Krishna Rai (Dead) Through LRs and Others vs Banaras Hindu University Through Registrar and Others

Civil Appeal Nos. 4578­4580 of 2022

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.31186­88 of 2016)

KRISHNA RAI (Dead) APPELLANT(S)

THROUGH LRs & ORS.

VERSUS

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY THROUGH REGISTRAR & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Vikram Nath, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. I.A.D.No.133982 of 2021 is allowed. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Rajni Mukhi Date: 2022.06.16 14:24:17 IST Reason: 1

3. In these three Civil Appeals, this Court has

been called upon to decide whether principle of

estoppel and acquiescence will prevail over

statutory service rules prescribing the procedure

for promotion of Class­IV employees to Class­III

working in the Banaras Hindu University1,

Varanasi, a Central University. The learned

Single Judge was of the view that the statutory

rules would prevail and must be strictly adhered

to, whereas, the Division Bench, although,

agreeing with the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge that the procedure prescribed under the

rules was violated, still proceeded to set aside

the judgment of the learned Single Judge

applying the principle of estoppel and

acquiescence over and above the eligibility

1 BHU

2 conditions having statutory force laid down by

the statutory rules.

4. The learned Single Judge had allowed the

writ petition filed by the appellants and after

setting aside the promotion of respondent Nos.3

to 16, had directed the BHU to carry out the

exercise for promotion afresh as per the law and

the observations made in the said judgment. The

Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the

judgment of the learned Single Judge and

dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the

same, the original writ petitioners are in appeal

before this Court.

5. Facts in brief are that for filling up 14 posts

of Class­III (Junior Clerk Grade) by way of

promotion, the University issued a

3 Notification/Advertisement dated 17.12.2005

inviting applications from permanent Class­IV

employees for promotion as Junior Clerk in the

Pay­Scale of Rs.3050­4590. The eligibility

prescribed in the aforesaid Notification reads as

under:

“Eligibility:

All Class­IV employees, who have put in five years services and who have passed matriculation examination or equivalent will be eligible for appointment as Junior Clerk under 25% promotion quota.

Such eligible candidates will be tested in: A typing test in English/Hindi for a minimum of 30 words per minutes; and after qualifying in the test.

Note: If an employee does not passed the typing test and is otherwise eligible for promotion he/she be promoted subject to the condition that he/she passes the typing test within two years from the date of his/her promotion failing which he/she will be reverted.

Provided further that for such employees, typing test be held at least twice a year.

4 Two papers of simple English, Hindi and Arithmetic of one hour duration.”

6. It would be worthwhile to mention here that

in the meantime, it was resolved to hold a

computer typing test on 20.04.2006. However,

upon a representation being made, the said

computer type test was deferred vide letter dated

19.04.2006 and, later vide communication dated

04.05.2006, it was informed that final merit list

would be based on the marks obtained in typing

test, written test and interview. The type test

could be taken on a computer or on a manual

type­writer. The typing test was held on

16.05.2006; the written test was held on

23.09.2006 and interview was held on

31.05.2007 and 01.06.2007. Thereafter, merit

list was prepared by the Board of Examiners

appointed for making the selection/promotion

5 and, accordingly, as per its recommendations,

14 selected candidates (respondent nos.3 to 16)

were issued appointment letters on 05.06.2007.

The appellants made a representation against

the decision to appoint respondent nos.3 to 16,

which was rejected by the competent authority

on 02.07.2007.

7. Aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition

No.37741 of 2007; Sri Krishna Rai and 33

others impleading the Banaras Hindu University

through its Registrar as respondent No.1, Vice­

Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University as

respondent No.2, and the 14 selected candidates

as respondent nos.3 to 16. The petition was filed

primarily on the ground that the

Advertisement/Notification, which was issued

6 laying down the eligibility conditions, as per

paragraph 6.4 of the Manual did not provide for

any interview, but later on, changing the rules of

the game and in violation of the eligibility

conditions laid down in para 6.4, the Board of

Examiners which did not have any authority or

power to amend paragraph 6.4 laying down the

eligibility conditions introduced an interview.

The Board of Examiners further laid down the

criteria for preparing the merit list out of total of

100 marks, with the following break­up: 20

marks for the type test, 60 marks for the written

test of Hindi, English and Arithmetic and 20

marks for the interview.

