Jarnail Singh And Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors

CWP-16-2015 and connected cases -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

(I) CWP-16-2015 Reserved on: 10.10.2023 Date of Decision: 16.12.2023

JARNAIL SINGH AND ORS -PETITIONERS

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(II) CWP-21285-2014

KAMAL KUTTAPPAN -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(III) CWP-23330-2014

THE SHIVALIK ENVIRON COOP HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY (REGD.) -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS -RESPONDENTS

(IV) CWP-26978-2015

JASKARAN SINGH -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(V) CWP-443-2015

MOHAN SINGH -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(VI) CWP-567-2015

GURMEET SINGH -PETITIONER

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V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(VII) CWP-576-2015

BHARAT PAL SINGH -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS -RESPONDENTS

(VIII)CWP-9155-2015

MINNA JHAKHAR -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. -RESPONDENTS

(IX) CWP-9176-2015

OP BHARDWAJ -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. -RESPONDENTS

(X) CWP-22512-2022

BANK EMPLOYEES AND FRIENDS COOPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY (REGD.) -PETITIONER

V/S

STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present : Mr. R.S. Rai, Senior Advocate with Mr. Gautam Dutt, Advocate and Ms. Radhika Mehta, Advocate for the petitioner(s) (in CWP Nos.16, 443, 567 and 576 of 2015).

Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Tushar Sharma, Advocate, Mr. Udit Garg, Advocate and

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Ms. Shifali Goyal, Advocate for the petitioner(s) (in CWP Nos.23330-2014, 9155-2015, 9176-2015 and 22512-2022).

Mr. Vikas Jain, Advocate and Mr. Vishesh Jain, Advocate for the petitioner(s) (in CWP-26978-2015).

Mr. Rahul Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner(s) (in CWP-21285-2014).

Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. AG, Haryana with Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.

Mr. Deepak Sabharwal, Advocate, Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate, Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur Manchanda, Advocate and Mr. Shivam Garg, Advocate for the respondent(s)- H.S.V.P.

KULDEEP TIWARI, J.

1. Since all these writ petitions arise from common acquisition

proceedings, besides when common questions of law are involved therein,

therefore, they are amenable for being decided through a common verdict.

2. However, since a couple of writ petitions, i.e. CWP-16-2015,

CWP-443-2015, CWP-567-2015, CWP-576-2015, besides raising

common grounds vis-a-vis the ones, as raised in the other writ petitions,

also invoke the lapsing provisions, as embodied in Section 24(2) of The

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the

'Act of 2013'), therefore, the claim (supra), will also become adjudicated

at the fag-end of this verdict.

3. The petitioner(s), who have in fact, collaborated with a

renowned builder/developer/colonizer, i.e. D.L.F., have thrown the instant

challenge to the relevant acquisition proceedings.

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4. To be precise, the challenge, as made in all these writ petitions,

is to the notification and the declaration, as respectively issued under Section

4 and under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter

referred to as the 'Act of 1894'). The notification and the declaration were

respectively issued on 16.3.1999 and on 15.03.2000. In addition, a challenge

is also made to the order dated 21.10.2014, as passed by the High Powered

Committee, whereby, the claim(s) of the petitioner(s) for release(s) of

acquired land(s), in terms of the relevant policy(ies), as adopted by the

State of Haryana, was rejected.

5. The relevant acquisition proceedings remained entangled in

various rounds of litigation, which commenced in the year 2001.

Therefore, to gain clarity of the relevant facts, for making adjudication

thereon, it is deemed imperative to extract the relevant facts. For the sake

of brevity, the facts are being extracted from CWP-23330-2014.

FACTUAL MATRIX

6. In the year 2001, one Dr. D.B.Singh filed CWP No. 876 of

2001, wherein, he raised certain grievances with regard to the activities

carried out by the State of Haryana in the periphery of the Sukhna Lake

and accordingly made a prayer that the State of Haryana and its

authorities be restrained from doing any act of damaging the forest area

abutting and/or around the Sukhna Lake. During the pendency of the

above writ petition, through an order passed by this Court on 18.05.2001,

further proceedings were ordered to be stayed. Thereafter, on 07.02.2003,

that petition was ultimately disposed of, through the issuance of a

mandamus upon the respondent(s) concerned to decide the

representation(s), as preferred by the petitioner(s) therein. However,

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aggrieved by the conduct of the authorities concerned, Dr. D.B.Singh

again filed a Writ Petition bearing No.7649 of 2003, wherein, a challenge

was made to the relevant acquisition proceedings, as launched by the

respondent-State, on the ground, that the same infringes the relevant

provisions, as enshrined in The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, besides

also violates the master plan of Chandigarh and the orders of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. In the writ petition (supra), the State of Haryana took a

specific plea that, in order to preserve and to protect the Sukhna Lake, the

Government has framed a policy to acquire the potential area in the

periphery of Shree Mata Mansa Devi Urban Complex (hereinafter

referred to as the 'M.D.C.') for planned low density Urban

Development (emphasis supplied) and that specific care has been

exercised during the relevant acquisition proceedings, for thereby

preserving the catchment area of the Sukhna Lake and its watercourses.

The relevant pleadings of the State of Haryana, which were reproduced in

the order passed by this Court on 11.9.2003, are extracted hereinafter:-

"i) The Government of Haryana and its authorities are also concerned to preserve and protect the "Sukhna Lake" in regard to which about 10,000 hectares of the lands have been earmarked as reserved forest in the catchment area of "Sukhna Lake and that no parallel "Sukhna Lake" is going to be created and developed and no other "Sukhna Lake" erected and/or developed by the Haryana Government.

ii) After the Government found imperative to acquire potential area under the periphery of Shree Mata Mansa Devi Urban Complex for planned low density urban development, as per proposals of development plan of this area, steps were taken for acquiring lands Invoking the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In doing so, the catchment of "Sukhna Lake and water

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courses thereof have been duly preserved. The proposed development urbanization is going to be carried out by the Haryana Urban Development Authority, which is a State Agency in the larger public interest which will not cause ecological imbalance of this area in any manner.

(iii) There is a proposal to develop larger area as green and recreational as per the provisions of development plan dated August 3 and 8 of 2000 of this area. The development plan, referred to by the petitioner(s) has been revised three times about which petitioner(s) has maintained a meticulous silence in his pleadings as well as in course of his submissions.

(iv) The real object of the petitioner(s) no. 1 in moving this court is to develop about 100 acres of land, which he has illegally acquired in the name of an alleged Society The Shivalik Enviorn Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Saketri."

7. Furthermore, a specific affidavit sworn by Shri N.C.Wadhwa

IAS, Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana, was also considered

by the Coordinate Bench of this Court while deciding the above writ

petition, wherein, the hereinafter extracted undertaking was given by the

respondent-State of Haryana, to this Court:-

"Coming to the remaining aspects, we find that in his affidavit Shri N.C. Wadhwa, IAS, Director, Town and Country Planning and Urban Estate Department, Haryana-cum-Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority has stated as follows:-

1. That Haryana Government is also concerned to preserve Sukhna Lake and thereby is fully conscious that no action taken by the Government cause any harm to Sukhna Lake rather Government is anxious to enhance cause of Sukhna Lake. It is also added that no parallel Sukhna Lake is hereby developed by the Haryana Government.

2. That it is imperative to acquire the most potential area of the periphery i.e. Shree Mata Mansa Devi Urban Complex for planned low density urban development as

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per proposals of development plan of this area. By this acquisition of land for proposed planned urbanization, Sukhna Lake is not going to be affected because the catchment area of Sukhna Lake has been duly preserved and all water courses of Sukhna lake are preserved.

3. That this planned urbanization will be carried out by Haryana Urban Development Authority, a state agency in the larger public interest and this urban development does not affect ecology of this area in any manner.

4. That large area has been proposed to develop as green and recreational as per provisions of development plan of this area."

8. Upon consideration of the hereinabove extracted pleadings

and the undertaking, the above writ petition was finally dismissed by this

Court, through an order passed on 11.9.2003. However, the order (supra)

caused pain to the petitioner(s) and propelled him to raise a challenge

thereto, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, through his instituting SLP(C)

No.9556 of 2005, which was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court on 18.11.2005. Therefore, the issue concerning preservation of the

Sukhna Lake, maintenance of reserved and protected forest(s), under the

Works of Defence Act by the Ministry of Defence, around Chandimandir

Military Station etc., and, the relevant layout plan of M.D.C., was raised

and settled vis-a-vis the disputed land(s) upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

9. A perusal of the hereinabove extracted undertaking, makes

significant revelations that, the State of Haryana undertook to, in the

larger public interest, plan the urbanization of the area around the Sukhna

Lake, under the aegis of the Haryana Shahari Vikas Pradhikaran

(hereinafter referred to as the 'H.S.V.P.') (formerly Haryana Urban

Development Authority), which is a State Agency, but without affecting

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the ecology of said area. Furthermore, in order to maintain the ecological

balance around the Sukhna Lake, a vast tract was proposed to be

developed as green and recreational area, as per the provisions of relevant

development plan. Another significant feature, as revealed in the

undertaking of the respondent-State, is that, it intended to acquire the land

for planning low density urban development, considering the most

potential area in the periphery of Sukhna Lake and State Capital.

10. To accomplish the above object, a vast tract was acquired

through the issuance of various acquisition notifications, for the M.D.C.,

and, one such notification, is the subject matter of the instant petition(s).

