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Lok Mal @ Loku vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court7 March 2025Bela M. Trivedi

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where rape is alleged, the testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence and is wholly trustworthy and unshaken, is of the same evidentiary value as that of an injured witness, and conviction may be rendered on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix without corroboration in material particulars, provided that the court examines the broader probabilities of the case and does not allow minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies to discard an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The absence of injury marks on the private parts of the victim is not fatal to a prosecution for rape; whether injuries are present depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the manner in which the assault was committed. Delay in lodging a complaint and registering an FIR is not fatal to the prosecution's case where the delay has been sufficiently explained by the evidence on record, such as by threats or intimidation of the victim. The alleged immoral character or reputation of the victim's mother or family members is not admissible to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix in a rape case, as the question of the accused's guilt turns solely on whether the rape was committed and is entirely independent of the character of the victim's relatives.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025 INSC 344

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 325 OF 2011

LOK MAL @ LOKU Appellant(s)…… VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Respondent(s)…….

JUDGMENT

PRASANNA B. VARALE, J.

1. The present criminal appeal arises out of a judgement and order

dated 22nd July 2010 passed by High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Crl. Appeal No. 496 of 1986. By the Signature Not Verified

impugned judgment and order, the conviction which was rendered Digitally signed by NITIN TALREJA Date: 2025.03.07 19:13:45 IST Reason:

by the trial court under Section 376, 323 Indian Penal Code, 1860

1 (hereinafter being referred to as ‘IPC’) was affirmed by the High Court

and a sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 376

IPC and 6 months rigorous imprisonment under Section 323 IPC

imposed by the trial court was confirmed.

BRIEF FACTS

2. The factual matrix of the case is that on 19.03.1984 at 9.30

A.M, the prosecutrix went to take tuition classes for the girls at the

house of the accused. It was stated that out of the two girls. One went

to the bathroom and the other was sent by the accused for bringing

water. It was further stated that when she was engaged in the work

on the first floor of the house, the accused entered the room and

latched the door from inside and forced her on the bed. The

prosecutrix tried to raise an alarm but her mouth was gagged with a

piece of cloth. The accused then removed her salwar to make her

naked. It was further stated that she tried to resist and run away

from the accused, but he held her by force and committed rape on

her. In the meantime, the girls reached there, and they knocked at

the door which was not opened. The accused threatened the

prosecutrix that if she raises a hue and cry about the incident, he

will kill her. The grandmother of the girls eventually came to the

rescue and brought the prosecutrix on the ground floor. Due to the

2 outcry of the prosecutrix, the local people had gathered at the place

of the incident. She was taken to her own house by uncle Nand

Kishore and she narrated the entire incident to her mother and

uncle. When the family members attempted to lodge the report, the

inhabitants of the mahalla and family members of the accused

threatened them with dire consequences if they tried to intimate the

incident to the police. Subsequently, a written report was submitted

at the police station by the prosecutrix, and a case was registered

under Section 376, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. After the investigation,

a charge sheet was submitted against the accused in the court. The

case was committed to the Court of sessions by the learned

Magistrate and charges were framed under Section 376,323 506 of

IPC.

3. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried before

the court of law. The prosecutrix was examined as PW1, PW2 Smt.

Dada Bai was the mother of the accused. PW3 Kumari Sangeeta was

the niece of the accused, PW4 was Dr. Daya Chaturvedi, PW5 was

head constable Kishan Niwas Tiwari. PW6 was a person named

Chhote Lala Choudhary. PW 7 was the Investigating Officer of the

case. PW8 Smt. Asha Devi was the head constable of the police

station concerned.

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4. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of Criminal

Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter being referred to as ‘CrPC’) was

recorded. The accused had denied the prosecution case and claimed

that he was falsely implicated due to the enmity with the prosecutrix.

The Trial Court vide its judgement and order dated 13.08.1986

convicted the accused under Sections 376, 323 IPC and awarded

imprisonment for a term of 5 years.

5. On appreciation of evidence of record, the High Court vide its

judgement dated 22.03.2010 confirmed the conviction rendered by

the Trial Court under Section 376 and Section 323 IPC, while

acquitting him under Section 506 IPC.

6. Aggrieved by the said Judgement of the High Court, the

appellant is before us.

CONTENTIONS

7. The counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that there

is absolutely no evidence against the appellant. It is submitted that

oral evidence is in the form of interested witnesses and as such Trial

Court as well as the High Court erred in recording the conviction and

awarding sentence to the appellant on such unacceptable evidence.

