide which I requested the Inquiry Officer for Hindi version except letters dated 12.1.1999 and
15.1.1999. It is correct that I signed the application in English on 12.1.1999 which is at Point 'A'. It is wrong
to suggest that I was asked by the Inquiry Officer for my evidence. It is wrong to suggest that I was given due opportunity to produce my evidence. It is also wrong that I failed to produce my evidence. It is
wrong that the management has supplied the list of witnesses to the Inquiry Officer as well as to me. It is correct that I received the 2nd show cause notice dated 6.1.1999 after the conclusion of the enquiry, which is Ex.R-15. I have received the second show cause notice in Hindi when I asked for the same, which is Ex.R-16. It is correct that I was given the termination order in Hindi as well as English, which is Ex.R-17 and Ex.R-18. No enquiry report in Hindi was received, but enquiry report in English was received. My application for appointment is Ex.R-19 which is signed by me. I cannot state that in the settlement, it was decided that only the suspension orders against me and the President Pammi Dutt were reviewed, but the
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disciplinary enquiry would continue. I had not signed the settlement. No letter was received from Labour Officer regarding illegality of strike. The letter is Mark-RX. It is correct that I was informed by the management about the Inquiry Officer and I received
.
the letter. Suresh and Mukesh witness were not
examined in my presence. It is also wrong that the stated before the Inquiry Officer that they were threatened by me. I admit my signatures on the cross-examination of the witnesses at Point 'B' and
'C'. Volunteered that I had not cross-examined the witnesses. I admit my signatures in all the enquiry proceedings. Volunteer that I was signing the documents as and when asked by the Inquiry Officer. I had not given any complaint against the Inquiry
of Officer and the management to the Labour Officer that my signatures are being taken forcibly by the Inquiry Officer. Leave application Ex.R-20 is signed by me, which is for leave. Volunteer I got the application written from other colleagues. It is correct that I had rt not mentioned in my petition that I was removed and Pammi Datt was kept in service. My petition is in English, but signed by me, but I do not know what is
written in my petition. No suit was filed against me and Pammi Dutt restraining us not to interfering us in the affairs of the workers. Copy of which is Mark RY. It is wrong that at the time of strike I was simply member and not the Joint Secretary. It is wrong to
suggest that proper enquiry was conducted against me and proper opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses were given to me. I had not given in writing to the Inquiry Officer to provide me Defence Assistant but orally I requested the Inquiry Officer. It is wrong
that I was removed due to my misconduct."
36. Bare perusal of the aforesaid statement of PW-1 itself
suggests that learned Tribunal has fallen in grave error while
returning findings that irregularities (as have been numbered
above) were committed by the Inquiry Officer while conducting
disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, this Court after perusing the
statement, as referred to above, finds that respondent-workman
never objected to the appointment of Mr.Yatish Khurana as
Inquiry Officer. Rather, in cross-examination he himself admitted
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that he was informed by the Management about the Inquiry Officer
and he had received the letter. Had he any objection in the
appointment of Yatish Khurana as Inquiry Officer, he could have
.
then and there objected to the same by making written
communication to the Management. This Court also finds that
respondent-workman participated in each and everyday inquiry
and signed each and everyday inquiry proceedings. Vide letter
of dated 12.1.1999, workman objected to the proceedings conducted
by the Inquiry Officer in English but by that time inquiry rt proceedings had already come to an end.
inquiry proceedings, respondent-Company had issued second After concluding the
show cause notice dated 6.1.1999 directing therein the
respondent-workman to explain that why he be not punished for
major mis-conduct as has been concluded by the Inquiry Officer.
Issuance of show cause notice dated 6.1.1999 itself suggests that
inquiry proceedings had come to an end before 6.1.1999 and as
such there was no occasion, whatsoever, for respondent-workman
to write letter dated 12.1.1999 requesting therein to conduct
inquiry proceedings in English. Rather perusal of letter dated
12.1.1999 compel this Court to infer that it was after thought by
the respondent-workman to create evidence in his favour that
petitioner-Company purposely to its advantage conducted
proceedings in English fully knowing well that respondent-
workman does not know English. Similarly, this Court noticed
that on letter dated 12.1.1999, respondent-workman has
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appended his signatures in English. In cross-examination,
respondent-workman himself admitted that there is no document
vide which he requested the Inquiry Officer to conduct proceedings
.
in Hindi version except letters dated 12.1.1999 and 15.1.1999.
