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M.Narayan vs State Of Karnataka

Supreme Court17 April 2015Amitava Roy

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. On reversal of acquittal, though the Supreme Court is not bound to re-scrutinize all evidence, where the offences involve statutory presumptions under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and corresponding provisions in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is expedient to undertake such scrutiny to determine whether the acquitted court's view was a possible one in law and fact, or whether the conviction court's view is the only permissible deduction from the evidence. 2. Under Section 304B, Indian Penal Code, where a woman's death occurs within seven years of marriage and otherwise than under normal circumstances, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death constitutes a "dowry death" and the husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death; the statutory definition of "dowry" under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 encompasses any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at or before or at any time after marriage in connection with the marriage. 3. Any money or property or valuable security demanded by persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1861 at or before or at any time after marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman shall be deemed to be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise. 4. The expression "soon before" appearing in Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code connotes proximity and not merely immediate temporality; there must be a proximate and live link between the impact of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death, though the exact time interval cannot be fixed by a straitjacket formula and must receive a fair and pragmatic construction considering the social evil the statute addresses. 5. Minor and stray inconsistencies in the testimony of multiple prosecution witnesses who are relations of both the deceased and accused will not destroy the substratum of their evidence where their core narrative on essential facts constituting the ingredients of offences remains unshaken in cross-examination and the prosecution's version is coherent, consistent and compact on the progression of events from before marriage to the death.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

{REPORTABLE}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1207 OF 2012

M. Narayan … Appellant

Versus

State of Karnataka … Respondent

JUDGMENT

Amitava Roy, J.

Aggrieved by the reversal of the verdict of his acquittal from

the charge of having committed the offences under Section 498A

and Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to

as ‘IPC’) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the appellant has mounted this

challenge against the judgment and order dated 15.02.2007

rendered by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal

Appeal No.1076 of 2000.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Sukhbir Paul Kaur Date: 2015.04.17 16:55:00 IST Reason:

2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 2

3. The prosecution is traceable to an oral information lodged by

Smt. Shivamma, the neighbour of the deceased Gangalakshmamma

(for short ‘Ganga’), to the effect that on her return to her house at

about 5.30 p.m. on 08.09.1993, she found Ganga hanging by the

neck by a rope from the roof. She also mentioned that a folding

chair was found on the cot. According to the informant on this

sight, she lost her consciousness and when she regained the same,

she found that the body of Ganga had been meanwhile removed

from the hook of the roof and had been laid in the house. She,

however, expressed ignorance about the person or the agency,

who/which had brought down the body.

4. On receipt of this information, the Hebbal Police Station,

Bangalore City, registered the same as UDR No.34/1993 under

Section 174 Cr.P.C. Autopsy on the dead body was conducted on

09.09.1993 at M.S. Ramaiah Medical College, Bangalore, which

confirmed that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of

hanging. The post mortem report also disclosed a ligature mark on

the front, sides and back of neck of the deceased. The ligature

material was identified to be a light green nylon rope measuring 286 3

cms in length and 4 cms in diameter. Dr. J. Kiran, who performed

the post mortem examination, mentioned in the report that the rope

did fit into the ligature mark and was capable of bearing the weight

of the body.

5. Be that as it may, on 10.09.1993 Shri Siddagangaiah, the

maternal uncle of the deceased, lodged a complaint about the death

of her niece Ganga on 08.09.1993 with the same Police Station.

The information revealed that the deceased had been given in

marriage to the appellant on 20.06.1991 and that on that occasion,

gold ornaments and cash of Rs.20, 000/- had been given by way of

dowry. It was alleged that for about six months after the marriage,

the couple lived happily and thereafter the husband of the deceased

(the appellant herein) developed some illicit relationship with

another girl of Nayak community and as a consequence, started to

despise the deceased and often assaulted her in an inebriated

condition besides intimidating and harassing her by demanding

Rs.50, 000/- as dowry. It was mentioned as well that about two

months prior to the demise of the deceased, she had come to the

village of the informant and had stayed there for a month for being 4

unable to bear the harassment meted out to her by her husband.

