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Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs Md. Ehshan

Supreme Court25 February 2025Pankaj Mithal

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. A landlord claiming bona fide need for eviction of a tenant need not personally possess expertise or technical qualifications to operate the commercial device or business he seeks to establish on the premises; the engagement of qualified technicians or professionals to operate such devices satisfies the requirement of bona fide need, and the absence of such expertise in the landlord's family members does not vitiate the genuineness of the need. 2. A landlord is the best judge of which of his properties should be vacated to satisfy a particular need, and a tenant has no right to dictate or challenge which specific premises the landlord chooses to vacate; the landlord's decision to seek eviction of one particular property rather than another property he owns does not establish lack of bona fide need or constitute misuse of the eviction remedy. 3. The suitability of premises for the intended purpose—established by clear findings that the property is located adjacent to related commercial establishments and is the most appropriate location for the proposed use—combined with the landlord's proven financial capacity to invest in the venture and proof that his family members are unemployed and require the business for their establishment, constitutes a duly established bona fide need for eviction. 4. A compromise decree arising from an earlier partial eviction suit does not operate to extinguish or limit a landlord's right to initiate fresh eviction proceedings against the same tenant on different grounds at a later date, and the mere fact of an earlier partial eviction for a different purpose does not affect the landlord's accruing rights for a subsequently arising and independently established bona fide need. 5. The bona fide need of a landlord for eviction must be assessed as of the date the eviction suit is filed, and any failure to utilize an earlier decree of eviction for its original stated purpose does not erode or negate a distinct and separately established bona fide need arising from a different occasion.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025 INSC 271 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21965 OF 2022)

KANAHAIYA LAL ARYA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MD. EHSHAN & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Heard Smt. Reshmi Rea Sinha, learned counsel for the

appellant-landlord and Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar

Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents-tenant.

3. The dispute in this appeal is for the eviction of the

respondents-tenant from the premises in dispute i.e., a

house existing on Holding No. 80, New Ward No. X, (Old Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by geeta ahuja Date: 2025.02.25 Ward No. IV, Old Holding No. 211) of Chatra Municipality, 16:57:03 IST Reason:

Jharkhand.

1

4. The appellant, as the owner and landlord of the said house,

filed Eviction Suit No.25/2001 against the respondents-

tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent and

refusal to vacate; and for personal need of the suit

premises for establishing an ultrasound machine for his

two unemployed sons.

5. The suit after contest was decreed by the court of first

instance vide judgment and order dated 15.07.2006 on the

ground of bona fide need of the appellant-landlord holding

that the oral and documentary evidence proves the bona

fide need of the appellant-landlord to install the

ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons. The

appellant-landlord had established his capability to

purchase such a machine and had proved his annual

income to be Rs.4,00,000/-. He had also proved that the

suit premises is the most appropriate place for the

installation of such machines as there is a medical clinic

and a pathology center adjacent to it. The suit was,

however, dismissed on the ground of default in payment of

rent.

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6. The aforesaid judgment and order of eviction passed by the

court of first instance was reversed by the First Appellate

Court and the same was also affirmed by the High Court

in Second Appeal. Thus, aggrieved by the impugned

judgment and order of the High Court of Jharkhand at

Ranchi dated 18.08.2022 passed in Second Appeal

No.317/20061, the appellant-landlord herein has

preferred this appeal.

7. It may not be out of context to mention here that the

appellant-landlord had not assailed the dismissal of the

suit on the ground of default in payment of rent and as

such the decree to that effect passed by the court of first

instance has become final and conclusive. The appellant-

landlord is, thus, confining his case for the decree of

eviction only on the ground of bona fide need of

establishing an ultrasound machine for the benefit of his

two unemployed sons.

8. The submission of Smt. Reshmi Rea Sinha, learned

counsel for the appellant-landlord, is that the First

Appellate Court and the High Court manifestly erred in law

1 Kahanaiya Lal Arya vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors.

3 in holding that he has failed to prove his bona fide need.

No evidence was adduced by him to prove that his two

unemployed sons have any expertise in handling the

ultrasound machine. The establishment and running of

the ultrasound machine is ordinarily done by the doctors

or the technicians employed and for that purpose it is not

necessary that the sons themselves should have any

expertise in running the same. Secondly, the partial

eviction of the respondents-tenant in an earlier eviction

Suit No.11/1981 from a portion under their tenancy and

re-letting it to another person does not affect the bona fide

need of the appellant-landlord. The aforesaid partial

eviction was for the need of the brother-in-law of the

appellant-landlord and not for his two unemployed sons.

Also, the said eviction was in respect of a different portion

and was much prior to the institution of the present suit

or when the cause of action for the present suit arose.

