Miss Lucy
← All judgments

Jitendra Nath Mishra vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court2 June 2023Pankaj Mithal · Dipankar Datta

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

The court's exercise of discretionary power under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure to summon a person not named as an accused in the First Information Report or charge-sheet is permissible where the evidence recorded during trial establishes involvement of that person in the commission of the crime, provided: (1) the evidence shows the person's involvement and that they ought to be tried together with the accused already arraigned; (2) the court's satisfaction must exceed prima facie but fall short of conviction-level certainty; and (3) the court must not act mechanically but must form the requisite satisfaction based on the evidence adduced before it. The satisfaction so required is that indicated in paragraph 106 of the Constitution Bench decision in *Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab*, (2014) 3 SCC 92. Where the First Information Report itself discloses that the offence was committed by multiple persons including an unnamed brother of an identified accused, and both complainant and his wife testify during trial to describe the manner of assault and utterances of the appellant as a co-perpetrator, the material existence of such evidence is sufficient to support the court's satisfaction to exercise power under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, notwithstanding that the appellant was not named in the original First Information Report. Points such as delay in lodging the complaint, material contradictions between the versions of the witnesses, the absence of any independent public witness, and the prior acquaintance of the complainant with the person summoned are matters of defence, to be left open to be urged in the course of the proceedings before the trial court. A court testing the legality of an order under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure will not pronounce upon each such point, because any expression of opinion on them could result in prejudgment and thereby hinder a fair trial; its consideration is confined to whether the evidence adduced justified the order that was made. Where an order under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure has been upheld on appeal, the trial court must nevertheless proceed uninfluenced by the fact of that affirmance, and must give the points urged against the summoning, as well as any other points raised, the consideration they deserve.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 978 OF 2022

JITENDRA NATH MISHRA … APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF U.P. & ANR …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. This appeal, by special leave, takes exception to an order

dated 1st June, 2022 of the Allahabad High Court. The impugned

order dismissed an appeal filed by the appellant under Section

14A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities Act, 1989 (hereafter ‘1989 Act’). Under challenge in the

appeal was a summoning order dated 16 th October, 2021 passed by

the relevant Special Court under the 1989 Act, in exercise of power

conferred on him by Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure

(hereafter, ‘Cr. PC’).

Signature Not Verified

2. Digitally signed by NEETA SAPRA Date: 2023.06.02 A First Information Report (hereafter ‘FIR’) came to be 13:32:43 IST Reason:

registered by the Khalilabad Police Station, District Sant Kabir Nagar, 2

under Sections 419, 420, 323, 406 and 506, Indian Penal Code and

3(1)(r) & (s) of the 1989 Act on the basis of information furnished by

the complainant. Accusations were levelled against (1) Dharmendra

Nath Mishra (hereafter ‘Dharmendra’); (2) brother of Dharmendra;

and (3) an ‘unknown person’ of having assaulted and abused the

complainant and his wife, amounting to commission of offences

punishable under the aforesaid provisions. Investigation of the FIR

culminated in a charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Cr. PC

being filed, wherein Dharmendra was shown as the sole accused.

The Special Court constituted under the 1989 Act took cognisance of

the offence and framed charges against Dharmendra, whereafter

the trial commenced. In course thereof, the complainant and his

wife deposed as PW-1 & PW-2 respectively. According to them,

Dharmendra and the appellant together with an unknown person

had assaulted them apart from hurling caste related abuses.

3. At this stage, the Special Court passed the order dated

16.10.2021 summoning the appellant for trial along with

Dharmendra for offences punishable under Sections 323, 504 and

506, IPC and 3(1)(r) & (s) of the 1989 Act. The said order dated 16 th

October, 2021 was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant

before the High Court which, by its order dated 1 st June, 2022,

dismissed the appeal of the appellant under Section 14A(1) of the

1989 Act as noted above.

3

4. Mr. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant

contended as follows:

(i) The FIR is grossly delayed. Although the incident of assault and

abuse giving rise to the FIR allegedly happened on 30 th September,

2017, the complainant lodged the complaint as late as on 28 th

February, 2018. There is no cogent explanation for such belated

lodging of complaint and this is an indicator that the contents of the

FIR are absolutely false.

(ii) There are material contradictions in the versions of PW-1 & PW-

2. While PW-1 deposed that Dharmendra, his brother (i.e., the

appellant) and an unknown person were travelling in a car when

they stopped PW-1 and his family members whereafter the alleged

incident of assault and abuse took place, PW-2 deposed that the

accused persons (Dharmendra, the appellant and an unknown

person) arrived at the place of occurrence riding two motorcycles.

Therefore, the depositions of PW-1 & PW-2 are absolutely unreliable

and untrustworthy.

(iii) It is to be found in the versions of PW-1 & PW-2 that since 2015,

they personally knew the appellant; hence, not naming the appellant

in the FIR and instead disclosing that the brother of Dharmendra too

had involved himself in the alleged assault and abuse and taking the

name of the appellant as a co-accused only in course of recording of 4

evidence is a clear embellishment, which has been made with a

view to harass the appellant by dragging him to face an

unnecessary trial.

(iv) The appellant and Dharmendra are siblings no doubt; but they

have three other siblings. If indeed the appellant was one of several

co-accused, it defies reason as to why the complainant knowing the

appellant quite well would not name him and vaguely allege that the

brother of Dharmendra too had assaulted and abused the

complainant.

