Kalpataru Properties Private Limited and Property Solutions (India) Private Limited vs Kalpataru Hospitality & Facility Management Services (P.) Limited

No.F1, 1st Floor, Shanti Nagar Co-op Industrial ) Estate, Vakola, Santacruz (E), Mumbai - 400055 )... Plaintiffs

Versus

Kalpataru Hospitality & Facility Management )

Services (P) Limited, a Company incorporated ) under the Companies Act, 1956, having its ) Registered office at 01, `Nariman Plaza' ) Makhwana Road, Marol Naka, Andheri (East), )

Mumbai - 400 059. )... Defendant

Dr. Virendra V. Tulzapurkar, senior counsel with Mr. Amit

Jamsandekar, Ms. Alka Parelkar and Ms. Alka Das i/b India Law Services for the Plaintiffs.

Mr. S.A. Tawte for the Defendant.

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CORAM : S.J. VAZIFDAR, J.

FRIDAY, 29TH JULY, 2011.

ORAL JUDGMENT. :

1. The plaintiff has sought a permanent injunction restraining the

defendant from using in relation to its business or service, the mark

"Kalpataru's" or the word "Kalpataru" or any other deceptively

similar word as a part of its corporate name or trading style so as to

infringe the plaintiff's registered trademarks and from so using the

said mark as to pass off or enable others to pass off the defendant's

services and/or business as that of the plaintiffs and/or to indicate any

connection with the plaintiff.

2. Plaintiff No.2, Property Solutions (India) Private Limited, was

incorporated on 27th November, 2000 for the purpose of carrying on

the business of facility management, mall management, project

management services, including business management services.

Plaintiff No.2 is a part of the Kalpataru group of companies of which

plaintiff No.1 is the flagship company. Plaintiff No.2 has been using

the trademark KALPA-TARU registered in the name of plaintiff No.1

with the permission of plaintiff No.1. Plaintiff No.1 has allowed the

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various companies in its group to use the trademark including as part

of their corporate and/or trade name.

3. Plaintiff No.1 was established in the year 1969 in the name of

Kalpataru Construction Overseas Private Limited and it's name was

changed to the present name with effect from 6th June, 2006. Plaintiff

No.2, as stated above, was incorporated on 27th November, 2000. The

defendant was incorporated much later on 27th January, 2006. The

plaintiff's case is that the defendant carries on business similar to the

business of plaintiff No.2.

4. Plaintiff No.1 has been using the trademark "KALPA-TARU"

written in a stylized manner since 1977. On 14th July, 2003, plaintiff

No.1 applied for and obtained separate registrations of the Kalpataru

device mark in respect of the goods falling under classes 16 and 19.

The device is of a tree and below the tree are the words "KALPA-

TARU" written in a stylized manner, including a horizontal bar above

the words. On 21st January, 2004, the plaintiff obtained separate

registrations of the same Kalpataru device mark under classes 36 and

37. The registration certificate of class 36 is in respect of "insurance,

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real estate affairs included in class 36." The registration certificate of

class 37 is in respect of "building constructions, repair, installation

services included in class 37."

5. The action for infringement and passing off is also founded

upon the case that the said mark is a well known mark has acquired

secondary significance in trade circles and has almost become a

household name and the plaintiff would, therefore, be entitled to

reliefs even in respect of the goods and services, which are not similar.

I have found this case to be well founded in view, inter-alia, of the

following facts.

There are twenty partnership firms and companies incorporated

under the Companies Act, 1956 in the Kalpataru group involved in a

variety of commercial activities. The plaintiff No.1 has developed

properties all over the city and its extended suburbs and outside

Mumbai.

In the advertisements for the sale of units in the properties

constructed by the group companies, the name of plaintiff No.2 is

included, indicating a connection of plaintiff No.2 with the Kalpataru

group. Plaintiff No.2 has been carrying on business of providing

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various services including integrated facilities management services to

various commercial and residential complexes, BPOs, IT and ITES,

malls, hospitals and industrial organizations. Plaintiff No.2 has, in the

course of its business, been extensively using the said trademark with

the permission and licence of plaintiff No.1 since the year 2000.

