Homag India Private Ltd vs Mr Ulfath Ali Khan
- Citation2012 SCC OnLine Kar 9199
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. An employee's breach of confidentiality owed to an employer—by transferring confidential information relating to business, customers, technical data, manufacturing processes, and commercial strategies from the employer's systems to personal accounts or to a competitor—constitutes an actionable infringement of the employer's legal rights, and a prima facie case for temporary injunction is established where documentary evidence demonstrates such transfer. 2. A third party who induces an employee still in service to breach confidentiality and gather confidential information of the employer with the intention of using that information as a springboard to establish competing business operations infringes the employer's legal rights, and such infringement is actionable independently of any contractual privity between the employer and third party. 3. Confidentiality in business information—such as customer databases, lists of offers, technical details, manufacturing processes, know-how, and brand-specific product specifications—is not negated by the fact that the general technologies or machine types used are in the public domain; information that is specific to the plaintiff's business operations, proprietary methodologies, customer relationships, and brand-identified products remains confidential and protectable. 4. A temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and not by the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and accordingly a contention that an injunction cannot be granted because it purports to enforce a negative covenant within the meaning of Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act does not apply. 5. Where an application for temporary injunction is general in nature but the plaint adequately describes the plaintiff's business activities and products, and the plaintiff provides a specific product catalogue identifying the brand names and models of machines to which confidential information relates, a temporary injunction may be granted with reference to those specifically identified products to avoid vagueness and prevent misuse of the order. 6. The imminence required for grant of temporary injunction need not be literal or require that the plaintiff wait until the last moment before irreparable harm occurs; the word should be understood to mean that the remedy sought must not be premature, and where prima facie evidence shows that a third party has deliberately gathered confidential information to intrude into the plaintiff's business, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to first establish that the third party is already actively using that information before an injunction may issue.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
(By Sri Prabhugouda B.Tumbgi, Advocate for Sri M.T.Nanaiah, Advocate for R1; Sri T.S.Amar Kumar, Advocate for M/s. Lawyers Inc., Advocates for C/R2)
These appeals are filed under section 104 r/w order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC, against the order dated 09.12.2009, passed on IA.No.1 & 2 in O.S.No.4418/2009, on the file of XVIII Additional City Civil Judge (CCH-10), Bangalore and etc.
These appeals having been heard and reserved for judgment on 03.10.2012, coming on for pronouncement this day, the court delivered the following:-
JUDGMENT
The appellant in these two appeals is common. The
appellant is plaintiff in O.S.No.4418/2009 (hereinafter
referred to as 'plaintiff'). The respondents herein are
defendants 1 & 2 in O.S.No.4418/2009 (hereinafter referred
to as 'defendants 1 & 2'). The plaintiff had sought for an
order of temporary injunction against defendants 1 & 2. The
learned trial Judge dismissed the application for grant of an
order of temporary injunction against II-defendant and
granted an order of temporary injunction against I-defendant 3
to obey the terms of contract had with plaintiff till disposal of
suit or for one year i.e., till April 2010, whichever is earlier.
2. The plaintiff has filed these two appeals, inter alia
contending that learned trial Judge should have granted an
order of temporary injunction against defendants 1 & 2 till
disposal of suit.
3. I have heard Sri V.Srinivas Raghavan, learned counsel
for plaintiff, Sri Prabhugowda B.Tumbgi, learned counsel for
I-defendant and Sri T.S.Amar Kumar, learned counsel for
II-defendant.
4. In brief, averments of plaint and application necessary
for disposal of these two appeals are stated thus:-
The plaintiff is a private limited company registered
under the Companies Act, 1956. It was incorporated in the
year 2004. The plaintiff's company is an Indian subsidiary
belonging to Homag Group, which originated in Germany
and now has several subsidiaries across the world, including 4
in India, Singapore, Australia, Japan, Brazil, etc. The Homag
Group and plaintiff company are the world's leading
suppliers of machines, cells and factory installations for the
panel processing furniture, structural element and timber
frame house construction industries. The plaintiff has
entered into trading and service activities. The product range
of the group focuses on machines, cells and factory
installations designed for efficient, versatile processing of
wood based panel materials. The plaintiff's company has a
separate department set up for research and development,
where huge amounts of funds are spent for the purpose of
discovering and inventing new processes for manufacture of
light weight panels, like honey comb structures, high speed
machines for manufacture of flooring, for special
technologies in transport chains using magnetic levitation
and so on.