The informant asserted that during that time, the deceased had

disclosed to him and his wife about the persistent demand of the

appellant-husband for Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry. The

informant mentioned as well about an incident of about the same

time, i.e. two months before the incident, when the

appellant-husband had visited their house at Dasanapura village in

the midnight in an intoxicated state, holding a knife in hand.

According to the informant, the appellant threatened to kill her

(deceased) and the family members if the deceased was not able to

arrange for Rs.50,000/-. The informant mentioned as well of

another incident thereafter, when the deceased had come to their

house stating that her husband had tried to murder her and also

showed to them the marks of assault on her body. The informant

stated too that the deceased had disclosed to them that unless

Rs.50,000/- as demanded by her husband was paid, he would kill

her. According to the informant, he thereafter did visit the house of

the appellant whereupon the deceased had repeated her

apprehension that if the amount of Rs.50,000/- was not paid, she

would be continuously harassed and intimidated. The informant 5

also mentioned that on 09.09.1993 at about 5.00 p.m., one of his

relatives, Seenappa, having conveyed to them, the news of the death

of his niece (Ganga) by hanging, he with his parents went to the

house of the deceased at about 12.30 p.m. and saw the dead body

lying there. Contending that all of them had noticed a ligature

mark around the neck of the deceased and that she had died in

suspicious circumstances relatable to the constant demand for

dowry and the harassment and ill-treatment unleashed on her,

suitable legal action was sought for. The police on this information

registered CR. No.318/93 under Section 304(B), IPC.

6. Investigation followed and after completion thereof, charge

sheet was filed against the appellant under Sections 304B and

498A, IPC as well as 3, 4 and 6 of the Act. The appellant, on being

confronted with the charge, denied the same for which he was made

to stand trial. The prosecution examined several witnesses,

including Dr. J. Kiran who had performed the post mortem

examination, as PW-1, the informant Siddagangappa as PW-2,

Govindaiah, grandfather of the deceased as PW-3, Govindappa,

nephew of PW-3, as PW-4, Yeshodha, niece of the deceased as 6

PW-10, as well as the Investigating Officer. Amongst others, the

post mortem report (Ext. P-1) and the information/complaint

referred to hereinabove were proved at the trial. The appellant

abided by his denial in course of his examination under Section

313, Cr.P.C., but did not adduce any evidence in defence.

7. The learned trial court, on an appraisal of the evidence on

record, disbelieved the case of the prosecution and consequently

recorded the finding of acquittal of the appellant qua all the

charges. It was of the view that the contradictions in the testimony

of PWs-3, 4 and 10 did render the prosecution case wholly

untrustworthy. It rejected the case of the prosecution also on the

ground that the allegations for demand of dowry had been levelled

only after the incident and not prior thereto. That the prosecution

had failed to adduce any evidence pertaining to the accusation that

the appellant had developed illicit relationship with another girl,

was also noted in support of his exoneration from the charges.

8. In the appeal against such acquittal preferred by the State of

Karnataka, to reiterate, the High Court of Karnataka has returned a

finding of guilt against the appellant, thus, convicting him under 7 Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC as well as under Sections 3, 4

and 6 of the Act. By the decision assailed, the appellant has been

awarded sentence of imprisonment: (a) for seven years with a fine

of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 304B, IPC,; (b) three

years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 498A,

IPC,; (c) five years and a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under

Section 3 of the Act; and (d) six months with a fine of Rs.1,000/- for

the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Provision to undergo further

imprisonment in case of default in payment of fine was also made.

All the sentences, however, were ordered to run concurrently. Relief

by way of set-off against the sentence awarded for the period of

custody suffered by him at the time of trial was, however, extended

to the appellant.

