Jameela vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2025 INSC 1121 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.3641-3642 OF 2025

JAMEELA & ORS. … APPELLANTS

VS.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Sheikh Akhtar1 (since deceased) was convicted by the Sessions Court

in S.T. No.378/2005 for commission of offence punishable under

sections 305 and 506-B, Indian Penal Code 18602 and sentenced to

rigorous imprisonment for ten years and two years, respectively, with

fine together with default stipulations vide judgment and order dated

28th March, 2007.

2. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence was carried in

appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench, at

Jabalpur3 under section 374(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 19734 by

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by rashmi dhyani pant Date: 2025.09.16

Reason: 1 Akhtar 18:07:18 IST

2 IPC 3 High Court 4 Cr.PC 1 Akhtar in 2007 itself. During the pendency of the appeal, Akhtar

passed away on 23rd April, 2015.

3. Prior to conviction, Akhtar was a public servant. He was the ‘Naib

Nazir’ in the local court. He suffered an order of termination of service

soon after the aforesaid conviction. In the normal course, the appeal

preferred by Akhtar should abate in view of section 394, Cr.PC.

However, the widow of Akhtar (Jameela) and their children (Amreen

Khan, Naaz Khan, Aftab, and Shreen Khan) continued the appeal with

the fervent hope that should the conviction and sentence be set aside,

they would be entitled to the terminal benefits which had accrued to

Akhtar by reason of his rendering more than 30 years of service.

4. Upon hearing the parties, the High Court vide its judgment and order

dated 25th April, 2024 held that Akhtar cannot be held guilty for

commission of offence under section 305 IPC; however, by reason of

his acts of threatening the victim (a minor girl), Akhtar was guilty of

the offence under section 195-A IPC. Accordingly, while setting aside

the conviction under section 305 IPC, the High Court convicted Akhtar,

in the alternative, under section 195-A IPC as well as section 506-B

thereof and maintained the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court.

The appeal was, accordingly, disposed of.

5. An application5 for modification of the judgment and order dated 25th

April, 2024 did not meet success. It was dismissed by an order dated

2nd August, 2024.

5 I.A. No.12367 of 2024 2

6. Aggrieved by the outcome of the appeal and the application before

the High Court, the widow and children of Akhtar appealed to this

Court whereupon leave was granted by us on 19th August, 2025.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent-

State at some length.

8. The offence alleged in the First Information Report 6 lodged by the

victim’s mother (PW-4) is that the victim had been molested by co-

convict Munna; that, Akhtar along with Munna, Bhadde and Mamu

Gudda had been threatening the victim with dire consequences if she

deposed in court against Munna; that, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and

Mamu Gudda had threatened to kill the victim and her father, unless

they compromised the matter; and that, the victim could not bear and

withstand such threat for which she took the extreme step of putting

an end to her life to save her father by setting herself ablaze on 19th

February, 1999. The victim, unfortunately, passed away on 23rd

February, 1999. While in hospital, the victim’s dying declaration was

recorded by the local Deputy Tehsildar (PW-2). The dying declaration

is, however, not on record.

9. From the version of PW-2, we find that the victim was threatened

between 10-11 am of 19th February, 1999, while she was on the way

to the court by Akhtar and the co-convicts.

10. According to PW-4, who was accompanying the victim while on the

way to the court, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda

6 FIR

3 threatened them around 11 am. This matches with the version of the

victim as spoken by her to PW-2 and supposedly recorded in the dying

declaration. However, PW-4 went a step further. She deposed that

while she had been away from the court to call a witness (Khima bai)

leaving the victim alone in the court and ultimately brought Khima bai

– in the interregnum, Akhtar and the co-convicts had again

threatened the victim. This was heard by PW-4 from the victim later,

after she set herself ablaze.

11. It was further in the evidence of PW-4 that since the court had

adjourned proceedings, she had returned home with the victim and

had left to go to a shop after a while. PW-4 was informed by one Bhuri

bai that the victim had suffered burn injury. Having heard it, PW-4

immediately returned home and saw the victim lying on the ground

with burns. At that point, the disclosure as aforesaid of the victim

having been threatened a second time by Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and

Mamu Gudda was made to PW-4 by the victim. The victim was

threatened to change her statement or else she and her father would

be killed. Since the victim did not want her father to die, she had set

herself on fire.