The said notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, on

16.3.1999. The notification caused grievance to the present petitioner(s),

as the land(s) enclosed therein, measuring 133.99 acres, falling in the

revenue estate of village Saketri, Tehsil and District Panchkula, are owned

by him/them. It is also relevant to record here that, in the notification, land

measuring 952.18 acres falling in the revenue estate of two villages of

District Panchkula, i.e. Saketri 748.56 acres and Bhainsa Tibba 20362

acres, was also notified for acquisition, for a public purpose, namely, for

development and utilization thereof, thus for residential, commercial and

institutional Sectors, 1, 2, 3, 5B, 5C and 6, for Panchkula extension

(MDC). The notification, besides being published in the Official Gazette,

was also published in two daily newspapers, therefore, compliance was

meted to the requisite statutory requirements. Subsequent to the issuance

of the notification, objections under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 were

invited, whereupon, the petitioner(s) preferred objections, and, upon

consideration, the Land Acquisition Collector concerned, on 3.2.2000,

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ordered the release of the total land measuring 1.94 acres, whereon,

constructions were in existence for religious purpose(s). Thereafter,

finally a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, in respect of land

measuring 747.69 acres, was issued on 15.3.2000, and, the requisite

statutory compliance was also made, thereby the said declaration did

acquire legal validity.

11. The reply, as furnished to the instant petition, by the State of

Haryana, also reveals that pursuant to issuance of notification and

declaration (supra), an award, in respect of land measuring 622.76 acres,

was announced on 9.10.2003 and thereupon, on the same day, the

physical possession of the acquired land, except land measuring approx.

96 acres, qua which stay was operative, was handed over to the Estate

Officer, HSVP, Panchkula. The reply further makes revelations that the

relevant acquisition proceedings were stayed by this Court, vide order

dated 18.5.2001, passed in CM-13086-2001 in CWP-876-2001, and, the

said stay was ordered to continue till 7.2.2003, with a direction to the

petitioner(s) to make representation before the appropriate authority,

besides, a mandamus was also passed upon the authority concerned to

decide the same within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of

the order (supra). Accordingly, the representation of the petitioner(s) was

decided by the authority concerned on 2.7.2003, thereby rejecting the

claim raised therein.

12. The further revelations, as made in the reply, are that, out of

the assessed sums of compensation amount of ₹61,57,90,176.78/-, in

respect of village Saketri, ₹51,67,18,897/- has already been paid/disbursed

to the landlooser(s) concerned. This implies that, 83.91% of

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compensation amount has already been paid, and, only 16.09% is not

accepted by the landlooser(s) concerned. Likewise, out of the assessed

sums of compensation amount of ₹14,84,66,189/-, in respect of village

Bhainsa Tibba, ₹12,61,00,068/- was disbursed to the landlooser(s)

concerned. This also implies that, 84.93% of compensation has already

been paid, and, now only 15.07% is not accepted by the landlooser(s)

concerned.

13. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned acquisition notification,

various persons including the present petitioner(s) filed CWP-6357-2000

before this Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, an interim

order to maintain status-quo was passed by this Court, on 22.5.2000,

which led the authority concerned to refrain from passing an award vis-a-

vis the disputed land(s). Thereafter, a majority of petitions were clubbed

and a bunch of 29 writ petitions were disposed of, vide a common order

dated 12.8.2011, passed in CWP-12848-2000, titled as "Jasbir Singh

Siali Vs. The State of Haryana and others", wherebys a direction was

made upon the State/High Powered Committee concerned, to decide the

claim of the petitioner(s) therein. The relevant portion of the order is

extracted hereunder:-

"The counsel for the petitioner(s) has no objection to the offer made. Under the circumstances, we dispose of this writ petition and other connected writ petitions with a direction to the State to constitute a High Powered Committee within 15 days from today, to which no objection has been raised by Mr. Sehgal. It is further agreed between the parties that after constitution of the High Powered Committee, the petitioner(s)s will appear before that Committee on 12th October 2011 in the office of Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of

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Haryana, Urban Estates Department, Sector-17 Chandigarh at 10.30 a.m. In the meantime, if any of the petitioner(s)s wish to file a representation before the abovesaid Officer, he may do so. The landowners are supposed to give detail of land owned by them and objections filed by them against acquisition. It is further agreed between the parties that till such time the decision is taken by the High Powered Committee and thereafter for a period of 15 days, from the date of communication of the order passed, to the landowners, through a registered post, the status quo regarding possession shall be maintained. It is also agreed that in case if any adverse order is passed against any of the landowners, liberty shall remain to file a fresh petition taking all the pleas including one which have been taken in these writ petitions."

14. In terms of the order dated 12.8.2011 passed by this Court,

the petitioner(s) preferred a detailed representation through its/their

collaborator DLF before the High Powered Committee. The High

Powered Committee after passing a detailed order dated 21.10.2014,

rejected the claim of the petitioner(s), for releasing their land(s), thus on

various grounds. The said order of rejection has caused grievance to the

petitioner(s), leading them to institute the instant writ petition(s) before

this Court, whereby, not only a challenge is made to the impugned

notification and declaration, besides a challenge is also laid to the

rejection order passed by the High Powered Committee.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL(S) FOR THE PETITIONER(S)

15. By placing reliance upon the approval letter dated 26.2.1992

(Annexure P-2), as issued by the Chief Administrator, Haryana Housing

Board to the petitioner(s), whereby, approval for taking up construction of

houses on behalf of the petitioner(s)-Society was given, the learned

counsel for the petitioner(s) has tried to lay a foundation that a legitimate

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expectation has arisen in their favour, which restrains the respondent-State

to exercise its power of eminent domain, hence through the issuance of

the impugned notification. To strengthen his above made argument, the

learned counsel for the petitioner(s), has submitted that, to tackle the

problem of housing, a decision was taken by the Government in

September, 1990, to promote the house building society(ies), who offered

its/their land(s) for the purpose of development under the Haryana

Housing Board Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1971')

and in pursuance of the said decision, a number of co-operative societies

were formed and registered with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies,

Haryana for constructing the houses on a co-operative basis, for its

members. Consequently, the petitioner(s)-Society, which was also

registered, to achieve the object of housing for its members, also

purchased various parcels of land from their funds. Thereupon, they made

a proposal, in pursuance of the said scheme, to the Haryana Housing

Board, which was accepted, through agreement dated 22.4.1992.

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has further

submitted that owing to eruption of a dispute inter se the Haryana

Housing Board and the respondent-H.S.V.P., which are two independent

bodies of the Government, the final layout plan was not approved by the

Department of Town and Country Planning concerned, and, during the

pendency of the approval, the State Government issued, the impugned

notification for acquisition of the petition land(s). He has also placed

reliance upon Sections 20 and 21 of the Act of 1971, to submit that the

very object and the purpose of creating the Housing Board, is to provide

houses to members of various entities like registered co-operative

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societies. He has further submitted that the very purpose of acquisition of

land, is the same, for which the co-operative society had already made an

agreement with the Haryana Housing Board. The purpose of acquisition,

which is mentioned in notification, as issued under Section 4 of the Act of

1894, reads as under:-

"Whereas it appears to the Governor of Haryana that the land described in the specification below is required for the public purpose namely for the development and utilization of land as residential, commercial, Institutional, residential and so on in Sectors 1, 2, 3, 5B, 5C and for Panchkula extension (Mansa Devi Complex) under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 by the Haryana Urban Development Authority in the area of village Saketri, Hadbast No.376, Bhainsa Tibba, Hadbast No.377, Tehsil and District Panchkula."

17. On the basis of the above submitted factual aspects, the

learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has requested to invoke the doctrine

of estoppel against the State, for thereby its becoming restrained to

exercise its power of eminent domain. Furthermore, to strengthen his

argument, he has submitted that the respondent-State or its instrumentality

cannot decline the request of the petitioner(s)-Society, for exempting the

disputed land(s) from acquisition, given the Society obtaining an approval

from another instrumentality of the State (Housing Board), especially

when the said approval has already been acted upon. Therefore, it is on

the above anchor that, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, besides, the

plea of legitimate expectation has been rested.

18. Further, it has been argued that the petitioner(s) is the

bonafide purchaser of the land, in pursuance of the advertisement/policy

of the State Government, and therefore, the State Government, in

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pursuance of the agreement (supra) created a valid and legal legitimate

expectation in favour of the petitioner(s), which estopped the respondent-

State from exercising its power of eminent domain. It has been further

submitted that a valuable right has been created in favour of the

petitioner(s)-Society, inasmuch as, once one of the entities of the State

entered into an agreement on 22.4.1992, in pursuance of an approval

granted by the Government, vide letter dated 26.2.1992. Therefore, it is

contended that the said approval cannot be tinkered with in the garb of the

launching of the impugned acquisition proceedings. He has further placed

reliance upon the judgments rendered in the cases of Navjyoti Co-Op

Group Housing Society Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 477,

Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries,

(1193) 1 SCC 71, Ghaziabad Sheromani Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. Vs.

State of U.P., (199) 1 SCC 583, Lalaram & Ors. Vs. Jaipur Development

Authority & Anr., (2016) 11 SCC and National Fertilizers Employees

Coop Housing Society Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 1998 SCC

Online P&H 891.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has further argued that

since the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 were not

considered by the Government, therefore, such non-consideration renders

the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 to be totally

illegal. Moreover, since in the earlier round of litigation, vide judgment

dated 12.8.2011, a specific direction was made by this Court to the High

Powered Committee to consider the objections, as moved by the

landowner(s) concerned under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894, however,

despite the direction, the same were not considered. He has placed

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reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

"Surinder Singh Brar Vs. Union of India" (2013) 1 SCC 403.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has highlighted some

factual contradiction(s) in the impugned order dated 21.10.2014, to submit

that the objections, which have been dealt with, whereby the request for

release(s) of land(s) was declined, are factually and legally incorrect. He

has argued that discrimination has been exercised qua the petitioner(s), as

similarly situated landowner(s), who applied for licence(s) by entering

into an agreement with the Haryana Housing Board, have already been

granted the apposite benefits, under different policies.

21. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has further submitted

that since no award has yet been passed, as prescribed in Section 11-A of

the Act of 1894, therefore, the impugned acquisition proceedings stand

lapsed. He has further submitted that nothing did well prevent the

respondent(s) concerned to pass an award, since as per judgment dated

12.8.2011 (Annexure P-7), all interim orders were converted into stay

against dispossession. Moreover, since the State Government could well

pass an award qua one parcel of the acquired land, as comprised in the

same notification, therefore, there was no legal impediment with the State

Government to pass an award, within the statutory limits of time qua other

parcels of land, especially when the order of stay was converted into stay

against dispossession by this Court itself.

22. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner(s), by placing

reliance upon an order made by this Court on 15.07.2008, upon CWP-

12510-2000, titled as "Abhishek Gupta V/s The State of Haryana and

another", submits that since the same notification has already been

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quashed qua the petitioner(s) therein, on the ground of perpetration of

discrimination, therefore, the petitioner(s) herein also deserve to be

treated at par.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL(S) FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)

23. The learned State counsel, apart from submitting written

submissions, which are taken on record, has vociferously argued that the

foundation, as tried to be laid by the petitioner(s), for raising the plea of

legitimate expectation, lacks vigour. The fulcrum of legitimate

expectation is rested upon an agreement dated 22.04.1992, however, its

perusal reveals that, the validity of said agreement, does not create any

vested right in favour of the petitioner(s)-society, as the said agreement

was a conditional agreement, inasmuch as, the implementation of scheme

was made subject to clearance being accorded by the Department of Town

and Country Planning concerned, failing which, no legal right accrue to

the parties. Therefore, when there is no wrangle amongst the parties that,

the requisite clearance was not granted by the Department of Town and

Country Planning concerned, therefore, the contention qua legitimate

expectation arising in favour of the petitioner(s), on the basis of the

conditional agreement, does not carry any strength, rather is a feeble

argument.

24. Proceeding further, the learned State counsel has argued that

the agreement was never executed with the State Government, whereby

an estoppel can ably become encumbered upon the State Government,

against its refraining from exercising its power of eminent domain, that

too, through recoursing the relevant provisions of a central legislation, i.e.

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the Act of 1894. The learned State counsel has laid much emphasis on the

supervening events and submitted that the petitioner(s) has now entered

into collaboration with a developer, i.e. D.L.F., and has applied for licence

for developing a colony over the land in question. He argues that the

argument of legitimate expectation pales into insignificance.

25. The learned State counsel has further argued, that the

petitioner(s) has entered into collaboration with D.L.F. post the issuance

of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, which is wholly

impermissible under law. To buttress this argument, he has placed

reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in CWP-

2734-2007, titled as "Laxmi Educational Society, Manesar and others Vs.

State of Haryana and others", Decided on: 29.07.2022. He has also

placed reliance upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in case "State of Haryana Vs. Vinod Oil and General Mills", 2014(15)

SCC 410.

26. The further argument, as raised by the learned State counsel,

is that, the case of the petitioner(s) is not covered under relevant policy,

rather a decision was taken by the State Government not to release any

piece of acquired land, based upon an application for grant of licence, nor

was the case of petitioner(s) construable to be an appropriate deserving

case for the thereunder claimed release being made vis-a-vis the

petitioner(s). Moreover, the relevant and applicable policy for release of

land is not the policy of 26.10.2007, rather is the policy of 24.01.2011.

Under this policy, only such cases may be considered, wherein, the

landowner(s) concerned has filed an application under Section 3 of The

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975

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(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1975'), prior to the issuance of the

declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.

27. The learned State counsel has further submitted that, insofar

as the present acquisition proceedings are concerned, no land has been

released from the impugned acquisition, on account of grant of licence,

therefore, the petitioner(s) cannot plead qua his being subjected to

discrimination. The reference, as made by the petitioner(s), to the other

acquisition proceedings, wherein, land was released, is totally irrelevant.

28. Continuing his arguments, the learned State counsel has

assailed the argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner(s),

which pertains to lapsing of acquisition proceedings owing to non-passing

of award within the prescribed statutory period of two years. In this

regard, he has placed reliance upon Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, to

submit that since status quo qua possession was in existence, therefore,

the period of status quo is required to be excluded for the purpose of

making the requisite computation. To lend vigour to his submission, he

has placed reliance, upon, the judgment rendered in case titled as

"Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat", (1991) 4 SCC

531, and, "State of Maharashtra Vs. M/s Moti Ratan Estate, 2019 AIR

(SC) 4149.

29. Furthermore, the learned State counsel has argued that the

land in question was recommended for acquisition, given the same being

vacant, but only after making well consideration of the objections, as

made under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894, by the petitioner(s).

Moreover, the High Powered Committee, as constituted by the

Government, to consider the representation(s) of the petitioner(s), had

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also well considered all the pleas raised by the petitioner(s). However, the

principal plea of the petitioner(s), which pertains to release of petition

land(s) on the basis of policy dated 26.10.2007 was rejected by the High

Powered Committee, after considering the factual aspects and the

conditions, as enclosed in the relevant policy. In its order dated

21.10.2014, the High Powered Committee has recorded specific

observations that the petition land(s), besides affecting 60 meters wide

road and plots planned in Sector 2, M.D.C., C.A., H.U.D.A., falls in

public/semi-public/open space zone, and, in the area reserved for I.T.

Park.

30. Concluding his arguments, the learned State counsel has

drawn the attention of this Court towards the undertaking, as made by the

State Government in the earlier round(s) of litigation, undertaking

whereof, is recorded in the order dated 11.09.2003 of this Court, whereby,

it was informed to the Court, that the Government has framed a policy to

acquire potential area under the periphery of M.D.C. for planned low

density urban development and in case, permission is granted to the

petitioner(s)-Society to develop residential colony or high rise buildings

or flats, the basic object of acquisition would be defeated, as most of

the development has been executed at the site.

ANALYSIS

31. Since the crux of the arguments, as addressed by the learned

counsel for the petitioner(s), encompasses the plea relating to the

applicability of the equitable norm of legitimate expectation, therefore,

the following cardinal issue arises for adjudication:-

"Whether an unperformed conditional agreement does

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bestow in the petitioner(s), any legitimate expectation,

thereby curtailing the sovereign power of eminent

domain?"

32. Before we commence to evince our opinion and response on

the hereinabove framed issue, it is deemed imperative to first understand

the concept of the equitable doctrine of legitimate expectation.

33. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is one of the

recognized grounds of judicial review, being one of the limbs of the

principles of natural justice. Legitimate expectation imposes obligation

upon the State to maintain equality in its treatment with its citizens and to

act fairly, reasonably and non-arbitrarily. The finer nuance of the clear,

unambiguous and unqualified assurance, understood by those, to whom it

is given by the State or its instrumentality, is that, a particular action or

procedure will be followed, rather than being departed, whereby, a

legitimate expectation becomes endowed in favour of the citizens.

34. The definition, as assigned to the term "legitimate

expectation", in Law Lexicon Dictionary, is extracted hereinafter:-

"A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way of an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice." [Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edn., Vol-I(1)151]

35. Furthermore, one could relate the principle of legitimate

expectation to Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which requires the

States to maintain equality in its deeds, besides ensure reasonableness and

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non-arbitrariness in the decision making process, or, in the makings of

executive decisions. The doctrine of legitimate expectation also prevents

the administrative decision maker, from resiling from his promise or

changing a policy, without good reasons, and also restrains the State from

withdrawing any benefit, without complying with the principles of natural

justice.

36. Here, in the present case, the fulcrum or the foundation laid

by the petitioner(s) to invoke the equitable doctrine of legitimate

expectation is hinged upon an agreement dated 22.04.1992. The learned

counsel for the petitioner(s) has argued that a candid, unambiguous and

unqualified assurance has been meted to him, inasmuch as, upon an

approval being granted to the housing scheme, thereby the equitable

doctrine of legitimate expectation is contended to arise in favour of the

petitioner(s). Therefore, for determining whether the said agreement can

be termed to be an unambiguous and unqualified assurance being made to

the petitioner(s), or, the petitioner(s) have woven an artificial assurance,

thereby estopping the respondent-State from reneging from the same, it is

deemed imperative to reproduce the relevant extract of the said

agreement:-

"4. That the implementation of the scheme shall be subject to the clearance by the D.T.C.P., Haryana failing which no legal rights shall accrue to the parties."

37. However, a perusal of the hereinabove extracted agreement

reveals that it was a conditional agreement, containing therein a

conditional clause, inasmuch as, the implementation of scheme shall be

subject to clearance being accorded by the Department of Town and

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Country Planning concerned, failing which, no legal right shall

accrue to the parties.

38. Therefore, when the agreement was evidently a conditional

agreement, besides when there is no wrangle amongst the parties, that the

requisite clearance was not granted by the Department of Town and

Country Planning concerned. Therefore, this Court is led to conclude that

the agreement never meted any unambiguous and unqualified assurance to

the petitioner(s), contrarily rather when the conditions, as spelt therein,

remained not complied with. Therefore, any renegings therefrom by the

respondent-State, through its drawing the acquisition notification(s),

cannot spur any conclusion that, thereby any legitimate expectation

accrued, vis-à-vis, the petitioner(s), nor any further argument can be

erected that thereby any renegings therefrom rather were unlawful.

39. Moreover, predominantly the agreement was executed way

back on 22.04.1992, i.e. about 8 years prior to the issuance of the

declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, however, the petitioner(s)-

Society did not, evidently for almost 8 years, get any clearance from the

Department of Town and Country Planning concerned. In fact, approval

was never granted by the department concerned for almost 8 years,

thereby the above elongated period in the seeking of, and, consequent

non-meteing of approval to the imperative conditions (supra), thereby the

subsequently issued acquisition notification(s) are to be construed to be

lawful. The reason being that the above elongated period of time,

whereon, no affirmative action was made by the petitioner(s) to seek the

requisite approval, thereby estops the petitioner(s) from raising plea of

estoppel against State and does not restrict the State to exercise its power

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of eminent domain, through its recoursing the mandate of a central

legislation i.e. the Act of 1894.