9. It has been assiduously urged by the learned counsel for the

appellant that the order of acquittal having been recorded by the

learned trial court on an appropriate evaluation of the evidence on

record, the High Court had fallen in gross error in reversing the

same. According to the learned counsel, though death was as a

result of suicide committed by the deceased and that too after little 8

over two years of marriage, as the other essential ingredients of the

offences with which the appellant had been charged were not

proved, the learned trial court had rightly acquitted him. Referring

to the testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in particular, the learned

counsel insisted that in the face of the contradictions on material

terms, the prosecution version had been rendered wholly

untrustworthy and that the High Court had erred in law and on

facts in reversing the acquittal of the appellant. The learned

counsel has argued that in the absence of any reliable and

convincing evidence pertaining to demand for dowry and

harassment or cruelty meted out to the deceased, the view

entertained by the High Court to the contrary is patently erroneous

and if the impugned judgment and order is allowed to stand it will

result in travesty of justice. Without prejudice to the above, learned

counsel has maintained that the view expressed by the learned trial

court, in the conspectus of the evidence on record, being assuredly

a plausible one, it is not a case of reversal of acquittal as has been

decisively enunciated by a plethora of judicial pronouncements and,

thus, on this count as well the impugned judgment and order is

liable to be interfered with.

9

10. In reply, learned counsel for the State while endorsing the

sustainability of the impugned decision has emphatically argued

that the prosecution had amply established the charges against the

appellant. Dismissing the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of

PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 to be wholly inconsequential, the learned

counsel has asserted that the view entertained by the learned trial

court was not a possible one and, thus, was rightly overturned in

appeal in the interest of justice. According to the learned counsel

for the State, the evidence on record unmistakably established all

the ingredients of the offences with which the appellant had been

charged rendering the conclusion of guilt arrived at by the High

Court to be the yield of the only view possible. Adverting to the

facts bearing on the persistent demand for dowry, harassment and

ill-treatment qua the deceased as authenticated by the testimony of

the prosecution witnesses, learned counsel has insisted that the

appellant had been rightly convicted on the charges leveled against

him. It being not a case where the view entertained by the learned

trial court was one of the two permitted by the materials on record,

the plea against interference therewith based on the precedential

dicta outlining the parameters of scrutiny in an appeal against 10

acquittal, is wholly misplaced and, thus, untenable, she urged.

Reliance, to reinforce the above submissions, was placed on the

decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2015(3)

SCALE 174].

11. The materials on record as laid before this Court and the rival

assertions have been duly analysed. Following the sequence of

events as stand admitted, there is no room for doubt that the

unfortunate incident in which death had visited, Ganga, was barely

over two years of her marriage with the appellant. That the death

had been otherwise than under normal circumstances is also

indubitable.

12. In the instant appeal, it is not incumbent though for this

Court to re-scrutinize the evidence, the present being a case of

reversal of acquittal, we have construed it to be expedient to

undertake that exercise albeit to the extent essential. This is more

so having regard to the inalienable ingredients of the offences with

which the appellant had been charged and eventually convicted by

the High Court.

11

13. The testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 in particular having a

vital bearing on the accusations constituting the offences would,

therefore, be revisited. The narration on oath by PW-2,

Siddagangappa, is in substantial reiteration of his version in the

complaint pertaining to the facts relatable to marriage, dowry

demand of the appellant, harassment, assault and intimidation to

the deceased by him and eventual commission of suicide by her.

The witness had introduced himself to be the uncle of the appellant,

the latter being the son of his cousin brother. He is the maternal

uncle too of the deceased. He claimed to have reared the deceased

after she had lost her mother. According to this witness, the

appellant about 3 or 4 months prior to the marriage had demanded

Rs.40,000/- in cash and also jewelleries by way of dowry, to which

he had agreed to give Rs.25,000/- in cash accompanied by

jewelleries. The witness deposed that about twenty days before the

celebration of the marriage, he gave cash of Rs.25,000/- to the

appellant. He testified that after six months of the marriage, the

appellant started assaulting the deceased, coercing her to bring

Rs.50,000/- from him (witness) to purchase cows for his dairy. The

witness stated that the appellant thereafter repeated this conduct 12

for about 10/12 times and also sent the deceased to fetch this

amount from him. The witness has expressly stated on oath that

these facts have been revealed to him by the deceased. The witness

stated that this harassment and assaults did continue thereafter for

about 1 to 1-1/2 years till Ganga had committed suicide, the

situation having become intolerable for her. The witness also

deposed to have accompanied his parents to the matrimonial house

of the deceased after receiving the information of her death. That

he also on the same date lodged a complaint with the Hebbal Police

Station was stated by him.