5. The I-defendant joined services of plaintiff as a Senior
Service Engineer on 16.10.2006 with a compensation
package of Rs.3,60,000/- per annum and incentives under 5
appointment letter dated 12.10.2006. In the course of
employment, I-defendant had access to confidential
information of plaintiff's business.
6. After joining services of plaintiff's company, I-
defendant was given two promotions. On 25.03.2009, I-
defendant submitted his resignation. At that time, I-
defendant was holding the post of "Product Manager-Sawing"
with an annual remuneration of Rs.5,50,000/-.
7. The I-defendant was in a highly responsible post and
he had access to highly confidential and commercially
sensitive information pertaining to plaintiff's business,
products and operations. The I-defendant had access to
plaintiff's entire customer data base in India, details of
contracts entered into with customers, details of
methodologies and processes in relation to the products
supplied to various customers. The I-defendant was also
aware that aforestated confidential information is not
available in public domain. The I-defendant was fully aware
that if this data was made publicly available, it would act as 6
a springboard for any other company to launch itself in
Indian market. The I-defendant had submitted his
resignation on 25.03.2009 and requested plaintiff to relieve
him from employment and that he had received a better
employment. On 24.04.2009, I-defendant was relieved from
service of plaintiff. However, on 22.04.2009, officials of
plaintiff's company discovered that I-defendant had sent
several e-mails from official e-mail address containing
confidential information to II-defendant. These e-mails
contained customer details including added updated
commissioned reports, status of pending offers and other
technical details of plaintiff's products. Upon enquiry with I-
defendant, he confessed to have taken aforstated data. The I-
defendant showed to plaintiff his appointment letter with II-
defendant. On perusal of appointment letter, plaintiff was
shocked to realize that I-defendant had been hired by II-
defendant for the purpose of working in its behalf in Indian
market. The agreement clearly stated that I-defendant
approached II-defendant and offered to provide services in 7
the field of market entry as well as services in India. As per
the terms of contract between I-defendant and II-defendant,
former to assist latter in sales in direct competition with
plaintiff's business and I-defendant would be appointed as
Director of Indian subsidiary. The plaintiff also realized that
I-defendant had taken employment with II-defendant even
prior to submission of resignation to plaintiff's company. The
I-defendant had signed contract of employment with
II-defendant on 18.03.2009. The I-defendant submitted
resignation on 25.03.2009 and got relieved on 24.04.2009.
The I-defendant committed breach of terms of employment
by working for II-defendant, who was a competitor of
plaintiff's business. This was done when services of I-
defendant with plaintiff was still subsisting.
8. The II-defendant having enticed I-defendant with a
lucrative offer to appoint I-defendant as the Director of
Indian subsidiary had got confidential information relating to
plaintiff's business. The I-defendant was in contract with II-
defendant from August 2008. The II-defendant wants to use 8
confidential information so far furnished by I-defendant as a
springboard to set up its operations in India.
9. The plaintiff has sought for following reliefs:-
I. A judgment and decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, contractors or anybody claiming under them from carrying on business in India or carrying on business with, dealing or in any manner transacting with any of the customers of the plaintiff by utilizing confidential information whether in the form of technical data, correspondence and information pertaining to, manufacturing process, marketing plans, offers, pricing, customer list, software, specifications, engineering methods and know-how, consumer grievances, customer solutions, service logs, service history and service feedback pertaining to clients or method of resolving area specific problems.
II. A judgment and decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from utilizing or disclosing confidential information whether in the form of technical data, correspondence and information pertaining to, manufacturing process, marketing plans, offers, pricing, customer list, software, specifications, engineering methods and know-how, consumer grievances, customer solutions, 9
service logs, service history and service feedback pertaining to clients or method of resolving area specific problems.
