Jaipur Development Authority vs Mahesh Sharma & Anr

Section 36 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and

Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. The aforesaid

compensation was received by Jagirdar Mahant Ram

Narain on 29.10.1968 as interim compensation under the

Jagir Act.

4. Despite the aforesaid fact of vesting of the land on the

State Government by virtue of the provisions of Jagir Act

and despite the payment of interim compensation under

Jagir Act, an Award was passed by the Land Acquisition

Officer on 29.04.1971, determining a sum of Rs.

2,62,680/- as compensation in lieu of the acquisition of

the land. Surprisingly and rather peculiarly, the Land

Acquisition Officer apart from determining the

compensation for the land, also recommended allotment of

developed plot of land measuring 2,500 sq. yds. to be

given to the respondent. The Government of Rajasthan

taking the stand that the aforesaid issuance of

5 notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act as also

passing of the Award on 29.04.1971 was a nullity, issued

an order dated 26.09.1973 deacquiring the land under

Section 48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act stating

therein that the possession of the land in question stood

resumed on the day under the Jagir Act. On 27.11.1973,

the Land Acquisition Officer moved an application for

withdrawal of reference on the ground that the land

already stood deacquired, consequent upon which the

learned Civil Judge, Jaipur City, dismissed the reference

on 14.05.1974 as withdrawn. The respondent seems to

have been aggrieved by the aforesaid order and

accordingly preferred an application on 06.09.1974 before

the Land Acquisition Officer for payment of compensation

amount, which was rejected by the Land Acquisition

Officer holding inter alia that since the land stood resumed

under the Jagir Act there is no question of payment of

compensation.

5. The Government officials adopted the stand that the land

was Government land after its vesting with the

6 Government under the provisions of the Jagir Act. The

said position was also fortified by entry made in the Memo

of Entries (Jamabandi) of village Bhojpura Tehsil, Jaipur

District, Jaipur, wherein the entire land measuring 29

Bighas and 17 Biswas was shown with Khasra numbers

as government land and the said land stood as

Government land for the period between Samvat 2015 to

2034 which is years 1958 to 1977. The aforesaid

jamabandi entries, therefore, clearly indicate the land in

the revenue record was recorded as Government land

during the period from 1958 to 1977. But despite the said

fact, a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was

issued for acquiring the land by the State Government

followed by a Notification under Section 6 of the Act.

Further, not only did an award come to be passed on

29.04.1971 by the Land Acquisition Officer determining a

sum of Rs. 2,62,680/- as compensation in lieu of the

acquired land, but the Land Acquisition Officer also

recommended the allotment of additional land measuring

2500 sq. yds. of developed land to be given to the

respondent.

7

6. The respondent being aggrieved by the issuance of the

aforesaid Notification by the Government under Section 48

of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act preferred a writ

petition before the Rajasthan High Court praying for the

quashing and setting aside of the Notification dated

26.09.1973 with a further prayer to direct the appellant

herein to make immediate payment of an amount of Rs.

2,62,680/- awarded under the award dated 29.04.1971

and also to allot the land measuring 2500 sq. yds in

compliance of the award. The said writ petition was heard

by the learned single Judge of the High Court, who allowed

the writ petition filed by Mahant Ram Narain and pursued

by his son, the present respondent No. 1 as Ram Narain

himself expired before the judgment was pronounced. The

High Court while allowing the writ petition quashed the

Notification issued by the State Government under Section

48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act with a further

direction to the State Government to deposit the

compensation amount in the court of the Civil Judge,

8 Jaipur within three months and also to allot a plot of land

of 2500 sq. yds.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment and Order passed by

the learned Single Judge, the appellant herein preferred a

DB Civil Special Appeal before the Division Bench of the

High Court of Rajasthan contending inter alia that the

land acquisition proceedings were void ab initio as the land

had already vested in the State and therefore, no benefit

could be granted to the respondent under illegal and void

proceedings, particularly when the entire land acquisition

proceedings was a nullity. It was also contended before

the Division Bench of the High Court that the predecessor-

in-interest of the respondent had accepted the interim

compensation under the Jagir Act, which indicates that he

explicitly admitted resumption of the land, and therefore,

there was no occasion to take possession under the Land

Acquisition Act. The Division Bench of the High Court

admitted the appeal filed by the appellant herein but

ultimately dismissed the said appeal on 06.02.1996 on the

ground that the State had failed to take necessary steps.