14. In cross-examination, the witness deposed to have sold away

their land for a sum of Rs.80,000/- out of which Rs.40,000/- had

been spent for making gold ornaments. That in order to meet the

expenses of marriage the family had sold away standing trees for

about Rs.15,000/-, was stated as well. He, however, indicated that

the deceased though had discontinued her studies at an early age

and was a little sensitive by nature, had acquaintantes in the

neigbourhood. That she was a little upset for being unable to bear a

child was also stated by this witness.

13

15. PW-3, Govindaiah, is by relation a distant – cousin of the

accused. He too is the grandfather of the deceased. He reiterated

on oath that the appellant before the marriage had been demanded

Rs.40,000/- by way of dowry and that against the same, a sum of

Rs.25,000/- was paid. The witness stated further that in addition

thereto, jewelleries had been given at the marriage. According to

this witness, before the expiry of about one year from the date of

marriage, the deceased had visited his house and had told him that

she was being harassed by her husband, who was demanding from

her an additional amount of Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry for

developing his dairy business. The witness, in reply, expressed his

financial incapability. He, however, stated that during the stay of

the deceased with him for a period of about one week, the appellant

had come to the house and had created a pandemonium under the

influence of liquor and had threatened to assault him and the

deceased, reiterating his demand for Rs.50,000/-. This happened,

according to the witness, also in the presence of Gangappa,

Govindappa and Seenappa. This witness further stated that eight

days after the said incident, the appellant came to his house and

took the deceased with him whereafter within one week Ganga 14

committed suicide. This witness deposed to have seen the dead

body of the deceased in the house of the appellant. He affirmed

that PW-2 had lodged a complaint in connection with the incident.

He opined as well that Ganga had committed suicide because of the

intolerable harassment and ill-treatment meted out to her by the

appellant for failing to meet his illegal demand of additional dowry.

16. PW-4, Govindappa, is the nephew of PW-3 Govindaiah. His

evidence-in-chief is limited to the extent of his visit to the

matrimonial home of the deceased after receiving the information of

her death. This witness was declared hostile and was

cross-examined in course of which he generally denied the

statements made by him during the investigation inculpating the

appellant.

17. PW-10, Yeshodha, is the aunt of the deceased, besides being

the wife of Siddagangappa (PW-2). She reaffirmed the testimony of

PWs-2 and 3 about the demand of a sum of Rs.40,000/- by the

appellant and his parents as dowry before the marriage, together

with jewellery. She stated as well that as finally settled, an amount

of Rs.25,000/- by cash and jewelleries handed over to the appellant 15

and his father about a week prior to the marriage. This witness

stated that after four months after the marriage when Ganga

visited her house, she had revealed that she was being subjected to

harassment and assaults by the appellant in connection with

demand for an additional amount of Rs.50,000/- in cash for the

improvement of his dairy business. This witness deposed as well

that about 7-8 months thereafter Ganga had visited them again and

had reiterated her complaint of harassment, abuse and assault by

the appellant for the same reason. According to this witness, on the

same day the appellant visited their house late in the night and had

taken Ganga from there. She stated that about two months prior to

the incident, Ganga had again come to their house and had

confided in her that the same cruel treatment had been continuing.

This witness deposed that a little more than a month thereafter, the

appellant came to their house and created a furore in connection

with his demand for Rs.50,000/- and also threatened to kill

Govindaiah (PW-3) if the amount was not paid. This witness stated

that this happened also in the presence of Gangappa (PW-3),

Govindappa (PW-4) and one Srinivas. According to this witness,

Ganga met an unnatural death about a month thereafter. She 16

stated as well that on their visit to the matrimonial house of the

deceased they saw a ligature mark around her neck.

18. As adverted to hereinabove, the medical opinion in clear

terms evinced that the deceased had died due to asphyxia as a

result of hanging. The ligature marks were also seen on the front,

sides and back of neck of the deceased.

