Kiran vs The State Of Karnataka

2025 INSC 1453 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. of 2025 (@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.15786 of 2024)

Kiran ...Appellant Versus The State of Karnataka ...Respondent

JUDGMENT

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. A widow, with five children was torched to death, for

not having responded to the lustful advances of the accused,

a relative by marriage.

3. This Court had issued notice on 08.11.2024, limited to

the question as to whether the trial court was correct in

imposing life imprisonment meaning that it will be till the

end of his natural life and directing the accused to be not

granted the benefit of remission under Section 428 of the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731.

VARSHA MENDIRATTA Date: 2025.12.18 17:05:43 IST Reason:

1

for short, the Cr.PC Page 1 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024

4. Despite the limited notice, we have gone through the

evidence to convince ourselves on the conviction,

especially since the witnesses, including the daughter of the

deceased, an eyewitness turned hostile. The crime was

committed on 01.01.2014 at 11:30 pm when the accused was

alleged to have entered the shanty in which the deceased

was living with her daughters. The woman having not

succumbed to the sexual advances made, which had been

continuing for some time earlier, the accused poured

kerosene over her and set her ablaze. The woman was

rushed to the hospital, taken to a higher center but later,

after ten days, she succumbed to death. That the death was

due to 60% burns caused, has been established by the

medical evidence, making a clear case of homicide.

5. The crucial witnesses, who were close relatives,

including the father and daughter of the deceased, PW-1

and PW-7, turned hostile. PW-1 though did not support the

allegation against the accused, deposed on the incident and

spoke of the deceased having been taken to the hospital

after having sustained burns, to which she succumbed. As

found by the High Court, PW-7 though turned hostile with Page 2 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 respect to the allegation against the accused, admitted the

presence of PW-8 and PW-24, neighbors who had come to

the crime scene immediately after it occurred, hearing the

hue and cry. PW-24 was the brother-in-law of the deceased

who shifted her to the hospital along with PW-8, a neighbor,

who also spoke of this factum. PW-24, additionally spoke of

having seen the accused running away from the scene of

occurrence, known to him as a relative by marriage. The

presence of PW-24 having been spoken of by the other

prosecution witness, the presence of the accused and his

flight from the scene of occurrence is established.

6. One other compelling circumstance is the dying

declaration made by the deceased. Though there was a

dying declaration made to PW-1, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11

they resiled from their statements. However, it has been

established from the testimony of PW-9, the sister of the

deceased that the victim was conscious and could speak at

the time when she was admitted in the Hospital and

continued as an inpatient. Exhibit P-27 is the dying

declaration given by the deceased on 02.01.2014 at Nikhil

Hospital, Hyderabad to PW-25, the Head Constable Page 3 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 deputed on medical intimation having been received from

the Government Hospital, Bidar, to which place the

deceased was first taken before transferring her to

Hyderabad. PW-25 categorically stated that he was the

Station House Officer of Santapur Police Station and on

receiving intimation from the Government Hospital, Bidar,

he had gone there when he was informed of the victim

having been taken to Hyderabad. He then, after obtaining

sanction from the higher authorities, proceeded to

Hyderabad where he recorded Exhibit P-27, the dying

declaration, categorically pinning the crime on the accused.

He also stated that at Hyderabad he submitted a request to

the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to record the dying

declaration which request was produced as Exhibit D-1. In

Exhibit D-1, the recital was of a suicide having been

committed by pouring kerosene over oneself. However, this

was explained insofar as the crime scene was in the

northernmost part of Karnataka and the victim having been

taken to Hyderabad within the then State of Andhra Pradesh.

It was the deposition of PW-25 that he could not

communicate in Telugu, which resulted in the police at Page 4 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 Hyderabad not being properly communicated with the

offence; resulting in a mistaken intimation of suicide being

made in the request to the CJM, written in Telugu.

7. In any event, the Magistrate was examined as PW-21

who clearly spoke of Exhibit P-23, the dying declaration in

a question-and-answer form, on the very next day of

admission, again implicating the accused, in accordance

with the prosecution story, as also speaking of the

detestable prior conduct of the accused, resistance to which

was the motive projected. The dying declaration was taken

in the presence of PW-22, the duty doctor, who signed on

the declaration and fully corroborated in the box. PW-22

also confirmed that the deceased was conscious and

coherent when the statements were given. In the totality of

circumstances, as coming out from the case records, we are

convinced that the conviction was entered into properly.

8. Now, the question remains as to whether the Sessions

Court was competent to award a sentence of imprisonment

for life till the remainder of life and prohibit the benefit of

set-off as provided under Section 428 of the Cr.PC.

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9. The sentence of life imprisonment no doubt means the

entire life, subject only to the remission and commutation

provided under Cr. PC and also to Articles 72 and 161 of the

Constitution of India, which cannot be curtailed by a

Sessions Court. Nor can the Sessions Court, a creation of the

Cr.PC curtail the provision under Section 428, Cr.PC,

available in the Code which created it.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the

decision in Navas Alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala2 in

which the principle under Swamy Shraddananda (2) v.

State of Karnataka3 was employed to confirm the sentence

imposed by the High Court of a life sentence without

remission but modifying the period of 30 years

imprisonment to that of a period of 25 years of imprisonment

without remission.