8. In the counter­affidavit filed by the BHU as

also by the respondent nos.3 to 16, the eligibility

7 conditions as laid down in para 6.4 of the

Manual and duly approved by the Executive

Council, which is the supreme Authority, was

not disputed. Even during the course of the

arguments, learned counsel for the BHU agreed

to the submission of the appellants that the

Board of Examiners had no authority to alter the

eligibility conditions or the procedure prescribed

under para 6.4 of the Manual. It is further

undisputed that Board of Examiners was not

vested with any authority to alter the procedure

for promotion or in other words, it could not

amend para 6.4 of the Manual. It is also an

admitted position that it is only the Executive

Council, which could have amended or modified

the procedure/eligibility prescribed under para

6.4 of the Manual.

8

9. The learned Single Judge after considering

the entire material on record and also the catena

of decisions relied upon by the respondent­BHU

and the private respondents was of the view that

the Board of Examiners committed grave error in

making selections by awarding marks on the

type test, written test and interview and then

preparing the merit list.

10. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ

petition. It quashed the orders impugned dated

05.06.2007 and 02.07.2007 as also the

appointments of respondent Nos.3 to 16 on

Class­III post and further directed BHU to hold

fresh selections for promotion to the post of

Class­III, complete the same expeditiously within

three months, strictly in accordance with the

9 Rules and in the light of observations made

above. It also awarded costs quantified at

Rs.50,000/. The operative part of the judgment

of learned Single Judge is reproduced

hereunder:

“56. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated 5.6.2007 and 2.7.2007 and appointments of respondents 3 to 16 on Class IV posts are hereby quashed.

57. The University is directed to hold fresh selection for promotion to the post of Class III against the vacancies for which selection was held by notification dated 17.12.2005 and complete the same expeditiously and in any case, within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order strictly in accordance with Rules and in the light of observations made above.

58. Petitioners are entitled to costs which I quantify to Rs. 50,000/­“.

11. The finding recorded by the learned Single

Judge as contained in paragraph Nos.53, 54 and

55 are also reproduced hereunder:

10 “53. In the present case, I am constrained to observe that the notification published by University categorically reiterated what was contained in Clause 6.4 of the Manual. The rules of game were made known to everybody but Board of Examiners, which was constituted to hold selection strictly in accordance with aforesaid decided norms, changed the rules in between the game and held selection in a manner unknown to the extant Rules applicable for promotion from Class IV to Class III in BHU. This was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. It is well settled that rules of games cannot be allowed to be changed during the game.

54. This Court has no manner of doubt in the light of above discussion that petitioners have been discriminated and have been considered in a manner which was never contemplated by the University for considering promotion from Class IV to Class III.

55. One more aspect also not be ignored. In making such promotions persons totally unequal to each other in various respects have to be considered. A Class IV employee who was appointed in 1977 has much longer experience of a Class IV post but in the context of personality and other aspects, he may not compare with his much junior entered in service as Class IV employee after 10, 20 or 25 years. The subsequent

11 educational advancement also cannot be ignored.

It is evident that persons who were appointed in 1977 to 1997, i.e. petitioners, got occasion for consideration for promotion to Class III post after decades of service. For such persons, making interview as a part of selection when it was not contemplated in the relevant procedure prescribed by the University obviously made it difficult for them to qualify since they may not compete with young and youngest new employees having better qualifications. But one must also have considered that they at the fag end of service to their credit, have long experience. Better honour and respect needed so that they may retire from a higher post after getting at least one promotion at the fag end of their service. The University must have all these facts and other relevant aspects in mind when laid down the procedure in the Manual, but unfortunately the Board of Examiners acted unmindful of wider aspects. The acted wholly illegally by ignoring the established procedure laid down in the Rules and on the contrary settled their own selection procedure by exceeding their authority and jurisdiction.”

12. BHU as also the private respondent nos. 3 to

16 preferred intra­court Appeals registered as

12 Special Appeal No.24 of 2012 (Banaras Hindu

University and another Vs. Sri Krishna Rai and

others), Special Appeal No.9 of 2012 (Shri Sarvjit

Singh and others Vs. Sri Krishna Rai and others)

and Special Appeal No.25 of 2012 (Ram Kishore

Pandey and others Vs. Banaras Hindu

University and others). The Division Bench vide

judgment dated 29.07.2016 was of the view, as

already stated above, that the appellants having

appeared in the examination process as also the

interview without any protest, upon being

unsuccessful could not have challenged the

selection process. The Division Bench relied

upon a number of decisions, which we shall

shortly discuss, in support of its view and

accordingly allowed the Special Appeals, set

13 aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge

and dismissed the writ petition.