19. The material witnesses whose testimony has been synopsized

above, i.e. PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in our estimate, do prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the deceased had been subjected to

continuous harassment, assaults and intimidation from a few

months after the marriage, so much so that being unable to bear

the unbearable cruelty, she did take the extreme step of eliminating

herself to seek alleviation from such physical and mental torture.

PWs-2, 3 and 10, in particular, are the relations of both sides and,

therefore, in the absence of any overwhelming material on records

to the contrary, there is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve their

versions encompassing the progression of events from before the

marriage till the unfortunate end of the deceased. Noticeably, the

demand for dowry originated from before the marriage and against 17

a ‘claim’ of Rs.40,000/- and jewelleries, the family of the deceased

could garner Rs.25,000/- by way of cash. Jewelleries to the extent

possible were also given. This demand for dowry having its roots

from before the marriage, as the incidents thereafter as narrated by

PWs-2, 3 and 10, as being disclosed to them by the deceased and

also being witnesses to some of those demonstrate, assumed

virulent proportions culminating in the pathetic death of the

deceased. The gravamen of the testimony of PWs-2, 3 and 10

bearing on the essential facts constituting the ingredients of the

offences with which the appellant had been charged has remained

unshaken in their cross-examination. Minor and stray

inconsistencies in their narration, in our opinion, does not destroy

the substratum of their version which otherwise do wholly furnish

the required materials to constitute the pre-requisites for the

offences under Sections 304B, 498A and Sections 3 and 4 of the

Act. The view adopted by the learned trial court, in our opinion,

having regard to the gamut of the evidence adduced by the

prosecution, is not a possible one. On the other hand, we are of the

view that the conclusion reached by the learned trial court is the

only possible deduction in the attendant facts and circumstances. 18

20. Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC are set out hereunder at

this juncture for ready reference:-

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— 19

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

21. Whereas under Section 304B defining ‘dowry death’, there

will be a statutory presumption against the husband for having

caused the death of a woman resulting from burns or bodily

injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances

within seven years of her marriage accompanied by the proof that

soon before her death she had been subjected to cruelty or

harassment by him or any of his relatives for, or in connection

with, any demand for dowry, Section 498A provides for

punishment to the husband or his relative, if the woman has

been subjected to cruelty. As per the Explanation attached to

Section 498A, IPC, ‘cruelty’ has been defined to mean any willful

conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to 20

commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or

health (whether mental or physical) to her or harassment of the

woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to

meet such demand.

22. ‘Dowry’ as used in Section 304B, IPC, has been assigned the

meaning as, according to it, in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition

Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Act defining ‘dowry’ is quoted

hereinbelow:-

“2 Definition of ‘dowry'. —In this Act, “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly—

(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or

(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before 1 [or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

4[***] 21

Explanation II.—The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

23. As is evident from the definition so provided, ‘dowry’ shorn

of all details, in the plainest form, signifies any property or

valuable security having an inextricable nexus with the marriage.

24. Section 3 of the Act prescribes penalty for any person who

gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry after the

enforcement thereof. This section excludes its application

vis-à-vis the presents given at the time of marriage to the

bride/bridegroom without any demand having been made in that

regard and if such presents are entered in a list maintained in

accordance with the rules framed under the Act. The penalty for

demand, directly or indirectly, of any dowry from the parents or

other relatives or guardian of a bride/bridegroom has been

enjoined by Section 4 of the Act.

25. A combined reading of the above provisions attests the

salutary legislative intendment of not only discouraging any

demand for dowry either directly or indirectly but also penalizing 22

any such act. The obvious concern of the legislature on this

growing social menace based on demand for dowry, and the

resultant macabre fall outs eventuated in the incorporation of

Sections 498A and 304B by successive amendments of the Indian

Penal Code by Act of 46 of 1983 and Act 43 of 1986 respectively.

Not only Section 304B enjoins a statutory presumption of the

guilt of the husband on the proof of the eventualities as

mentioned therein, Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 fortifies such presumption in the probative perspectives.