III. A judgment and decree of permanent injunction
restraining the 1st defendant from working, dealing with or functioning in any manner or capacity, or carry on business,
either with the 2nd defendant or anybody else or independently, in any area or field competing with the
Plaintiff's business and restraining the 2nd defendant or its subsidiaries or associated companies from employing or in
any manner dealing with or being associated with the 1st defendant and
IV. Grant costs."
10. The plaintiff had filed an application under Order 39
Rules 1 & 2 r/w 151 CPC, reading as hereunder:
"For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble court be pleased to grant an order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, contractors or anybody claiming under them from carrying on business in India or carrying on business with, dealing or in any 10
manner transacting with any of the customers of the plaintiff by utilising confidential information whether in the form of technical data, correspondence and information pertaining to manufacturing process, marketing plans, offers, pricing, customer list, software, specifications, engineering methods and know-how, consumer grievances, customer solutions, service logs, service history and service feedback pertaining to clients or method of resolving area specific problems in addition to, pending disposal of the suit on merits, in the interest of justice and equity.
It is further prayed that an exparte ad- interim order of temporary injunction in the above terms may kindly be granted, as the delay involved if notices are issued would render the suit nugatory."
11. In brief, averments of written statement and statement
of objections filed by first defendant are as follows:-
The first defendant has admitted that he joined the
services of plaintiff as a Senior Service Engineer on 11
16.10.2006 with a compensation package of Rs.3,60,000/-
per annum and incentives. The first defendant has admitted
letter of appointment dated 12.10.2006 and terms of
appointment contained therein.
As per terms 12 and 13 of letter of appointment, first
defendant was expected to maintain confidentiality of the
information of plaintiff's business, both during the course of
employment and also thereafter and he was not expected to
take up employment with any competitor of plaintiff or to
start on his own accord, anything in competition with the
plaintiff's business for a period of one year after termination
of his employment that he had to maintain confidentiality
about the information pertaining to plaintiffs business.
12. The first defendant has admitted that he had tendered
resignation on 25.03.2009, at the time of tendering his
resignation, he was holding the post of "Product Manager-
Sawing" with annual remuneration of Rs.5,50,000/-. The
first defendant has denied that he had transferred from 12
companies Email ID to his personal Email ID, confidential
information of the business of plaintiff, customers list etc.
The first defendant has contended that in the normal course
of employment such Emails were being transferred from the
company Email ID to his personal Email ID. The first
defendant, from the beginning for business purpose was
using these Emails at customer places for trouble shooting
whenever needed. The first defendant resigned from his
employment on 25.03.2009 and he was relieved on
24.04.2009. The first defendant has denied that he had
transferred the confidential information of plaintiff's
business from companies Email ID to his personal Email ID
with an intention to help the second defendant for the
purpose of working with the second defendant and enable
the second defendant to establish it's subsidiary in India as
competitor to plaintiff.
13. The first defendant has denied that he had entered
into contract of employment with the second defendant. The
first defendant has contended that letter dated 24.04.2009 13
said to have been executed by him was under threat and
coercion. The first defendant has contended that there is no
cause of action against first defendant and the plaintiff has
not made out prima-facie case to grant an order of temporary
injunction against first defendant.
14. In brief, averments of written statement and objection
filed by second defendant are as follows:-
The second defendant has denied that it had contacted
first defendant and first defendant had worked for second
defendant. The second defendant has denied averments of
plaint relating to nature of business activities of plaintiff and
the technologies evolved by plaintiff.
15. The second defendant has contended that companies
like BIESSE (Italy) HOLZHER (Germany), SCM (Italy) and
even the second defendant for many years have produced,
sold and serviced the machines through feed corner
rounding. The second defendant has denied the
correspondence of defendants No.1 and 2 interse and Emails 14
exchanged defendants 1 and 2 interse. The second
defendant has denied that first defendant for and on behalf
of second defendant had tried to establish contacts with
several customers of plaintiff.
16. The second defendant has denied that first defendant
has breached confidentiality by revealing confidential
information of plaintiff's business to second defendant. The
second defendant has denied that it was fully aware about
first defendant being in possession of highly sensitive
confidential information pertaining to plaintiffs business and
second defendant had induced first defendant to leave
services with plaintiff, employed first defendant and obtained
confidential information relating to plaintiff's business from
first defendant. The second defendant has contended that
plaintiff has no right to sue against second defendant. The
plaintiff is not entitled to an order of temporary injunction
against second defendant.