9 On 17.04.2002, an application for recalling the order

dated 06.02.1996 was filed and the High Court dismissed

the matter holding inter alia that the application was

pending for last six years. As against the aforesaid order a

special leave to appeal petition was filed in this Court,

which was also dismissed on 11.10.2002.

8. It appears thereafter the respondent preferred a fresh

petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution on 22.07.2002 for contempt of court in view

of the alleged non-compliance of the order passed by the

High Court. On 27.11.2002, the Division Bench of the

High Court took up the aforesaid writ petition and rejected

the same.

9. The contention of the appellant before the High Court was

that the order dated 27.11.2002 was non est and a nullity.

Before the High Court it was also stated by the appellant

that not only was the initiation of the acquisition

proceedings by issuance of notifications under Sections

4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act a nullity, but even

10 the passing of the award was also a nullity. In support of

the contentions, reliance was placed on the decisions of

this Court in Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey

Shyam, reported at (1994) 4 SCC 370 and Secretary,

Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain,

reported at (1997) 1 SCC 35, as also the case of Narpat

Singh & others vs. Jaipur Development Authority &

Another reported at (2002) 4 SCC 666.

10.The Division Bench, however, by the impugned order

dated 27.11.2002, held that the Division Bench cannot

enter into a controversy so as to find out whether the

order dated 17.05.1984 is a nullity once the order dated

17.05.1984 has attained its finality upto the Supreme

Court, and therefore, a direction was issued to the

appellant herein to carry out the order. Being aggrieved by

the aforesaid order dated 27.11.2002 passed by the

Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant preferred

the present Special Leave Petition in which initially a

notice was issued and an interim order was passed staying

the operation of the impugned order. However, an order

11 came to be passed on 03.11.2003 by this Court granting

leave and also making interim order absolute till the

disposal of the appeal. It was, however, ordered by this

Court in the same order dated 03.11.2003 that the

amount awarded would be deposited before the Registrar

of the High Court within a period of four weeks and that

the same would be permitted to be withdrawn by the

respondents on furnishing security to the satisfaction of

the Registrar of the High court. Now the appeal being

ready in all respects was listed for hearing and in the light

of the aforesaid background facts we heard the learned

counsel appearing for the appellant in this appeal but

none appeared for the respondent despite the matter being

heard on several dates.

11.Mr. S.K. Bhattacharya, counsel appearing for the

appellant submitted before us that the land measuring 29

Bighas and 17 Biswas having been vested with the

Government, and with the legislation and enforcement of

the Jagir Act the said land having been resumed, and

there being a case of resumption of the entire land by the

12 Government effective from 01.08.1960, there could not

have been any notification under Section 4(1) and 6 of the

Land Acquisition Act seeking to acquire land belong to the

Government itself, and therefore, entire initiation of the

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and passing of

the award under the Land Acquisition Act was a nullity. It

was also submitted by him that the land in question

belonged to the Idol and not to Ram Narain, who was only

a Mahant being the sole priest of the temple and therefore

passing of the Award of compensation in favour of Ram

Narain, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent was

not only illegal, but also a nullity, and therefore, even on

that ground the award is non est in the eyes of law. His

further submission was that in any case the order passed

by the Land Acquisition Officer directing allotment of land

measuring 2500 sq. yds. in favour of Ram Narain was void

ab initio and that the aforesaid directions of the Land

Acquisition Officer were contrary to and unknown to the

law of the land. He also drew our attention to an

agreement dated 21.04.2001, copy of which is placed on

record, whereby the respondent no. 1 herein had entered

13 into an agreement for the development of land measuring

3 Bighas and 15 Biswas covered by Khasra No. 130 with

Messrs Ganpati Royal Estate, who is described as

partner/purchaser. In the said agreement, it was stated

by the respondent no. 1 that the aforesaid property is

entered in the revenue record and papers in the name of

father of first party Shri Ram Narayan Sharma and

consequent upon his death, the owner of the aforesaid

land, proprietor is first party and land owner. It was

further stated in the said agreement that the aforesaid

land is under acquisition proceeding initiated by the

Government of Rajasthan but no award or compensation

has yet been paid to the land owner - respondent for

which litigation is pending, and therefore, the agreement is

being executed for development of the aforesaid land

under the said agreement.