This Court has already discussed hereinabove that letter dated
12.1.1999 had no relevance because by that time inquiry
proceedings had already been concluded. Similarly, this Court
of finds that learned Tribunal has fallen in error while concluding
that no opportunity of producing evidence was afforded to rt respondent-workman by the Inquiry Officer. It is not understood
that how Inquiry Officer could compel the delinquent employee to
produce evidence. It is not the case of the respondent-workman
that he was prevented by the Inquiry Officer for leading evidence
in his support, rather perusal of record suggests that Inquiry
Officer afforded reasonable opportunity to respondent-workman to
produce the evidence, which he failed to produce. But delinquent
official himself stated that he does not want to produce any
evidence.
37. Now, adverting to another illegality having been
pointed out by Tribunal that Inquiry Officer was not examined,
this Court is of the view that once Management by way of placing
on record Ex.RD-1 to RD-16 had made available complete inquiry
proceedings before the Tribunal, which was admittedly signed by
the respondent-workman, there was no necessity, if any, for
Management to site Mr.Yatish Khurana as a witness in the case.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:02 :::HCHP 28 Respondent-workman in his statement has categorically admitted
that he appended his signatures on each and every day's
proceedings and he identified all the signatures of Mr.Yatish
.
Khurana in inquiry proceedings Ex.RD-1 to RD-16 as such there
was no question of adverse inference having been drawn against
the petitioner-Company for not citing Mr.Yatish Khurana as
witness. This Court, while perusing inquiry proceedings, also
of found that respondent-workman has signed all the exhibits in
English. Similarly, leave application (Ex.R-20) sent by petitioner is rt also written and signed in English and as such this Court finds it
difficult to be in agreement with the findings returned by the
learned Tribunal below that the petitioner-Company knowing fully
well that respondent-workman did not know English, conducted
inquiry proceedings in English. Rather, petitioner-Company by
placing on record certain documents, especially Ex.R-20 has been
able to prove on record that respondent-workman use to write,
sign and could read English and was aware about the documents,
which were in English and similarly second show cause notice
dated 6.1.1999, which was issued to the respondent-workman,
was in English. But interestingly at no point of time, during
proceedings of the case, respondent-workman raised issue with
regard to conducting of proceedings in English or making available
the services of Defence Assistant. It stands admitted in his cross-
examination by respondent-workman that charge-sheet was
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received and reply was made by him and he signed every day
inquiry proceedings.
38. In view of his specific admission that he had not made
.
any written request to make available the services of Defence
Assistant and to conduct inquiry in Hindi, this Court really finds it
difficult to accept the findings returned by the learned Tribunal
below and this Court after perusing the record made available is of
of the view that learned Tribunal below has misread and
misinterpreted the evidence led on record which was sufficient to
workman rt conclude that petitioner-Company dismissed the respondent-
after following due procedure of disciplinary
proceedings.
39. This Court, after carefully perusing the evidence
available on record as well as submissions having been made on
behalf of learned counsel representing the parties, is not in a
position to concur with the findings returned by the Tribunal
below that Inquiry Officer committed illegalities while conducting
disciplinary proceedings because bare perusal of statement made
by PW-1 i.e. respondent-workman, itself suggests that at no point
of time he raised issue, if any, with regard to holding of inquiry in
Hindi during proceedings. He categorically admitted in cross-
examination that he had not sent any communication to Inquiry
Officer praying therein for providing Defence Assistant as well
holding of inquiry proceedings in Hindi and as such this Court is
of the view that learned Tribunal below failed to appreciate the
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evidence on record in its right perspective, rather it drawn its own
inferences and conclusions which are admittedly contrary to the
records as has been discussed in detail hereinabove.
.
40. Otherwise also, Defence Assistant cannot be claimed
as a matter of right by the delinquent official. Rather, decision, if
any, with regard to providing of Defence Assistant depends upon
the standing order of a particular organization/management. In
of the present case, this Court was unable to lay its hands to any
document placed on record by respondent-workman suggestive of rt the fact that management in its standing order had specific
provisions of providing Defence Assistant to a delinquent official
during disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, in the absence of
specific prayer having been made on behalf of delinquent official to
conduct proceedings in Hindi, there was no occasion for Inquiry
Officer to conduct proceedings in English, on which admittedly
respondent-workman appended his signatures daily without any
demur. Though respondent-workman raised issue with regard to
appointment of Officer of Management as Inquiry Officer but
interestingly there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that
delinquent official at no point of time raised issue of malafide, if
any, against Inquiry Officer and as such this Court sees no
illegality in appointing officer of the Management as an Inquiry
Officer.