The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that it is a case

4 of false implication and that the mother of the prosecutrix has a

doubtful character. The Ld. counsel for the appellant submitted that

the medical evidence on record does not corroborate with the version

of the prosecutrix as there is no injury found in the private parts.

Hence, the conviction ought not have been rendered in the present

case. Ld. counsel further submitted the sole testimony of PW1

prosecutrix was not trustworthy to sustain a conviction.

8. On the other hand, Ld. counsel for the State of UP argued that

the judgement argued that the judgement passed by the High Court

is a very well-reasoned judgement. The High Court has rightly

convicted the accused persons on appreciation of evidence and the

appeal of the appellant needs to be set aside.

ANALYSIS

9. We have heard the arguments from both sides and perused

other relevant documents as also the judgment passed by the High

Court.

10. Though learned counsel for the appellant, submitted before this

Court that the oral evidence is unacceptable being the testimony of

interested witnesses, we are unable to accept the submissions of the

learned counsel for the simple reason that the evidence of the

5 prosecutrix is wholly trustworthy, unshaken and inspires

confidence. Admittedly, the prosecutrix was a major girl studying in

first part of B.A. at the time of the incident. Though she was

subjected to detailed cross examination, she stood firm and

unshaken disclosing the incident in detail regarding the presence

and participation of the accused in ravishing her.

11. Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no major

injury marks, this cannot a be a reason to discard the otherwise

reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not necessary that in each

and every case where rape is alleged there has to be an injury to the

private parts of the victim and it depends on the facts and

circumstances of a particular case. We reiterate that absence of

injuries on the private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the

case of the prosecution. According to the version of the prosecutrix,

the accused overpowered her and pushed her to bed in spite of her

resistance and gagged her mouth using a piece of cloth. Thus,

considering this very aspect, it is possible that there were no major

injury marks. The appellant made an attempt to raise the defence of

false implication, however, he was unable to support his defence by

any cogent evidence. Ld. counsel for the appellant further submitted

that there is an inordinate delay in lodging complaint and registering

6 FIR. However, considering the evidence on record, we are of the

opinion that the said delay in lodging of the complaint and registering

FIR has been sufficiently explained and is not fatal to the case of the

prosecution.

12. In the present case, the prosecutrix was continuously

threatened by the appellant that she will face his wrath if she creates

a commotion. The prosecutrix was hence forced to submit to the lust

of the appellant and was left with no other alternative than to submit

to the evil wish of the appellant.

13. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the

evidence of a prosecutrix in a case of rape is of the same value as

that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis

of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In the case of State of

Punjab v. Gurmit Singh1, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“21… The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case

1 (1996) 2 SCC 384

7 and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

14. A profitable reference can also be made to the case of Bharwada

Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 2 where the Supreme

Court observed as under:

“9..In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?”

15. Applying the above said principle of law to the facts of the

present case, we are of the opinion that the testimony of the

prosecutrix is trustworthy and leaves no shadow of doubt to discredit

her case. Moreover, the appellant has failed to cause a dent in the

testimony of the prosecutrix.

16. Merely by alleging that mother of the prosecutrix was a lady of

easy virtue or her husband left her, there is absolutely no supportive

material brought by the appellant in his defence so as to explain why

he was implicated. The court is separately required to adjudicate

whether the accused committed rape on the victim or not. We find

2 (1983) 3 SCC 217

8 no reason to accept the contention that the alleged immoral

character of the mother of the prosecutrix has any bearing on the

accused being falsely roped in on the basis of a concocted story by

the mother of the prosecutrix. The question of conviction of the

accused for rape of the prosecutrix is independent and distinct. It

has absolutely no connection with the character of the mother of the

prosecutrix and seems to be a dire attempt at using it as a license to

discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix. We find no merit in these

contentions.

17. Guided by law as aforesaid and applying it to the facts and

circumstances of the present case, we find no reason to interfere with

the judgment of the High Court which is hereby affirmed. The appeal

is dismissed accordingly.

18. Considering that the incident is of the year 1984 and the

impugned judgment of the High Court was of 2010, we deem it fit to

direct the competent authority to consider and decide the case of the

accused for the purpose of remission strictly in accordance with

applicable state policy, within a period of four weeks from this

judgment.

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19. Pending application(s), if any, be disposed of accordingly.

........................................J. [SANDEEP MEHTA]

.........................................J. [PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 7, 2025.

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