The gross business income of the twenty companies in the

plaintiff's group for the year 2009-2010, was `.49,000,000,000/-.

Most of these companies have used the said trademark extensively. It

is important, however, that the gross business income has been

enormous not merely in the year 2009, but even in the previous years.

For instance, in the year 2005-2006, i.e. before the defendant was

incorporated, it was `.12,696,000,000/-. It is also significant to note

that the word "Kalpataru" forms a part of the corporate name and

trading style of several other group companies and firms involved in a

variety of commercial activities.

The advertisements and business promotional expenses of

some of the companies in the Kalpataru group increased from

`.3,20,00,000/- in the year 2004-2005 to `.9,34,00,000/- in the year

2009-2010. The plaintiffs have also referred to several advertisements

and other promotional material issued by them and the other

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companies and firms in the group.

The device mark has been used by the plaintiffs and many of

the other companies in the Kalpataru group extensively in a variety of

ways, including on letter-heads, visiting cards and other stationery.

The plaintiffs have also received several awards, including at

the Asia-Pacific Property Awards 2010, the Best Architect Multiple

Units Award, and Best Office Development Award, Best High-rise

Architects for Towers.

6. In August, 2008, the plaintiffs noticed an advertisement issued

by the defendant. The advertisement mentions the full name of the

defendant in which the word "KALPATARU'S" is substantially larger

than the other words. The advertisement states prominently:-

"OUR SERVICES : HOUSE KEEPING, GUEST HOUSES MGMT, PROPERTY MGMT, PEST CONTROL

and GARDENING"

7. The plaintiffs, accordingly, issued a cease and desist notice

dated 25th August, 2008, through its advocate.

The defendant by its letter dated 18th October, 2008, replied to

the same. Several allegations were made, which have been reiterated

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in the present case. I will refer to them while dealing with the

submissions.

The plaintiff's advocate replied to the same by a letter dated 31st

October, 2008.

The plaintiffs' case is that thereafter it did not notice the said

mark being used and therefore, did not file any proceedings.

8(A) An article appeared in the 23rd September, 2010 publication of

the Hindustan Times. The article stated that the officials of the

Organizing Committee of the Common Wealth Games had found that

the performance of the two main Indian vendors for cleaning work

including "Kalpataru" was shoddy. The article further states :

"Kalpataru which is in charge of cleaning the Games Village

residential towers numbered 16 to 34 had been given dressing down

and the Organizing Committee had decided to rope in more agencies

in view of the said place being found to be filthy by a number of

foreign delegates." The article goes on to describe the poor work

carried on by "Kalpataru".

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(B) Another prominent article appeared in the 29th September, 2010

publication of the Indian Express. In this article too, it is stated that

during the evaluation process, the Organizing Committee had

disqualified Kalpataru Hospitality, which finally got the bid along

with another company. The article further states that the publication

was in possession of a copy of the minutes of the 35 th meeting of the

Organizing Committee whereat a member had given a presentation

indicating that the shortlisted firms including "Kalpataru", did not

understand the scope of the work and that the Committee evaluated

the bids and disqualified "Kalpataru" as they had not met some of the

requirements and technical parameter. The article roundly criticised

"Kalpataru".

(C) The plaintiffs relied upon the letters received by them from their

customers making enquiries in respect of the articles. This was

obviously to indicate the damage that is being done and the prejudice

that is being caused as a result of the defendant passing off its services

as those of the plaintiffs.

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9. Mr. Tawte, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

defendants submitted that the articles do not prove the truth of what is

stated therein and are purely hear-say evidence. This action for

infringement and passing off is not concerned with the truth or falsity

or what is stated in the articles. Even assuming the same to be false,

the fact that such articles have appeared itself prejudices the plaintiffs

enormously for the readers of the articles and those who are otherwise

exposed to the defendant's work are, likely to associate the

defendants' services as being those of the plaintiffs and the reference

to "Kalpataru" in the articles to the plaintiffs and the plaintiff's group.

