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Jeevan Adhar Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. vs Chandigarh Housing Board and Anr.

Supreme Court23 September 2024Sudhanshu Dhulia

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an order of review does not expressly modify a specific finding in a prior judgment except as stated in the review order itself, the unmodified finding retains its force and finality. When a review order explicitly substitutes certain dates in a limited paragraph dealing with one issue (here, ground rent), it does not extend to modify findings on a separate issue (here, escalation cost) that were not the subject of the review application, notwithstanding any argument that the two issues should logically proceed pari passu. An executing court cannot expand the scope of rights awarded in a decree or modify findings that were not expressly changed in prior proceedings, even where the party executing the decree argues that the modification of one date should entail modification of another or that justice requires it; the executing court's function is to give effect to the decree as written and as previously modified, not to revisit and alter its substantive findings.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

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2024 INSC 1062 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.15122 OF 2024 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.8545/2020]

JEEVAN ADHAR CO-OPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY LTD.1 …APPELLANT VERSUS CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD AND ANR. …RESPONDENTS R1: CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD R2: THE REGISTRAR, CHANDIGARH STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

ORDER

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises from the Order dated 08.11.2019

passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RAJNI MUKHI Date: 2025.03.19 19:40:02 IST Reason: Delhi2 in MA/525/2017 in First Appeals No.150-152 of 1999 (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’), whereby the NCDRC noted that the 1 Now ‘Jeevan Adhar Co-op House Building First Society Ltd.’. 2 Hereinafter abbreviated to ‘NCDRC’.

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complainant (Appellant herein) is entitled to escalation w.e.f. 3 23.12.1994

to 30.04.1997 and proceeded to dispose of the execution application

holding that the Order of the NCDRC, as modified by this Court, stood

complied with.

THE FACTUAL MILIEU:

3. On 28.05.1991, The Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh

notified the scheme for allotment of land to Co-operative House Building

Societies in the Union Territory of Chandigarh through the Chandigarh

Housing Board (Respondent No.1 herein) with a view to promote private

housing and optimum utilization of land by constructing multi-storied

structures. The Chandigarh Housing Board by a Letter dated 24.10.1991

informed the complainant to deposit 25% of the price of the land to be

allotted, which the complainant deposited by 31.01.1992. The land was

to be allotted before 31.05.1992, and the complainant alleged that the

Chandigarh Housing Board failed to give possession within the agreed

time-frame. Subsequently, on 04.06.1993, the complainant was informed

that they have been allotted 1.12 acres of land in Sector 49A,

Chandigarh. It is alleged that there was a lapse on the part of

Chandigarh Housing Board for the delay in passing over the price to the

3 Abbreviation for ‘with effect from’.

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Chandigarh Administration. Thereafter, the complainant received another

Letter of Allotment dated 23.12.1994 informing that the allotment in

Sector 49 stands cancelled and they have been allotted land in Sector

48A. The possession of the land was finally delivered to the complainant

on 06.09.1995.

4. The complainant filed Complaints No.20 & 22 of 1996 alleging

deficiencies on account of delay in delivery of possession and for want of

basic essential services on the part of the respondents/opposite parties

therein despite receiving more than 25% of the price for the land. The

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Union Territory, Chandigarh

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’) vide Order dated

25.01.1999 partly allowed the complaint holding that there was deficiency

in service as the land remained undeveloped, for the requisite sanction

from the Divisional Town Planner was obtained on 10.10.1996, which

was after the institution of the complaint. It was held that the opposite

parties were not entitled to ground rent/lease money. The complainant

was held entitled to 5% rebate, where the payment had been made in

time. The complainant was further held entitled to interest @ 18% p.a. 4

from 31.01.1992 till the Chief Engineer of the Chandigarh Administration

or an officer next below him would certify in writing that the land in

4 Expands to ‘per annum’.

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question had become habitable and the amount recoverable in this

regard should be adjustable qua the future ground rent/lease money. The

complainants were held entitled to get a consolidated cost of Rs.5,000/-

(Rupees Five Thousand).

5. The appellant filed First Appeal No.55 of 1999 against the order

passed in Complaint No.22 of 1996, and First Appeal No.74 of 1999

against the order passed in Complaint No.20 of 1996. The Respondent

also moved the NCDRC by filing First Appeals No.150-152 of 1999

against the above order. The NCDRC vide Order dated 07.07.2008,

partly allowed the appeal of the Chandigarh Housing Board and reduced

the interest from 18% p.a. to 12% p.a. on the amounts deposited by the

complainant. Further, the appeal by the appellant was also partly allowed

and it was held:

‘As regards cost of escalation, the complainant would be entitled to the cost of escalation w.e.f. the date of allotment i.e. 23-12-1994 and not earlier date and the cost of escalation would be confined to the very limited period, till the plan as sanctioned in 10.10.1996, plus a reasonable time of six months to get the plan proposed and get it sanctioned. We fix this date 30-04-1997. If any further delay was caused in raising construction Ops/Appellant would not be liable to pay escalation in the cost of construction.

