Jagjit Singh (Dead) Through Lrs. vs Amarjit Singh
- SCC(2018) 9 SCC 805
- Neutral2018 INSC 815
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of the contract up to the date of filing the suit; the mere issuance of a legal notice or the filing of a suit after the extended date for performance does not, without more, establish such readiness and willingness throughout the entire period. A High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under the law of second appeal must not disturb pure findings of fact made by the lower appellate court unless they are shown to be erroneous, fallacious or perverse; such disturbance requires cogent reasons and cannot rest on grounds that do not logically support the conclusion reached.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9124 OF 2018
JAGJIT SINGH (D) THR. LRS. …APPELLANT(S)
Versus
AMARJIT SINGH …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Gupta, J.
1. Amarjit Singh (since deceased, the respondent herein)
hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiff”, filed a suit for specific
performance of contract. He alleged that he had entered into an
agreement dated 17.10.2000 with Jagjit Singh (since deceased,
the appellant herein) hereinafter referred to as “the defendant”,
for purchase of half share in the shop in dispute for a total sale
consideration of Rs. 1,50,000/. According to the plaintiff, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Date: 2018.09.13 15:28:58 IST
Rs. 1,30,000/ was paid in cash at the time of execution of the Reason:
2
agreement to sell. The balance amount was to be paid on or
before 30.03.2003, by which date the sale deed was to be
executed and registered. It was further alleged that the date for
execution and registration of the sale deed was extended by
mutual consent of the parties till 09.10.2003. The defendant
denied the execution of the sale deed itself. According to him, he
had not been paid any money.
2. The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence came
to the conclusion that no agreement to sell had been executed
between the parties and accordingly dismissed the suit.
Aggrieved, the plaintiff filed an appeal. The first appellate court
set aside the finding of the trial court that the agreement to sell
had not been executed. However, the first appellate court came
to the conclusion that the so called agreement was, in fact, not
an agreement to sell. It further held, that assuming that the said
agreement was an agreement to sell, the plaintiff had failed to
prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the
agreement. It held that the plaintiff had failed to show what
steps he had taken to perform his part of the contract from
17.10.2000 to 09.10.2003. The first appellate court, on perusal 3
of the pleadings and the evidence, came to a finding of fact that it
had nowhere been averred and proved that the plaintiff had ever
showed his readiness or willingness to perform his part of the
contract. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
3. The second appeal filed by the plaintiff has been allowed by
the High Court without framing any question of law much less a
substantial question of law. The High Court, without discussing
the evidence, held that in its view the finding of the lower
appellate court is “not only erroneous, but fallacious and
perverse’’. The only ground for coming to this decision is that the
suit had been filed on 09.01.2004 whereas the extended date for
execution and registration of the sale deed was 09.10.2003 and
thereafter, the plaintiff had sent a legal notice on 13.10.2003.
We fail to understand as to how the issuance of notice on
13.10.2003 or the filing of the suit on 09.01.2004 can lead to the
conclusion that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract from the date of agreement to sell
till date of filing of suit. Moreover, this is a pure finding of fact
which should not have been disturbed in a second appeal that
too without giving any cogent reasons.
4
4. It is settled law that a plaintiff who seeks specific
performance of contract is required to plead and prove that he
was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract1.
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates that the plaintiff
should plead and prove his readiness and willingness as a
condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific
performance. As far back as in 1967, this Court in
Gomathinayagam Pillai and Ors. v. Pallaniswami Nadar2
held that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff must
plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part
of the contract right from the date of the contract up to the date
of the filing of the suit. This law continues to hold the field and
has been reiterated in the case of J.P. Builders and Anr. v. A.
Ramadas Rao and Anr.3 and P. Meenakshisundaram v. P.
Vijayakumar & Ors.4. It is the duty of the plaintiff to plead and
then lead evidence to show that the plaintiff from the date he
1 16. Personal bars to relief .- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person - (a).............
(b)............
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
2 (1967) 1 SCR 227 3 (2011) 1 SCC 429 4 Civil Appeal No.3353-3354 of 2018 decided on 28.03.2018, 2018(5) SCALE 229 5
entered into an agreement till the stage of filing of the suit always
had the capacity and willingness to perform the contract.
5. As far as the present appeal is concerned, the finding of the
first appellate court that the plaintiff had failed to plead or prove
his willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date
of agreement till filing of the suit is a pure finding of fact based
on evidence and law. The High Court has while upsetting the
judgment of the District Judge lost sight of the provisions of the
Specific Relief Act and the law in this regard. Hence the appeal is
allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of
the lower appellate court dated 02.03.2007 is restored. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
….……………………..J. (MADAN B. LOKUR)
.….…………………….J. (DEEPAK GUPTA) New Delhi September 13, 2018
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