41. At this stage, this Court, in support of aforesaid
reasoning/findings returned by it while holding that impugned
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award passed by the learned Tribunal is not based upon correct
appreciation of facts as well as law, intends to place reliance upon
following judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court:-
.
42. In South Indian Cashew Factories Workers' Union
vs. Kerala State Cashew Development Corpn.Ltd. and Others,
(2006) 5 SCC 302, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
of "10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the fact that the enquiry officer was an officer of the management itself affected the fairness of the enquiry. Further his biased approach was evident from the unnecessary observations made by him. He, therefore, rt contended that the view of the learned Single Judge was the correct one and should be restored. Learned counsel for the respondent
No.1 on the other hand supported the impugned order of the High Court.
11. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.
Labour Court, (1970) 1 LLJ 23 (SC) this Court has
held that merely because the Enquiry Officer is an employee of the Management it cannot lead to the assumption that he is bound to decide the case in favour of the Management.
12. In Saran Motors (P) Ltd. v. Vishwanath, (1964)2 LLJ 139 (SC) this Court held as follows:
(LLJ p.141)
"It is well-known that enquiries of this type are generally conducted by officers of the employer
companies and in the absence of any special bias attributable of a particular officer, it has never been held that the enquiry is bad just because it is conducted by an officer of the employer."
13. Therefore, finding of the Labour Court that enquiry was vitiated because it was conducted by an officer of the Management cannot be sustained.
14. The only other ground found by the Labour Court against the enquiry officer is that he made some unnecessary observations and, therefore, he was
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biased. The plea that enquiry officer was biased was not raised during the enquiry or pleadings before the Labour Court or in earlier proceedings before the High Court. The bias of the enquiry officer has to be specifically pleaded and proved
.
before the adjudicator. Such a plea was
significantly absent before the Labour Court. We also note that the Labour Court itself found that the enquiry officer relied on the evidence adduced in the enquiry and its findings were not
perverse. After such a finding, even if he has stated some unwarranted observations, it cannot be stated that report is baised. In TELCO v. S.C. Prasad, (1969) 3 SCC 372 this Court held that :
(SCC pp.380-81, para 13)
of "13. Industrial Tribunals, while considering the findings of domestic enquiries, must bear in mind that persons appointed to hold rt such enquiries are not lawyers and that such enquiries are of a simple nature where technical rules as to evidence and procedure do not prevail. Such findings are not to be lightly brushed aside merely
because the enquiry officers, while writing their reports, have mentioned facts which are not strictly borne out by the evidence before them."
15. In this case for finding the employee guilty, the enquiry officer relied on the evidence adduced in the enquiry and Labour Court itself found that the findings were not perverse. In such circumstances, the preliminary order of the
Labour Court setting aside the enquiry on the ground that enquiry was conducted by an officer
of the Management and he had made some observations in the enquiry report which were not warranted in the case is not a vitiating factor and these reasons are not sufficient to set
aside the enquiry.
16. The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to re-appraise the evidence
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adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly
.
mentioned in the Section itself. Before the
introduction of Section 11-A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Workmen (1958) SCR 667 this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment
for that of the Management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice,
of victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11-A is illustrated by this Court in Workmen v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co.of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813. When enquiry was conducted fairly rt and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or malafides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no
power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11-A is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to re- appraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not
or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of
natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry."
43. Reliance is also been placed upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
Vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Others, (1999)1
SCC 626, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"25. Section 10 provides for duration and modification of Model Standing Orders. The Standing Orders finally certified under the Act cannot be modified except on an agreement between the employer and the workmen or a Trade union or other representative body of the
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workmen until the expiry of six months from the date on which they came into operation.
26. Before coming to the core question, we may first consider the right of an employee to be
.
represented in the disciplinary proceedings and
the extent of the right.
27. The basic principle is that an employee has no right representation in the departmental
proceedings by another person or a lawyer unless the Service Rules specifically provide for the same. The right to representation is available only to the extent specifically provided
of for in the Rules. For example, Rule 1712 of the Railway Establishment Code provides as under:
"The accused railway servant may present his case with the assistance of any other railway rtservant employed on the same railway preparatory to retirement) on which he is working.
