Joshu Khan vs State Of Assam
- SCC(1979) 3 SCC 424
- AIRAIR 1979 SC 1549
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A High Court cannot reverse an order of acquittal merely because it disagrees with the view taken by the Sessions Judge, where that view was legally reasonable and rested on the evidence before the court, even if the High Court would have taken a different view of the same evidence. Where a Sessions Judge has acquitted an accused on the ground that material omissions in the statements of eye-witnesses to the police create a reasonable doubt about the accused's participation in the occurrence, and the witness statements were properly put to the witnesses in accordance with the Evidence Act, the High Court cannot set aside that acquittal as legally erroneous. Where the circumstances of a case, including the advanced age of the accused and the improbabilities inherent in the narrative of prosecution, provide a reasonable basis for the Sessions Judge to entertain doubt about the accused's presence and participation at the occurrence, the High Court cannot reverse an acquittal based on such reasoning.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Assam High Court by which the acquittal of the appellant by the Sessions Judge was set aside and he has been convicted under Section 304(1) read with Section 149 and sentenced to R.I. for five years. There were other accused also, but this Court refused leave to them. The short point on which the Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant was that there was no reliable evidence to show that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence. The appellant is alleged to have exhorted the other accused to assault the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge refuced to accept the case against the appellant because some of the eye-witnesses had not stated in their statements before the police that it was the appellant who exhorted the accused to assault the deceased. The High Court found with this line of reasoning on the ground that the statements of witnesses were not properly put to the witnesses. We find that attention of witnesses had been drawn to their previous statements and the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act had been substantially complied with. It appears from the evidence of P.W. 12 that P.W. Martuz and P W. 1 Lebu Mian had stated before the Police that one Chandu Mian had exhorted the accused and they did not mention the name of the appellant. On the basis of these material omissions, the Sessions Judge and could have entertained a doubt regarding the participation of the appellant in the occurrence and it could not therefore be said that the view taken by the Judge was legally erroneous or not reasonably possible. Thus, even if the High Court did not agree with the view taken by the judge, that was no ground to reverse the order of acquittal. The Sessions Judge had also relied on the improbabilities of the case against the appellant. Having regard to the old age of the appellant who was about 80 years of age at the time of occurrence and it is now about 90 years of age, it was most unlikely that he must would participated in the occurrence when he had/his young sons reaping the paddy. For these reasons, therefore, we are not in a position to support the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him.
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