9. To counter the above arguments, Shri Ardhendumauli

Kumar Prasad, learned senior counsel for the

respondents-tenant, submitted that in an earlier

proceeding of their eviction from the suit premises, i.e.,

4 Eviction Suit No.11/1981, a compromise was arrived at

between the parties whereunder the respondents-tenant

were allowed to occupy the premises with respect to three

pucca rooms constructed by appellant-landlord as tenant

in perpetuity. Therefore, the suit for eviction is not

maintainable. Secondly, the appellant-landlord has

sufficient accommodation available with him to start any

new business either for himself or for his two unemployed

sons and does not require the suit premises bona fidely.

The appellant-landlord has misused the partial eviction

order passed earlier by letting out the said vacated

premises to another person at a higher rent instead of

using it for the purpose it was got vacated.

10. The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit

premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord

is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a

mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is

the best judge to decide which of his property should be

vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has

no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord

5 should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for

eviction.

11. In the case at hand, the appellant-landlord may be having

some other properties under tenancy of various persons

but once he has decided to get the suit premises vacated

for the bona fide need of establishing an ultrasound

machine for his two unemployed sons, he cannot be forced

to initiate such a proceeding against the other tenants. It

is for the appellant-landlord to take a decision in this

regard and once he has decided to get the suit premises

vacated, no error or illegality could be pointed out in his

decision. Secondly, it has come on record by clear finding

of the court of first instance that the suit premises is the

most suitable accommodation for establishing an

ultrasound machine. The reason being that it is situated

adjacent to a medical clinic and a pathological centre and

is the most appropriate place for establishing any medical

machine. Moreover, the appellant-landlord has also proved

his capacity to invest in purchasing/establishing an

ultrasound machine and that his two sons are unemployed

and as such the suit premises is required to establish them

6 in business and to augment the family’s income. Therefore,

the bona fide need of the appellant-landlord stands duly

established.

12. Insofar as the issue that his two unemployed sons do not

have any expertise/training to run the ultrasound

machine, the argument is without any substance. It is

common knowledge that these days medical devices such

as ultrasound machines are installed and established and

are ordinarily run by the technicians or the medical

experts who are engaged for the said purpose. The person

establishing such devices or ultrasound machines himself

need not have any expertise in running the same.

Therefore, the Appellate Court and the High Court were not

justified in disbelieving the bona fide need of the appellant-

landlord solely on the ground that his two sons do not

possess any expertise for running an ultrasound machine.

13. It may be important to note that the appellant-landlord

had earlier filed Eviction Suit No.11/1981 for the eviction

of the respondents-tenant from the part of the premises.

The said suit travelled up to the High Court by way of

Second Appeal No.40/1983. In the said appeal, a

7 compromise dated 20.03.1988 was arrived at between the

parties and the suit was decided in terms of the said

compromise. The compromise reveals that the appellant-

landlord had agreed that the respondents-tenant shall

continue to be a tenant of the appellant with respect to

three pucca rooms which have been re-constructed by the

appellant-landlord after demolishing the portion under

tenancy. There is no clause in the compromise deed which

stipulates that the appellant-landlord will not initiate any

proceeding for eviction against the respondents-tenant in

future. Naturally, there cannot be such a clause inasmuch

as such a compromise does not intend to take away the

right of the landlord to initiate eviction proceedings against

the tenant if he defaults in payment of rent, makes

material alterations damaging the property or otherwise

ceases to use the same for his benefit and lets it out to an

outsider. The aforesaid clause in the compromise that the

respondents-tenant would continue to be a tenant of the

appellant-landlord with respect to the said portion does

not mean that the appellant-landlord has given up his

8 right to initiate proceedings for eviction against him for all

times to come.

14. Therefore, on the strength of the above compromise decree,

it cannot be said that the present proceedings for eviction

are not maintainable.

15. As would be evident from the above compromise, the

decree for partial eviction from the premises occupied by

the respondents-tenant was partially decreed in Second

Appeal No.40/1983 on 31.03.1988 for the bona fide need

of the appellant-landlord to establish his brother-in-law.

The said need was altogether a different need. The said

decree of the year 1988, even if not used for the purpose

intended, it would not affect the rights of the appellant-

landlord which accrues to him in the year 2001. The need

of the appellant-landlord for getting the suit premises

vacated for establishing his two sons has to be seen on the

date of filing of the suit i.e., 28.11.2001. On the said date,

the need of the appellant-landlord stands established. The

said need would not get eroded by any earlier decree of

eviction of the year 1988.

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16. Accordingly, in view of the facts and circumstances of the

case, the appellant-landlord has proved his bona fide need

for the suit premises. The appeal is allowed and the

impugned judgment and order dated 18.08.2022 and

25.09.2006 of the High Court and the First Appellate Court

respectively are set aside. The suit of the appellant-

landlord stands decreed.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 25, 2025

10

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