10. The suggestion that even the authenticity of the articles is not

established, is however, not well founded. There is nothing to suggest

that the articles were not published. If that was so, the defendants

could easily have established the same by producing issues of the

same publications of the said date. They have not done so.

11. After receiving the queries from its customers which were

raised pursuant to the said articles, the plaintiffs, through their

advocates, served another cease and desist notice dated 21st October,

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2010.

12. The plaintiffs have thus established that they are the prior users

of the mark; that "Kalpataru" is a well known mark and is associated

among people with the plaintiffs and that the defendant's mark

"Kalpataru's" is not merely deceptively similar to the plaintiffs mark,

but almost identical thereto. The question is whether in view thereof,

the plaintiffs or either of them is entitled to the reliefs claimed.

13. Mr. Tawte, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

defendant contends that it has made an application for registration of

its services under class 42 and that the services offered by it are

entirely different from the goods and services in respect whereof the

plaintiff's marks are registered. As stated earlier, the plaintiffs marks

are registered under classes 16, 19, 36 and 37.

14. The error in this submission arises on account of the defendant

having failed to notice an amendment to class 42 of Schedule IV of

the Act.

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(A) Class 42 falls under the head "Services" and, prior to the

amendment, read as under:-

"42. Providing of food and drink, temporary

accommodation, medical, hygienic and beauty care, veterinary and agricultural services, legal services, scientific and industrial research computer

programming; services that cannot be classified in other classes."

(B) Class 42 was amended with effect from 20th May, 2010 by GSR

428(E) issued in exercise of powers conferred by section 157(1)(2) of

the Act. Class 42, as amended, reads as under :-

"42. Scientific and technological services and research

and design relating thereto; industrial analysis and

research services; design and development of computer hardware and software."

(C) Admittedly, the defendant filed its application for registration

on 21st December, 2010 i.e. after class 42 was amended.

None of the services provided by the defendant fall under any

of the items in class 42.

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15. Mr. Tawte submitted that the application has already been made

by the defendant and, therefore, it is for the Registrar of Trademarks

to decide whether it was made in respect of the correct class or not

and to correct the same if necessary. Admittedly, the defendant filed

its application for registration on 21st December, 2010 i.e. after class

42 was amended. A party cannot make an application under an

incorrect class and then contend that the error is for the Registrar to

look into and the High Court must proceed on the basis that the

application is correctly made. It is difficult to accept this submission

and, with respect, I do not think it warrants elaborate consideration.

16. Dr. Tulzapurkar's submission that the services provided by the

defendant fall within classes 36 and 37 is well founded. The first

plaintiff's mark is also registered in respect of those classes.

(A) Classes 36 and 37 are also service marks and read as under :-

"36. Insurance, financial affairs; monetary affairs; real

estate affairs."

37. Building construction; repair; installation services."

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(B) Section 7 of the Act and Rule 22 of the Trade Mark Rules,

2002, read as under :-

"7. Classification of goods and services.- (1) The

Registrar shall classify goods and services as far as may be, in accordance with the International classification of goods and services for the purposes of registration of

trade marks.

(2) Any question arising as to the class within which any goods or services falls shall be determined by the

Registrar whose decision shall be final."

..................

22. Classification of goods and services.- (1) For the purposes of the registration of trade marks, goods and services shall be classified in the manner specified in the

Fourth Schedule.

(2) The goods and services specified in the Fourth Schedule only provide a means by which the general content of numbered international classes can be quickly

identified. It corresponds to the major content of each class and are not intended to be exhaustive in accordance with the international classification of goods

and services. For determining the classification of particular goods and services and for full disclosure of the content of international classification, the applicant may refer to the alphabetical index of goods and services, if any, published by the Registrar under section

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8 or the current edition of the international classification of goods and services for the purpose of registration of

trade mark published by the World International Property Organisation or subsequent edition as may be

published. [emphasis supplied] (3) The Registrar shall identify and include in the

alphabetical index of classification of goods and services, as far as practicable, goods or services of Indian origin."