15
17. The learned trial judge on hearing learned counsel for
parties and referring to documents relied upon by parties
has held that first defendant could be restrained by an order
of temporary injunction to obey the terms of contract of
employment with the plaintiff till disposal of the suit or for
one year from the date of order, whichever is earlier.
18. The learned trial judge has held that there was no
privity of contract between plaintiff and second defendant.
As per terms and conditions of employment contract, first
defendant after termination of his service with plaintiff was
not expected to serve for any of the companies for a period of
one year in India and suit would become infructuous after
the month of April'2010, thus dismissed the application
against second defendant.
19. The first defendant has not challenged the impugned
order.
20. In the circumstances, points that would arise for
consideration are:-
16
1) Whether the plaintiff has made out a prima-facie case for grant of temporary injunction against defendants No.1 and 2 pending disposal of the suit?
2) Whether balance of convenience lies in favour of plaintiff?
3) Whether plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury in case if an order of temporary injunction is not granted?
4) Whether the impugned order is perverse, capricious and calls for interference?
21. The learned counsel for plaintiff and second defendant
have taken me through the impugned order and various
documents relied upon by them. They have also relied on
several decisions.
22. Before adverting to submissions made by learned
counsel for parties, it is necessary to state certain facts,
which are not in dispute.
17
23. The first defendant was employed in plaintiff's
company on 12.10.2006. Clause 12 and 13 of appointment
order dated 12.10.2006 reads thus:
"12. You shall not, at any time either during or after leaving the services of the company, disclose or divulge or make public to anyone any confidential information relating to the affairs, transactions or dealings of the company.
13. In the event of your leaving the services of the Company for any reason whatsoever, you shall not be employed, offer consultation, start on your own accord, or involve in any manner in any activity same or similar in nature to the operations of the company for a period of one year from the date of your leaving the services of the company."
It is not in dispute that first defendant submitted his
resignation to plaintiff on 25.03.2009. The first defendant
was relieved with effect from 24.04.2009.
24. It is the case of plaintiff that first defendant
while in service and also after submitting resignation on
25.03.2009 had transferred from the companies Email ID to
his personal Email ID the confidential information relating to
plaintiffs business such as technical data, information 18
pertaining to manufacturing process, marketing plans,
offers, pricing, customer list, software, specifications,
engineering methods and know-how, consumer grievances,
customer solutions, service logs, service history and service
feedback pertaining to clients or method of resolving area
specific problems.
25. It is the case of plaintiff that on 25.04.2009 first
defendant submitted a letter to plaintiff reading as
hereunder:
"I wish to state in the beginning that I am writing this affidavit of my own free will and I am under no compulsion or under any coercion to write this affidavit.
In 2008 during the Indiawood exhibition in Bangalore I was approached by the company IMA Klessmann GmbH represented by Mr.Marcus offering me a position in their company. It was originally agreed that I will be posted in Singapore for Sales and Service of machines manufactured by IMA and Schelling. They offered me more than two times my 19
remuneration with Homag and a large sales commission. I was therefore tempted to take their offer. I said 'Yes' but was shocked when I received the employment contract from them which said I will be posted in India. Mr.Marcus and Mr.Sydow told me that IMA will establisha subsidiary company in India and I will then be appointed as Director-Sales & Marketing in this company. Till the time the new company is formed I will work as employee of IMA.
During the course of these conversations regarding my appointment they persuaded me to take out as much of details as I can from Homag that may be useful later for business of IMA. Accordingly, I got lot of data transferred to my personal Yahoo account through my official Homag account. The data consisted of the entire address data base of Homag India, list of customers, list of offers and details, machinery installed and serviced and so on. I had transferred and stored all this data in my personal account.
I wish to state that I did this on being prompted to do so with higher remuneration, returns and 20
all kind of inducements. I regret this action which would have caused unbelievable damages to Homag.
Written this day 25th of April 2009, in the presence of witnesses below."
It is the contention of first defendant that the above
letter was obtained by plaintiff under duress and coercion.
