Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs Md. Ehshan
- Neutral2025 INSC 271
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. A landlord claiming bona fide need for eviction of a tenant need not personally possess expertise or technical qualifications to operate the commercial device or business he seeks to establish on the premises; the engagement of qualified technicians or professionals to operate such devices satisfies the requirement of bona fide need, and the absence of such expertise in the landlord's family members does not vitiate the genuineness of the need. 2. A landlord is the best judge of which of his properties should be vacated to satisfy a particular need, and a tenant has no right to dictate or challenge which specific premises the landlord chooses to vacate; the landlord's decision to seek eviction of one particular property rather than another property he owns does not establish lack of bona fide need or constitute misuse of the eviction remedy. 3. The suitability of premises for the intended purpose—established by clear findings that the property is located adjacent to related commercial establishments and is the most appropriate location for the proposed use—combined with the landlord's proven financial capacity to invest in the venture and proof that his family members are unemployed and require the business for their establishment, constitutes a duly established bona fide need for eviction. 4. A compromise decree arising from an earlier partial eviction suit does not operate to extinguish or limit a landlord's right to initiate fresh eviction proceedings against the same tenant on different grounds at a later date, and the mere fact of an earlier partial eviction for a different purpose does not affect the landlord's accruing rights for a subsequently arising and independently established bona fide need. 5. The bona fide need of a landlord for eviction must be assessed as of the date the eviction suit is filed, and any failure to utilize an earlier decree of eviction for its original stated purpose does not erode or negate a distinct and separately established bona fide need arising from a different occasion.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2025 INSC 271 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21965 OF 2022)
KANAHAIYA LAL ARYA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MD. EHSHAN & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard Smt. Reshmi Rea Sinha, learned counsel for the
appellant-landlord and Shri Ardhendumauli Kumar
Prasad, learned senior counsel for the respondents-tenant.
3. The dispute in this appeal is for the eviction of the
respondents-tenant from the premises in dispute i.e., a
house existing on Holding No. 80, New Ward No. X, (Old Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by geeta ahuja Date: 2025.02.25 Ward No. IV, Old Holding No. 211) of Chatra Municipality, 16:57:03 IST Reason:
Jharkhand.
1
4. The appellant, as the owner and landlord of the said house,
filed Eviction Suit No.25/2001 against the respondents-
tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent and
refusal to vacate; and for personal need of the suit
premises for establishing an ultrasound machine for his
two unemployed sons.
5. The suit after contest was decreed by the court of first
instance vide judgment and order dated 15.07.2006 on the
ground of bona fide need of the appellant-landlord holding
that the oral and documentary evidence proves the bona
fide need of the appellant-landlord to install the
ultrasound machine for his two unemployed sons. The
appellant-landlord had established his capability to
purchase such a machine and had proved his annual
income to be Rs.4,00,000/-. He had also proved that the
suit premises is the most appropriate place for the
installation of such machines as there is a medical clinic
and a pathology center adjacent to it. The suit was,
however, dismissed on the ground of default in payment of
rent.
2
6. The aforesaid judgment and order of eviction passed by the
court of first instance was reversed by the First Appellate
Court and the same was also affirmed by the High Court
in Second Appeal. Thus, aggrieved by the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi dated 18.08.2022 passed in Second Appeal
No.317/20061, the appellant-landlord herein has
preferred this appeal.
7. It may not be out of context to mention here that the
appellant-landlord had not assailed the dismissal of the
suit on the ground of default in payment of rent and as
such the decree to that effect passed by the court of first
instance has become final and conclusive. The appellant-
landlord is, thus, confining his case for the decree of
eviction only on the ground of bona fide need of
establishing an ultrasound machine for the benefit of his
two unemployed sons.
8. The submission of Smt. Reshmi Rea Sinha, learned
counsel for the appellant-landlord, is that the First
Appellate Court and the High Court manifestly erred in law
1 Kahanaiya Lal Arya vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors.
3 in holding that he has failed to prove his bona fide need.
No evidence was adduced by him to prove that his two
unemployed sons have any expertise in handling the
ultrasound machine. The establishment and running of
the ultrasound machine is ordinarily done by the doctors
or the technicians employed and for that purpose it is not
necessary that the sons themselves should have any
expertise in running the same. Secondly, the partial
eviction of the respondents-tenant in an earlier eviction
Suit No.11/1981 from a portion under their tenancy and
re-letting it to another person does not affect the bona fide
need of the appellant-landlord. The aforesaid partial
eviction was for the need of the brother-in-law of the
appellant-landlord and not for his two unemployed sons.
Also, the said eviction was in respect of a different portion
and was much prior to the institution of the present suit
or when the cause of action for the present suit arose.