12.Our attention was also drawn by the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant to a Circular dated

13.12.1991, which was issued by the Deputy Secretary,

Admn., Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur to the Deputy

14 Director, Bikaner, Settlement Commissioner, Jaipur. The

subject of the said Circular described the Entry of the

name of Pujari along with Mandir Dev Statue for khatedari

of land. In the said Circular, it was stated that the

question has been raised time and again that when such

Mandirs which have their personal lands, whether the

name of the Pujari should be entered in the revenue

records (Jamabandi) along with the Idol (Dev Statue). In

paragraph 3 of the said Circular, it was also clarified that

the right position is that the name of the Pujari or

Shiwayat should not be mentioned in the Jamabandi.

13.In view of the aforesaid position and for the protection of

the Dev statue and in order to check the unwarranted

litigation relating to the land of the Dev statue, it was

decided that in the Jamabandi to be prepared by the

Revenue Department or by the Settlement Department in

future, the name of Pujari will not be mentioned along

with the name of the Dev statue. Another direction which

was issued was that in Jamabandis which have been

prepared and presently in force, the name of Pujari

15 wherever it occurs alongwith name of Dev statue be struck

off and be mentioned in the aforesaid register. It was also

informed under the aforesaid Circular that the aforesaid

directions shall come into force with immediate effect.

14.During the course of his arguments, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant relied upon the copy of

Jamabandi for the period between 1958 to 1977, wherein

the entire 29 Bighas and 17 Biswas of land was shown to

have been registered as Government land in the

Jamabandi.

15.The facts of the present case, which we have delineated at

length, clearly disclose that the entire land of 29 Bighas

and 17 Biswas stood in the name of the Government and

has been shown as Government land in the Jamabandi for

the period between 1958 to 1977. That entry came to be

entered into in view of the promulgation of the Jagir Act

w.e.f. 18.02.1952 and was fortified by the resumption of

the entire land effective from 01.08.1960. The order of the

Jagir Commissioner dated 17.10.1968 is also placed on

16 record. A bare perusal of the said order proves and

establishes that a sum of Rs. 2250/- was sanctioned as

interim compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to

the Jagirdar Ram Narain under Section 36 of the

Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act,

1952. There could have been a mistake in describing Ram

Narain as Jagirdar as the land belonged to the Idol/Dev

statue and Ram Narain being only a priest of the said

temple. Such description of Ram Narain as Jagirdar was

also not in tune with the circular dated 13.12.1991. This

fact gets established even by the application filed before

the Jagir Commissioner by showing Ram Narain as the

Pujari and Manager and showing the Idol as the Jagirdar.

In paragraph 1 of the said application filed by the

predecessor-in-interest of respondent no. 1 herein, it was

clearly stated that there is a temple with an Idol of Lord

Hanuman Ji in which Ram Narain is the only Pujari and

Manager. He had stated in the said application that with

the vesting and resumption of the land, he is entitled to

get compensation under Section 22 of the Land Reforms

and Resumption of Jagir Act, which should be paid to him.

17 Pursuant to the same, order for interim compensation was

made by the Jagir Commissioner, Rajasthan. The

predecessor-in-interest of respondent no. 1 received the

interim compensation thereunder without any protest and

demur. Consequently, he was, at the most, entitled to

receive balance compensation under the Jagir Act.

16.Despite vesting of the land with the Government under

the provisions of the Jagir Act and also resumption of the

said land measuring 29 Bighas and 17 Biswas by the

Government, a notification proposing acquisition of the

said land was issued by the Government under Section

4(1) of the Act followed by the notification under Section 6

of the Act. The Land Acquisition Officer even proceeded

to pass an award in respect of the land, which already

belonged to the Government, by determining

compensation, and proceeded further in directing

retention of interim compensation paid under Jagir Act

and also by directing the allotment of a plot of developed

land measuring 2500 sq. yds. Although there was no law

supporting such action, the said action on the part of the

18 Land Acquisition Officer directing the payment of

compensation and also allotting a plot of land in favour of

the respondent indicates as to how Government officials,

who are protectors of the Government property, abuse

their power and trust under the camouflage of

performance of their public duty. The respondent no. 1

entering into a private agreement describing himself as the

owner of the land is in itself a disclosure as to how

property belonging to an Idol is being frittered away by a

trustee who is a Manager for promoting his self interest

and self gain. If on the one hand, a Government officer of

the status of Land Acquisition Officer, who is entrusted

with a public authority while performing a public duty has

sought to make an illegal acquisition of land and also

making illegal allotment of land, on the other hand it is a

trustee and the Manager who has abused his position and

has, following the trust reposed on him, sought to fritter

away a property belonging to the Idol.