12. This second incident of threat spoken to by PW-4, however, does not

appear in the FIR.

13. PW-3, the victim’s elder sister, had also deposed at the trial. When

the victim had set herself ablaze and attempt was being made to

douse the fire, she had told PW-3 that while going to appear in the

4 court and while returning, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda

stopped her and threatened her that compromise must be made

otherwise they would kill her and her father; and it is due to this threat

that the victim set herself on fire to end her life and, thereby, save

her father.

14. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued before us that there is

gross inconsistency in the version of PW-4, as recorded in the FIR, the

victim’s dying declaration recorded by PW-2 and the depositions of

PWs 3 and 4 as regards the number of times the victim was

threatened on 19th February, 1999.

15. True it is, PW-4 did not refer to the second act of threatening in the

FIR. However, the omission is not considered too material. PW-4, we

can presume, must have been under severe emotional stress when

information of the offence was given to the police. That apart, it is not

the requirement of law that an FIR while disclosing a cognizable

offence must also reveal all facts preceding and following the incident

of offence with precision. Having considered the contentions and

looking at the materials on record, we do not see reason to hold that

the inconsistency, as pointed out, is such that the same would lead us

to discredit the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 that Akhtar, along with the

co-convicts, had not threatened the victim.

16. Next, it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that although the

victim, PW-3 and PW-4 had spoken about Akhtar and the other co-

convicts having threatened the victim, the versions of the other

5 prosecution witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) is that the victim had taken

the names of Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda but not Akhtar as

those who had also threatened her.

17. Having read the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 as well as considering what

was recorded by PW-2 as the dying declaration of the victim, we have

no hesitation to overrule this contention. Merely because PWs 5, 6

and 7 had not taken the name of Akhtar while referring to what they

heard the victim say about the identity of those who had threatened

her would in no way render the version of the victim, as recorded by

PW-2, unreliable. In fact, narration of the version of the victim in the

dying declaration by PW-2 finds support from the evidence of PWs 3

and 4.

18. Next, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the High

Court grossly erred in convicting Akhtar under section 195-A IPC. The

incident which resulted in unfortunate death of the victim, as noticed

earlier, occurred on 19th February, 1999. Section 195-A IPC was

inserted by Act No.2 of 2006 with effect from 16th April, 2006. As on

date of the offence, section 195-A IPC was not on the statute book.

The High Court, therefore, fell in error in not noticing the date of

offence and the date of insertion of section 195-A in the IPC and

proceeded to hold Akhtar guilty under that section in clear breach of

clause (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India.

19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, while not

making any attempt to justify the High Court’s conviction of Akhtar

6 under section 195-A IPC, pointed out to us that Akhtar was held guilty

of the offence under section 506-B IPC and the finding of the trial

court, since affirmed by the High Court in this regard, does not suffer

from any infirmity.

20. We are in agreement with learned counsel for the appellants that the

High Court could not have found Akhtar guilty of Section 195-A IPC.

However, what cannot be ignored is that Akhtar was also found guilty

of an offence under section 506(B) IPC.

21. We have found from the memo of appeal filed before the High Court

that the convictions recorded both under sections 305 and 506-B IPC

were under challenge in the appeal. In the entirety of the appellate

judgment and order, impugned before us, we do not find any

discussion made by the High Court in respect of the conviction

recorded against Akhtar under section 506-B IPC. We are inclined to

the view that since the High Court had embarked on a process of

reasoning to convict Akhtar under section 195-A IPC, it did not

consider it necessary to make any further discussion regarding the

offence under section 506-B IPC. Had we upheld the conviction under

section 195-A IPC, obviously the omission of the High Court to

independently deal with the offence under section 506-B thereof with

reference to the evidence on record would not have been rendered

vulnerable. However, in the changed circumstances where we are

unable to uphold the conviction under section 195-A IPC, the omission

does assume significance and requires us to independently examine

7 whether, on the evidence on record, the offence under section 506-B

IPC stands proved.

22. Considering the evidence on record and in view of our discussions as

above relatable to the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 4, we have no

hesitation in holding that Akhtar was one of four who threatened the

victim and, therefore, his conviction under section 506-B warrants no

interference.