26. In order to appreciate these rival contentions, it is
necessary to refer to the Emails sent from the official Email
ID of plaintiff to the personal Email ID of first defendant and
also Email correspondence between first defendant and
second defendant even before first defendant had submitted
resignation. At this stage of the case, there are no reasons to
suspect contents of these documents.
27. The plaintiff has made available the copy of
agreement of employment entered into between the first
defendant and second defendant on 18.03.2009, which
reads thus:
21
"This Agreement is made on 18th of March 2009 by and between:
IMA AG ASIA PACIFIC PTE. LTD, a Company incorporated under the Laws of Singapore and having its registered office at No.2, Kallang Pudding Road, #05-16, Mactech Industrial Building, SINGAPORE-349 307 (hereinafter referred to as "the company"
AND
Mr.ULFATH ALI KHAN, presently residing at 862, Coconut Garden Street, Dasarahalli Post, 560 057 Bangalore, Karnataka, India (hereinafter referred to as "Mr.KHAN"
WHEREAS, the Company is engaged in the business of machine sales and services to the furniture and wood processing industries;
AND WHEREAS Mr.Khan has approached the company and has offered to provide services in the field of market entry, sales and service for the company in India on the terms and conditions of the company.
AND WHEREAS the Company has agreed to appoint Mr.Khan to provide the services more fully described in Annexure-'A' on the following terms and conditions:
NOW THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE MUTUAL CONVENANTS AND UNDERTAKING HEREIN CONTAINED, THE PARTIES HERETO HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1. OBJECT 22
Mr.Khan has approached the company and has offered to provide the services for the company to establish and structure a sales and service subsidiary for the Company in India and the Company has agree to appoint Mr.Khan to provide the services on the terms and conditions detailed out in Annexure-'A'.
2. EMPLOYMENT IN INDIAN ENTITY
It is the intention of the company to set up a Private Limited Company in India. In the event of the company setting up a Private Limited Company in India and or any other entity in India (Indian Entity) then Mr.Khan shall be appointed as the Director of Sales and Service for the Indian Entity. The terms and conditions of such appointment and the designation of Mr.Khan shall be under a new contract during or after the employment contract attached hereafter in Annexure-A.
It being clarified and agree between the parties that a new employment contract with the Indian Entity shall be executed and signed between the parties if an only if the company has set up an Indian Entity. In the event of the company setting up an Indian Entity, the new employment contract will be executed with such entity and Mr.Khan will not be entitled to negotiate any of the terms and conditions stated in the Employment Contract under Annexure-A."
28. On perusal of relevant terms of contents of
Annexure-'A' referred to in the employment of contract, I find 23
that second defendant had appointed the first defendant as
an employee of second defendant on monthly salary of
2,750 SGD (Singapore Dollars). The second defendant had
also offered commission of 0.25% of the net machine value
on each deal.
Annexure-'A' also contains the confidentiality clauses,
which are similar to the confidentiality clauses contained in
the letter of appointment issued by plaintiff. From the letter
of appointment (Annexure-A), it is clear that the second
defendant had intention to set up a private limited company
in India. It was the intention of II-defendant to appoint I-
defendant as the Director of Sales and Service of its Indian
entity. Regarding terms and conditions of such appointment
and designation of first defendant, defendants 1 & 2 had
agreed to enter into a new contract. It was agreed between
defendants till such company is established, the first
defendant would be an employee of second defendant. 24
29. These documents would prima-facie establish that first
defendant was prompted by second defendant and he was
offered higher remuneration. The first defendant being
tempted by the offer made by second defendant had
committed breach of confidentiality and also transferred
from the plaintiff's Email ID to his personal Yahoo account
through his official Homag account the data consisting of list
of customers, list of offers and details, machinery installed
and serviced and so on. The e-mail correspondence
defendants interse would indicate that I-defendant was in
contact with II-defendant from 01.02.2008. There was email
correspondence defendants interese during period between
26.05.2008 and 20.04.2009. This correspondence relates
exchange of confidential business information of plaintiff.
The I-defendant tendered resignation on 25.03.2009 after
entering into agreement of employment with II-defendant on
18.03.2009.
