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Kannan vs Selvamuthukani

Supreme Court30 January 2012Ranjana Prakash Desai · Aftab Alam

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an accused person is charged with abetting an offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code (bigamy), the prosecution must affirmatively prove that the accused had knowledge of the material fact which constituted the offence—namely, that the marriage which rendered the second marriage bigamous was still subsisting at the time of the second marriage. Knowledge of this fact cannot be presumed from the accused's relationship to the person committing the primary offence, nor from their participation in ceremonies connected with the second marriage. Where the evidence before the court does not conclusively establish such knowledge, the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 234-235 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1262-1263 of 2009)
Kannan ... Appellant
Versus
Selvamuthukani ... Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.236 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7924 of 2009)
Murugayee & Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
Selvamuthukani @ Selvamuthu ... Respondent
JUDGMENT
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These two appeals, by special leave, can be disposed of
by a common judgment as they challenge the judgment and
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order dated 24.9.2008 delivered by the Madras High Court

in Criminal R.C. Nos. 1439 and 1440 of 2005 filed by the

respondent.

3. It is necessary to state the facts which led to these

appeals. The respondent - Selvamuthukani @ Selvamuthu is

the original complainant ( `the complainant' for short). She

filed a private complaint in the court of Judicial Magistrate

No. 1, Coimbatore being CC No. 620 of 1992 against Kannan

(original accused 1 - `A1' for short), M. Rangan Chettiar

(original accused 2 - `A2' for short), Murugayee (original

accused 3 - `A3' for short), K. Palaniammal (original accused

4 - `A4' for short), Ganesan (original accused 5 - `A5' for

short) and seven others. The complainant alleged that she

was married to A1 on 16.6.1980. According to her, during

the subsistence of her marriage with A1, A1 married A4 and

thus committed an offence punishable under Section 494 of

the Indian Penal Code (for short `the IPC'). The

complainant further alleged that by actively assisting and

participating in the said marriage ceremony, the other

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accused abetted the commission of said offence and they

are thus guilty of offence punishable under Section 494 read

with Section 109 of the IPC. After perusing the complaint

and deposition of the complainant, learned Magistrate

framed charge under Section 494 of the IPC against A1 and

under Section 494 read with Section 109 of the IPC against

A2 to A5. The complainant examined herself as PW-1. She

also examined two more witnesses (PW-2 and PW-3). The

accused examined two witnesses in support of their case

(DW-1 and DW-2). After perusing the evidence on record,

learned Magistrate held A1 guilty of offence punishable

under Section 494 of the IPC. He held A2 to A5 guilty of

offence punishable under Section 494 read with Section 109

of the IPC. He sentenced all the accused to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for two years each and to pay a fine

of Rs.1,000/- each. In default, the accused were to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for one month.

4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order, A1

preferred Criminal Appeal No. 147 of 2004 and A2 to A5

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preferred Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 2004 in the Court of

District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore. Learned Sessions

Judge, while disposing of the appeals confirmed the

conviction but reduced the sentence of the accused to the

sentence already undergone by them. The said judgment

was challenged by the complainant in the Madras High

Court. She preferred two criminal revision cases being

Criminal Revision Case No. 1439 of 2005 and Criminal

Revision Case No. 1440 of 2005. By the impugned

judgment the High Court confirmed the finding that A1 had

during the subsistence of his first marriage married A4 and

was, therefore, guilty of offence punishable under Section

494 of the IPC. The High Court also confirmed the finding

that A2 to A5 abetted the said offence and hence, they were

guilty of offence punishable under Section 494 read with

Section 109 of the IPC. The High Court noted that none of

the accused has chosen to prefer any appeal or revision and,

therefore, conviction recorded by the trial court which was

confirmed by the lower appellate court has become final.