17.Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge while hearing the

first writ petition completely ignored the aforesaid position

19 and instead issued a direction for not only for retaining

payment of the interim compensation under the Jagir Act

but also ordered for payment of compensation under the

Land Acquisition Act along with interest, but also upheld

the order of allotment of additional land. The Division

Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed

therefrom on the ground that the appellant has failed to

take appropriate steps. The special leave petition by this

Court was dismissed for non-prosecution as the appellant

failed to take steps in the appeal. In the subsequent writ

petition, the Division Bench of the High Court by the

impugned order directed for payment of compensation,

totally ignoring the contention of the appellant that such

an order is a nullity in the eyes of law which submission

was enforced by at least three decisions of this Court.

18.In Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam,

reported at (1994) 4 SCC 370, at page 372, it was held by

this Court that the power expressly given to the Land

Acquisition Officer is only in respect of enquiry into the

true area of the land acquired and determination of the

20 compensation which in his opinion should be allowed to

the acquired land and apportionment of the compensation

among the claimants who appeared before him or persons

known or believed to be interested in the land whether

appeared or not and that it excludes by implication any

other power other than that given to the Collector by

Section 11. It was also held in the said decision that the

award is only an offer made after consideration of the

above matters and is only made subsequent to reference

and determination made under sub-section (1) of Section

23 of the amounts awardable thereunder or any other

amount awarded under any or all other clauses

thereunder including sub-section (2). Subsequently, an

award shall be made by court and such award by

operation of sub-section (2) of Section 26 would be deemed

to be a decree. In Para 7, this Court laid down that a

reading of sub-section (4) of Section 31 indicates that the

Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to

give any land under acquisition or any other land in lieu of

compensation. The contention of the learned counsel for

the claimants was that while awarding compensation, the

21 Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) has a higher power

than the limited power given under sub-section (3) of

Section 31. It was held that such a position is not tenable,

and would run counter to the scheme envisaged in the Act

and such interpretation, if accepted would result in

defeating the public purpose. This Court clearly held in

the said decision that what is executable is only an award

under Section 26(2), namely, the amount awarded or the

claims of the interests determined of the respective

persons in the acquired lands and that the decree cannot

incorporate any matter other than the matters determined

under Section 11 or those referred to and determined

under Section 18 and no other.

19. The subsequent decision of this Court in Secy., Jaipur

Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain, reported at

(1997) 1 SCC 35 is almost to the same effect. In the said

decision, this Court has laid down almost to the same

extent while interpreted the provisions of the Rajasthan

Land Acquisition Act, 1953. This Court held in

paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 as under:

22

"11. ......... In a democratic society governed by rule of law, power is conferred on the holder of the public office or the authority concerned by the Constitution by virtue of appointment. The holder of the office, therefore, gets opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. The politician who holds public office must perform public duties with the sense of purpose, and a sense of direction, under rules or sense of priorities. The purpose must be genuine in a free democratic society governed by the rule of law to further socio-economic democracy. The Executive Government should frame its policies to maintain the social order, stability, progress and morality. All actions of the Government are performed through/by individual persons in collective or joint or individual capacity. Therefore, they should morally be responsible for their actions.

12. ........The Government acts through its bureaucrats, who shape its social, economic and administrative policies to further the social stability and progress socially, economically and politically. Actions of the Government, should be accounted for social morality. Therefore, the actions of the individuals would reflect on the actions of the Government. The actions are intended to further the goals set down in the Constitution, the laws or administrative policy. The action would, therefore, bear necessary integral connection between the `purpose' and the end object of public welfare and not personal gain. The action cannot be divorced from that of the individual actor. The end is something aimed at and only individuals can have and shape the aims to further the social, economic and political goals. The ministerial responsibility thereat comes into consideration.........