It is true I-defendant had right to approach II-
defendant seeking appointment on higher remuneration. 25
Similarly II-defendant had right to appoint I-defendant.
However, such an agreement should not have been on
quid-pro-quo basis of I-defendant sharing with II-defendant,
confidential information of plaintiff's business detrimental to
interest of plaintiff.
30. The plaintiff has made out a prima-facie case of breach
of confidentiality by first defendant. The learned trial judge
on the premise that suit will be disposed of within one year
has granted an order of temporary injunction for a period of
one year from the date of order i.e., till April'2009. However,
the suit is still pending. In view of breach of confidentiality
committed by first defendant for being utilised by second
defendant for its business activities, the trial court was
justified in holding that plaintiff has made out a prima-facie
case against first defendant. In the circumstances, the trial
judge should have granted an order of temporary injunction
against first defendant pending disposal of suit. 26
The next point for consideration is whether the learned
trial judge was justified in refusing to grant an order of
temporary injunction against II-defendant?
31. The learned counsel for plaintiff has made following
submissions:-
I. The II-defendant had appointed I-defendant on
18.03.2009 to use I-defendant as a conduit to intrude into
plaintiff's business in India. The agreement of employment
(document No.9) would manifest the intention of II-defendant
to set up a private limited company in India and appoint I-
defendant as its Director and utilise confidential information
of plaintiff's business as a spring board for it's business
activity which is similar to business activity of plaintiff's
company.
II. The plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that
there was contrivance between I-defendant and II-defendant
by conduct of defendants and e-mails exchanged between
defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff has produced these 27
documents to make out a prima facie case. The II-defendant
in connivance with I-defendant has invaded legal rights of
plaintiff to use confidential information relating to plaintiff's
business as a springboard to establish its business entity in
India. The learned trial Judge has committed an error in
refusing an order of temporary injunction against II-
defendant on the ground that there was no privity of contract
between plaintiff and I-defendant. The learned trial Judge
has ignored that plaintiff has placed prima facie material to
establish that II-defendant has invaded legal rights of
plaintiff.
The learned counsel for plaintiff has relied on various
decisions to contend that infringement of confidential
information of plaintiff's business would entitle plaintiff to
get an order of temporary injunction against both
defendants.
32. The learned counsel for II-defendant has made
following submissions:-
28
I. The reliefs sought for in plaint as also in the
application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC are vague. The
application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC lacks
clarity.
II. If an order of temporary injunction is granted on vague
assertions of plaintiff, plaintiff is likely to misuse the same to
curb business activities of II-defendant.
III. The products of plaintiff are not confidential. They are
very much in public domain. The plaintiff cannot claim right
of confidentiality, without making specific references.
IV. The plaintiff has filed the instant suit with an intention
to prevent II-defendant from establishing its business
activities in India. It is not for plaintiff or for the court to
decide whether II-defendant should establish its business in
India.
V. The plaintiff has filed this suit on the premise that
II-defendant is carrying on business similar to business of 29
plaintiff and II-defendant would use confidential information
from I-defendant as a springboard to establish its business
entity in India. These apprehensions are founded on
surmises and conjectures, without there being any material
to establish that II-defendant has invaded legal rights of
plaintiff.
VI. The plaintiff cannot enforce a negative covenant
against the provisions of section 41(h) of Specific Relief Act.
33. In the discussion made supra, I have referred to
averments of plaint application. The documents relied upon
by plaintiff would provide prima facie proof of activities of
defendants inter se. At this stage, there are no reasons to
suspect the contents of these documents.
The II-defendant had employed I-defendant on
18.03.2009 whilst I-defendant was under the employment of
plaintiff. The terms of employment would prima facie
establish that II-defendant had induced I-defendant to
commit breach of confidentiality. The I-defendant committed 30
breach of confidentiality and violated the terms of contract
of employment of I-defendant with plaintiff.
34. In a decision reported in (2012) 6 SCC 792 (in the case
of Best Sellers Retail (India) Private Limited Vs. Aditya Birla
Nuvo Limited & Others & connected matters), the Supreme
Court has held:-
"25. It is not necessary for us to deal with the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties based on the provisions of Sections 14, 41 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 because Section 37 of the said Act makes it clear that temporary injunctions are to be regulated by CPC and not by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In fact, the application for temporary injunction of Respondent 1 before the trial court is under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC."