5 The High Court also noted that the accused were on bail

throughout and that they had not served any part of the

sentence in jail. The High Court was of the opinion that in

the circumstances the reduction of sentence done by the

lower appellate court cannot be sustained. In the opinion of

the High Court the said order was passed without application

of mind. In the circumstances, the High Court reduced the

sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment awarded to A1

to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Sentence of two

years each awarded to A2 to A5 was reduced to six months

rigorous imprisonment each. The High Court did not modify

the trial court's order as regards fine. The criminal revision

cases were thus partly allowed. Being aggrieved by the said

judgment, the accused have preferred the present appeals.

5. Admittedly A2 (Rangan Chettiar) is dead and his name

has been struck of from the array of parties vide this Court's

order dated 2.9.2011. So far as A1 i.e. husband of the

complainant is concerned, he has undergone the sentence

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awarded to him. Thus, we have to consider the involvement

of A3, A4 and A5 in the offences in question.

6. We have heard Shri A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, learned

senior counsel appearing for the accused and Shri Rana

Ranjit Singh, learned counsel appearing for the

complainant-respondent.

7. Learned counsel for the accused pointed out that A1

had filed a divorce petition against the complainant. A

divorce decree was passed on 20.2.1991. The appeal filed

by the complainant was allowed on 10.2.1992 and on that

date the marriage between A1 and the complainant could be

said to have been revived. A1 married A4 on 8.3.1992 but

there is nothing to establish that A3, A4 or A5 knew that the

divorce decree dated 20.2.1991 was set aside. To hold that

A3, A4 and A5 had knowledge of the fact that on 10.2.1992

the divorce decree was set aside, would be entering into the

arena of conjectures and surmises. Counsel submitted that,

in any case, the marriage between the complainant and A1

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has been dissolved by a consent decree dated 12.1.2010.

Counsel submitted that A5, the father of the second wife i.e.

A4 is 80 years of age. He is seriously ill. He is surviving on

one kidney. Counsel submitted that in the circumstances of

the case, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be

set aside.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent-complainant on the

other hand submitted that the marriage between the

complainant and A1 is established beyond doubt. There is

enough evidence on record to establish that during the

subsistence of the first marriage, A1 got married to A4.

Counsel submitted that it is inconceivable that A3 to A5 did

not know that the divorce decree obtained by A1 was set

aside on 10.2.1992. Therefore, they have rightly been

convicted for offence under Section 494 read with Section

109 of the IPC.

9. The prosecution has clearly established that A1 was

married to the complainant on 16.6.1980. It is also a fact

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that A1 obtained a decree of divorce on 20.2.1991 which

was set aside on 10.2.1992 in the appeal carried by the

complainant against the said decree of divorce. Evidence of

the complainant establishes beyond doubt that A1 married

A4 on 8.3.1992. The question is whether the fact that the

decree of divorce was set aside and the marriage between

A1 and the complainant was revived was known to A3, A4

and A5. Merely because A3 is the sister of A1, it cannot be

presumed that she knew that the decree of divorce was set

aside. If A1 wanted to marry A4, it is possible that he would

keep back these facts from his sister as also from A4 and A5

i.e. his second wife and her father respectively.

10. In our opinion, the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3

does not conclusively establish that the fact that the decree

of divorce was set aside on 10.2.1992 was known to A3, A4

and A5 and, therefore, benefit of doubt must be given to A3,

A4 and A5. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the

impugned judgment and order dated 24.9.2008 so far as it

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convicts and sentences A3, A4 and A5 needs to be set aside.

Hence, the following order:

11. The impugned judgment and order dated 24.9.2008

passed in Criminal R.C. Nos. 1439 and 1440 of 2005 is

quashed and set aside to the extent it convicts and

sentences A3, A4 and A5. Murugayee (original accused

3), K. Palaniammal (original accused 4), and Ganesan

(original accused 5) are acquitted of the charge under

Section 494 read with Section 109 of the IPC. Their bail

bonds stand discharged.

12. Appeals are disposed of in the aforestated terms.

.....................................................J.

(AFTAB ALAM)

.....................................................J.

(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

NEW DELHI

JANUARY 30, 2012.

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