17.

Dr. Tulzapurkar's reliance upon the International Classification

of Goods & Services (ICGS) for the purposes of registration of marks

published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is,

therefore, justified. I find his submission that the services offered by

the defendant fall within classes 36 and 37 to be well founded and to

be established by the current edition of ICGS published by WIPO.

18. Firstly, class 42 as amended understandably does not include

any of the services provided by the defendant. Mr. Tawte was also

unable to correlate the defendant's services with any of the entries in

class 42 published by WIPO. Mr. Tawte was unable to indicate any

other class under which the defendant's services would fall either. In

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fact, he was unable to indicate why the defendant's services do not fall

within classes 36 and 37.

19. On the other hand, Dr. Tulzapurkar indicated the various entries

under classes 36 and 37 published by WIPO, which correlated to the

defendant's services.

As stated earlier, the defendant's advertised its services for

house keeping, guest house, management, property management, pest

control and gardening. The current edition of the ICGS for the

purpose of registration of trademarks published by WIPO in respect of

classes 36 and 37 contain the following entries which clearly

correspond to the defendant's services :-

"Class 36 Insurance, Financial Affairs, Monetary Affairs, Real Estate Affairs.

Sr. No. INDICATION OF SERVICES

A 0046 Apartment Home Management 0047 Apartments (Renting of) E 0030 Estate Management

R 0013 Real Estate Management E 0029 Estate Agencies (Real)

Class 37 Building Construction, Repair, Installation Services.

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Sr. No. INDICATION OF SERVICES

A 0023 Air Conditioning Apparatus, Installation and Repair

B 0024 Building (Cleaning of ...) (Exterior Surface) B 0046 Buildings (Cleaning of ...) (Interior)

B 0049 Burglar Alarm Installation and Repair C 0041 Cleaning of Buildings (Exterior Surface) C 0042 Cleaning of Buildings (Interior)

D 0034 Disinfecting E 0015 Elevator Installation and Repair

E 0042 Exterminating (vermin) other than for

Agriculture F 0020 Fire alarm installation and repair P 0004 Painting interior and exterior

R 0008 Rat exterminating

S 0003 Safe maintenance and repair V 0019 Vermin exterminating, other than for agriculture

W 0021 Window Cleaning."

20. There is, therefore, a clear similarity of services under classes

36 and 37 in respect of which the first plaintiff's mark is registered

and the services offered by the defendant.

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The plaintiff's case, therefore, clearly falls within section 29(2)

(c), which reads as under :-

"29. Infringement of registered trade marks.-...............

(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a

mark which because of -

(a) ........... (b) ...........

(c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the

identity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark,

That plaintiff No.1 has not yet used the mark itself in respect of

the services under classes 36 and 37, would not affect its right as the

registered proprietor of the mark under those classes is likely to cause

confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an

association with the registered trade mark.

Further, I have held above the plaintiff's mark "KALPATARU"

to be a well known mark. The plaintiff's case, therefore, also falls

under section 29(4) which reads as under :-

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"29. Infringement of registered trade marks.-...........

(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person

who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a

mark which -

(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade

mark; and (b ) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is

registered; and

(c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India

and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair

advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark."

21. The right to protection of a well known mark has been

recognized by a series of judgments. It is sufficient to refer to the

judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Kirloskar Diesel

Recon Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd., AIR 1996 Bom

149, where the learned Judge held as under :-

"13. ................................................................................ The real question in each case is whether there is as a result of misrepresentation a real likelihood of confusion or deception of the public and consequent damage to the plaintiff. The focus is shifted from the external objective

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test of making comparison of activities of parties to the state of mind of public in deciding whether it will be

confused. With the passage of time and reputation acquired, the trade mark 'Kirloskar' has acquired the

secondary meaning and has become almost a household word. The judgments relied upon by Mr. Kane pertain to

the cases of one type of business and not where variety of businesses have been carried by the plaintiff and defendant as in the instant case. The business activities

of the Respondents vary from pin to piano as borne out from the object clauses of the Memorandums of

Association of the Respondents. The Appellants have still

to commence their business activities but as mentioned in the Memorandums of Association of 1st Appellant in each appeal, some of the object clauses therein overlap

with the activities of Respondents and more particularly

of Respondents Nos. 6 and 7.