35. In view of what has been held in the above decision,
submission of learned counsel for II-defendant that plaintiff
is trying to enforce a negative covenant against provisions of 31 section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be
accepted.
36. The learned counsel for II-defendant relying on a
decision of High Court of Madras, reported in (2003) 3 MLJ
557 (in the case of Polaris Software Lab Limited rep. by its
Company Secretary Vs. Suren Khiwadkar) would submit that
plaintiff has sought for temporary injunction restraining
defendants from divulging any confidential information. The
plaintiff has not divulged nature of confidentiality. The
confidential information that I-defendant had in his mind is
purely subjective. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to an
order of temporary injunction.
37. In the aforestated judgment, plaintiff had sought for
an order of temporary injunction in the following terms:-
(1) restraining defendants from committing any act in breach of undertaking;
(2) restraining the defendants from disclosing any confidential information;
32
(3) Restraining them from giving out any adverse publicity to the media."
38. The Madras High Court having regard to nature of
relief sought for has held that confidential information is
purely subjective. The application for grant of an order of
temporary injunction was devoid of clarity. If an order of
temporary injunction is granted, the plaintiff is likely to
misuse the order.
39. In a decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1098 (in the case
of Niranjan Shankar Golikari Vs. Century Spinning and
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.), the Supreme Court has held that
negative covenant in maintaining confidentiality of
information and negative covenant during subsistence of
contract are essential to fulfillment of contract.
40. Under Exception I to Section 27 of the Contract Act,
post service restraint in maintaining confidentiality and also
carrying on any other business for a limited period is
permissible.
33
41. In a decision reported in AIR 1987 Delhi 372 (in the
case of John Richard Brady and Others Vs. Chemical
Process Equipments P. Ltd. and another), it is held:-
"22. ....in general rules of equity, there can be restraint of breach of confidence.
The Delhi High Court relying on a judgment reported
in 1948 RFC 203 has held:-
"Secrecy
The maintenance of secrecy which plays sucha an important part in securing to the owner of an invention the uninterrupted proprietorship of marketable know-how, which thus remains at least a form of property, is enforceable at law. That statement may now be examined in the light of established rules making up the law of trade secrets. These rules may, according to the circumstances in any given case, either rest on the principles of equity, that is to say the application by the Court of the need for conscientiousness in the course of conduct, or by the common-law action for breach of confidence which is in effect a breach of contract.
34 In considering these alternatives there are three sets of circumstances out of which proceedings, may arise:
(a) Where an employee comes into possession of secret and confidential information in the normal course of his work, and either carelessly or deliberately passes that information to an unauthorized person;
(b) Where an unauthorized person (such as a new employer) incites such an employee to provide him with such information as has been mentioned above; and
(c) Where, under a license for the use of know-how, a licensee is in breach of a condition, either expressed in any agreement or implied from conduct, to maintain secrecy in respect of such know-how and fails to do so."
In the same judgment, it is held that if a defendant is
proved to have used confidential information, obtained
directly or indirectly, from a plaintiff, without the consent,
express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of
infringement of plaintiff's rights.
35
In the case on hand, plaintiff has produced prima facie
material to prove that II-defendant had induced I-defendant
to gain confidential information of plaintiff business even
when I-defendant was very much in services of plaintiff.
There are reasons to believe that II-defendant had obtained
confidential information in connivance with I-defendant.
These facts are prima facie established by documents relied
upon by plaintiff, in particular, letter of agreement and
agreement of contract entered into between I-defendant and
II-defendant on 18.03.2009 and e-mails exchanged between
defendants 1 and 2. Therefore, plaintiff has prima facie
established that II-defendant has infringed legal rights of
plaintiff.
42. The learned counsel for II-defendant, referring to the
contents of application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC
would submit that averments of application are general in
nature. There is no specific reference to any product or
technical know-how with reference to products dealt by
plaintiff. The learned counsel would submit that products 36
dealt by plaintiff such as Table Edgebander etc., are within
public domain. Therefore, there cannot be any
confidentiality.