(v) Falsity of the versions of PW-1 & PW-2 would be manifest if one

were to read their depositions. The incident giving rise to the trial

occurred on 30th September, 2017 at 6.00 pm, which happened to

be the day of Dussehra. Although, it was alleged that the accused

persons assaulted and abused the complainant and his wife in a

public place while they were returning home, no other public witness

has been cited to prove the prosecution case of assault and abuse. It

is, therefore, a clear case of false implication.

5. Based on such contentions, Mr. Pandey argued that exercise

of power under Section 319, Cr. PC by the Special Court is arbitrary

and that the High Court erred in law as well as on facts in not

interfering with such order in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. He, 5

thus, prayed for quashing of the order 16 th October, 2021 of the

Special Court, since affirmed by the High Court on 1st June, 2022.

6. Opposing the appeal, Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel

representing the State of Uttar Pradesh, contended that the law

relating to summoning a person for being tried along with an

accused is no longer res integra. He invited our attention to the

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh vs.

State of Punjab: (2014) 3 SCC 92 and placed reliance on

paragraphs 106, 117.4 and 117.6 thereof. It was his contention that

the Special Court duly took into consideration the oral evidence

adduced by the complainant and his wife and summoned the

appellant under Section 319, Cr. PC; hence, such order does not

suffer from any illegality, far less patent illegality. He also contended

that the points urged by the appellant to have the impugned order

set aside are points which he can urge in defence before the Special

Court. According to him, the impugned order of the High Court,

affirming the summoning order of the Special Court, does not call for

any interference and, as such, he prayed that the appeal be

dismissed.

7. We have heard the parties and perused the materials on

record.

6

8. Having bestowed due consideration to the rival claims, we are

of the view that any expression of ours while dealing with each and

every point urged on behalf of the appellant could result in

prejudgment; and thereby hinder a fair trial hence, adopting a

cautious approach, we propose to restrict our consideration solely to

the question as to whether the evidence adduced by the

complainant and his wife in course of recording of their depositions

did justify the Special Court to make the order it did.

9. Section 319, Cr. PC, which envisages a discretionary power,

empowers the court holding a trial to proceed against any person

not shown or mentioned as an accused if it appears from the

evidence that such person has committed a crime for which he

ought to be tried together with the accused who is facing trial. Such

power can be exercised by the court qua a person who is not named

in the FIR, or named in the FIR but not shown as an accused in the

charge-sheet. Therefore, what is essential for exercise of the power

under section 319, Cr. PC is that the evidence on record must show

the involvement of a person in the commission of a crime and that

the said person, who has not been arraigned as an accused, should

face trial together with the accused already arraigned. However, the

court holding a trial, if it intends to exercise power conferred by

section 319, Cr. PC, must not act mechanically merely on the ground

that some evidence has come on record implicating the person 7

sought to be summoned; its satisfaction preceding the order

thereunder must be more than prima facie as formed at the stage of

a charge being framed and short of satisfaction to an extent that the

evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction.

10. In the present case, the FIR disclosed offences having been

committed by Dharmendra, his brother and an unknown person.

Both the complainant and his wife, while testifying before the court,

described the manner of assault on the former inflicted by

Dharmendra and the appellant and the utterances used by

Dharmendra and the appellant, inter alia, touching the caste of the

complainant and his wife. At least, on this point, prima facie there

appears to be no contradiction at all. The FIR in this case is not such

where one finds complete absence of any reference to the brother of

Dharmendra who had joined Dharmendra in assaulting and abusing

the complainant or that the allegations are entirely Dharmendra

centric with none else playing any role. It is not that involvement of

Dharmendra’s brother in the crime is being referred to for the first

time in the court. True it is, the appellant was not named in the FIR;

but, that by itself, cannot be held to be decisive. Once it is conceded

that the appellant is a sibling of Dharmendra and he is named as

one of the assailants, the material for forming the requisite

satisfaction cannot be said to be non-existent. For the purpose of

passing an order under section 319, Cr. PC, it is sufficient to form a 8

satisfaction of the nature indicated in paragraph 106 of the decision

in Hardeep Singh (supra). We are satisfied, on facts and in the

circumstances, that the Special Court formed the requisite

satisfaction prior to summoning the appellant to face trial with

Dharmendra.

11. In such view of the matter, the order of the Special Bench

dated 16th October, 2021 and the impugned order of the High Court

dated 1st June, 2022 affirming it cannot be faulted.

12. In so far as the points regarding delay in registration of the FIR,

material contradiction in the versions of the complainant and his

wife, absence of any public witness as well as the circumstances

that the complainant and his wife were known to the appellant since

2015 are concerned, the same are left open to be urged by the

appellant in course of the proceedings before the Special Court.

13. There is no merit in the appeal, and it stands dismissed.

14. The Special Court is encouraged to expedite the trial. But, in

the process, it shall proceed uninfluenced by reason of its order

under Section 319, Cr. PC having been upheld by the High Court and

this Court. The points raised on behalf of the appellant, recorded

above, if raised before it as well as other points, if any, shall be

given the consideration the same deserve.

9

15. In view of dismissal of the appeal, nothing survives for decision

on the application for stay. The same stands dismissed together with

any other application, if any.

.………………………………………..J (DIPANKAR DATTA)

..………………………………………J (PANKAJ MITHAL) New Delhi;

2nd JUNE, 2023.

This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.

Research this judgment with Miss Lucy

Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.

Try Miss Lucy free