Lokendra Kumar Tiwari vs Union Of India

2026 INSC 487 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5307 OF 2024

LOKENDRA KUMAR TIWARI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. In January 2013, Respondent No. 2/Institute issued an Advertisement

numbered FS-01/2013 (“Advertisement”) calling for applications from

suitable candidates for the posts of Professor, Associate Professor and

Assistant Professor. The Civil Appeal concerns the appointment of an

Assistant Professor. The Advertisement invites applications for appointment

to regular posts of Assistant Professor, and the Appellant is among the

applicants. The qualifications required for the post and the qualifications

possessed by the Appellant are stated in the following table:

Criteria Required for Assistant Professor Qualifications Possessed by the Appellant

Ph.D. with First Class or equivalent (in Ph.D. in Information Security, Department of Signature Not Verified

terms of grades) at the preceding degree in Digitally signed by GEETA AHUJA Electronics and Communication, University of Date: 2026.05.13 16:39:28 IST the appropriate branch, with a good Reason: Allahabad (November 2008 to May 2012) academic record throughout

1 M.S. in Cyber Law & Information Security, IIIT-

First class or equivalent at the degree Allahabad, First Division; awarded Bronze preceding the Ph.D. in the appropriate Medal and Certificate of Merit for branch securing Third Position in the MS batch;

CGPA 9.02/10 (July 2006 – May 2008)

Working as Lecturer at Ewing Christian Experience of minimum 3 years of teaching College (University of Allahabad), Department of / research / industrial experience as on Computer Science, 21.07.2008 to 05.04.2013;

the closing date of the advertisement, additionally served as Guest Faculty at IIIT-

25.02.2013 Allahabad from October 2012 to 05.04.2013

Faculty positions in areas including Information Technology (including Applied for Assistant Professor in Information Security, Laws & Practices, the Information Security/MSCLIS Information and Network Security), stream (Information Security Laws & Practices; Electronics, Management, MSc/LIS, Information and Network Security) Bioinformatics, Biomedical Engineering

2. The Appellant was invited for the interview held on 18.03.2013. On

06.04.2013, Respondent No. 3 issued a letter of appointment to the Appellant

as Assistant Professor on a contract basis for a period of 12 months. The

Appellant accepted the appointment on a contract basis, and continued to

discharge the duties and functions in the Respondent No. 2/Institute. On

26.03.2014, Respondent No. 2, on a few perceived omissions in the selection

process, cancelled all the appointments made pursuant to the

recommendation of the Selection Committee dated 06.04.2013. It is pertinent

to note that, in the very selection dated 06.04.2013, Respondent No. 2

appointed thirteen individuals as Associate and Assistant Professors in the

Institute. The Appellant and another individual, Dr. Ranjana Vyas, were

recommended on a contract basis and given appointments. The aggrieved

appointees, pursuant to the recommendation of the Selection Committee

dated 06.04.2013, challenged the cancellation of appointment by Respondent

2 No. 2 by filing Writ Petition No. 22558 of 2014 in the High Court of Judicature

at Allahabad.

3. On 11.12.2015, the Writ Petitions filed by the removed Associate and

Assistant Professors were allowed, and Respondent No. 2 was directed to

reconsider the issue after affording the candidates an opportunity. The

Appellant filed an application for modification on the ground that the

Appellant’s initial appointment on a contractual basis was ex facie illegal and

contrary to the Rules. The Appellant’s application was disposed of on

24.03.2017, along with the Civil Appeal Nos. 4406-4418 of 2017 filed against

the judgment dated 11.12.2015 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

4. The present Civil Appeal arises from the decision taken by Respondent

No. 2, pursuant to the order of remand.

5. Respondent No. 2, while reconsidering the matter, decided to reiterate

the decision of the Selection Committee, resulting in the re-issuance of the

appointment letter to the thirteen candidates. Respondent No. 2 has offered

the contractual appointment on 27.06.2017 to the Appellant, and the

operative portion reads as follows:

“As apropos the above Office Memorandum, you are requested to join your services to complete your contract period at IIIT Allahabad within 21 days from the receipt of this letter; failing which the opportunity to join the IIIT Allahabad will automatically stand cancelled.

You are required to bring proper relieving order from your present organization at the time of rejoining your services here. Please also bring your Last Pay Certificate.

This is being issued with the approval of competent authority.”