13. Having heard learned counsel for the

parties and having perused the material on

record as also the case laws relied upon by the

learned counsel for the parties, we now proceed

to deal with the issue at hand.

14. As per para 6.4 of the Manual duly

approved by the Executive Council’s Resolution

No.223 dated 2/3rd of November, 1980, all Class­

IV employees, who have put in five years’ service

and who have passed matriculation examination

or equivalent, would be eligible for promotion to

the post of Junior Clerk Grade. Such eligible

candidates would be tested in a typing test in

English/Hindi for a minimum speed of 30 words

per minute. The note appended to such Clause

14 of typing test mentions that if an employee does

not pass the typing test and is otherwise eligible

for promotion, he be promoted subject to the

condition that he passes the typing test within

two years from the date of his promotion failing

which, he would be reverted. The note further

provided that for such employees the typing test

would be held twice a year. Para 6.4(ii)(b)

provided that two papers of simple English,

Hindi and Arithmetic of one hour duration

would be held.

15. The Executive Council vide its Resolution

No.131 dated 29/30.03.1996 had raised the

vacancies from 20% to 25% for promotion of

Group­D in­service employees and it further

provided that the seniority list would be

prepared after passing the departmental test

15 and it further provided that no relaxation in

prescribed qualification shall be given for in­

service employees.

16. The net effect of the above eligibility and

procedure prescribed for promotion of Group­D

Class­IV employees to the cadre of Junior Clerk

would be that­ (1) a type test would be held with

a minimum speed of 30 words per minute in

Hindi/English. This type test was not

mandatorily required to be qualified and even

those eligible candidates, who could not qualify

the type test, but were otherwise eligible having

passed in the departmental test, would be

allowed two years’ time after joining to qualify

the typing test and for such candidates, typing

test would be held twice a year.

16

17. The only test required for eligible candidates

was to pass in the departmental test i.e. the test

of simple English, Hindi and Arithmetic. Thus, if

an eligible candidate passes in the written test of

simple English, Hindi and Arithmetic and also

passes in the type test, would be entitled to be

placed in the seniority list for promotion. It

further mandated that even where eligible

candidates had passed in the departmental

written test of simple English, Hindi and

Arithmetic, but could not pass in the typing test,

would still be eligible for promotion and be

placed in the seniority list with a rider that

he/she would have to qualify the typing test

within two years and such typing test for these

promoted candidates would be held twice a year,

that is to say that they would have at least four

17 chances of appearing in the typing test and

qualifying it subsequent to their promotion.

18. In the present case, the Board of Examiners

comprising of large number of Members changed

the entire procedure and they established a

completely new procedure. They awarded 20

marks for the type test treating it to be

compulsory, 60 marks for the written

departmental test of simple English, Hindi and

Arithmetic with 20 marks for each subject and

further introduced an interview of 20 marks.

Thus, the merit list was to be prepared on the

total 100 marks as distributed above.

19. There is neither any provision nor any other

indication in the Manual duly approved by the

Executive Council for preparing such a merit list

based upon the marks awarded under different

18 heads. The promotion was to be made on the

basis of seniority subject to passing the

departmental written test, once the candidate

was eligible having five years’ experience in

Class­IV and matriculation certificate or

equivalent. The intention and object as culled

out from the aforesaid eligibility procedure was

that, seniority subject to qualifying the written

test would be the criteria for promotion.

20. The Board of Examiners on their own

changed the criteria and made it purely merit

based by introducing an interview and also

preparing the merit list on the basis of marks

awarded in the type test, written test and

interview. As per the provisions of Clause 6.4 of

the Manual, type test was not mandatory.

Anybody who would fail in the type test, could

19 also be promoted subject to the rider that they

would have to qualify the type test within two

years from his joining.