14. In the case of trading name which has become

almost a household word and under which trading name a variety of activities are undertaken, a passing off can successfully lie if the defendant has adopted identical or

similar trading name and even when the defendant does not carry on similar activity. Even if the defendant's activities in such circumstances, are remote, the same are likely to be presumed a possible extension of plaintiff's business or activities. In the instant case, the

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Respondents have established that word 'Kirloskar' has become a household word and their businesses cover

variety of activities and that there is even a common connection with some activities of the Respondents and

activities of the Appellants. In the case of Albion Motor Car Company Ltd. v. Albion Carriage and Motor Body

Works Ltd. (34 RPC 257) (supra) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Tulzapurkar, it has been held that the Defendant Company's business had not been proved to

be the same class of business as that of the Plaintiff Company, yet the probability of confusion between the

two companies, both being connected with the motor car

industry, was proved and injunction was granted. In that case, the Plaintiff Company carried business in a large way as makers of engines and chassis of commercial and

other motor-cars, their goods being identified and known

to the trade by the name 'Albion' for which they had two Trade Marks. The defendants did not make motor cars or manufacture engines or chassis. In the action, the

plaintiffs alleged that the use of the word 'Albion' in the title under which the defendants company was later on incorporated was calculated to deceive and lead to the

belief that the defendant Company was a branch of or connected with the plaintiff company."

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The judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in

Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.

AIR 2002 SC 117 [See paragraphs 22 and 23].

22. Mr. Tawte submitted that plaintiff No.1 is, however, not entitled

to an injunction restraining the defendant from using the words

"Kalpataru's" in its corporate name as it does not itself deal in any

services covered by class 36 and class 37. There is, therefore, no

similarity in the services provided by plaintiff No.1 and the defendant.

In this regard, he relied upon section 29(5) and the judgment of a

Division Bench of this Court in Raymond Limited v. Raymond

Pharmaceuticals 2010 (5) BCR 568.

Section 29(5) reads as under :-

"29. Infringement of registered trade marks.-............... (5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if

he uses such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of his trade name, or name of his business concern or part of the name of his business concern dealing in

goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered."

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The Division Bench held that section 29(5) applies only when

the plaintiffs registered trademark is used by the defendant as a part of

the trade name and the defendant also deals in the same goods in

relation to which the trademark is registered. In other words, if the

defendant uses the registered trademark as a part of its trade name, but

does not deal in the same goods in respect of which the trademark is

registered then it does not amount to an infringement under section

29(5).

23. The judgment in Raymond Limited, however, does not apply to

a passing off action. The proprietor of a well known trademark is

entitled to an injunction restraining a party from passing off his goods

and services as those of the proprietor by using he trademark although

the goods and services dealt in by them are not similar. The judgment

in Kirloskars case (supra) supports this submission [see paragraph 14

set out above]. The judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in

Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra

Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 147. In the case before the Supreme Court, the

respondent had filed a suit in the High Court for infringement and

passing off. The learned single Judge, inter-alia, granted an

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injunction restraining the defendant i.e. the appellant before the

Supreme Court from in any manner using as a part of its corporate

name or trading style the words Mahindra & Mahindra or any word(s)

deceptively similar to Mahindra or and/or Mahindra & Mahindra so as

to pass off or enable others to pass off the business and/or services of

the defendant as those of the plaintiffs or as emanating from or

affiliated or in some way connected with plaintiffs. The appeal was

dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. The Supreme Court

dismissed the defendant's appeal by the said judgment.

