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Krantesh vs Chancellor, Bundelkhand University and ors.

Supreme Court26 July 2000M.B. Shah · S.N. Phukan

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an employee was not a party to prior judicial proceedings in which the court found him unqualified for appointment and confirmed the order terminating his services, he cannot subsequently challenge that same order before the administrative authority (the Chancellor) by claiming he was not bound by the earlier judgment, if he had the opportunity to challenge the order at the relevant time or to join as a party-respondent in the appeal. Once a statutory authority (the Vice Chancellor) has not approved an employee's appointment, continuation in service thereafter is illegal and cannot be cured by the fact that a stay order permitted continued service pending appellate decision. An administrative authority (the Chancellor) does not act illegally or erroneously in dismissing a representation against an order when that order has been confirmed by the courts in prior proceedings.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

ORDER

1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. By a judgment and order dated 06.2.1997 in Civil Appeal No. 5322/83, this Court held that continuation of the petitioner was not approved by the Vice Chancellor and, therefore, direction sought by the Management (appellant in that case) cannot be given.

This Court dismissed the appeal by considering all the contentions raised by the parties. The Court observed thus:

It would be obvious that only a qualified and competent Lecturer should be selected and its approval sought. It does not appear that such a procedure was followed. That apart as per the statute as pointed out by the Vice Chancellor, Mithlesh Kumar alias Krantesh, does not even possess, the minimum qualification for the post. The learned Counsel repeatedly reiterated that he was qualified without placing any unimpeachable documentary evidence in disproof of the finding by the Vice Chancellor.

2. In view of the aforesaid finding given by this Court, petitioner was not only unqualified to be appointed but his continuation in the service after 30.6.1978 was illegal.

3. Subsequently, petitioner approached the Chancellor of the University by filing a representation. The Chancellor by his order dated 28.5.1997, dismissed the representation by observing that this Court had dismissed the appeal and has approved the order passed by the Vice Chancellor, Bundelkhand University and, therefore, there was no justification to challenge the said order under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.

4. That order was challenged before this Court by filing a Writ Petition No. D 14648/97 which was dismissed. It appears that learned senior Counsel sought permission to withdraw the petition and, therefore, Court passed the order, "the writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn".

5. Thereafter, petitioner approached the High Court by filing Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.41877/1997. That writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by holding that in view of the decision rendered by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 5322/83, the order passed by the Chancellor does not suffer from any infirmity. That order is challenged in this petition.

6. From the facts narrated above, we are of the view that the order passed by the High Court or the Chancellor, cannot be said to be in any way illegal or erroneous. The Vice Chancellor has passed the order as early as in 1985 holding that petitioner was not possessing the minimum qualification laid down in the statute at the time of his original appointment and hence the Management cannot appoint him under the rules. It was also observed that after 30.6.1978 he could not have been retained by the Management. The Vice Chancellor further directed the Director of Higher Education, Allahabad, to take appropriate action against the Management in continuing the petitioner in service and in paying the salary after 30.6.1978. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as the petitioner was not party in the previous proceedings, he was not bound by the order passed by the High Court or by this Court and, therefore, petitioner was entitled to challenge the order passed by the Vice Chancellor under the statutory provisions before the Chancellor. This submission of the learned Counsel is devoid of any substance. The petitioner, if at all, was aggrieved by the order passed by the Vice Chancellor in February, 1985, ought to have challenged the said order at the relevant time. It is apparent that the Management was justifying the appointment of the petitioner and challenged the order before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in 1982. That order passed by the High Court, was challenged in appeal before this Court. After considering all the relevant facts, this Court confirmed the order passed by the Vice Chancellor and observed that under the statutory provision, only a qualified and competent lecturer should be selected after following the procedure prescribed and that as pointed out by the Vice Chancellor/petitioner was not possessing the minimum qualification for the post. The Court also negative the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that petitioner was qualified, by holding that there was no documentary evidence on record to establish that petitioner was qualified.

7. Further, once the Vice Chancellor has not approved the appointment of the petitioner, it was obvious that his continuation on the post was illegal and against the statutory provision. However, it is contended that the order passed by the Vice Chancellor was stayed by this Court and, therefore, the petitioner continued in service till disposal of the Civil Appeal by this Court in February 1997. This would not make any difference because if petitioner was aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Vice Chancellor, he ought to have resorted to appropriate proceedings at the relevant time or to have joined himself as party -respondent in the appeal filed by the Management. In any case, petitioner's appointment was not approved by the Vice Chancellor and, therefore, continuing in service after 30.6.1978 was illegal. Hence, the decision taken by the Chancellor, cannot be faulted.

8. In this view of the matter, this petition is dismissed.

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