23. At this stage, as a last-ditch effort, learned counsel for the appellants

has invited our attention to one other aspect.

24. Referring to the evidence of a staff of the court where Akhtar was

posted (DW-4), it was sought to be highlighted that DW-4 had spoken

of Akhtar, the Naib Nazir, to be present in the court for the entire day

on 19th February, 1999. According to DW-4, Akhtar usually came to

court at about 10 am and returned at 6/6.30 pm without leaving the

court. It was also his specific version that on the fateful day, i.e., 19th

February, 1999, Akhtar had come to the court at about 10 am and

had returned at around 6/6.30 pm; also, that Akhtar and DW-4 did

not go anywhere during the duty hours on that day.

25. The evidence of DW-3, the Deputy Nazir of the concerned court, would

also reveal that he had produced the attendance register from August

1997 to April 1999 to show that on 19th February, 1999, Akhtar was

at his work place.

26. According to learned counsel for the appellants, for whatever it is

worth, the defence evidence of DWs 3 and 4 should have been

8 considered by the High Court. He sounded critical of the omission of

the High Court to spare a single sentence in regard to the defence

evidence.

27. We had the occasion to peruse the judgment of conviction of the

Sessions Court. The depositions of DWs 3 and 4 were noted in

paragraphs 34 and 35 in the judgment and the Sessions Court appears

to have assigned good reasons as to why the defence evidence did

not appeal to him to be creditworthy for discrediting the versions of

PWs 2, 3 and 4 and for returning a finding of acquittal in favour of

Akhtar. We need not advert to the reasons assigned here, having also

noted that there is not a single ground urged in the memo of appeal

filed by Akhtar in the High Court assailing the reasoning of the

Sessions Court in this regard. It is quite possible that in course of

hearing of the appeal before the High Court too, no point of objection

was raised with regard to evaluation and assessment by the Sessions

Court of the evidence of DWs 3 and 4 for which the High Court did

not consider it necessary to discuss such evidence.

28. There is, therefore, no strong reason for which the recording of

conviction of Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC in the

judgment passed by the Sessions Court can be faulted; and, by

extension, we do not see reason to interfere with the judgment and

order of the High Court affirming such conviction.

29. In our view, conviction of Akhtar under section 506-B IPC cannot be

interfered with on any valid ground, although his conviction under

9 section 195-A IPC by the High Court is unsustainable in law. Also, the

respondent-State not having carried acquittal of Akhtar for the offence

under section 305 IPC in appeal, such acquittal has attained finality.

30. Having regard to the nature of offence proved to have been committed

by Akhtar and also bearing in mind the evidence on record revealing

that a minor girl, to save her father, had to take the extreme step of

doing away with her own life, we could not have in the present

circumstances extend the provisions relating to release on probation

to Akhtar, had he been alive. Dismissal of the appeal, albeit setting

aside the conviction under section 195-A IPC but maintaining the

conviction under section 506-B thereof, is the obvious result. We order

accordingly.

31. However, unfortunately, Akhtar is no longer alive. He left behind him

the appellants as his surviving heirs. The appellants have brought the

lis to this Court only for the purpose of staking a claim to the terminal

benefits that had accrued to Akhtar for rendering three decades of

service.

32. Akhtar’s service was terminated on consideration of his conviction not

only for the offence under section 506-B IPC but also the graver

offence under section 305 thereof. Since the High Court has set aside

the conviction under section 305 IPC and the alternative conviction

under section 195-A thereof too stands set aside by us, only the

conviction against Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC

survives. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that

10 interests of justice would be best served if the respondent-State

considers the matter of termination of service of Akhtar de novo and

decides, whether for his conviction only under section 506-B IPC, the

right to terminal benefits accruing for rendering three decades of

service would stand forfeited for all times to come.

33. Accordingly, while disposing of these appeals, we request the

appropriate department in the Government of Madhya Pradesh to

effect consideration of the matter as indicated in the preceding

paragraph upon taking into account the financial status of the

appellant no.1 and her liability, if any, adopting a humanitarian

approach. Such consideration may be effected as early as possible,

but preferably within three months from date.

34. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.

……………….…………………………J. (DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………………..…………………..J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 15, 2025.

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