13. All purposes or actions for which moral responsibility can be attached are actions performed by individual persons composing the department. All government actions, therefore, means actions performed by individual persons to further the objectives set down in the Constitution, the laws and the administrative policies to develop democratic traditions, social and economic democracy set down in the Preamble, Part III and Part IV of the Constitution. The intention behind the government actions and

23 purposes is to further the public welfare and the national interest. Public good is synonymous with protection of the interests of the citizens as a territorial unit or nation as a whole. It also aims to further the public policies. The limitations of the policies are kept along with the public interest to prevent the exploitation or misuse or abuse of the office or the executive actions for personal gain or for illegal gratification."

What the Court has said in paragraphs 14 and 15, have

been extracted right at the beginning of this Judgment.

20. In State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma, reported at

1995 Supp (3) SCC 249, this Court has held that the

Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate or provide for

the acquisition of any interest belonging to the

Government in the land on acquisition. It reiterated the

settled position of law that the Government being the

owner of the land need not acquire its own land merely

because person mistakenly resorted to acquire the land

and later on mistakenly published notifications under

Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.

21. The aforesaid position was reiterated in a subsequent

decision of this Court in Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of

India, reported at (2004) 7 SCC 362. In paragraphs 15

24 and 16 of the said judgment, this Court has held that the

High Court has clearly erred in setting aside the order of

the Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference

since it is settled law that in land acquisition proceedings

the Government cannot and does not acquire its own

interest. While laying down the aforesaid law, this Court

has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Collector

of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri & Ors.

reported at (1955) 1 SCR 1311.

22. We may at this stage appropriately refer to the decision of

this Court in the case of Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman

Paswan & Ors. reported in (1955) 1 SCR 117. In the said

case this Court has held that judgment passed by a Court

without jurisdiction is a nullity and such a judgment could

be challenged even in execution or collateral proceedings.

Court on page 121 at para 6 held thus:

"........................... It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. .................."

25 23. In the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sanahullah

Mir reported in (1980) 3 SCR 281 this court dealing with

a case regarding resumption of land on pages 286-287 at

para 9 held thus: -

"..................... On going through these documents it appears to us that under the influence of some high-ups a case was made out for payment of compensation to the respondent in respect of the land acquired 60 years ago by acquiring it again which naturally led to the determination of the market value of the land in or about the year 1955. The State Exchequer cannot be made to suffer for such wanton and illegal actions of its officers. The land had been resumed long ago. It belonged to the State. The whole proceeding of land acquisition was a nullity. The Award resulting therefrom was also-ultra vires and a nullity. It mattered little whether the proceeding was taken as a result of the fraud or mistake or otherwise. We are accepting the findings of the courts below that the respondent had not practised and fraud nor was the land acquisition proceeding started as a result of any mistake of fact. It was either as a result of gross negligence or a deliberate act on the part of the officials at the instance of some high-ups to help the respondent. It is well-settled that there is no question of any acquisition of the State's own land as was purported to be done in this case."

24. In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is crystal

clear that the issuance of notifications under Sections 4

and 6 of the Act as also the Award passed for acquisition

of the land was a nullity and the subsequent action of the

Government de-requisitioning land by issuance of

notification under Section 48 was just and proper as that

26 was an action for rectification of the mistake. The

subsequent land acquisition officer was justified in

refusing to refer to the Reference Court in view of the fact

that the land was already a Government land and was so

described in the revenue record itself. The Land

Acquisition Officer, who passed the award, committed an

illegality by not only determining the compensation under

the Land Acquisition Act but also directing for retention of

the interim compensation paid under Jagir Act and also in

directing for allotment of a developed plot of land

admeasuring 2500 sq. yds. Initiation of the acquisition

proceedings as also award passed by the said Land

Acquisition Officer is nullity in the eyes of law and void ab

initio and therefore could be held so and set aside in a

proceeding of this nature. We, therefore, hold that the

directions for payment of compensation under the

Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act to the predecessor-in-

interest of the respondent no. 1 and subsequently to

respondent no. 1 are illegal and without jurisdiction as the

award passed by the land acquisition officer was only an

offer which itself was a nullity. Payment made to the

27 predecessor-in-interest of the respondent no. 1 and also to

the respondent no. 1 as its successor is also held

unwarranted as the said orders were passed considering

them as the owners of the land and not as a trustee or

manager. Therefore, the said orders directing for payment

of compensation and withdrawal of the compensation by

respondent no. 1 is held to be illegal and without

jurisdiction. We set aside the said orders by allowing the

appeal filed by the appellant. The amount deposited

pursuant to the orders of this Court, if, has been

withdrawn by respondent no. 1 shall be realized from him

through the process of the High Court. The Registrar

General of the High Court would take necessary steps to

realise the amount paid to the respondent by invoking the

security furnished and if necessary by resorting to remedy

in accordance with law. In terms of the aforesaid order the

appeal is allowed but we leave the parties to bear their

own costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9158 OF 2003

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9161 OF 2003

28 AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9162 OF 2003

25. The remaining appeals may be disposed together since the

facts and circumstances in these cases are similar.

