M/S. Cable Corpn. Of India Ltd vs Additional Commissioner Of Labour & Ors

Additional Commnr. of Labour and Ors. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division

Bench of the Bombay High Court upholding the view of a

learned Single Judge that once the review application in terms

of Section 25-N(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in

short the `Act') is rejected, the appropriate Government/specified authority is not precluded from making

a reference for adjudication under the said provision.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The appellant company was established in 1957 for the

manufacture of high voltage electric cables and wires. The

company has manufacturing units at Borivli and Nasik. In the

present case we are concerned with the Company's unit at

Borivli. The company made an application in terms of Section

25-N(2) to the Specified Authority on 16.1.2003 to retrench

280 workmen out of 509 workmen working at its Borivli Unit.

The Specified Authority, after giving an opportunity of being

heard to the company, workmen and other interested persons,

including workers unions and after conducting an inquiry, by

a reasoned order dated 29.4.2003 partly allowed the

application preferred by the company by granting permission

to retrench 276 workmen out of 509 workmen on conditions

mentioned in the order. The correctness of that decision was

put in issue by the workers unions, the respondent Nos. 2 and

2 3 herein by filing applications under Section 25-N(6) of the Act

for review of the decision or to refer the matter for

adjudication. By an order dated 9.7.2003 the applications

preferred by the Unions were rejected on the ground that such

applications could be preferred only by workmen whereas the

same have been made by the Unions. Besides, it was observed

that no new point was raised in the review proceedings which

warranted fresh examination. Accordingly, both the

applications for review/reference came to be rejected.

The aforesaid order of the Specified Authority was

challenged through Writ Petition No. 1947 of 2003 by the 2nd

respondent-union, which came to be partly allowed by the

learned Single Judge, vide order dated 2.8.2004. The learned

Single Judge held that finding of the Specified Authority that

unions had no locus as all the aggrieved workmen were not

made parties to the application was contrary to law laid down

by this Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/s

Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and Ors. (AIR 1976 SC 1455). The

learned Single Judge further held that the right of review is

3 possible only on limited grounds and since no new points have

been raised by the unions, the prayer for review was rightly

rejected. The learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment

of a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Rajya General

Kamgar Mandal and Ors. v. Vice President, Packart Press Div.

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises, Baroda and Ors. (1995 II CLR

613) further held that merely because review application is

rejected, reference cannot be said to be barred under Section

25-N(6) of the Act and, accordingly, directed the specified

authority to refer the matter for adjudication to the Industrial

Tribunal in accordance with Section 25-N(6) of the Act.

Stand of the appellant both before the learned Single

Judge and the Division Bench was that once the review

application is disposed of, there is no scope for further making

a reference in view of the clear language of Section 25-N(6)

which provides for the alternatives and does not empower a

reference after the review petition is rejected. Both learned

Single Judge and the Division Bench held to the contrary.

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3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both

learned Single Judge and the Division Bench lost sight of the

fact that the language of the provision is very clear and the

determinative expression used is "or". It is submitted that if

the view of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is

accepted it would mean substitution of the word `and' for `or'.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand

submitted that the position is no longer res integra and in

view of the decision of this Court in Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd.

v. State of Orissa and Ors. (2002 (2) SCC 578), it is submitted,

the view of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench does

not suffer from any infirmity. The reference is intended as an

additional protection. Considering the fact that though the

scope for review is limited, which is evident from the fact that

unlike other reference a period of 30 days is provided. This

indicates the urgency.

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5. The factual position need not be referred to in detail in

view of the fact that fate of this case depends upon

interpretation of Section 25-N(6).

6. Section 25-N(6) of the Act reads as follows:

"The appropriate government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.

Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference."

(Underlined for emphasis)

7. In Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC

224) this Court considered the legality of Section 25-O and

25-R as it stood then. It was held that those provisions were

violative of Section 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950

6 (in short the `Constitution'). It was held that steps under

Section 25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-

O.

8. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v.

Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr. (1992 (3) SCC 336) the scope

and ambit of Section 25-N as it stood then prior to its

substitution by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984

was considered. Section 25-O was recast with effect from

21.8.1984 by Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought

in Section 25-N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984. Under

Section 25-N(5) finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A

plain reading of the provision shows that two options are

available i.e. to decide itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot

be said that the Tribunal is an additional forum for fresh look

at the matter.

9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitutional

validity of Section 25-O of the Act was under consideration. 7

10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great

reliance on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment to

contend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given

by the High Court.

11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the

said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall

for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the

provisions for amended Section 25-O relates to review and

reference would be in addition to judicial review under Article

226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really

considering the question as to whether provisions for review

and reference were in addition to judicial review. It never said

that they are cumulative and not alternative.

12. The word `or' is normally disjunctive and `and' is

normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa

to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as

disclosed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You

do sometimes read `or' as `and' in a statute. But you do not do

8 it unless you are obliged because `or' does not generally mean

`and' and `and' does not generally mean `or'. And as pointed

out by Lord Halsbury the reading of `or' as `and' is not to be

resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or

the clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the

literal reading of the words produces an unintelligible or

absurd result `and' may be read for `or' and `or' for `and' even

though the result of so modifying the words is less favourable

to the subject provided that the intention of the Legislature is

otherwise quite clear. Conversely if reading of `and' as `or'

produces grammatical distortion and makes no sense of the

portion following `and', `or' cannot be read in placed `and'. The

alternatives joined by `or' need not always be mutually

exclusive.

13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1) SCC

741) it was held that the word `or' is normally disjunctive. The

use of the word `or' in a statute manifests the legislative intent

of the alternatives prescribed under law.

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14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could be

made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals

with the review power, it would have said so specifically by

specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference.

The parameters of review are different from a reference.

15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position clear

that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the

appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an

application made, review its order or refer the matter to the

Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be

adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding

circumstances and several other relevant factors.

16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the

appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review

its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-

section (3).

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17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or

unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one

meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning

irrespective of consequences. [See: State of Jharkhand v.

Govind Singh (AIR 2005 SC 294), Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi

Gupta (2005 (2) SCC 271)].

18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 CI&F 85, at page 143

Tindal C.J. observed as follows:

"If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver."

19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits

of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute

arises, for the Act speaks for itself.

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20. As observed in Nathi Devi's case (supra) if the words

used are capable of one construction, then it would not be

open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical

construction on the ground that such construction is more

consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The

spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and

the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in

opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.

21. In view of analysis made above, the inevitable result is

that the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct.

................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

...............................J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, May 16, 2008

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