6. The Appellant filed Writ Petition No. 7099 of 2018 challenging the

reiteration of the recommendation for the Appellant’s appointment on a

3 contractual basis. The Appellant's case in Writ Petition No. 7099 of 2018 was

that the Advertisement was issued exclusively for regular appointments in Pay

Band-IV and Pay Band-III, with no mention of contractual appointments, and

that Rules 9 and 9-A of the Recruitment and Service Rules of IIIT-Allahabad,

1999 (“Rules”), separately prescribed distinct Selection Committees for

regular and contractual appointments, a procedure entirely bypassed in the

present case. It was contended that, of all candidates selected on 06.04.2013,

every other candidate was appointed on a regular basis, while the Appellant

alone, along with Dr. Ranjana Vyas, was arbitrarily placed on a contractual

appointment. This constituted a violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution of India. The Appellant urged that his oral protest at the time of

joining, and his subsequent acceptance under economic compulsion on the

assurance of the then Director, could not operate as an estoppel against the

illegality. It was further contended that, even after this Court’s remand in

2017, the Institute regularised all other candidates’ contractual appointments

except the Appellant’s. The Appellant accordingly prayed for the quashing of

the orders dated 01.01.2018, 19.06.2017 and 27.06.2017, the modification of

the Selection Committee’s recommendation dated 06.04.2013, and the

treatment of his appointment as regular with all consequential service and

monetary benefits from 06.04.2013.

7. Respondent No. 2 opposed the writ prayer, arguing the Selection

Committee was competent to recommend appointments on a regular or

contractual basis, as rules allowed discretion. The committee exercised this

discretion based on candidates' merit and available posts. It was added that

the Appellant was not uniquely treated; Dr. Ranjana Vyas was similarly

4 appointed contractually. The Respondent asserted that the Appellant

voluntarily accepted his contractual appointment on 06.04.2013 without

protest and worked for nearly a year without grievance. When appointments

were cancelled, and a new offer was made on 27.03.2014, the Appellant

accepted it in writing, thereby barring him from later questioning the

contractual nature of the offer. The Respondent also argued that the Appellant

failed to press his claim for regular appointment earlier, including during the

proceedings of 11.12.2015 and 24.03.2017. The Board of Governors re-

examined the matter on 06.06.2017 after providing a status report and

hearing. The decision to uphold the contractual appointment was well-

reasoned and not subject to judicial review. Lastly, it was contended that,

since the Appellant was not in service and refused to complete his contractual

term, he was not entitled to regularisation.

8. On 12.02.2019, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition

filed by the Appellant. The Single Judge noted that the Board of Governors’

decision dated 06.06.2017 had been taken after due reconsideration

pursuant to this Court's directions and therefore carried a presumption of

due application of mind. It was observed that the Competent Authority had

considered the Appellant’s case along with that of others and had chosen to

maintain his contractual appointment. This decision does not warrant an

interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court

further held that the Appellant, having been appointed on a contractual basis,

did not have the right to seek regular appointment. It was additionally noted

that the Appellant had accepted his contractual appointment without any

formal protest and had worked for a considerable period under those terms,

5 and therefore could not subsequently challenge the nature of his

appointment, more so when he had accepted a fresh contractual appointment.

The Writ Petition was accordingly dismissed, with the limited relief of

permitting the Appellant to join and complete the remaining duration of his

contractual tenure.

9. The Appellant filed an unsuccessful appeal before the Division Bench.

The Division Bench recorded that even if the advertisement did not expressly

distinguish between contractual and regular appointments, the fact was that

the Appellant had accepted his contractual appointment without any written

protest and continued in service for a considerable period. The Division Bench

noted that the Appellant’s allegation of an oral protest at the time of joining

was insufficient to displace his clear conduct in accepting the contractual

terms. It further emphasised that acquiescence disentitled the Appellant from

later challenging the appointment. While dealing with the plea of

discrimination, the Division Bench held that the Appellant could not claim

regularisation merely because other candidates had been appointed on a

regular basis, observing that the Selection Committee had the discretion to

recommend appointments. The Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeal.

Hence, the Civil Appeal.

10. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Sudhir Kumar Saxena, appearing for the

Appellant, argued that the advertisement was issued for filling up a

sanctioned regular post in Respondent No. 2/Institute. The Rules provide for

a separate procedure for the selection on a regular or contract basis. The

Selection Committee has no jurisdiction or authority to arbitrarily make a

recommendation of the Appellant’s case for appointment on a contract basis.

6 If the Appellant is eligible for appointment on a contract basis, then by the

same criteria, he is eligible for a regular appointment. It is no one’s case that

the contractual appointment was made despite the Appellant not being fully

qualified to hold the position of Assistant Professor. Rather, the Appellant is

fully qualified and was entitled to a regular appointment. The Appellant

accepted the appointment on a contractual basis by making an oral protest.

Even assuming the protest was oral, the options for the unemployed are few,

and on the assurance given by the then Director, the Appellant joined as an

Assistant Professor. Therefore, acceptance of the contractual appointment

does not estop a challenge to the illegality or irregularity of the selection

procedure for all candidates. Giving singular treatment to the Appellant

suffers from discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution

of India. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are excessively

swayed by the conduct of the Appellant in accepting the contractual

appointment. The original record produced in this Court, stated with

circumspection, “bristles with patent illegalities and arbitrariness” as the

persons who were conducting the appointment were part of the Selection

Committee. The Appellant had been working as a lecturer/guest lecturer in

other institutions, and the denial of regular employment in the case at hand

is for reasons unavailable. The Appellant suffers from discrimination and

prays for re-appointment as a regular appointee and for the issuance of all

consequential benefits.