21. What we notice is that, the Division Bench

approved the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge. The relevant extract of the judgment of

the Division Bench is reproduced below:

“Learned Single Judge as already noted above has rightly proceeded to observe that interview was not at all subscribed by the provisions holding the field. We are also of the same view that procedure prescribed ought to have been adhered to by the Board of Examiners. Board of Examiners on their own could not have changed the procedure already holding the field as laid down by the Executive Council.”

22. However, the Division Bench fell in error in

applying the principle of estoppel that the

appellants having appeared in the interview and

being unsuccessful proceeded to challenge the

same and on that ground alone, allowed the

20 appeals, set­aside the judgment of the learned

Single Judge. The Division Bench having

approved the reasoning of the learned Single

Judge, ought not to have interfered in the

judgment of the learned Single Judge on a

technical plea. The Division Bench ought to have

considered that the appellants were Class­IV

employees working from 1977 onwards and

expecting from them to have raised serious

objection or protest at the stage of interview and

understanding the principles of changing the

Rules of the game, was too far­fetched,

unreasonable and unwarranted.

23. The case laws relied upon by the Division

Bench would have no application in the facts of

the present case as none of the judgments relied

upon by the Division Bench laid down that

21 principle of estoppel would be above law. It is

settled principle that principle of estoppel

cannot override the law. The manual duly

approved by the Executive Council will prevail

over any such principle of estoppel or

acquiescence.

24. The Division Bench relied upon the

following judgments:

(1) Union of India and another Vs. N. Chandrashekharan and others2.

(2) Utkal University and others Vs. Dr. N.C. Sarangi and others3.

(3) Chandra Prakash Tiwari Vs. Shakuntala4 . (4) K.A. Nagmani Vs. Indian Airlines5. (5) Madan Lal and others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others6.

2 JT 1998(1) SC 295 3 JT 1999 (1) SC 101.

4 2002 (6) SCC 127 5 2009 (5) SCC 515 6 1995(3) SCC 486

22

25. In the case of Chandrashekharan (supra),

the plea taken by the unsuccessful candidates

was that the marks prescribed for interview and

confidential reports were disproportionately high

and the authorities could not fix a minimum to

be secured either in interview or in the

assessment of annual confidential reports. In

the above case, there was no violation of any

statutory rules or the eligibility determined by

the rule making authority.

26. In the case of Utkal University (supra), the

objection taken by the unsuccessful candidates

was with regard to the composition of the

Selection Committee. This again would not have

any application to the facts of the present case.

27. In the case of Chandra Prakash Tiwari

(supra), the unsuccessful candidate did not find

23 the result of the interview palatable and the

objection taken was that the process of interview

was unfair. This also has no application to the

facts of the present case.

28. In the case of K.A. Nagmani (supra), the

unsuccessful candidates were given equal

opportunity and no violation of any statutory

rule was alleged, as such, this judgment would

also have no application.

29. In the case of Madan Lal (supra), again the

objection taken by the unsuccessful candidate

was regarding the process of interview being

unfair. This case also does not have any

application to the facts of the present case.

30. On the contrary, what we find is that, in the

case of Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu and others

24 Vs. State of Orissa and others7, it has been

held that the suitability criteria is to be laid

down by the rule making authority and that the

selection criteria cannot be laid down by the

Selection Board/Selection Committee unless

specifically authorized. In the present case,

firstly, there was no authorization to the Board

of Examiners to lay down the selection criteria

and further there was clear violation of the

suitability criteria laid down by the rule making

authority. Paragraph nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and

36 of the said judgment are reproduced

hereunder:

“31. Now, power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed on Govt. Posts is available to the Governor of the State under the Proviso to Article 309 and it was in exercise of this power that the present rules were made. If the statutory Rules, in a given

7 1995 (6) SCC 1

25 case, have not been made, either by the Parliament or the State Legislature, or, for that matter, by the Governor of the State, it would be open to the appropriate Government (the Central Government under Article 73 and the State Government under Article 162) to issue executive instructions. However, if the Rules have been made but they are silent on any subject or point in issue, the omission can be supplied and the rules can be supplemented by executive instructions. (See: Sant Ram Sharma V. State of Rajasthan).

32. In the instant case, the Government did neither issue any administrative instruction nor did it supply the omission with regard to the criteria on the basis of which suitability of the candidates was to be determined. The members of the Selection Board, of their own, decided to adopt the confidential character rolls of the candidates who were already employed as Homoeopathic Medical Officers, as the basis for determining their suitability.