40. Predominantly, in the wake of the above, the agreement

collapses, besides when post the issuance of a declaration under Section 6

of the Act of 1894, the petitioner(s) has entered into a collaboration

agreement with D.L.F., in the year 2006. Resultantly, when at that stage,

there was complete legal restraint to transfer any kind of right qua land

under acquisition, therefore, obviously the entering of a collaboration

agreement with the D.L.F. in the year 2006, post the issuance of a

declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, is also an acquiescence of

the petitioner(s), that thereby the conditional agreement has lost its

relevance, or, becomes underwhelmed in the said drawn collaboration

agreement. Moreover, when during the elongated period, no affirmative

action was taken at the instance of the petitioner(s), therefore, it naturally

constitutes waiver and abandonment of any plea(s), as rested thereon.

Consequently, any plea of legitimate expectation, as stemming therefrom,

vis-à-vis the petitioner(s), is completely eclipsed in the drawing of a

collaboration agreement by the petitioner(s) with the D.L.F., in the year

2006, i.e. post the issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of

1894.

41. In nut shell, reiteratedly, the above plea founders. Contrarily,

the power of eminent domain, as exercised for bringing the subject matter

land(s) to acquisition is to be construed to be lawfully exercised,

specifically when compensation has to be determined under the relevant

award vis-a-vis the landlooser(s) concerned.

42. Nonetheless, even if assumingly, for the sake of arguments, a

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legitimate expectation, does arise in favour of the petitioner(s), it may

give rise to another issue, i.e.:-

"Whether such legitimate expectation can curtail the

right of sovereign to exercise its power of eminent domain,

which has the strength of a Central legislation, i.e. the Act

of 1894?"

43. The power of eminent domain endows an inherent power in

the sovereign to take private property, for the same being used for public

purpose, after paying adequate compensation, to the landlooser(s)

concerned. The definition assigned to the term "eminent domain" in

Black's Law Dictionary is extracted hereinafter:-

"The inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking."

44. Also, Law Lexicon Dictionary assigns the following

definition to the term "eminent domain":-

"The inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, especially land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking. The right of the State or the sovereign to its or his own property is absolute while that of the subject or citizen to his property is only paramount. The citizen holds his property subject always to the right of the sovereign to take it for a public purpose. This right is called "eminent domain". See Lewis on Eminent Domain; Mills on Eminent Domain; Randolph on Eminent Domain). It is the right of the state or of those to whom the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property for public use and to appropriate the ownership and possession of such property for such use, upon paying the owner a due compensation to be ascertained according to law."

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45. In view of the hereinabove extracted definitions, as assigned

to term "eminent domain", let us examine whether the respondent-State

has exercised its power of eminent domain with reasonableness and

without any arbitrariness, for its achieving the requisite public purpose.

46. As noted hereinabove, in the factual matrix section of this

verdict, the respondent-State, while taking into consideration the

maintenance of ecological and environmental balance around Sukhna

Lake, had given a specific undertaking before this Court, in the initial

round of litigation, i.e. CWP-7649-2003, that it is imperative to acquire

the potential area in the periphery of M.D.C., for making planned low

density Urban Development, and, in pursuance thereof also, the

proposed development plan was also put forward. Moreover, the

respondent-State had also undertaken that a larger area will be developed

as green and recreational area, as per the provisions of development plan.

47. Taking into account the undertaking, as given by the

respondent-State, this Court had dismissed the CWP-7649-2003 through

an order on 11.09.2003, which was unsuccessfully assailed by the

aggrieved petitioner(s) therein, upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Therefore, insofar as the issue(s) relating to preservation of Sukhna Lake,

maintenance of reserved and protected forest restriction, under the Works

of Defence Act by the Ministry of Defence, around Chandimandir

Military Station etc., was given well consideration by Courts of law and

the act of respondent-State was upheld upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

48. In order to make compliance of the undertaking (supra), the

respondent-State prepared a development plan for M.D.C. and thereupon

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acquired land(s), through various acquisition notification(s), for planned

development of Sector 1, 2, 3, 5B, 5C and 6, M.D.C., Panchkula. In

Sector 1, Gymkhana Club Building, a Power House, Rajiv Gandhi Park

(partly) and Paradise Park have been constructed and a waterworks site is

under constructions. The record further transpires that, keeping in view

the need to protect water shed area of Sukhna Lake, land use of

Sector 1 has been changed from "area reserved for I.T. use" to "open

space zone". Moreover, besides parks being developed in the area, which

is in possession of H.S.V.P., the rest of the area of Sector 1, possession

whereof is not available with H.S.V.P., is also planned to be developed as

"open space zone" upon assumption of its possession.

49. The impact of the above discussion is that the petitioner(s)

cannot be permitted to raise the plea of promissory estoppel, or, legitimate

expectation.

50. Now, insofar as the land(s) of the petitioner(s) is concerned,

the record elucidates, that most of his land(s) falls in the layout plan of

Sector 2, whereins, total 1435 plots have been carved out and out of these

plots, 131 plots have already been allotted. The remaining plots could not

be allotted owing to pendency of present litigation. Therefore, the layout

plan makes it apparent that in order to develop M.D.C. in a planned and

integrated manner, the petition land(s) has been acquired, through the

impugned acquisition proceedings and making any release of petition

land(s) would adversely hamper the planned and integrated development

of M.D.C. Moreover, it has also come on record that, out of the awarded

and tendered compensation amount of ₹61,57,90,176.78/-, in respect of

village Saketri, an amount of ₹51,67,18,897/- has already been

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paid/disbursed to the landowners concerned, which implies that, 83.91%

of compensation amount has already been paid, whereas, only 16.09% is

not accepted by the landowners concerned. Moreover, the High Powered

Committee had also, while passing the order dated 21.10.2014, as

impugned herein, examined the layout plan and the impact, in case

petition land(s) is released. The relevant observations of the High

Powered Committee are extracted hereunder:-

"14. The Committee also perused the layout plan and details submitted by District Town Planner, Panchkula showing the impact of the land requested for release on the layout plan. After going through the facts and circumstances, in all the cases, the Committee made following observations:-

(i) It was noted that the HUDA has already allotted plots in

(ii) residential sector-2 Mansa Devi Complex. In some cases, HUDA is not able to offer the possession because of lack of linkages. The area under the writ petitions affects the sector roads, internal roads planned in and around Sector-2 MDC and some of the essential infrastructure facilities. Therefore, it is necessary to take possession of the land to enable provision of essential infrastructure facilities to the allottees. The Committee further noted that in some cases, the lands applied for grant of license of residential plotted colony are

(iii) located either in recreational zone/open space zone, designated commercial zone, area reserved for IT. Such lands since are not within the residential sector, therefore, are not in conformity with the zoning regulations for grant of licence for a plotted residential colony. Similarly in case of IT Park application also, major part of applied area falls in non conforming use. It was noted that conformity with Development Plan proposals is an important parameter to be considered by Director while deciding the licence application as required under rule 8 of the Rules 1976 read with section 3(2) of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. The open spaces designated

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in the Development Plan are necessarily required to be acquired and developed by HUDA because these are part of external infrastructure in lieu of the EDC collected from the plot holders of HUDA as well as from the private colonizers. Moreover, these designated open space zones cannot be allowed for development for residential colonies as it will deprive the residents of Panchkula/MDC of their rights to have the parks and open spaces for their well being and leisure/recreation. HUDA has already made efforts in this regard by developing 'Walkers Paradise' out of the available litigation free area and the complete zone needs to be developed. It was also observed that HUDA is duty bound to develop these areas for parks and open spaces as per commitments given in the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No. 9566 of 2005 and in the Hon'ble High Court in CWP No. 18253 of 2009. Therefore, it was observed that such lands cannot be considered for grant of licence. After perusal of the record of DGTCP regarding application for grant of license for IT Park of 15.256 acres, it was noted that the entire area applied for IT Park under file No. LC-2526 is also subject matter of application for plotted colony in LC-1063, therefore, the Schedule of either of application needs to be corrected."

51. The hereinabove recorded facets of planned development of

M.D.C. makes it evident that the respondent-State has exercised its power

of eminent domain with all reasonableness and without any arbitrariness,

purely with an intent to achieve the requisite public purpose

(emphasis supplied).

52. Reiteratedly, the most predominant public purpose, as sought

to be accomplished through bringing the petition land(s) to acquisition,

was/is to plan a low density urban development, keeping in view the

fact that the acquired land falls around the Capital periphery, near Sukhna

Lake. Therefore, the alleged legitimate expectation of a private individual

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cannot curtail the right of sovereign to exercise its power of eminent

domain to achieve the requisite public purpose. A private individualistic

interest has to surrender and give way to a public cause, which enjoys

predominance thereovers.

53. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment rendered in

"Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. V/s Commercial Tax Officer and others",

2005(1) SCC 625, has held that though it is now firmly established that

the Government can change its policy at any time, in public interest,

which must override private interest, however, withdrawal of

representation or promise, which induced a person to change his position

to his disadvantage, must not be arbitrary and unreasonable and must

satisfy the requirement of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. It has

also been held that in order to determine the reasonableness of the change

of a policy, the Court will see:-

(i) whether there is any unfairness involved;

(ii) the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed;

(iii) the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed;

(iv) the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,

(v) the disproportion of the imposition,

(vi) the prevailing condition at the relevant time enter into judicial verdict.

In this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held

that the reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined

with respect to the circumstances. The relevant paragraphs of the

judgment are reproduced hereinafter:-

"16. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national

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priorities and adopt trade policies. As noted above, the ultimate test is whether on the touchstone of reasonableness the policy decision comes out unscathed.

17. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved the nature of the right alleged to have taken infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the relevant time enter into judicial verdict, the reasonableness of the legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalisation of a particular business in favour of even a specified individual is reasonable where the interests of the country are concerned or where the business affects the economy of the country.

XX XX XX

19. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the Court.