26. In all these appeals, the respondents are sub-awardees

who have come to the fore after a Notification under

Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was

published in the State Gazette for acquisition of land in

village Bhojpura and Chak Sudershanpura Tehsil Jaipur.,

for the purpose of construction of a scheme popularly

known as Lal Kothi scheme, which is adjacent to Jaipur

City for a planned development of the city.

27.These appeals merit the same observations as we have

made in Civil Appeal No. 8590 of 2003, wherein the Land

Acquisition Officer proceeded to pass an award in respect

of the land acquired, which was already vested with the

Government after the coming into force of the Rajasthan

Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act (hereinafter

"Jagir Act" for short) on 18.02.1952, by determining

29 compensation, and went further by directing for allotment

of a plot of developed land measuring 2500 sq. yds. We

have made it clear in the aforesaid appeal that the Land

Acquisition Officer, through such an action, was not only

acting beyond his mandate and jurisdiction, but was also

betraying the public trust reposed on him by virtue of

being a public servant.

28. Pursuant to such an illegal award that we have held in the

aforesaid appeal to be non est and void ab initio, the sub-

awardees who are also Respondents in the present appeals

made representations to the Urban Improvement Trust,

Jaipur for allotment of land. Unfortunately, the Trust not

only complied with these representations but also drew up

allotment plans, asking the Respondents to deposit money

in lieu of the same.

29. Kamla Mehta, who is the respondent in Civil Appeal No.

9162, claims to have paid the full price for this reallotted

plot on 17.12.1970. Dr. S.K. Sharma, who is the

respondent in Civil Appeal No. 9161, was initially allotted

a plot no. 32 in the Lal Kothi Scheme by the Urban

Improvement Trust and he had deposited the full amount

30 of the plot on 31.3.1970. In the case of Pushpa Saxena,

the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9158, she had purchased

land measuring 400 sq. yards from one Usha Kumari vide

an agreement to sell dated 7.7.72. The said Usha Kumari

who had purchased the plot from the original Khatedar,

one Narpat Singh, was allotted a plot no H-256 in the Lal

Kothi Scheme vide allotment letter dated 13.9.1970.

30. The Respondents, in their Writ Petitions submitted before

the High Court of Rajasthan had complained that the said

allotments were not being made expeditiously. The High

Court allowed the Writ Petitions holding inter alia that the

actions of the appellants herein cannot be sustained and

that once an allotment has been made by the Urban

Improvement Trust, the same cannot remain unfulfilled.

31.We heard the counsel for parties at length. Mr. S.K.

Bhattacharya, Advocate appearing for the appellant

submitted before us that the entire initiation of

proceedings and passing of the award under the Land

Acquisition Act was a nullity. The learned counsel for the

appellant based his argument on the contention that the

Land Acquisition Officer had no authority or right to allot

31 plots in addition to monetary compensation. It was also

the submission of the appellant that the allotment of the

plots in respect of the Respondents was cancelled and

possession was taken back. Therefore, according to the

appellant, the High Court's decision to allow the claims of

the Respondents on the basis of policy was erroneous as

the High Court failed to appreciate that the policy of the

State Government is inapplicable to the facts of these

cases and that such action allowing sub-awardees,

nominees, dealers and even encroachers to obtain

developed land at nominal rates, as opposed to the high

market prices. On this count, the appellant also submitted

that recognizing the claim of the Respondents would

tantamount to recognizing the right of dealers in land,

since nearly all the original Khatedars have sold their

anticipated allotment in favour of unscrupulous dealers.

32. The learned counsel for the Respondents, on the other

hand, submitted before us that the principles of natural

justice were not followed in the proceedings that led to the

cancellation of allotment in that the Respondents were not

provided an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, it was the

32 submission of the Respondent that the appellant was

delivering possession to a number of other allottees who

were similarly situated.