The defendant contended, however, that its products were in no

way similar to the products and business of the plaintiffs and that the

business carried on by it did not overlap with the business of any of

the companies enlisted by the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that

by using the plaintiff's trademark as a part of its corporate name, the

defendant had committed the fraud of passing off its business and/or

services as that of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court approved the

judgment of this Court in Kirloskar's case including paragraph 13 of

the judgment I have set out earlier and held as under :-

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"24. Judging the case in hand on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the aforementioned decided

cases, it is clear that the plaintiff has been using the words "Mahindra" and "Mahindra & Mahindra" in its

companies / business concerns for a long span of time extending over five decades. The name has acquired a

distinctiveness and a secondary meaning in the business or trade circles. People have come to associate the name "Mahindra" with a certain standard of goods and

services. Any attempt by another person to use the name in business and trade circles is likely to and in

probability will create an impression of a connection

with the plaintiffs' Group of Companies. Such user may also affect the plaintiff prejudicially in its business and trading activities. Undoubtedly, the question whether the

plaintiffs' claim of "passing-off action" against the

defendant will be accepted or not has to be decided by the Court after evidence is led in the suit. Even so for the limited purpose of considering the prayer

for interlocutory injunction which is intended for maintenance of status quo, the trial court rightly held that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and

irreparable prejudice in its favour which calls for passing an order of interim injunction restraining the defendant Company which is yet to commence its business from utilising the name of "Mahendra" or "Mahendra & Mahendra" for the purpose of its trade

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and business. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be faulted for confirming the order of

injunction passed by the learned Single Judge."

24. Thus a passing off action is maintainable in the case of a well

known mark even if the goods and services being dealt in by the

parties are not similar. The plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to an

injunction restraining the defendant from passing off its services as

those of the plaintiff by using the mark "Kalpataru's" or any mark

deceptively similar to the plaintiffs mark "Kalpataru" in its corporate

name. They are, however, not entitled to such an injunction for

infringement under section 29(5) in view of the judgment in

Raymond's case.

25. The alleged user by the defendant from the year 1986 cannot

come to it's aid. Section 34 reads as under :-

"34. Saving for vested rights.- Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered

trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to which that person or a predecessor in title of his has continuously used that

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26 NMS3320.10

trade mark from a date prior-

(a) to the use of the first mentioned trade mark in

relation to those goods or services be the proprietor of a predecessor in title of his; or

(b) to the date of registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services in the

name of the proprietor of a predecessor in title of his; whichever is the earlier, and the Registrar shall not refuse (on such use being proved) to register the second

mentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of the first-mentioned trade-mark." [emphasis supplied]

26. The defendant cannot avail the benefit of section 34 as it has

been unable to establish that it or its predecessors in title had

"continuously" used that mark from a date prior to the date of

registration of the plaintiff's mark viz. 21st January, 2004. The opening

part of the section 34 requires continuous user of the trade mark from

a date prior to the date of registration of the mark said to be infringed,

for a party to claim the benefit thereof. There is nothing to indicate

the use of the mark by the defendant or its predecessor in title from

1990 to 2006 i.e. the date on which it was incorporated.

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27. Dr. Tulzapurkar also submitted that the defendant, an

unregistered proprietor of the mark, cannot avail of the benefit of

section 34 as it has been unable to establish prior use of the mark. The

defendant claims to have used the mark from the year 1986, whereas

the plaintiff No.2 has been using the said mark since the year 1969.

The use of the mark by plaintiff No.2 under a licence from plaintiff

No.1, he submitted, constitutes use by plaintiff No.1. In support of

this submission he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Cycle Corporation of India v. T.I. Raleigh Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR

1969 SC 3295.

28. This submission, if upheld, would support the plaintiffs case for

infringement even by the use of the mark "Kalpataru" in the

defendant's corporate name and in respect of a defence under section

34. I have, for the reasons already stated, rejected the defence under

section 34 on another ground and upheld the plaintiffs case of passing

off by the use of the word "Kalpataru" in the defendant's corporate

name. It is not necessary for the purpose of the Notice of Motion,

therefore, to decide this question of law.