11. In Swamy Shraddananda3, this Court held that: -

“56. But this leads to a more important question about the punishment commensurate to the appellant's crime. The sentence of imprisonment for a term of 14

2 (2024) 14 SCC 82 3 (2008) 13 SCC 767 Page 6 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 years, that goes under the euphemism of life imprisonment is equally, if not more, unacceptable. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hegde informed us that the appellant was taken in custody on 28 March, 1994 and submitted that by virtue of the provisions relating to remission, the sentence of life imprisonment, without any qualification or further direction would, in all likelihood, lead to his release from jail in the first quarter of 2009 since he has already completed more than 14 years of incarceration. This eventuality is simply not acceptable to this Court. What then is the answer? The answer lies in breaking this standardisation that, in practice, renders the sentence of life imprisonment equal to imprisonment for a period of no more than 14 years; in making it clear that the sentence of life imprisonment when awarded as a substitute for death penalty would be carried out strictly as directed by the Court. This Court, therefore, must lay down a good and sound legal basis for putting the punishment of imprisonment for life, awarded as substitute for death penalty, beyond any remission and to be carried out as directed by the Court so that it may be followed, in

Page 7 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 appropriate cases as a uniform policy not only by this Court but also by the High Courts, being the superior Courts in their respective States” (sic-para 56).

12. An alternative measure was brought in, to break the

standardisation in sentencing in such cases wherein the

crime is heinous, dastardly and brutal. Though life sentence

literally denotes imprisonment till the last breath, it

operates only as an imprisonment for 14 years with the

power of remission and commutation conferred on the

Government. Balancing, the need to provide proportionate

punishment at least in crimes which shocks human society,

with the need to avoid death; an irreversible penalty, a

middle ground was found. A measure by which, in crimes

possible of categorisation as ‘rarest of the rare’, the Courts

even then finds a need to avoid death, on mitigating

circumstances, could award life imprisonment without

remission. Also, when the case falls short of the ‘rarest of the

rare’ category, thus excluding imposition of death sentence,

but by the nature of crime the normal sentence of life

imprisonment subject to remission or commutation,

Page 8 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 working out to a term of 14 years would not suffice and

would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate, again

this measure could be employed. It was in such

circumstances that this Court considered the possibility of

expanding the options so as to cover the ‘vast hiatus between

14 years imprisonment of life and death’ (para 92). The Court

thus, substituted the death sentence awarded by the Trial

Court and confirmed by the High Court, with imprisonment

for life and directed that the accused shall not be released

till the rest of his life.

13. This Court, hence, as evident from the extract

hereinabove, clearly held that in appropriate cases as a

uniform policy, punishment of imprisonment for life beyond

any remission can be awarded, substituting the death

penalty; not only by the Supreme Court but also by the High

Courts. The power to impose punishment of imprisonment

for life without remission was conferred only on the

Constitutional Courts and not on the Sessions Courts.

Page 9 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024

14. In Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan and

Others4, a Constitution Bench of this Court by majority

reaffirmed the alternative option as laid down in Swamy

Shraddananda (2)3 restricting the principle to be applied

only by the Constitutional Courts, the Supreme Court and

the High Courts. While upholding the principle of

alternative sentencing, it was also held that this would not

affect the power conferred under Articles 72 & 161 of the

Constitution of India. It is on the same principle that we say,

the Sessions Court is not competent to interfere with or

curtail the effect of the provisions of the Cr.PC.

15. Going by the decisions cited, it has to be held that life

imprisonment awarded would be for the rest of the life, the

power to grant remission and commutation under Sections

432 to 435 Cr.PC cannot be curtailed by the Sessions Court,

when the remission as provided under the Constitution was

declared to be not permissible of interference by the

Constitutional Courts. The power of alternate sentencing to

cover the hiatus between 14 years and death, cannot be

4 (2016) 7 SCC 1 Page 10 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 applied by the Sessions Courts. Hence, the sentence of life

imprisonment cannot be directed to be till the end of natural

life, by the Sessions Court which direction would be in

conflict with the provisions of the Cr. PC. The power of

remission or commutation conferred on the State cannot be

taken away and the sentence as awarded by the trial court

and confirmed by the High Court for the offence under

Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 18605 is confirmed as

imprisonment for life.

16. Now, we come to the question of set-off under Section

428, Cr. PC having been curtailed. The learned Government

Advocate brought to our notice a refence made by a

Division Bench of this Court, in The Superintendent of

Prison and Anr. v. Venkatesan @ Senu @ Srinivasan @

Baskaran @ Radio @ Prakasam6. Therein the question

referred was the principle of set-off being made applicable

insofar as the period of detention with respect to other

offences, suffered in the course of a separate investigation

inquiry and trial. In the present case, no such question arise

5 for short, ‘the IPC’ 6 2025 INSC 541 Page 11 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024 insofar as the direction of the trial court is not to grant the

set-off for the period of detention undergone by the accused

in the course of the investigation and trial of the same case.

The statutory imprimatur in Section 428, Cr. PC is that the

period of detention undergone by an accused during the

investigation, inquiry or trial of a case, before the date of

conviction in the case shall be set-off against the term of

imprisonment imposed on the accused, as the sentence on

such conviction. The direction of the Sessions Court not to

grant set-off under Section 428, Cr. PC will stand deleted, as

there is no escape from it.

17. The learned Government Advocate also relied on

Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)7, in which this Court

following the decisions in Swamy Shraddananda3 and V.

Sriharan alias Murugan4, upheld the special category of

sentence of a life term for 20 years as imposed by the trial

court, finding it to be fit and proper in the circumstances of

the case. We do not think the offence herein requires the

same treatment.

7 (2024) 2 SCC 323 Page 12 of 13 Crl. Appeal @SLP Crl. No.15786 of 2024

18. The appeal stands partly allowed, modifying the

sentence to imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC

and permitting set-off, as provided under Section 428, Cr.

PC as also confirming the sentence under the other

offences, which would run concurrently. The accused would

be entitled to avail of remission/commutation, in due

course, but subject to the decision being taken by the

Government as per its policy.

19. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed

of.

……...…….……………………. J.

(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)

………….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 18, 2025.

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