28. The right to representation, therefore, has been made available in a restricted way to a delinquent employee. He has a choice to be represented by another railway employee, but the choice is restricted to the Railway on which he himself is working, that is, if he is an
employee of the western Railway, his choice would be restricted to the employees working on the Western Railway. The choice cannot be allowed to travel to other Railways.
29. Similarly, a provision has been made in Rule
14(8) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, where too, an employee has been given the choice of being represented in the disciplinary proceedings
through a co-employee.
20. In N.Kalindi v. Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co.Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 914, a Three-Judge Bench observed as under:-
"Accustomed as we are to the practice in the courts of law to skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers specially trained in the art of examination and cross-examination of witnesses, or first inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the person accused of an act should have the assistance of some person, who even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine and cross-examine
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witnesses with a fair amount of skill. We have to remember however in the first place that these are not enquiries in a court of law. It is necessary to remember also that in these enquiries, fairly simple questions of fact as to
.
whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or not only fall to be
considered, and straightforward questioning which a person of fair intelligence and knowledge of conditions prevailing in the industry will be able to do will ordinarily help
to elicit the truth. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour.
of It is helpful to consider in this connection the fact that ordinarily in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case. Rules have been framed by Government as regards the rt procedure to be followed in enquiries against their own employees. No provision is made in these rules that the person against whom an
enquiry is held may be represented by anybody else. When the general practices adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge-
sheet of misconduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of his Union. Besides it is necessary to remember that if any enquiry is not otherwise fair, the workman concerned can challenge its validity
in an industrial dispute.
Our conclusion therefore is that a workman
against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his Union: though of course an employer in his discretion
can and may allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In another decision, namely Dunlop Rubber Co.
(India) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1965 1392 it was laid down that there was no right to representation in the disciplinary proceedings by another person unless the Service Rules specifically provided for the same."
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:03 :::HCHP 36 44. In D.G. Railway Protection Force and Others vs.
K.Raghuram Babu, (2008)4 SCC 406, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:-
.
"9. It is well settled that ordinarily in a domestic/departmental inquiry the person accused of misconduct has to conduct his own case vide N. Kalindi v. Tata Locomotive and
Engg.Co. Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 914. Such an inquiry is not a suit or criminal trial where a party has a right to be represented by a lawyer. It is only if there is some rule which permits the accused to
of be represented by someone else, that he can claim to be so represented in an inquiry vide Brook Bond India (P) Ltd. v. Subba Raman, (1961)2) LLJ 417(SC)."
45. rt In State of Haryana and Another vs. Rattan
Singh, (1977)2 SCC 491, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as
under:-
"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the
strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative
tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not
necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below mis-directed themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out
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should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does
.
not go to that extent nor does the passage from
Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any
of evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of rtChamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has elevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on
that ground."
46. In Workmen of Balmadies Estates vs.
Management, Balmadies Estates and Others, (2008)4 SCC
517, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"10. It is fairly well settled now that in view of the wide power of the Labour Court it can, in an
appropriate case, consider the evidence which has been considered by the domestic Tribunal and in a given case on such consideration arrive at a conclusion different from the one arrived at
by the Domestic Tribunal. The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiry is not required to be made by applying the same yardstick as a Civil Court could do when a lis is brought before it. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry so far as the domestic enquiries are concerned, though principles of fairness are to apply. It is also fairly well settled that in a domestic enquiry guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the proof of misconduct would be sufficient. In a domestic enquiry all materials
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which are logically probative including hearsay evidence can be acted upon provided it has a reasonable nexus and credibility."
.
47. In Om Parkash vs. Delhi Transport Corporation,
2016 LLR 683, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held as under:-
"17. The materials on record by way of award show
that the Tribunal was unduly influenced only by the evidence of the workman who deposed on oath. Furthermore, the Tribunal doubted the statement on behalf of the DTC by its witness
of that the checking staff found only 16 passengers in the bus without ticket. These, in the opinion of the Tribunal, were insufficient evidence to establish guilt. The Tribunal also based its findings on the submission of the workman that rt if he could sign the challan under protest then he could have also put signatures on the statement of the passengers by mentioning that it was "under protest". The absence of these and
the fact that the DTC examined only one witness was held to be insufficient to bring home the charge.