33.It is amply clear from our decision in Civil Appeal No.

8590 of 2003 that the issuance of notifications under

Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as also the

Award passed for acquisition of the land was a nullity and

the subsequent action of the Government de-requisitioning

land by issuance of Notification under Section 48 was just

and proper as that was merely by way of rectification of

the mistake committed therein. In the light of this

decision, we find that the Respondents herein have no

claim or right to a fresh allotment of land, as directed by

the Land Acquisition Officer. That other allottees have

been wrongly delivered possession by the appellant does

not, in any way, entitle the Respondents to claim the same

benefit for a wrong action cannot be allowed to be

perpetuated on the ground of discrimination, which is not

at all applicable. Furthermore, it is important to note that

none of the Respondents herein has been in possession of

the said land allotted to them.

33

34. Moreover, this Court in Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of

Rajasthan, reported at (1996) 1 SCC 334, on a case

dealing with the lapse on the part of the Land Acquisition

Officer in wrongly granting a benefit to one party, has held

that the benefit thus wrongly granted cannot entitle others

to get the same or to press claims of invidious

discrimination.

35. In Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam,

reported at (1994) 4 SCC 370, at page 372, it was held by

this Court that the power expressly given to the Land

Acquisition Officer is only in respect of enquiry into the

true area of the land acquired and determination of the

compensation which in his opinion should be allowed to

the acquired land and apportionment of the compensation

among the claimants who appeared before him or persons

known or believed to be interested in the land whether

appeared or not and that it excludes by implication any

other power other than that given to the Collector by

Section 11. Seen in the light of the facts and

circumstances of the present appeals, and from our

decision in Civil Appeal No. 8590 of 2003, there is no

34 doubt that the award passed by the Land Acquisition

Officer determining compensation and allotting fresh plots

of land to the Respondents is illegal and void ab initio.

36. Furthermore, it is settled law that sub-awardees and

subsequent purchasers possess right vis-`-vis the original

vendor only and not against the State Government as the

purchases were subsequent to passing of the award. When

the acquisition proceedings are itself a nullity, there

clearly cannot be a valid claim to allotment as has been

contended by the Respondents in this case. In Secy.,

Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain,

reported at (1997) 1 SCC 35, this Court has held at page

43 :

"The diverse contentions give rise to the first question: whether the respondents have a right to allotment of the lands? It is an admitted position that they purchased the lands from Chhote Lal, the erstwhile owner, pursuant to the sale deeds executed by him in 1970 or an agreement of sale etc. Their source of title, therefore, is Chhote Lal, the erstwhile owner. The sales obviously are void since Chhote Lal had no right, title and interest in the land acquired pursuant to notification under Section 4(1) issued on 29-6-1960 and possession taken under Section 16 of the Central Act and equivalent to Section 16 of the State Act. The pre-existing right, title and interest had by Chhote Lal stood ceased and

35 the same were vested in the appellant free from all encumbrances. The nomenclature of sub-awardees or nominees does not get elevated above the source and they had no right, title or interest under void sale except, if at all, only to claim compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. In Gian Chand v. Gopala this Court had held that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published, any encumbrances created by the owner of the land does not bind the Government. The agreement of sale, if any, was frustrated by the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section

6. In Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and a catena of other decisions, this Court has held that the purchase after notification under Section 4(1) published in the Gazette was not lawful which did not clothe the sale with any colour of title as against the State. All encumbrances stand extinguished by operation of Section 16 of the Act. Therefore, the purchaser gets no title to the acquired land. The sale (being opposed to the public policy) was void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872. Consequentially, the respondents acquired no right, title or interest either under the sale deeds or agreement entered into by them with Chhote Lal, the erstwhile owner."

37.So far as the respondents-claimants, namely, Pushpa

Saxena, Kamla Mehta and Dr. S.K. Sharma are concerned,

there is no dispute to the fact that they purchased a part

of the acquired land after the same was vested with the

State Government under the Jagir Act and after the

36 Government had resumed possession of the said land. All

the aforesaid purchases were in any case subsequent to

the notification issued by the State Government under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and even after

passing of the award, so as to take advantage of the undue

and invalid direction for allotment of additional land by

the Land Acquisition Officer.

