Karuppudayar vs State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.____________ OF 2025 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.8778- 8779 of 2024]

KARUPPUDAYAR …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS

STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDI TRICHY & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeals challenge the judgment and final

order dated 28th February 2024 in Criminal Original Petition

(MD) No. 6676 of 2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition

(MD) No.4621 of 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of

the High Court of Madras at Madurai. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

3. By way of the impugned order, the High Court dismissed NARENDRA PRASAD Date: 2025.01.31 13:14:15 IST Reason:

the petitions filed by the Appellant under Section 482 of the

1 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”)

wherein the Appellant has prayed to call for records relating to

proceedings in Spl.S.C.No.7 of 2022 pending before the I-

Additional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli

and to quash the same.

4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are

as under:

4.1 The prosecution story is that on 2nd September 2021 the

Appellant approached the Respondent No. 3 (Mr. Ravikumar,

Revenue Inspector) in order to inquire regarding the status of

a petition filed in the name of Appellant’s father concerning

inclusion of Appellant’s father’s name in the patta1 for the land

situated in Natham UDR, Sembarai village.

4.2 A quarrel developed between Appellant and Respondent

No. 3 whereby the Appellant abused Respondent No.3 by using

his caste name in the Revenue Divisional Office, Lalgudi,

Tiruchirappalli.

4.3 Consequently, Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before

the Respondent No. 2 (Sub-Inspector of Police, Lalgudi Police

1 ‘Patta’ is a government issued document which contains various details such as landowner’s name, land survey number, type of land, location of land, etc. that validates the ownership of land.

2 Station, Trichy) and case being Crime No. 676 of 2021 was

registered against the Appellant for the offences punishable

under Sections 294(b) and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter, “IPC”) read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, “SC-ST Act”).

4.4 After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was

filed by the Respondent No.1 (Investigating Officer/Deputy

Superintendent of Police) in the court of Judicial Magistrate,

Lalgudi, Tiruchirappalli and the case was committed to the

Sessions Court.

4.5 As a result of the same, a case being Spl. S.C. No. 7 of

2022 was initiated against the Appellant before the I-

Additional District and Sessions Judge (PCR), Tiruchirappalli

(hereinafter, “trial court”).

4.6 Aggrieved by the initiation of criminal proceedings so also

the trial, the Appellant filed petitions under Section 482 of

CrPC before the High Court to call for the records relating to

Spl. S.C. No. 7 of 2022 and to quash the same.

4.7 The learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide the

impugned judgment and final order, held that no prejudice

3 would be caused to Appellant if he is subjected to trial and

dismissed his petitions.

4.8 Aggrieved thereby, the present appeals arise by way of

special leave.

5. We have heard Smt. Vanshaja Shukla, the leaned counsel

appearing on behalf of the Appellant and Shri Sabarish

Subramanian, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondents.

6. Smt. Vanshaja Shukla submitted that the learned Single

Judge of the High Court has grossly erred in rejecting the

petition of the Appellant. She submits that even taking the

allegations in the FIR at its face value, the ingredients to

constitute an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the

SC-ST Act are not made out. She, therefore, submits that the

learned Single Judge of the High Court ought to have exercised

his jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and quashed

the proceedings.

7. As against this, Shri Sabarish Subramanian, learned

counsel for the Respondents submits that upon detailed

investigation a charge-sheet was filed by the then Investigating

Officer (Respondent No.1 herein). Learned Single Judge of the

4 High Court, on a perusal of the charge-sheet, found that no

case for quashing of the proceedings was made out. He,

therefore, submits that no interference is warranted in the

facts and circumstances of the present case.

8. For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite

to refer to the provisions of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the

SC-ST Act, which read thus:

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--

(a) ………………………………………………

(b) ………………………………………………

xxx xxx xxx

(r) intentionally insults or intimidates

with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;”

9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal

that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be

established that the accused intentionally insults or

intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled

5 Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.

Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of

the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses

any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by

caste name in any place within public view.

10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up

for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran

Singh and others v. State through Standing Counsel and

another2. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of

Uttarakhand and another3 referred to Swaran Singh

(supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:

“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would

2 (2008) 8 SCC 435 3 (2020) 10 SCC 710

6 certainly be a place within the public view.

On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. :

This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public

7 view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (emphasis in original)”

11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public

view’, the place should be open where the members of the

public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused

to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four

corners of the wall where members of the public are not

present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a

place within public view.

12. If we take the averments/allegations in the FIR at its face

value, what is alleged is as under:

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That on 2nd September 2021, while the complainant

was engaged in his office doing his duty, the accused

came to the office in the morning in order to enquire

about the petition given by him already to the Revenue

Divisional Officer regarding entering the name of his

father in the ‘patta’. On such enquiry being made, the

complainant informed the accused that the said petition

has been sent to the Taluk office, Lalgudi and that

appropriate action would be taken after receipt of the

reply from the Taluk Office, Lalgudi. It is alleged that at

that stage, the accused asked the complainant as to what

caste he belongs to and stated that the complainant

belongs to ‘Parayan’ caste. Thereafter, the accused stated

that, “if you people are appointed in Government service

you all will do like this only…”. Thereafter, he scolded the

complainant calling his caste name and insulted him

using vulgar words. The further allegation is that

thereafter the colleagues of the complainant came there,

pacified the accused and took him away.

9 13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it

would reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant

was in his office the accused came there; enquired with the

complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him in the

name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three

colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused

and took him away.

14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has

taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the

complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived

at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.

15. We are, therefore, of the considered view that since the

incident has not taken place at a place which can be termed to

be a place within public view, the offence would not come

under the provisions of either Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s)

of the SC-ST Act.

16. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of

this Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v.

Bhajan Lal and others4. The law as laid down therein by this

4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

10 Court has been consistently followed.

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

11

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

12 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

17. No doubt, that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC

is required to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection

and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It is equally settled

that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an

enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the

allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. However, the

court would be justified in exercising its discretion if the case

falls under any of the clauses carved out by this Court in

Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 13

18. We find, as already observed herein, that the allegations

made in the FIR, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute an

offence either under Section 3(1)(r) or under Section 3(1)(s) of

the SC-ST Act. We are of the considered view that the case

would fall under the first category, listed by this Court in

Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

19. On a perusal of the order of the High Court, we find that

the High Court has not at all considered this aspect of the

matter though it was strenuously argued on behalf of the

petitioner before the High Court (Appellant herein) that the

allegations made in the FIR do not make out a case that the

offence is committed in public view. The High Court did not

even deal with the said contention, leave aside considering the

same.

20. In that view of the matter, we find that the present

appeals deserve to be allowed.

21. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed.

(ii) The judgment and final order dated 28th February

2024 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No. 6676 of

14 2022 and Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (MD)

No.4621 of 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge

of the High Court of Madras at Madurai is quashed

and set aside.

(iii) The charge-sheet in Special S.C. No. 7 of 2022 on

the file of I Additional District and Sessions Judge

(PCR), Tiruchirappalli and all proceedings pursuant

thereto shall stand quashed and set aside.

22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

..............................J (B.R. GAVAI)

……………..............................J (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 31, 2025

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