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29. Dr. Tulzapurkar submitted that the defendant is not the

proprietor of the mark. In paragraph 4 of the affidavit in reply, the

defendant stated that it's Directors were carrying on the business of

housekeeping and facility management since the year 1986 in the

name starting with the word "Kalpataru's". The defendant relied upon

certain documents to indicate the same. He submitted that even

presuming that the documents prove that the Directors of the

defendants were carrying on the said business from the year 1986 to

1999, there admittedly was no assignment by the Directors to the

defendant of the said trademark assuming that they were entitled to it

in law. The defendant has not pleaded any licence by the said

Directors of the said trademark either. The defendant does not appear

to be the proprietor of the said trademark. Nor does it appear to be the

licencee thereof.

30. It is not necessary for me to consider this submission either. In

view of what I have held earlier, it would make no difference to the

order I intend passing even if the defendant had established a licence

or assignment in its favour by its Directors. Had a decision on this

point made a difference to the defendant's case, even if there is no

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pleading to support the defendant's case, I would have readily

permitted the defendant an opportunity to rectify the defect. It is

highly probable that the defendant would be able to prove this case. If

it was untrue, I would have expected some opposition to the use of the

mark in the corporate name by the Directors. As this aspect does not

affect the decision of this Notice of Motion, I refrain from considering

it any further.

31.

Mr. Tawte relied upon section 20 of the Companies Act, 1956,

which reads as under :-

"20. Companies not be be registered with undesirable names.- (1) No company shall be registered by a name

which, in the opinion of the Central Government, is

undesirable.

[(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, a name which is identical with, or too

nearly resembles, -

(i) the name by which a company in existence has been previously registered; or

(ii) a registered mark, or a trade mark which is subject of an application to registration, of any other person under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, may be deemed to be undesirable by the Central

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Government within the meaning of sub-section (1) (3) The Central Government may, before deeming a

name as undesirable under clause (ii) of sub-section (2), consult the Registrar of Trade Marks]"

Mr. Tawte submitted that the Registrar of Companies had

approved the defendant's corporate name and the defendant was

registered in that name with effect from 27th January, 2006. He

submitted that the Court presume, therefore, that the corporate name

does not infringe any mark or that the defendant by the use of such

mark in its corporate name is liable in an action for passing off.

32. This point is answered against the defendant by the judgment of

this Court in Poddar Tyres Ltd. v. Bedrock Sales Corporation Ltd. &

Anr., where it was held :-

"45. It is urged that, if the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the first defendants adopting the word "Bedrock" as part of their corporate name, and, if the act of the Registrar in permitting them to adopt the name "Bedrock Sales

Corporation Ltd." was erroneous, then the remedy lay elsewhere, and not by way of an injunction in an infringement action or passing off action. As has been rightly pointed out by the Delhi High Court in K.G.

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Khosla Compressors Ltd. v. Khosla Extraktions Ltd., AIR 1986 Delhi 181, the aggrieved plaintiffs have two

remedies, which are alternative and not mutually exclusive. It is open to the plaintiffs to move under the

provisions of the Companies Act for cancelling the name of the first defendants, if so advised, but that, by itself,

does not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing an action for infringement of their registered trade mark and/or passing off."

33.

Mr. Tawte's submission that the judgment is not good law as it

was delivered prior to the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is not well founded.

None of the provisions of the Act curtail the jurisdiction of this Court

where the question can also be decided by the Registrar of Companies

under the Companies Act, 1956.

34. The registration of a company under a particular name under

the provisions of section 20 of the Companies Act does not preclude a

party from maintaining an action for infringement or passing off.

Neither the Companies Act, 1956, nor the Trade Marks Act, 1999,

contain or even suggest such a prohibition. Even the mere registration

of a mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, does not by itself prohibit

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or effect an action for passing off.