20. In Shrijee Sales Corporation and Anr. v. Union of India, 1897 (3) SCC 398) it was observed that once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity the

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principle would be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated for operation of the promise. If there is a supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change its stand and has the power to withdraw from representation made by it which induced persons to take certain steps which may have gone adverse to the interest of such persons on account of such withdrawal. Moreover, the Government is competent to rescind from the promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. Similar view was expressed in Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd. Meerut etc. v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others (AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3810) and in Sales Tax Officer and Anr. v. Shree Durga Oil Mills and Anr., 1998 (1) SCC 573), it was further held that the Government could change its industrial policy if the situation so warranted and merely because the resolution was announced for a particular period, it did not mean that the government could not amend and change the policy under any circumstances. If the party claiming application of the doctrine acted on the basis of a notification it should have known that such notification was liable to be amended or rescinded at any point of time, if the government felt that it was necessary to do so in public interest."

54. From the hereinabove extracted paragraphs, it becomes

amply clear that even the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is

a supervening public equity, the Government would be allowed to change

its stand and has the power to withdraw from any representation as made

by it.

55. A Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its

judgment drawn upon Writ Petition Nos.151, 152, 153, 176 to 182, 186 to

189 and 198 of 1971 and Civil Appeal Nos.1398, 1416 and 1417 of 1972,

Decided on: 18.09.1973, titled as "State of Kerala and another V/s The

Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc.", has held that any

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agreement between a private individual and the government does not

create estoppel upon the latter to exercise its executive power. The

relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) reads as under:-

"23. Mr. Menon who appeared for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1398/72 put forward a plea of equitable estoppel peculiar to his client company. It appears that the Company established itself in Kerala for the production of rayon cloth pulp on an understanding that the Government would bind itself to supply the raw material. Later Government was unable to supply the material and by an agreement undertook not to legislate for the acquisition of private forests for a period of 60 years if the Company purchased forest lands for the purpose of its supply of raw-materials. Accordingly, the Company purchased 30,000 acres of private forests from the Nilambhuri Govila Kannan estate for Rs. 75/- lakhs and, therefore, it was argued that, so far as the company is concerned, the agreement not to legislate should operate as equitable estoppel against the States. We do not see how an agreement of the Government can preclude legislation on the subject. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the surrender by the Government of its legislative powers to be used for pubic good cannot avail the company or operate against the Government as equitable estoppel."

56. In the present case, there is no conflict that the petitioner(s)

has not been granted any NOC/CLU/Licence by the respondent-State or

its instrumentality, which may debar the respondent-State to exercise its

power of eminent domain. Even otherwise also, a Division Bench of this

Court, in its judgment rendered in case of Laxmi Educational Society

(Supra), has categorically held that grant of NOC/CLU/Licence/any other

permission would not grant any immunity to the land, for all times to

come, from its acquisition being made by the State, especially when it is

required for a public purpose, as the private interest will have to make

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way for the public interest.

57. Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also, in case of

State of Haryana V/s Vinod Oil and General Mills (Supra), held that

even the grant of CLU/Licence will not operate as an estoppel for the

State to acquire the land for the public purpose. The relevant paragraph of

the judgment (supra) is extracted hereinafter:-

"8. Permission for change of land use and developing the area as an industry, in our view, has no relevance while considering the validity of acquisition. If we are to hold that once permission is granted for change of land use for developing the area as an industry and thereafter State cannot acquire it, then a situation may arise that for all time to come, the particular area cannot be acquired which may not be in the larger public interest. We are also unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the action of the respondents/State in approving setting up of a factory and then acquiring the same is unreasonable. It is not as if the lands where factories are set up are immune from any acquisition. The only effect of permission for such change in land use and approval for construction and developing the area as an industry can be recognized as valid only to the extent as to confer right upon the land owners to recover the appropriate compensation.

9. The land was acquired for development and utilization of the same for residential and commercial purposes in Sector 9 & 11, Hissar. So far as the purpose of acquisition of land is concerned, the High Court observed that "the acquisition is not for essential public services such as development of infrastructure, railways, metro or the purpose related thereto, irrigation, water supply, drainage, road, communication etc.....". High Court was not correct in observing that only development of infrastructure, railways or irrigation, water supply, drainage, road etc. are primary public purposes. Public purpose includes a purpose involving general interest of community as opposed to the interest of an individual directly or indirectly involved. Individual interest

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must give way to public interest as far as public purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned."

58. In view of the hereinabove extracted legal propositions, as

also the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, it can be

easily concluded that the power of eminent domain exercised by the

respondent-State, to achieve larger public interest, enjoys precedence

over legitimate expectation, as allegedly created in favour of a private

individual.

59. In case titled "State of Bihar and Ors. V/s Project Uchcha

Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors.", (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 545,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the rule of estoppel

has no application where contention relates to recourse being made to

unchallenged constitutional provisions or unchallenged statute. The

relevant paragraph of case (supra) is reproduced hereinafter:-

"77. We do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the principle of equitable estoppel would apply against the State of Bihar. It is now well known, the rule of estoppel has no application where contention as regards a constitutional provision or a statute is raised. The right of the State to raise a question as regards its actions being invalid under the constitutional scheme of India is now well recognized. If by reason of a constitutional provision, its action cannot be supported or the State intends to withdraw or modify a policy decision, no exception thereto can be taken. It is, however, one thing to say that such an action is required to be judged having regard to the fundamental rights of a citizen but it is another thing to say that by applying the rule of estoppel, the State would not be permitted to raise the said question at all. So far as the impugned circular dated 18.02.1989 is concerned, the State has, in our

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opinion, a right to support the validity thereof in terms of the constitutional framework."

60. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the

petitioner(s) upon Navjyoti Co-op. Group Housing Society (Supra), to

substantiate his argument(s), is concerned, the same appears to be a

misplaced reliance, as this judgment in fact supports the view adopted by

this Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Navjyoti's case (Supra), has

held that the petitioner(s)-Housing Society was entitled to 'legitimate

expectation' of following consistent past practice in the matter of

allotment. It has been further held that the doctrine of 'legitimate

expectation' imposes a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into

consideration all relevant factors relating to such 'legitimate expectation',

and, finding no compelling reasons to change its procedures, finally took

the decision to invoke the 'legitimate expectation' against the State. The

relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) reads as under:-

"16. It may be indicated here that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' imposes in essence a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to such 'legitimate expectation'. Within the conspectus of fair dealing in case of 'legitimate expectation', the reasonable opportunities to make representation by the parties likely to be affected by any change of consistent past policy, come in. We, have not been shown any compelling reasons taken into consideration by the Central Government to make a departure from the existing policy of allotment with reference to seniority in Registration by introducing a new guideline. On the contrary, Mr. Jaitley the learned Counsel has submitted that the DDA and/or Central Government do not intend to challenge the decision of the High Court and the impugned memorandum of January 20, 1990 has since been withdrawn. We therefore feel that in the facts of the case it was only desirable that before introducing or

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implementing any change in the guideline for allotment, an opportunity to make representations against the proposed change in the guideline should have been given to the registered Group Housing Societies, if necessary, by way of a public notice."

61. However, the ratio of law laid down in judgment (supra) is

not going in favour of the petitioner(s), as reiteratedly, neither the

'legitimate expectation' arises in favour of the petitioner(s), nor the act of

the respondent-State, as comprised in its exercising the power of eminent

domain is arbitrary or non-reasonable, rather it is aimed at accomplishing

the requisite public purpose.

62. The further reliance placed by the learned counsel for the

petitioner(s), upon the case of Food Corporation of India (Supra), is also

a misconceived reliance, as therein also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

held that legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due

consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation

of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the relevant context, is a

question of fact in each case and this question has to be determined not

according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest. The

relevant paragraph of the judgment (supra) is extracted hereinafter:-

"8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according

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to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent."

63. Consequently, the gist of the hereinabove made discussion,

results in this Court penning down a negative response to the second

issue also, as framed hereinabove.

64. Now, insofar as the other argument(s), as raised by the

learned counsel for the petitioner(s) is concerned, which pertains to

petitioner(s) being entitled for release of land, as an application was made

by them for grant of licence, which however became wrongly rejected,

despite theirs being well entitled for grant of licence.

65. The above made argument is vehemently opposed by the

learned State counsel on the ground that the relevant and applicable policy

for release of land is not the policy of 26.10.2007, but is the policy of

24.01.2011, whereunder, only such cases may be considered, wherein,

landowner(s) concerned has filed an application under Section 3 of the

Act of 1975 prior to the issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the

Act of 1894, subject to the condition that the land shall be owned by the

applicant before notification under Section 4.

66. The learned State counsel further submits that since the

declaration under Section 6 was issued on 15.03.2000, whereas, the

application for grant of licence was made subsequent thereto, thus on

04.08.2006, therefore, the petitioner is not covered within the parameters

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of the relevant policy.

67. Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to adjudicate

whether the petitioner(s) is covered under policy 'A' or policy 'B'. Since

as already held hereinabove, even in case the petitioner(s) succeeds in

their attempt to get a licence to develop colony upon petition land(s), yet

grant of such licence cannot curtail the right of sovereign to exercise the

power of eminent domain, as the superior thereto. The predominant public

purpose, as sought to be accomplished, through bringing the petition

land(s) to acquisition, was/is to plan a low density urban development,

qua which an undertaking has also been given before this Court by the

respondent-State, moreover, when the said undertaking has also been

accepted by this Court and upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

earlier round of litigation.

68. Moreover, since it is also informed to this Court by the

learned counsel for the respondent(s) that no land, as brought to

acquisition through the impugned acquisition proceedings, has been

released, on account of grant of licence. Therefore, the petitioner(s)

cannot even plead any perpetration of discrimination vis-a-vis them. The

petition land(s) is an inevitable and insegregable component of the layout

plan and this aspect has been considered even by the High Powered

Committee, as is evident from the order dated 21.10.2014. Therefore too,

consequently, this Court does not deem it fit and appropriate to, merely

for the benefit of the petitioner(s), make any untenable tinkerings with the

layout plan, which is meant to subserve a public purpose.

69. The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has placed reliance

upon an order made by this Court on 15.07.2008, upon CWP-12510-2000,

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titled as "Abhishek Gupta V/s The State of Haryana and another", to

contend that the same notification has already been quashed qua the

petitioner(s) therein, on the ground of discrimination, therefore, the

petitioner(s) herein also deserves to be treated at par, through quashing the

impugned acquisition proceedings.