18. The management's witness had deposed that the
passengers were divided into two groups -as noted earlier. One passenger from each of these groups - 5 and 11 respectively, had stated in writing that money had been collected from the
passengers but the appellant did not issue them tickets. Copies of those statements were produced as Ex.AW-1/R1 and AW-1/R2. The
challan too was exhibited as Ex.1/19. There were 16 other documents; besides, there were 16 unpunched tickets, Ex.AW-1/1 to exhibit AW- 1/16. The checking staff's report dated
14.10.1991 is also on the record. The management witness clearly stated during the course of his deposition before the Tribunal that 16 passengers had boarded the bus from Kalkaji temple and that they had not been issued tickets despite having paid for them. There were two members of the checking staff, i.e. Kishan Lal Saluja, ATI and Om Prakash, ATI (not to be confused with the appellant, who was a conductor). Om Prakash, ATI deposed in the course of the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b).
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:03 :::HCHP 39 19. Given the clear enunciation of law in Rattan Singh (supra) that the Court has to be alive to the realities in certain circumstances (and not insist upon the strict rules of evidence and procedure which govern other Court proceedings)
.
the conclusion of the Tribunal that misconduct
had not been proved, in our opinion, could not have been sustained. As held in Vijay Kumar Tiwari (supra), under Section 33(2)(b), the Tribunal could not have insisted on strict proof
of facts - much less insisted upon production of the original passengers. The checking staff had clearly deposed in the proceedings and another member of the checking staff had clearly deposed in the domestic enquiry. The appellant
of did not attribute mala fideson the part of members of the checking staff. Furthermore, this Court notices that the appellant had previously been cautioned repeatedly and even censored. Apparently, on more than one occasion, rt disciplinary proceedings were initiated for similar charges.
20. Having regard to all these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that the Tribunal fell into error in refusing the approval, cannot be found fault with. The appeal consequently fails and is
dismissed with no order as to costs."
48. In Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road
Transport Corporation vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012)1 SCC 442,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"LOSS OF CONFIDENCE
25. Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed. (Vide: Air India Corpn. v. V.A. Ravellow, (1972)1 SCC 814, Francis Kalein & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972)
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4 SCC 569 and BHEL v. M. Chandrashekhar Reddy, (2005)2 SCC 481).
26. In Kanhaiyalal Agrawal v. Gwalior Sugar Co.Ltd., (2001)9 SCC 609, this Court laid down
.
the test for loss of confidence to find out as to
whether there was bona fide loss of confidence in the employee, observing that, (SCC p.614, para 9) (i) the workman is holding the position of trust and confidence; (ii) by abusing such
position, he commits act which results in forfeiting the same; and (iii) to continue him in service/establishment would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer, or would be
of detrimental to the discipline or security of the establishment. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind rt of the management, regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved.
(See also: Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar v. Bank of India, (1997) 6 SCC 271).
27. In SBI v. Bela Bagchi, (2005)7 SCC 435, this Court repelled the contention that even if by the
misconduct of the employee the employer does not suffer any financial loss, he can be removed from service in a case of loss of confidence. While deciding the said case, reliance has been
placed upon its earlier judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69.
28. An employer is not bound to keep an employee in service with whom relations have reached the point of complete loss of confidence/faith
between the two. (Vide: Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972)3 SCC 806; Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, (1974)3 SCC 152; Anil Kumar Chakraborty v.
Saraswatipur Tea Co.Ltd., (1982)2 SCC 328; Chandu Lal v. Pan American World Airways Inc., (1985)2 SCC 727; Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways Inc., (1987)1 SCC 146 and Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi, (2004)3 SCC 172.
29. In Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan, (2006)11 SCC 67, while dealing with the similar issue this Court held that: (SCC p.90, para 56)
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"56. ....loss of confidence cannot be subjective but there must be objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the employer regarding trustworthiness of the employee and
.
which must be alleged and proved."
30. In case of theft, the quantum of theft is not important and what is important is the loss of confidence of employer in employee. (Vide:
A.P. SRTC v. Raghuda Shiva Sankar Prasad, (2007)1 SCC 222).
31. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition
of and keeping in view that judicial review is concerned primarily with the decision making process and not the decision itself. More so, it is a settled legal proposition that in a case of misconduct of grave nature like corruption, rt theft, no punishment other than the dismissal may be appropriate. (Vide: Pandiyan Roadways Corpn. Ltd. V. N.Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755
and U.P. SRTC v. Suresh Chand Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 555)."