Unfortunately Jeewan Adhaar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. In this appeal has not given any estimate about the escalation cost of construction between the aforesaid period. The cost of construction between the aforesaid period. The cost of escalation is required to be 5

calculated on the basis of PWD schedule of rates on the basis of difference in rates between dates of allotment and 30-04-1997 on the basis of permissible FAR on the allotted land. The Chandigarh Housing Board shall get it calculated by the Architect of Chandigarh Administration and is directed to deposit the amount to cost of escalation within six months with the State Commission for payment to the complainant Jeewan Adhaar Co-operative House Building Society with interest @ 9% on the amount of cost of escalation.

The appeal of Jeewan adhaar Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. is allowed in part in above terms.’

6. The appellant filed a Review Petition before the NCDRC being

M.A. No.207 of 2008 in First Appeals No.55 & 74 of 1999 contending that

the respondents therein themselves have admitted that the land was fit

for construction only on 15.10.1998. On this basis, they sought: i) the

lease rent and interest on installments be charged from 15.10.1998, and;

ii) the cost of escalation be allowed upto 15.10.1998 instead of

10.10.1996. Vide Order dated 24.10.2008, the NCDRC noted that the

limited question that arose for its consideration was the date from which

the complainant would be charged lease rent and interest on

installments. It was further noted that at Page 10 of the Order dated

07.07.2008, the date(s) were mentioned as 10.10.1996. The NCDRC,

relying on Letter dated 08.03.2000 of the Chief Engineer, Chandigarh

Administration, allowed the review and held ‘… there is an error apparent

on the fact of the record hence in view of the provisions of section 22 of

the Consumer Protection Act at second para of page 10 of our order the 6

dates mentioned stands substituted as 15.10.1998 instead of

10.10.1996.’

7. Thereafter, the appellant approached this Court by way of Special

Leave Petitions (Civil) No.693-696 of 2009, which became Civil Appeals

No.1675-1678 of 2010. Vide Order dated 16.08.2017, these appeals

were disposed of by reducing the rate of interest awarded by the NCDRC

from 18% p.a. to 9% p.a. Subsequently, M.A. No.525 of 2017 was filed

by the appellant in First Appeals No.150-152 of 2017 before the NCDRC

for execution of the Order dated 16.08.2017 passed by this Court. Vide

the Impugned Order, the NCDRC disposed of the application, inter alia,

noting that the order of the NCDRC, as modified by this Court, stands

complied with.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

8. Learned senior counsel Mr. G. Umapathy, contended that the

NCDRC failed to appreciate that by the Order dated 24.10.2008 passed

in the Review Petition, the date(s) was/were changed from 10.10.1996 to

15.10.1998 at Page 10 of the Order dated 07.07.2008 passed in First

Appeals No.55 & 74 of 1999, so the escalation and interest on deposit

would be charged up to 15.10.1998 instead of 10.10.1996. In the face of 7

this, it was argued that the NCDRC fell in error by holding that the

appellant would be entitled to escalation w.e.f. 23.12.1994 to 30.04.1997,

when it actually should have been 15.10.1998 as was decided in the

Order dated 24.10.2008.

9. It was argued that this Court vide the Order dated 16.08.2017

merely altered the rate of interest from 18% p.a. awarded by the NCDRC

to 9% p.a.. Thus, the other findings attained finality and the period of

grant of escalation and interest on deposit remained unaltered from

23.12.1994 to 15.10.1998. It was vehemently argued that the NCDRC

erred in traversing beyond the order passed by it in M.A. No.207 of 2008

and the Order dated 16.08.2017 passed in C.A. Nos.1675-1678 of 2010

by this Court, which was wholly impermissible.

10. Learned senior counsel relied on certain precedents and argued

that an Executing Court cannot go beyond the order under execution,

unless it is shown that the order in question was passed by a Court

inherently lacking jurisdiction, which would make it a nullity. In the

present case, the Impugned Order is wholly without jurisdiction as the

NCDRC could not have gone beyond the affirmed order passed by this

Court and such order could not have been varied at the stage of

execution.

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11. It was pointed out that the Chandigarh Housing Board itself has

admitted in Para 6 of the Reply filed pursuant to the Order dated

24.10.2008 of the NCDRC that the appellant is entitled to escalation from

23.12.1994 to 15.10.1998 and the interest thereon, and that the said

amount has to be calculated as per PWD Schedule rates, and that

CPWD rates as calculated by itself and PEC are almost the same. In

such an event, it was argued, restricting escalation to 30.04.1997 is both

contrary to facts and law and in any event is beyond jurisdiction,

tantamounting to going behind the decree affirmed by this Court. On

these grounds, it was prayed to allow the appeal and set aside the

Impugned Order.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1:

12. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. S.N. Terdal argued that the

Appellant has raised a legally unsustainable demand beyond the

unambiguous terms of the Review Order dated 24.10.2008, by wrongly

claiming that not just in the second paragraph at Page 10 of the NCDRC

Order dated 07.07.2008, but the dates mentioned should be read as

substituted [as 15.10.1998 instead of 10.10.1996] in the entire text of the

Order dated 07.07.2008.