9. To counter the above arguments, Shri Ardhendumauli
Kumar Prasad, learned senior counsel for the
respondents-tenant, submitted that in an earlier
proceeding of their eviction from the suit premises, i.e.,
4 Eviction Suit No.11/1981, a compromise was arrived at
between the parties whereunder the respondents-tenant
were allowed to occupy the premises with respect to three
pucca rooms constructed by appellant-landlord as tenant
in perpetuity. Therefore, the suit for eviction is not
maintainable. Secondly, the appellant-landlord has
sufficient accommodation available with him to start any
new business either for himself or for his two unemployed
sons and does not require the suit premises bona fidely.
The appellant-landlord has misused the partial eviction
order passed earlier by letting out the said vacated
premises to another person at a higher rent instead of
using it for the purpose it was got vacated.
10. The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit
premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord
is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a
mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is
the best judge to decide which of his property should be
vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has
no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord
5 should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for
eviction.
11. In the case at hand, the appellant-landlord may be having
some other properties under tenancy of various persons
but once he has decided to get the suit premises vacated
for the bona fide need of establishing an ultrasound
machine for his two unemployed sons, he cannot be forced
to initiate such a proceeding against the other tenants. It
is for the appellant-landlord to take a decision in this
regard and once he has decided to get the suit premises
vacated, no error or illegality could be pointed out in his
decision. Secondly, it has come on record by clear finding
of the court of first instance that the suit premises is the
most suitable accommodation for establishing an
ultrasound machine. The reason being that it is situated
adjacent to a medical clinic and a pathological centre and
is the most appropriate place for establishing any medical
machine. Moreover, the appellant-landlord has also proved
his capacity to invest in purchasing/establishing an
ultrasound machine and that his two sons are unemployed
and as such the suit premises is required to establish them
6 in business and to augment the family’s income. Therefore,
the bona fide need of the appellant-landlord stands duly
established.
12. Insofar as the issue that his two unemployed sons do not
have any expertise/training to run the ultrasound
machine, the argument is without any substance. It is
common knowledge that these days medical devices such
as ultrasound machines are installed and established and
are ordinarily run by the technicians or the medical
experts who are engaged for the said purpose. The person
establishing such devices or ultrasound machines himself
need not have any expertise in running the same.
Therefore, the Appellate Court and the High Court were not
justified in disbelieving the bona fide need of the appellant-
landlord solely on the ground that his two sons do not
possess any expertise for running an ultrasound machine.
13. It may be important to note that the appellant-landlord
had earlier filed Eviction Suit No.11/1981 for the eviction
of the respondents-tenant from the part of the premises.
The said suit travelled up to the High Court by way of
Second Appeal No.40/1983. In the said appeal, a
7 compromise dated 20.03.1988 was arrived at between the
parties and the suit was decided in terms of the said
compromise. The compromise reveals that the appellant-
landlord had agreed that the respondents-tenant shall
continue to be a tenant of the appellant with respect to
three pucca rooms which have been re-constructed by the
appellant-landlord after demolishing the portion under
tenancy. There is no clause in the compromise deed which
stipulates that the appellant-landlord will not initiate any
proceeding for eviction against the respondents-tenant in
future. Naturally, there cannot be such a clause inasmuch
as such a compromise does not intend to take away the
right of the landlord to initiate eviction proceedings against
the tenant if he defaults in payment of rent, makes
material alterations damaging the property or otherwise
ceases to use the same for his benefit and lets it out to an
outsider. The aforesaid clause in the compromise that the
respondents-tenant would continue to be a tenant of the
appellant-landlord with respect to the said portion does
not mean that the appellant-landlord has given up his
8 right to initiate proceedings for eviction against him for all
times to come.
14. Therefore, on the strength of the above compromise decree,
it cannot be said that the present proceedings for eviction
are not maintainable.
15. As would be evident from the above compromise, the
decree for partial eviction from the premises occupied by
the respondents-tenant was partially decreed in Second
Appeal No.40/1983 on 31.03.1988 for the bona fide need
of the appellant-landlord to establish his brother-in-law.
The said need was altogether a different need. The said
decree of the year 1988, even if not used for the purpose
intended, it would not affect the rights of the appellant-
landlord which accrues to him in the year 2001. The need
of the appellant-landlord for getting the suit premises
vacated for establishing his two sons has to be seen on the
date of filing of the suit i.e., 28.11.2001. On the said date,
the need of the appellant-landlord stands established. The
said need would not get eroded by any earlier decree of
eviction of the year 1988.
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16. Accordingly, in view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, the appellant-landlord has proved his bona fide need
for the suit premises. The appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment and order dated 18.08.2022 and
25.09.2006 of the High Court and the First Appellate Court
respectively are set aside. The suit of the appellant-
landlord stands decreed.
.............……………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
.............……………………………….. J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 25, 2025
10
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