49. It is well settled that in a domestic inquiry, the strict
and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act
may not apply. All materials, which are logically probative for a
prudent mind, are permissible. It is trite law that strict rules of
evidence are not applicable to the proceedings before the
Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and they are free to devise rules
of procedure in accordance with principles of natural justice.
50. In the present case, factum of non-examination of
Inquiry Officer by the Management during proceedings before
Tribunal has weighed heavily, with the learned Tribunal, as a
result of which learned Tribunal while drawing adverse inference,
upheld the claim put forth on behalf of the respondent-workman.
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:03 :::HCHP 42 In an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, it is not the
requirement of law that the Tribunal will insist for proof of the
inquiry conducted strictly in terms of provisions contained in
.
Indian Evidence Act by examining the Inquiry Officer and
exhibiting the report.
51. In this regard reliance is placed on Om Parkash vs.
Delhi Transport Corporation, 2016 LLR 683, wherein the
of Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held as under:-
"10. The Labour Court, to begin with, is required to enquire if a proper, valid enquiry was conducted: whether order of the dismissal rt based on legal evidence adduced before domestic tribunal and is not based on extraneous considerations and the order of dismissal is not
an act of victimization or unfair labour practice. In order to reach to a conclusion as regards validity of the domestic enquiry, the Labour Court has to analyze the enquiry proceedings placed on record alongwith the application. The
insistence on formal proof of enquiry proceedings runs contrary to the rules of evidence governing the proceedings before Labour Courts. The Industrial Disputes Act
empowers the Labour Court to formulate its own procedure with the object to do justice. The Labour Court can examine any document
produce in this Court without its formal proof (where genuineness of document is not disputed).
11. This Court has also in the case of Vijay
Kumar Tiwari v. Lt.Governor & Ors, LPA 394/2002 held as under:-
6. "It is trite law that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and they are free to devise rules of procedure in accordance with principles of natural justice.
Thus, in an application under Section 33(2)(b) ID Act, it is not the requirement of law that the Tribunal will insist proof of the enquiry conducted in accordance with Indian Evidence Act by examining the Inquiry Officer and exhibiting the report. Suffice it is that the enquiry report and the proceedings conducted
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by the Inquiry Officer are produced before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. The Constitution Bench in JT 2010 (5) 553 Union of India v. R.Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association noting the distinction between a
.
Court and Tribunal held that while Courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural
rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act requiring an elaborate procedure in decision making, Tribunals generally regulate their own procedure
applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict rules of Evidence Act."
of (See: E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another,
(1974)4 SCC 3, Gulam Mustafa and Others vs. The State of rt Maharashtra and Others, (1976)1 SCC 800, Kumaon Mandal
Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar Pant and Others, (2001)1
SCC 182, J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. K.P. Agrawal and Another,
(2007)2 SCC 433, Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco
Industries Limited, (2014)11 SCC 85 and Mackinnon
Mackenzie and Company Limited vs. Mackinnon Employees
Union, (2015)4 SCC 544).
52. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made
hereinabove, present petition is allowed and the impugned award
passed by the learned Tribunal below is quashed and set aside.
However, at this stage, it may be noticed that the petitioner-
Company in the instant petition has submitted that it had made
an alternate submission before the learned Tribunal below that
without conceding that the inquiry is just, fair and proper, if Court
comes to the conclusion that the inquiry is bad then respondent-
::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 21:23:03 :::HCHP 44 workman be given compensation in lieu of reimbursement.
Relevant portion of ground (r) of the petition is reproduced
hereinbelow:
.
"(r) ......The petitioner company had also submitted as an alternate arguments before the Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court that without conceding that the enquiry is just fair and
proper but if the court comes to the conclusion the enquiry is bad then petitioner be given compensation in lieu of reimbursement. ...."
of
53. Accordingly, in view of aforesaid, this Court, keeping
in view the fact that the respondent-workman has uninterruptedly rt worked w.e.f. June, 1989 till 19.1.1999 i.e. about 10 years deems
it fit to award one time fair compensation amounting to Rs.3.5 lacs
in terms of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tota
Ram vs. Belliss India (Private) Limited, (2016)6 SCC 406 case.
Accordingly the petitioner-Company is directed to pay an amount
of Rs.3.5 lacs to the respondent-workman by way of a fair
compensation in lieu of 10 years service rendered by him.
54. All the interim orders are vacated. All miscellaneous
applications are disposed of.
October 07, 2016 (Sandeep Sharma) (aks) Judge
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