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13. It was contended that the said legally untenable assertion of the

appellant was rightly rejected by the NCDRC vide the Impugned Order,

which being unexceptionable, deserves to be upheld by this Court. It was

argued that the Appellant is, in fact, seeking undue benefit at the cost of

public funds by seeking to re-write the said unchallenged ex-parte Order

dated 24.10.2008 of the NCDRC, which was obtained by the appellant

more than 15 years back.

14. It was pointed out that during the course of proceedings in M.A.

No.525 of 2017, which were in the nature of execution proceedings, the

Appellant received the entire relief due to it. It was brought to the notice

of this Court that whereas the land in question was allotted to the

appellant for a consideration of Rs.42,31,620/- (Rupees Forty-Two Lakhs

Thirty-One Thousand Six Hundred and Twenty) but the Chandigarh

Housing Board has paid Rs.50,10,971/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Ten

Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-One) i.e., far more than the allotment

price in compliance with the orders passed. The detailed breakup of the

figure of Rs.50,10,971/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs Ten Thousand Nine

Hundred Seventy-One) is as under:

Head Amount Cost of escalation with interest Rs.42,99,021/- 10

Ground rent Rs.3,17,373/- Rebate Rs.1,74,525/- Interest on amounts deposited by Rs.2,15,052/- appellant Litigation cost Rs.5,000/- Total Rs.50,10,971/-

15. It was argued that the Impugned Order has been passed keeping

in view all relevant considerations of justice and equity, and the Appellant

has failed to show any infirmity therewith. Hence, this appeal, being

devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed ex debito justitiae.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:

16. Having considered the rival contentions, the Court finds that the

only issue involved is whether the payment for escalation should be till

15.10.1998 as claimed by the appellant or till 30.04.1997 as was held in

Order dated 07.07.2008 in First Appeals No.150-152 of 1999 and later

clarified in the Order passed in review being M.A. No.207 of 2008 dated

24.10.2008 and acted upon in the Impugned Order in execution being

Order dated 08.11.2019 in M.A. No.525 of 2017. The relevant extract

from original Order which remains in First Appeals No.150-152 of 1999

dated 07.07.2008 has already been quoted above in Paragraph 5. In 11

M.A. No.207 of 2008, by Order dated 24.10.2008 the review preferred by

the appellant was allowed only to a limited extent which is quoted above

in Paragraph 6. In the Impugned Order, when the Appellant claimed

before the NCDRC that because of the fact that the NCDRC has held

that ground rent would be chargeable from 10.10.1996 initially, which

was modified to 15.10.1998, the escalation cost should also be

commensurate therewith and the Chandigarh Housing Board is liable to

pay the same till 15.10.1998, which has been negated.

17. The categorical modification of the Order dated 07.07.2008 by

Order dated 24.10.2008 was that the date of ‘10.10.1996’ in the second

paragraph at Page 10 was substituted by ‘15.10.1998’. In our mind, this

leaves no scope for ambiguity as the entire paragraph deals only with the

ground rent. Thus, submission of the Appellant that because the ground

rent has been held to be payable from 15.10.1998, the escalation cost

should also be payable till that date does not carry weight. The NCDRC’s

Order dated 07.07.2008 itself at Page 16 states:

‘As regards cost of escalation, the complainant would be entitled to the cost of escalation w.e.f. the date of allotment i.e. 23-12-1994 and not earlier date and the cost of escalation would be confined to the very limited period, till the plan as sanctioned in 10.10.1996, plus a reasonable time of six months to get the plan proposed and get it sanctioned. We fix this date 30-04-1997. If any further delay was caused in raising construction Ops/Appellant 12

would not be liable to pay escalation in the cost of construction.’ (emphasis supplied)

18. The NCDRC itself has fixed the date for payment of escalation

cost till 30.04.1997. It is an admitted position that this part of the Order

has not been interfered with even in the review and the Review Order,

having not been challenged by the Appellant, has attained finality.

19. From the aforesaid discussions, it is crystal clear that the cost of

escalation would be payable only till 30.04.1997. Such payment by the

Chandigarh Housing Board, as per the chart provided by it, has been

made and is not disputed by the Appellant.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed, but

without an order as to costs.

………………..........................J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

..………………..................…..J. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH] NEW DELHI 23rd SEPTEMBER, 2024

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