70. However, the reliance (supra) does not lend any vigour to the

contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner(s), as the order dated

15.07.2008, passed in CWP (supra), has been challenged before the

Hon'ble Supreme Court and is yet subjudice. Even otherwise, the said

order was passed on the ground of discrimination, as the therein land

which was released in favour of Maharaja Harinder Singh 'Khalaf'

Maharaja Varjinder Singh, was subsequently acquired, as 4.77 acres of

land under Garden, was again notified for acquisition, through the

issuance of respective notification and declaration respectively under

Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 and ultimately, an award was passed

on 23.03.2009.

71. It would be significant to note here that a similar plea was

also raised in CWP-11945-2008, however, it was dismissed vide order

dated 09.10.2023.

72. Moreover, in case titled "Haryana Urban Development

Authority V/s Abhishek Gupta etc.", wherein, the order made by this

Court on 15.07.2008 has been challenged, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on

26.07.2003, had sought specific instructions from the learned State

counsel, as to whether the State Government is inclined to drop the

acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in dispute, provided that the

landowner(s) concerned is agreeable to give land for roads and other

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public amenities free of cost.

73. Thereafter, on 13.09.2023, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had

requisitioned an affidavit from the State Government, thus with echoings

therein in respect of the following:-

"(i) Why the State Government is agreeable to release the land of the respondents from acquisition?

(ii) Whether such release of land will affect the acquisition of adjoining lands or not?

(iii) Whether the subject-land falls within or near the Sukhna Lake catchment area?

(iv) Whether the land in dispute falls in non-construction zone?

(v) If not, what type of construction is permissible in and around the area of subject-land?"

74. Since most of the instructions, as sought by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, on 13.09.2023, are already available on record of this

Court, in the shape of an undertaking by the respondent-State,

thereby this Court has been already led to form the hereinabove

inferences.

75. Consequently, the plea of discrimination, as raised by the

learned counsel for the petitioner(s) does not warrant any attention, as

evidently there occurs no discrimination, vis-a-vis, the petitioner(s).

76. Proceeding further, the next argument of the learned counsel

for the petitioner(s) pertains to non consideration of objections, as made

by them under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894. It is argued that since the

only right available to the petitioner(s) to protest against acquisition(s) is

through its/theirs filing objections under Section 5-A, however, its non-

consideration and the straightaway making of a declaration under Section

6 has led to defeating the right of the petitioner(s), and, thereby the

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principles of natural justice have been breached.

77. However, to the considered mind of this Court, the above

made argument, does not hold any force, as is not under dispute that, the

objections filed by the petitioner(s) were duly considered by the Land

Acquisition Collector concerned on 02.02.2000 and on 04.02.2000, and

thereupon only, the petition land(s) was recommended for acquisition,

given theirs being then vacant. It was only after acceptance of such

recommendations by the Government that, a declaration under Section 6

of the Act of 1894 thus was issued.

78. Moreover, in the earlier round of litigation, i.e. CWP-12848-

2000, titled as "Jasbir Singh Siali Vs. The State of Haryana and

others", this Court, besides directing the petitioner(s) therein to file their

representation(s) and objection(s), had also directed the State/High

Powered Committee concerned to decide the claim of the petitioner(s)

therein. Compliance to the above order was made by the High Powered

Committee, as constituted by State Government, which considered each

and every plea/issue raised by the petitioners and thereupon, passed a

detailed order dated 21.10.2014, thereby rejecting the claim of the

petitioner(s) for releasing the land.

79. However, since this Court has also considered all the

arguments, as raised by the petitioners before the High Powered

Committee, besides when the said argument(s) relating to the validity of

the said rejection order has not been assigned adequate weightage,

therefore, the impugned rejection order, as made by the High Powered

Committee, is affirmed and upheld.

LAPSING OF ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS

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80. The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has claimed that the

impugned acquisition proceedings be declared to become lapsed, as no

award has been passed within the statutory period, as prescribed under

Section 11 of the Act of 1894. It has been further argued that since there

was status quo operating only qua possession, therefore, there was no

restraint upon the acquiring authority concerned to pass an award pursuant

to issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, and that too,

within the period prescribed for the making of an award.

81. Before adjudicating the above made argument, it would be

relevant to, at this juncture, make a survey of the provisions, as enclosed

in Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, which is extracted hereinafter:-

[11A. Period shall be which an award within made.- The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation- In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.]

82. A bare glance at the explanation, as attached to the

hereinabove extracted Section, makes it graphically clear that for the

purpose of computing two years, such period shall be excluded, during

which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of declaration, is

stayed by order of Court.

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83. As elaborated hereinabove, the declaration under Section 6

was issued on 15.03.2000. In CWP-6357-2000, which was a part of a set

of several writ petitions, this Court had passed an interim order on

22.5.2000 to maintain status-quo. The writ petition (supra) was finally

disposed of, vide a common order dated 12.8.2011, as passed in lead

petition of said bunch, i.e. CWP-12848-2000, titled as "Jasbir Singh Siali

Vs. The State of Haryana and others", whereby, a direction was issued

upon the State/High Powered Committee concerned, to decide the claim

of the petitioner(s) therein, besides a direction was also made to maintain

status quo regarding possession of land, till communication of said

decision to the High Powered Committee and 15 days thereafter.

84. Accordingly, the High Powered Committee, as constituted,

considered the representation(s) of all concerned and passed a detailed

order on 21.10.2014, thereby declining the relief(s), as asked by the

concerned. Since the declining order caused pain to the landowner(s)

concerned, they approached this Court through filing the writ petition at

hand, i.e. CWP-23330-2014, whereupon, on 14.11.2014, again a direction

was made to the parties concerned to maintain status quo.

85. Therefore, the status quo order against dispossession, and, the

directions made to the High Powered Committee to consider the

representation(s) of the landlooser(s) concerned, and, the said phase

within which the representation(s) were subjudice before the authority

concerned, well restrain the acquiring authority concerned to, within the

limitation period prescribed in Section 11 of the Act of 1894, make an

award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. Consequently, the above

phase, whereby, the respondent(s) was precluded to draw an award, did

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naturally fall within the domain of the explanation, as attached to Section

11-A of the Act of 1894, for computing the statutory period of two years

for passing an award. Since immediately post the making of rejection

order by the High Powered Committee, the instant petition(s) was filed

and thereon, on 14.11.2014, yet again the parties were directed to

maintain status quo with respect to the petition land(s). Therefore, when

the validity of the rejection order was under consideration, thereby too,

even during the said phase, the respondent(s) concerned could be well

construed to be ably deterred to make an award within the period of

limitation, as prescribed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894.

86. In "Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad

V/s Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors.", Civil Appeal No.2915 of 2022, it

has been declared that when no award under Section 11 is passed after

issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, owing to

pendency of any proceeding and/or interim stay granted, landowners shall

not be entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013.

Consequently, the pendency of the instant writ petition(s) before this

Court, against the rejection order made by the High Powered Committee,

did during that era, well preclude the authority concerned to make an

award. Therefore, an interim stay, even if it was a stay against

dispossession, makes the said fact to be construed to be a well made

deterrence upon the acquiring authority against its passing an award under

Section 11 of the Act of 1894. In sequel, the said period is to be excluded,

in terms of the explanation attached to Section 11-A of the Act of 1894,

and, in terms of the judgment (supra), from making the relevant

computation and also there is no entitlement endowed to the petitioner(s)

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to claim compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013.

87. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment

rendered in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya's case (Supra) has also

held that the explanation to Section 11-A is couched in the widest possible

terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings

referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the

making of the award under Section 11. Therefore, the period of status

quo, as granted by this Court, created an embargo upon the acquiring

authority concerned from taking possession of the land and therefore,

such period has to be excluded while computing the statutory period of

two years for the making of an award, since the making of a declaration

under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.

88. The law laid down in judgment (supra) was reiterated and re-

affirmed by a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while

drawing a judgment in case titled as "State of Maharashtra Vs. Moti

Ratan Estate" (Supra), wherein, it has been held that:-

"7.5 On considering catena of decisions of this Court, referred to hereinabove, the following propositions of law can be culled out:

(i) when the scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even with respect to other pockets of land and in such a situation the authorities are justified in not proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and therefore the acquisition proceedings would not lapse;

(ii) interim order of stay granted in respect of one of the land owners would have a complete restraint for the authorities to proceed further;

(iii) when the stay has been granted in one matter and where the scheme was one, the authorities were justified to stay their hands;

(iv) the extended meaning of the words "stay of the action or

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proceedings under Section 11A of the Act" would mean that any interim effective order passed by the court which may come in the way of the authorities to proceed further;

(v) Explanation to Section 11A of the Act is in the widest possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings, referred to in the explanation, to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the Act and therefore the period of injunction obtained by the land holders staying the acquisition and authorities from taking possession of the land has to be excluded in computing the period of two years."

89. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as

"Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad V/s Dr. Rajesh

Kumar Pandey & Ors.", has again considered this issue and while relying

upon various propositions of law, held that in case, where on the date of

commencement of the Act of 2013, no award under Section 11 is passed

after the makings of the apposite declaration, thus owing to pendency of

any proceeding and/or interim stay granted by the court, thereby such

landlord shall not be entitled to compensation under Section 24(1) of the

Act of 2013, rather shall be entitled to compensation only under the Act of

1894. Therefore, in view of the exposition, as made therein and as relates

to pendency of any proceeding, comprising a well deterrence upon the

acquiring authority to make an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894.

Consequently, thereby too, all throughout, when status quo and status quo

qua dispossession were in force, there was a well made restraint upon the

authority concerned to pass an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894.

Resultantly, the said period has to be excluded for computing the relevant

period of limitation.