33. The members of the Selection Board or for that matter, any other Selection Committee, do not have the jurisdiction to lay down the criteria for selection unless they are authorised specifically in that regard by the rules made under Article 309. It is basically the function of the Rule making authority to provide the basis for

26 selection. this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. V. Sadanandam and Ors observed as under: (SCC pp. 583­84, para 17):

“We are now only left with the reasoning of the Tribunal that there is no justification for the continuance of the old rule and for personnel belonging to either zone being transferred on promotion to offices in other zones. In drawing such conclusion, the Tribunal has travelled beyond the limits of its jurisdiction. We need only point out that the mode of recruitment and the category from which the recruitment to a service should be made are all matters which are exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is not for judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in choosing the mode of recruitment of the categories from which the recruitment should be made as they are matters of policy decision falling exclusively within the purview of the executive.” (Emphasis supplied).

34. The Selection Committee does not even have the inherent jurisdiction to lay down the norms for selection nor can such power be assumed by necessary implication. In P.K. Ramachandra lyer and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (SCC pp. 180­ 81 para 44) , it was observed :

“By necessary inference, there was no such power in the ASRB to add to the required qualifications. If such power is claimed, it has to

27 be explicit and cannot be read by necessary implication for the obvious reasons that such deviation from the rules is likely to cause irreparable and irreversible harm”.

35. Similarly, in Umesh Chandra Shukla Etc. v.

Union of India and Ors. it was observed that the Selection Committee does not possess any inherent power to lay down its own standards in addition to what is prescribed under the Rules. Both these decisions were followed in Durgacharan Misra v. State of Orissa and Ors and the limitation of the Selection Committee were pointed out that it had no jurisdiction to prescribe the minimum marks which a candidate had to secure at the viva­voce test.

36. It may be pointed out that rule making function under Article 309 is legislative and not executive as was laid down by this Court in B.S. Yadav and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. For this reason also, the Selection Committee or the Selection Board cannot be held to have jurisdiction to lay down any standard or basis for selection as it would amount to legislating a rule of selection.”

31. Further in the case of Tata Chemicals Ltd.

Vs. Commissioner of Customs (preventive),

28 Jamnagar8, it has been laid down that there can

be no estoppel against law. If the law requires

something to be done in a particular manner,

then it must be done in that manner, and if it is

not done in that manner, then it would have no

existence in the eye of the law. Paragraph 18 of

the said judgment is reproduced below:

“18. The Tribunal’s judgment has proceeded on the basis that even though the samples were drawn contrary to law, the appellants would be estopped because their representative was present when the samples were drawn and they did not object immediately. This is a completely perverse finding both on fact and law. On fact, it has been more than amply proved that no representative of the appellant was, in fact, present at the time the Customs Inspector took the samples. Shri K.M. Jani who was allegedly present not only stated that he did not represent the Clearing Agent of the appellants in that he was not their employee but also stated that he was not present when the samples were taken. In fact, therefore, there was no representative of the appellants when the samples were taken. In law equally the Tribunal ought to have realized that there can be no estoppel against law. If the law requires that something be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner, and if not done in that manner has no existence in the eye of law at all. The Customs Authorities are not absolved from following the 8 2015 (11) SCC 628

29 law depending upon the acts of a particular assessee.

Something that is illegal cannot convert itself into something legal by the act of a third person.”

32. For all the reasons recorded above, the

appeals deserve to be allowed. They are,

accordingly, allowed.

33. The impugned judgment of the Division

Bench dated 29.07.2016 is set aside and the

judgment of the learned Single Judge dated

26.08.2011 is restored.

34. We have been informed that some of the

appellants have retired and a couple of them

have also died, post retirement. Rest of them are

still working. Since the examinations have

already been held in the year 2006­07, all the

appellants who are found to be eligible for

promotion as per the existing rules and as

directed by the learned Single Judge, would be

30 extended all consequential benefits. Further,

where the appellants have died, the benefit

would be extended to their legal heirs entitled

under law for the same.

35. Pending application(s), if any, is/are

disposed of.

…………..........................J. [DINESH MAHESHWARI]

………….........................J. [VIKRAM NATH]

NEW DELHI JUNE 16, 2022.

31