38. Pushpa Saxena purchased her land from Usha Kumari

vide sale deed dated 07.07.1972 and the area of land

which was purchased by her was only 400 sq. yards. Usha

Kumari had earlier purchased the land from Khatedar,

Narpat Singh. The total area of land of Raja Narpat Singh

that was acquired was 872.22 sq. yards whereas he was

given an area of plot of 1,000 sq. yards as an alternative

plot, which itself proves and establishes how some

government officers got together to give undue benefit to

unscrupulous person and were thereby trying to cause

wrongful loss to the government of their assets.

39.There were many such awardees who were being given

more land as an alternative to the area of the land which

was sought to be acquired by issuing the notification

37 under Section 4. There were 12 awardees who also entered

into compromise and they were awarded plots of land in

additional to mandatory compensation as under:

S.No Name of the Sl. No. of Area of The area of . Awardee the Land Land (in plot to be sq.yards) given in addition to cash compensati on as per the award

1. Sh. Radhuveer 50 1361 1500 Singh

2. Sh. Ram 27 2108 2000 Lal/Pokhermal

3. Sh. Raja 36 872.22 1000 Narpat Singh

4. Smt. Sharda 54 1097 1000 Dhapar

5. Smt. Jyotsna 28 2089 2000 Kumari

6. Sr. Tulsi 48 2166 2000 Vishnoi

7. Sr. Rameshwari 33 2658 2000 Sethi

8. Amrit Chain 29 2089 2000 Kumari

9. Madhu and 60 2166 2000 Vibhu Kashyap

10. Alok Prasad 52 298 500 Mathur 11. B.P. Bhatnagar 500

40. Incidentally, Raja Narpat Singh who was the original

Khatedar and from whom Usha Kumari purchased land of

38 which Pushpa Saxena purchased about 400 sq. yards,

approached the Supreme Court but he himself was not

allotted any plot of land whereas Pushpa Saxena, who

purchased the land from Usha Kumari, is now seeking for

allotment of alternative land at least to the extent of 250

sq. yards.

41. In so far as the claim of Dr. S.K. Sharma is concerned, his

case is similar to that of Kamla Mehta whose case is

disposed by the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan

dated 2nd June, 2000. Dr. S.K. Sharma purchased the land

from Rajendra Singh whose area of land that was acquired

was 3508 sq. yards as against which there was an order

for allotment of alternative land of an area of 2000 sq.

yards. Kamla Mehta, out of the anticipated allotment of

land measuring 1500 sq. yards in favour of Raghubir

Singh, entered into an agreement for allotment of land

measuring 375 sq. yards. She has lodged her claim on the

basis of documents like receipt and the alleged agreement

to sale and she put forth her request for allotment of land

in her favour on the basis of such anticipated allotment.

39

42.The decision to allot alternative plot of land was given by

the Land Acquisition Officer in the absence of any

supporting law to support such claim on the ground of

alleged rehabilitation of the person whose land is sought to

be acquired by the Government.

43.Necessarily, none of the aforesaid awardees, namely,

Pushpa Saxena, Kamla Mehta and Dr. S.K. Sharma falls

into the aforesaid category. When they entered into the

agreements to sale there was no allotment of land in

favour of the vendors and there was just an anticipated

and possible action of allotment of some alternative land

either to the vendors or the Khatedars from whom the

vendors purchased through agreement to sell. While

ordering for allotment of land in favour of such persons

the concerned officers misused their position and the trust

reposed on them. In any case, as of now, there is neither

vacant land available in the Lal Kothi area nor are any of

the aforesaid respondents-claimants is entitled to

allotment of any alternative land.

44. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, and

our discussion in Civil Appeal 8590 of 2003, we find that

40 the cases of the Respondents are devoid of any merit. We,

therefore, hold that the directions for payment of

compensation and allotment of land under the Rajasthan

Land Acquisition Act to the Respondents are illegal and

without jurisdiction as the award passed by the land

acquisition officer was only an offer which itself was a

nullity. They are not entitled to an allotment of 250 sq.

yards of plot, for any direction to allot such plot of land

could amount to unjust enrichment of a person who had

sought to bind the Government, although, in law no such

binding effect came into existence as the land already

vested in the Government. If any one of them has paid the

charges for allotment of alternative land they can only get

back the same from the competent authority, in which

case, they shall be paid interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a

from the date of the deposit of the amount till the date of

the payment.

..........................................J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

41 ........................................J. [Anil R. Dave ]

New Delhi, September 21, 2010.

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