11. Learned Counsel, Mr. Sanyat Lodha, appearing for Respondent No. 2,

contends that the scope of judicial review in matters of selection and

appointment is well established, and the case on hand does not fall within the

7 permissible parameters of judicial review. This Court vide order dated

24.03.2017 directed reconsideration, and the reconsideration cannot be

faulted with inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 accepted the recommendations

as made by the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee recommended

that the Appellant be appointed on a contract basis, whereas other candidates

be appointed on a regular basis. Therefore, the Appellant has no right.

11.1 Vide order dated 28.01.2026, this Court directed Respondent No. 2 to

file a tabular statement of the details of candidates appointed, qualifications

held by the candidates selected and appointed on a regular basis, and whether

any relaxation was granted to any one of the selected or regularly appointed

candidates. Mr. Sanyat Lodha placed before us the statement together with

the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Committee.

12. We have perused the record and noted the arguments. The real

controversy in the Civil Appeal is not whether a contractual appointee is

entitled to regularisation, but whether issuing a contractual appointment

against an advertisement meant for a regular vacancy, subjecting it to the

regular process and arbitrarily granting a contractual appointment, is

sustainable. The following are the admitted circumstances:

A. Advertisement: Respondent No. 2 issued the Advertisement calling for

applications for appointment to the posts of Professor, Associate Professor

and Assistant Professor in the Institute. The posts were advertised in Pay

Band-IV and Pay Band-III, respectively. The Advertisement made no mention

of any appointment being made on a contractual basis, and the last date for

receipt of applications was 25.02.2013.

8 B. Appellant’s Application and Suitability: The Appellant applied in

response to the advertisement for the post of Assistant Professor in the area

of Information Security. He was found suitable for consideration, possessing

a PhD with a First-Class preceding degree and a good academic record, and

was accordingly called for an interview for the post of Assistant Professor by

letter dated 18.03.2013.

C. Shortlisted for Consideration for a Regular Appointment: The Appellant

was shortlisted and appeared for the interview held on 18.03.2013 before the

Selection Committee constituted for the purpose. The selection process was

one and the same for all candidates, regular and otherwise, and the Appellant

was considered alongside all other candidates who were ultimately appointed

on a regular basis.

D. Recommended for Appointment on a Contract Basis: Despite being

found suitable and selected through the same process, the Selection

Committee, vide its recommendation dated 06.04.2013, recommended the

Appellant for appointment on a contract basis for a period of one year at a

fixed pay of Rs. 40,000/- per month, while all other thirteen candidates,

barring the Appellant and Dr. Ranjana Vyas, were recommended for and given

regular appointments. No reason was recorded for this differential treatment.

13. We observe that the procedure initiated is for a regular appointment,

and the Selection Committee, after perusing the candidates' applications and

credentials, has not given equal or uniform treatment to all candidates invited

for an interview. The Appellant, if unsuitable for appointment, could not have

been recommended even on a contract basis for a period of twelve months. To

justify a singular treatment, at least the record must disclose reasons. The

9 record does not disclose any reason for denying the post for which the

Appellant was shortlisted and interviewed. We are aware that in Judicial

Review, the court will not sit as a court of appeal on the views recorded by the

Selection Committee. The point in the case at hand is not whether the reasons

recorded are right or untenable, but whether, even by the most liberal

approach to the primacy of appointment, educational institutions have, in

these matters, the denial of regular appointment justified?

14. At this stage, we do not intend to examine the procedure followed by

the Selection Committee for making the recommendation dated 06.04.2013

in respect of other appointees. Because there is no challenge to their

appointments and they are not parties before us. The other argument

regarding the illegality of the Selection Process is also not considered, as it is

not under challenge in the present proceedings. However, we note that

denying a regular appointment is patently illegal and unconstitutional.

Respondent No. 2 places before us the present vacant positions of Assistant

Professors in the Institution, with thirty-two vacancies. The total number of

vacancies for Assistant Professors is sixty-seven. Having perused the record,

we are unable to discern a just and real reason for denying the Appellant a

regular appointment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that

the Appellant is entitled to a Regular Appointment in Respondent No.

2/Institution as Assistant Professor. Further, we mould the relief by denying

other benefits except the Appellant’s entitlement to continuity of service

without financial benefit. Respondent No. 2 is directed to issue an order of

appointment within four weeks from today, and the Appellant shall be kept,

in the seniority of Assistant Professors, as the last candidate against the

10 candidates recommended and appointed by the Selection Committee

resolution dated 06.04.2013.

15. All the orders/judgments impugned are set aside. The Civil Appeal is

allowed as indicated above. No order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any,

is/are disposed of accordingly.

……..……….…………………J. [PANKAJ MITHAL]

.……..…………………………J. [S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi;

May 13, 2026

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