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90. In the above referred judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

has also relied upon a decision rendered by it in the case of "State of

Gujarat Vs. Essar Oil Ltd.," 2012 (3) SCC 522, wherein, it has been

observed that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust

enrichment or unjust benefit. The relevant extract of the judgment

rendered in Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority's case (supra) is

reproduced hereinafter:-

"15. In the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), even this Court applied the principle of restitution. It is observed that the principle of restitution is founded on the ideal of doing complete justice at the end of litigation, and parties have to be placed in the same position but for the litigation and interim order, if any, passed in the matter. Applying the principle of restitution, it is further observed that no party could take advantage of a litigation. It is further observed and held that the principle of restitution is a statutory recognition of the rule of justice, equity and fair play. The court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice. This is also on the principle that an unsuccessful litigant who had the benefit of an interim order in his favour cannot encash or take advantage of the same on the enforcement of the Act, 2013 by initially stalling the acquisition process and later seeking a higher compensation under the provisions of Act, 2013. We say so for the reason that if at the instance of a landowner, who has challenged the acquisition, an interim order has been passed by a Court is successful then the proceeding of acquisition or the acquisition notification would be quashed. Then there would be no occasion to determine any compensation. But on the other hand, if a landowner, who has the benefit of an interim order in his favour whilst a challenge is made to the acquisition, is unsuccessful, he cannot then contend that he must be paid compensation under the provision of the Act, 2013 on its enforcement, whereas a landowner, who did not have the benefit of any interim order is

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paid compensation determined under the provisions of the Act, 1894, which is lesser than what would be computed under the Act, 2013.

15.1 Following the decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Essar Oil Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 522, it is observed that the principle of restitution is a remedy against unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. Following the decision of this Court in the case of A. Shanmugam Vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, (2012) 6 SCC 430, it is observed that the restitutionary jurisdiction is inherent in every court, to neutralise the advantage of litigation. A person on the right side of the law should not be deprived, on account of the effects of litigation; the wrongful gain of frivolous litigation has to be eliminated if the faith of people in the judiciary has to be sustained.

XX XX XX XX

17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it is observed as under:-

(i) It is concluded and held that in a case where on the date of commencement of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, no award has been declared under Section 11 of the Act, 1894, due to the pendency of any proceedings and/or the interim stay granted by the Court, such landowners shall not be entitled to the compensation under Section 24(1) of the Act, 2013 and they shall be entitled to the compensation only under the Act, 1894.

18. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above and in view of our conclusion above, all these appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High Court are quashed and set aside. The concerned appropriate Authority(s) to declare the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 with respect to the lands in question and determine the compensation under the provisions of the Act, 1894 by taking into consideration Section 114 of the Act, 2013 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, wherever applicable and the

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original landowners shall be paid the compensation accordingly, under the provisions of the Act, 1894."

91. Moreover, in the judgment (supra), following observations

were summarized:-

"(i) The time of five years is provided to the authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter;

(ii) Only in cases of lethargy or inaction and default on the part of the authorities and for no other reason lapse of acquisition can occur;

(iii) Lapse of acquisition takes place only in case of default by the authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason or order of the court;

(iv) The additional compensation @ 12% provided under Section 69 of the Act, 2013 has been excluded from the period acquisition proceedings have been held up on account of the interim injunction order of any court;

(v) If it was not possible for the acquiring authorities, for any reason not attributable to them or the Government, to take requisite steps, the period has to be excluded;

(vi) In case the authorities are prevented by the court's order, obviously, as per the interpretation of the provisions such period has to be excluded;

(vii) The intent of the Act, 2013 is not to benefit landowners only.

The provisions of Section 24 by itself do not intend to confer benefits on litigating parties as such, while as per Section 114 of the Act, 2013 and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act the case has to be litigated as per the provisions of the Act, 1894.

(viii) It is not the intendment of the Act, 2013 that those who have assailed the acquisition process should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated under Section 24;

(ix) It is not intended by the provisions that in case, the persons, who have litigated and have obtained interim orders from the Civil Courts by filing suits or from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should have the benefits of the provisions of the Act, 2013 except to the extent specifically provided under the Act, 2013;

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(x) In cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to litigation and have obtained interim orders restraining taking of possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical reality it is not possible for the authorities or the Government to take possession or to make payment of compensation to the landowners. In several instances, such interim orders also have impeded the making of an award;

(xi) However, so far as awards are concerned, the period provided for making of awards under the Act, 2013 (sic 1894 Act) could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section 11-A, which provided that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded;

(xii) The litigation initiated by the landowners has to be decided on its own merits and the benefits of Section 24(2) should not be available to the litigants in a straitjacket manner. In case there is no interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not otherwise. Delays and dilatory tactics and sometimes wholly frivolous pleas cannot result in benefitting the landowners under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013;

(xiii) Any type of order passed by this Court would inhibit action on the part of the authorities to proceed further, when a challenge to acquisition is pending;

(xiv) Interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would cause a complete restraint on the authorities to proceed further to issue declaration;

(xv) When the authorities are disabled from performing duties due to impossibility, it would be a sufficient excuse for them to save them from rigour of provisions of Section 24. A litigant may have a good or a bad cause, be right or wrong. But he cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation created by him by way of an interim order passed in his favour by the Court at his instance. Although provision of Section 24 does not discriminate between landowners, who are litigants or non-litigants and treat them differently with respect to the same acquisition, it is

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necessary to view all of them from the stand point of the intention of the Parliament. Otherwise, anomalous results may occur and provisions may become discriminatory in itself;

(xvi) The law does not expect the performance of the impossible; (xvii) An act of the court shall prejudice no man;

(xviii) A party prevented from doing an act by certain circumstances beyond his control can do so at the first subsequent opportunity;

(xix) When there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a charge has to be excused. When performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken as a valid excuse;

(xx) The Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the act of the Court;

(xxi) No person can suffer from the act of Court and an unfair advantage of the interim order must be neutralised; (xxii) No party can be permitted to take shelter under the cover of Court's order to put the other party in a disadvantageous position;

(xxiii) If one has enjoyed under the Court's cover, that period cannot be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps under Section 24 as the State authorities would have acted and passed an award determining compensation but for the Court's order."

92. Therefore, in view of the ratio decidendi, as laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court and as elaborated hereinabove, when status quo

regarding possession was granted by this Court in favour of the

landowner(s) concerned and they have been reaping its fruits, now such

landowner(s) concerned cannot mutate their stand and use the said interim

order qua status quo of possession as a circuitous mechanism for claiming

lapsing of the impugned acquisition proceedings, on account of non

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passing of an award within the period of limitation prescribed under

Section 11 of the Act of 1894.

93. In CWP-16-2015, it is specifically averred that the land

belonging to the petitioner(s) Jarnail Singh was partitioned and was

reflected in the revenue record for the year 2011-2012, and, that there was

no status quo in respect of his share. Therefore, it is argued that in the

absence of any award being passed, in terms of Section 11 of the Act of

1894, in respect of his share of land, the impugned acquisition

proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed.

94. Reiteratedly, since the declaration under Section 6 of the Act

of 1894 was issued on 15.03.2000 and thereupon, the co-sharers of the

petitioner-Jarnail Singh had approached this Court, which led to this

Court to make an interim order regarding status quo, as detailed

hereinabove, therefore, the order of status quo is to be deemed to become

issued in respect of entire land and not in respect of any specific pocket of

land. The partition, if any occurred between the petitioner-Jarnail Singh

and his co-sharers, does not have any impact upon the status quo granted

by this Court, nor it can be said that the acquiring authority concerned, did

not thereby have any restraint to pass an award in respect of share of

petitioner-Jarnail Singh, especially when during the era (supra), orders of

status quo were in operation, in respect of remaining pocket of land,

which is still under litigation.

95. Consequently, the argument(s) as made by the learned

counsel(s) for the petitioner, thereby seeking release of petition land(s) on

the anvil of lapsing provisions, does not carry any vigour, rather is

rejected for the reasons detailed hereinabove.

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96. Insofar as the plea of lapsing of impugned acquisition

proceedings, by dint of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is concerned, the

same is halfheartedly raised in some of the writ petitions. Moreover, the

said issue is no more res integra, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

already decided this issue in its judgment rendered in "Indore

Development Authority v. Manoharlal", 2020 AIR (Supreme Court) 1496,

and, in "Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority, Faizabad V/s Dr.

Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors.", Civil Appeal No.2915 of 2022.

Therefore, this issue warrants no further adjudication.

97. As a sequel to the hereinabove made discussion, this Court

does not find any merit in all these writ petitions and the same are

accordingly dismissed.

SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.

98. I have gone through the detailed analysis, as made by Justice

Kuldeep Tiwari, of the arguments addressed before this Court, by the

learned counsel(s) for the petitioner(s) as well as by the learned counsel(s)

for the respondent(s).

99. The above detailed analysis, though does not require any

further addition thereto, being made by the undersigned. Nonetheless, the

power of eminent domain, as became exercised by the acquiring authority

concerned, was exercised with deepest circumspection and care. The

exercising of the power of eminent domain by the acquiring authority

concerned, even otherwise, is an untrammeled power. It envelopes the

power to make acquisitions of all land(s), which are but declared to be

suitable, to further or to achieve the requisite public purpose.

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100. The undersigned has evaluated the detailed reply(ies)

furnished on affidavit(s) by the replying respondent(s). A keenest perusal

thereof discloses that, with the most sombre mindfulness, given the

necessity of acquisitions being made of the subject matter land(s), that

such acquisition proceedings were launched. The acquiring authority

concerned was successful in repulsing the assault made to the launching

of the relevant acquisition proceedings, thus uptil, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court. Therefore, thereby the launching of the instant motion rather for

making an assault vis-a-vis the launching of the acquisition proceedings,

is but a last ditch attempt, to save the acquired land(s) from acquisition.

