Louis Peter Surin vs State Of Jharkhand

O R D E R

This appeal arises out of the following facts:

On 8th July, 1983 an agreement was executed by the

Deputy Commissioner, Palamu with M/s. Bharat Drilling for

doing some drilling work in the District. The appellant

was then employed as the Managing Director of the District

Rural Development Agency, Palamu, and as per his statement

had absolutely no role to play in the award of the contract to M/s. Bharat Drilling. By order dated 16th July, 1983 the

appellant was transferred from his post as Managing

Director and he handed over the charge from that very date

to some other officer.

A first Information Report was registered on 14th

April, 1984 under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the

Indian Penal Code against the Deputy Commissioner who had

signed the contract with M/s. Bharat Drilling on 8th July

1983 and against the District Rural Development Agency

alleging that the Deputy Commissioner and the appellant had

entered into a conspiracy in awarding the

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contract to M/s. Bharat Drilling for consideration. The

Investigating Agencies moved the State of Bihar for sanction to prosecute the appellant but the same was

declined by the Governor on 2nd February, 1990 on the

premise that no prima facie case was made out against any

of the accused. A review of the order dated 2nd February

1990 was again sought which too was rejected vide order

dated 28th July 1992 for the same reason, the appellant

superannuated from service on 1st December 1997. On 16th

June, 1999 the dispute between M/s. Bharat Drilling and the

Government of Bihar was referred to Arbitration to the then

Superintendent Engineer who made an award in favour of

M/s. Bharat Drilling thereby settling the issue in its

favour. Apparently piqued with what had happened and taking

advantage of the fact that the appellant had retired in the

meanwhile and that sanction for prosecution ws no longer

required, a charge-sheet was submitted de hors the sanction

on 9th November 2001. The Special Judge Ranchi thereafter took cognizance of the matter on 13th December, 2001. The

order of the Special Judge was challenged before the High

Court which by its order dated 23rd November, 2004 rejected

the challenge. The matter is before us in this appeal in

the above circumstances.

Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned senior counsel for the

appellant has raised primarily one plea before us today.

He has pointed out that cognizance had been taken by the

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Special Judge a full seventeen and half years after the

filing of the FIR and about four years after the appellant

had retired from service and in the light of the judgments

of this Court reported in (2002) 1 SCC 149 (Mahendra Lal Dua vs. State of Bihar and Ors.) and (2002) 1 SCC 153

(Ramanand Chaudhary vs. State of Bihar and Ors.) this was

impermissible and the proceedings were liable to be quashed

as being belated and stale. He has highlighted that after

the State Government, had on two occasions, declined the

sanction, on the ground that no prima facie case existed,

there was no change in circumstances except that the

appellant had superannuated in the meanwhile which was a

factor which could not justify cognizance after such a

long delay.

The learned counsel for the State of Jharkahnd has

however supported the orders of the Special Judge and the

High Court and has pointed out that the State Government

had not considered the matter in its proper perspective,

when it had declined sanction on the two occasions.

We see from the judgments cited by Mr. Vikas Singh that they proceed on facts which are akin to the present

one. In both cases sanction was granted after a delay of

thirteen years while the officials concerned were still in

service under the State Government. We find in the matter

before us that the appellant had superannuated in the year

1997 and the cognizance had been taken by the Special

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Judge four years thereafter in a matter arising out of an

F.I.R. registered in April 1984 even though the request for

sanction had been rejected by the State Government on two

occasions. In view of these peculiar facts we are of the

opinion that the initiation of proceedings against the appellant was not justified.

We may however clarify that this judgment should not

be read to mean that sanction would be required in a case

where an employee has in the meanwhile superannuated.

We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the

impugned orders and quash the proceedings against the

appellant.

(HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

.................J. (C.K. PRASAD) New Delhi, July 27, 2010.