Section 304B, IPC, and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872, do supplement each other to effectuate the legislative

mandate of statutory presumption of guilt, the contingencies

warranted being present.

26. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits a

court to presume that the husband of a woman or any of his

relative had abetted her to commit suicide if it is shown that she

had resorted to the such act within a period of seven years from

the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of

his had subjected her to cruelty.

23

27. This Court, amongst others, in Rajinder Singh (supra) after

an exhaustive survey of the judicial pronouncements on the

purport of the expression ‘dowry’ as noticed hereinabove, has

enunciated that any money or property or valuable security

demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the

Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is

reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would

necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage

unless the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point

otherwise, thus defining the content of the word for its

application.

28. Having regard to avowed objective of the Act along with the

purpose of incorporation of Section 498A and 304B, IPC, along

with Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,

we are in respectful agreement with the view so expressed.

29. Qua the words ‘soon before’ appearing in Section 113B of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 304B of the IPC, it is

no longer res integra that the same is laden with the notion of 24

proximity test, but not synonymous with the term ‘immediately

before’. It has been inter alia stated also in Surinder Singh v.

State of Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129] that though the applicability

of this expression would obviously depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case, it ought to mean that the time

interval cannot be stretched to any period. This Court in Kans

Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207], while dwelling upon the

import of the words ‘soon before death’ observed that there ought

to be a proximate and live link between the impact of cruelty

based on dowry demand and the consequential death. That these

words, however, should receive a fair and pragmatic construction

keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the

enactment of Section 304B was highlighted by this Court in Sher

Singh v. State of Haryana [(2015 (1) SCALE 250]. In Dinesh v.

State of Haryana [2014 (5) SCALE 641], it was underscored that

the expression ‘soon before’ cannot be lodged in a straitjacket

formula so as to fix any time for its relevance and applicability.

30. On a cumulative consideration of the relevant aspects,

factual and legal, as addressed to hereinabove, we are, thus, of 25

the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution had been able to

prove the culpability of the appellant vis-a-vis the charges beyond

any reasonable doubt.

31. To reiterate, the progression of events from before the

marriage till the unnatural death of the hapless deceased, not

only provides an inseverable link inter se but also unambiguously

demonstrates the buildup of the intolerable mental and physical

torture on her, driving her to take refuge of such a drastic step.

The evidence of the prosecution witnesses in this regard is

evidently coherent, consistent and compact. The materials on

record though indicate that the deceased had lost her mother at a

young age and was denied the love and affection of her father

who married for the second time and was also a little sensitive

and self-centered, there is nothing supervening to suggest that

she did suffer from any mental imbalance or eccentricity so as to

probabilise any act of self-elimination without any compelling

reason. On the other hand, the evidence on record demonstrates

in emphatic terms that she had been complaining of the

appellant’s persistent and hurtful demand for dowry by way of an 26

additional amount of Rs.50,000/- and her pitiable condition,

being subjected to continuous and ruthless harassment and

ill-treatment resulting in severe physical and mental torture.

32. In view of the above, we hereby affirm the conviction and

sentence as recorded by the High Court in toto. In the result,

the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant’s bail bond

stands discharged and he is hereby ordered to surrender before

the learned trial court to serve out the sentence awarded. All

follow up steps be taken forthwith.

…………………….J. (T.S. Thakur)

..…………………..J. (Amitava Roy) New Delhi, Dated: April 17, 2015 27

ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.10 SECTION IIB (For Judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1207/2012

M.NARAYAN Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondent(s)

Date : 17/04/2015 This appeal was called on pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s)

Mr. Rajesh Mahale,Adv.

For Respondent(s)

Ms. Anitha Shenoy,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur and His Lordship.

We affirm the conviction and sentence as recorded by the High Court in toto. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant's bail bond stands discharged and he is hereby ordered to surrender before the learned trial court to serve out the sentence awarded. All follow up steps be taken forthwith.

[INDU POKHRIYAL] [SUKHBIR PAUL KAUR] COURT MASTER A.R.-CUM-P.S.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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