35. The defendants are not concerned with whether plaintiff No.1

carries on business beyond the scope of the Memorandum of

Association (MOA). That is a matter between plaintiff No.1 and its

share holders, creditors and the concerned authorities, including under

the Companies Act, 1956. Even if a company carries on business

beyond the scope of the objects clause in the MOA, it cannot be

deprived of its right as a proprietor of a trademark. Third parties,

unconcerned with or unconnected to the plaintiffs, are not concerned

or affected by the same. A company can always amend it's objects

clause to include such activity. It's use of a trademark in respect of

such activity is different from the activity itself and cannot be illegal

even if the activity is ultra vires the objects clause in its MOA. This

is evident from section 18 of the Act.

36. Further, under section 18, a person claiming to be the proprietor

of a trademark even proposed to be used by him, is entitled to have

the same registered. There is nothing, therefore, that prevents a

company from seeking registration of a trademark it proposes to use

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in respect of goods and services it proposes dealing in or supplying.

A company, therefore, cannot be deprived of its proprietary rights in

respect of a trademark on this ground.

37. The contention that the plaintiffs have not proved an assignment

of the trademark by plaintiff No.1 in favour of plaintiff No.2 is of no

relevance. It is not the plaintiffs case that plaintiff No.1 has assigned

the trademark to plaintiff No.2. In the plaint and in particular

paragraph 11 thereof, it is averred that plaintiff No.1 has granted a

licence to plaintiff No.2 to use the KALPATARU device mark in

respect of its activities pursuant to which the plaintiff No.2 has been

carrying on the business of providing various services using the said

KALPATARU device mark. It is permissible for a registered

proprietor of a trademark to permit a person to use his registered

trademark. As held by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling

Company Limited v. Coca-Cola Company (1995) 5 SCC 545,

[paragraph 13], apart from the provisions relating to registered users,

it is permissible for the registered proprietor of a trademark to permit

a person to use his registered trademark and that such licence of

trademark is governed by common law and is permissible, subject to

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certain provisions. The Supreme Court held that the use of the

trademark can be permitted de-hors any provisions of the Act by grant

of licence by the registered proprietor to the proposed user and that

such a licence is governed by common law. It is not contended that

any of the reservations apply in the present case.

38. I am unable to brush aside the plaintiff's contention that after

the exchange of correspondence in the year 2008, viz. the cease and

desist notice dated 25th August, 2008, the defendant's reply thereto

dated 18th October, 2008 and the plaintiffs further letter dated 31st

October, 2008, they believed that the defendant had not been using the

said mark.

Firstly, it is important to note that the defendant has not even

furnished information regarding the revenue from it's business

activities using the said mark after the year 2006. It is not possible,

therefore, to assess either the nature or the extent of the defendant's

business after the cease and desist notice. This would be necessary to

indicate whether it was possible for the plaintiffs to have been aware

of the defendant's activities such as through advertisements, sales etc.

Moreover, the defendant has not indicated exactly how the plaintiffs

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would or could have been aware of the defendant's continued use of

the mark after October, 2008.

39. Mr. Tawte relied upon Exhibits A to G of the affidavit in reply.

Exhibits A to G of the affidavit in reply is correspondence exchanged

between the defendant's predecessor viz. M/s. Kalpataru's Enterprises

the proprietary concern/ partnership firm of its Director/Directors and

third parties such as the Reserve Bank of India, Benett. Coleman &

Co. Ltd., Bombay Port Trust and the Maharashtra State Electricity

Board. The last letter is dated 21st July, 1990. In any event, the

correspondence between the plaintiffs and third parties would not

indicate the plaintiffs knowledge of the defendants use of the mark, if

any. The correspondence is not in public domain. In any event, it is

not in open circulation.

40. In the circumstances, the Notice of Motion is made absolute in

terms of prayer (a) and (b).

No order as to costs.

The order is stayed for a period of eight weeks to enable the

defendant to challenge the same.

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