101. Moreover, the purpose of acquisition is for making planned

developments, thus in a sensitive zone adjoining the Sukhna Lake. The

said planned development, thus embodies the solemn principle, that

thereby(s) no ecological disaster becomes perpetrated upon the Sukhna

Lake, which adjoins the acquired land(s). The preemption to spurrings of

ecological disaster rather from planned development, is thus, assured

through the acquisitions being made rather for low density urban

development, vis-à-vis, the subject matter land(s). Therefore, the

instrumentality and the wing of the respondent-State, which otherwise, is

also the beneficiary of the acquisitions, as made of the subject matter

land(s), to the prudent mind of this Court, thus would ensure that the said

purpose would become achieved. Contrarily, on this Court permitting, the

collaborator to engage itself in developmental activities being made on the

subject matter land(s), thereby the above purpose of planned low density

urban development being made on the subject matter land(s), rather would

become jeopardized. The reason being that the instrumentality or the wing

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of the respondent-State would completely adhere to the principles relating

to low density urban development being made vis-a-vis the subject matter

land(s). The same shall be ensured through the height of the buildings

being restricted, besides through curtailment of the storeys of the

buildings, as become raised by the instrumentality or the wing of the

respondent-State. However, as stated (supra), the collaborator concerned

would possibly breach the solemn objective behind low density urban

development taking place over the subject matter land(s), inasmuch as, for

ensuring its reaping exorbitant profits, through alienating the properties to

buyers, rather the developer concerned making high rise structures on the

subject matter land(s). Moreover, thereby too, an endangerment would

ensue to the ecological balance to be maintained to the Sukhna Lake,

which almost adjoins the acquired land(s).

102. Predominantly also, the developer concerned, with whom the

petitioner(s)/landlord(s) have entered into a collaboration agreement, is

but, naturally fighting a proxy litigation for the petitioner(s), who after

breaching the conditional agreement (supra), have naturally, through the

proxy litigator(s) rather attempted to fructify the ill endeavour of the

collaborator concerned, to reclaim the acquired lands, but, naturally for

enabling the developer concerned to reap exorbitant profits from

alienating developed properties, to the alienees concerned. Considering

the sale price offered by the instrumentality and agency of the respondent-

State, thus for the sale of the properties erected on the acquired lands, vis-

a-vis, the exorbitant prices offered for such properties, by the developer

concerned, thereby too, the fleecings made by the developer concerned,

would thus become obviated. The said obviation would also ensure that,

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therebys rather than oligarchs purchasing the properties offered for sale by

the developer concerned, also other less economically empowered

sections of society would take to purchase the properties at prices

affordable to them, and, as become offered by the instrumentality and

agency of the respondent-State. Resultantly, thereby the problem of

housing, as faced by all sections of society would become curbed and

eased, besides therebys, the holistic object of resolving the housing

problems of all sections of society but would also become mitigated.

Contrarily, the developer concerned would only benefit oligarchs, thereby

jeopardizing and completely defeating the holistic objective of easing

housing problems of all sections of society.

103. The equitable principle of promissory estoppel and/or of

legitimate expectation, which is tried to be erected upon the conditional

agreement, thus does not warrant its application to the facts at hands. The

reason for making the above conclusion, stems from the factum that, the

said conditional agreement, never became complied with, rather at the

instance of the petitioner(s). The said conditional agreement, though was

drawn in the year 1992, but even upto the launching of the impugned

acquisition proceedings in the year 1999, through the issuance of a

notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the said agreement rather

remained never acted upon. Therefore, when there was no affirmative

action(s) taken on the conditional agreement (supra), and that too, for an

elongated phase, resultantly, thereby ensues but a candid bespeaking, thus

against the petitioner(s) qua its willfully abandoning and waving its rights,

if any, as became purportedly endowed upon it, through the conditional

agreement (supra). As a consequence, there is no permissibility in the

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petitioner(s) to raise the plea of promissory estoppel or of legitimate

expectation.

104. As stated (supra), the instant litigation(s) is a proxy litigation,

thus sponsored by the collaborator concerned. The consequence of the

above inference, is that, the petitioner(s)/landlooser(s) concerned, through

making a collaboration agreement with the D.L.F., do thereby become

completely precluded to draw any sustenance from the conditional

agreement (supra). Moreover, thereby they also become completely

precluded to make any challenge to the acquisition proceedings,

especially given the writ pleas, becoming sponsored by the collaborator

concerned, thus only for the collaborator concerned making unjust

enrichments, which otherwise would become precluded, in case the

instrumentality or agency of the State proceeds, to develop the acquired

lands, thus for the benefit of all sections of society.

105. Therefore, this Court deprecates the instant proxy

litigation(s), but sponsored by the collaborator concerned. It appears that

the collaborator concerned is attempting to spread its tentacles over lands,

in respect whereof, as of now, there is complete divestment of right, title

and interest in the landlooser(s) concerned, but naturally, at the behest of

certain hidden bigwigs spread over all organs of the government, who

may have made well bargainings for theirs purchasing the properties from

D.L.F. Naturally thereby, the collaborator concerned is but a land grabber,

thus only for promoting its selfish individualistic interest, than the interest

of the society at large, and/or, public interest which otherwise would

become subserved by this Court through its sustaining the impugned

notification(s) and the consequent thereto made award.

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106. Even otherwise, when the conditional agreement (supra) is

entwined with a holistic purpose of acquisition, thus thereby also the same

cannot stand erect, nor can it acquire any lawful tenacity, nor it can

thereby restrict the power of eminent domain, as endowed in the acquiring

authority concerned, through recourse being made to a central legislation

nomenclatured as the Act of 1894, especially when thereins there is no

mandate that, even on such conditional agreement becoming drawn,

thereby the power of eminent drawn, becomes restricted or becomes

curtailed. Predominantly also, when there is no challenge to the vires of

the central legislation (supra), whereunders becomes endowed an

unrestricted power of eminent domain in the acquiring authority, and that

too, for promoting public interest. Since public interest, for reason(s)

(supra), would become subserved by this Court, through its, sustaining the

challenged acquisition proceedings, thereby too, the power of eminent

domain is to be construed to be well exercised.

107. Moreover, with the judgment rendered by a Division Bench

of this Court in the case of Laxmi Educational Society (Supra), besides

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of

Haryana V/s Vinod Oil and General Mills (Supra), thus making

expostulations, that the grant of CLU/licence will not operate, as an

estoppel for the State to acquire land for any public purpose. If so, on co-

equal analogy, the conditional agreement (supra), thus reinforcingly does

not endow, any legitimate expectation, in the landlooser(s) concerned,

especially when for reason(s) (supra), at this stage, the landlooser(s)

concerned become precluded to raise the above grounds.

108. In other words, for want of any specific statutory provision,

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in the central legislation (supra), which otherwise enjoys the completest

dominion in respect of exercisings of power of eminent domain,

especially relating to such power becoming restricted, upon, drawing of

any agreement, thereby the said power of eminent domain, has the widest

expanse and/or underwhelms, the impact of any agreement drawn inter se

the petitioner(s) and any agency of the government. Predominantly also,

when the said agreement was only a conditional agreement and which

otherwise is succeeded by an ill drawn collaboration agreement, thus with

a real estate developer, thus for ill serving only the ill profiteering

interests of the collaborator concerned.

109. Importantly and reiteratedly, the drawing of the collaboration

agreement (supra) by the landlooser(s) concerned thus with the

collaborator nomenclatured as D.L.F., but post the launching of

acquisition proceedings, rather conspicuously post the making of a

declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, is a vivid exemplification

of thereby, despite then complete vestment of right, title and interest

becoming endowed in the acquiring authority, yet in the garb of the said

collaboration agreement, proxy claim(s) for release(s) or exemption(s)

from acquisition being made of the acquired land(s).

110. The further effect thereof, is that, reiteratedly thereby the plea

of promissory estoppel and/or legitimate expectation becomes completely

underwhelmed, thus barring the petitioner(s) to claim any lawful right for

release(s) of the acquired land(s) being made in its/their favour.

111. The expostulation of law, as made in the judgment rendered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Faizabad-Ayodhya Development

Authority, Faizabad V/s Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey & Ors." (supra), is but

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candid that, in case, there is any subjudice proceedings in court(s) of law,

whereins, any order against dispossession is made, thereby such

pendency(ies) will deter the acquiring authority, to thus make an award

within the period of limitation, as stipulated in Section 11 of the Act of

1894. Moreover, therebys the said phase relating to the pendency of

proceedings, and/or, the phase whereins, there is any stay against

dispossession, thus also attracting thereto(s), the mandate of the explanation

attached to Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, rather for thereby computing

the period of limitation, for the making of an award, in consequence to the

respective issuances of a notification and a declaration, respectively under

Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894. Since the relevant pendency(ies), as

discussed in the judgment made by Justice Kuldeep Tiwari, did cause a well

deterrence upon the acquiring authority concerned, besides when the said

deterrence eased on 07.02.2003, resulting in the relevant award(s) being

passed on 09.10.2003. Consequently, since from 07.02.2003 upto

09.10.2003, the period of limitation of two years to be computed from

07.02.2003 rather did not terminate. In sequel, the making of the impugned

award on 09.10.2003, is deemed to be made in terms of the explanation to

Section 11-A of the Act of 1894, besides the petitioners are not well entitled

to claim that the award was rather to be drawn in terms of the Act of 2013.

FINAL ORDER

112. In aftermath, this Court does not find any merit in all these writ

petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/-

to be borne in each of the writ petition by the proxy litigator, i.e. D.L.F. Ltd.

The costs (supra), as encumbered upon the proxy litigator, namely, D.L.F.

Ltd., is to curb the ill exercise, as embarked by it, thus for its achieving the

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ill purpose of land grabbing. The costs (supra) shall be deposited in favour

of the High Court Legal Services Committee. The order dated 21.10.2014

passed by the High Powered Committee, and, the impugned notification and

declaration are affirmed and maintained. Furthermore, the acquiring

authority is directed to forthwith pass an award in terms of Section 11 of the

Act of 1894.

113. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.

(SURESHWAR THAKUR) (KULDEEP TIWARI) JUDGE JUDGE

16.12.2023 devinder

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Whether reportable: Yes/No

Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:163481

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