43. The learned counsel for II-defendant would submit
that CNC machines said to be used by plaintiff are within
public domain. The application of CNC machines is not only
plaintiff's activities or II-defendant's activities, it is used in
industrial activities by other companies.
44. The learned counsel for II-defendant would submit
that CNC (Computerised Numerical Control) machine is used
in all industrial activities for precision and also to save
manual labour and time. The plaintiff cannot contend that
CNC is a confidential information of plaintiff's business.
45. On consideration of averments of application filed
under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC, I find that plaintiff has not
made any specific reference, however in the plaint, plaintiff
has stated nature of its business activities and range of
products dealt by plaintiff.
37
46. The learned counsel for plaintiff has made available
product range catalogue of plaintiff and submitted that an
order of temporary injunction against II-defendant may be
granted with reference to products stated in the catalogue.
47. After going through the contents of catalogue, I find
that plaintiff has been dealing with Table Edgebander,
Universal Edgebander, Through Feed Edgebander, Wide-Belt
Sanding Machine, Manual Beam Saw, CNC Beam Saw, CNC
Processing Centres, Double sided panel sizing and
Edgebanding Machines etc. Though CNC machines adopted
by plaintiff for its operations are available within public
domain, yet plaintiff has given brand names to its products
such as Optimat NKD 720, Optimat KTD 820, Ambition
1200, Ambition 1210/Ambition 1210F, Ambition 1220
C/Ambition 1220 FC, Ambition 1430 C/Ambition 1430 FC,
Ambition 1440 FC/Ambition 1440 F2C, Ambition 1650
FC/Highflex 1650, Optimat SWT 124 RK, Optimat SWT 315
X, Optimat SWT 325 RL, Optimat SWT 335 QCH, HPM 120, 38
HPP 180/38/38, HPP 230/31/31/HPP 250/31/31, HPL
430/38/22, Ambition 2260, Ambition 2262, Venture 20/22,
Venture 316 M, KFL 326C, FPR 225/FPR 226, BAZ
322/40/K, BAZ 722, WoodCAD/CAM, NDS 102, Optimat
BST 503, BHX 050 Optimat/BHX 055 Optimat, PTP 160
PLUS, Venture 2M and Vantage 100/480. Therefore, plaintiff
has its brand names for several machines such as Table
Edgebander, Universal Edgebander, Through Feed
Edgebander, Wide-Belt Sanding Machine, Manual Beam
Saw, CNC Beam Saw, CNC Processing Centres, Double sided
panel sizing and Edgebanding Machines etc. In the
circumstances, it cannot be held that technical data
information to manufacturing process and know-how of
these machines dealt by plaintiff are within public domain.
48. The learned counsel for II-defendant has submitted
that plaintiff has not placed prima facie material to show
that II-defendant has established its entity in India and it is
carrying on business similar to plaintiff's business in India. 39
Therefore, plaintiff merely on the basis of apprehensions
cannot seek an order of temporary injunction.
49. The learned counsel for plaintiff, relying on a judgment
of this court, reported in AIR 1976 KARNATAKA 53 (in the
case of M.K.Dasappa Vs. G.Ramachandra) would submit that
a temporary injunction should not be granted if there is no
imminent danger to the plaintiff or to his building. But the
word "imminent" in the context need not be literally
understood. If the plaintiff has to wait till the last moment,
disastrous consequences might follow which the Court
cannot prevent for want of time or procedural requirements.
The word should be understood in the sense that the remedy
sought by the plaintiff should not be premature.
50. The learned counsel for plaintiff would submit that
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that defendants 1 &
2 have gathered confidential business information of plaintiff
to intrude to the business activities of plaintiff. Therefore, 40
II-defendant cannot be heard to say that relief sought for by
plaintiff is premature.
51. In the discussion made supra, I have referred to
various documents relied upon by plaintiff. I have held that
II-defendant had lured I-defendant to gather confidential
information of plaintiff's business with an intention to make
use of the same. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to establish that II-defendant has been using
plaintiff's confidential business information to promote
business of II-defendant.
52. It is true that plaintiff's application for grant of
temporary injunction is not precise, however there is
reference to plaintiff's business activities and various
products dealt by plaintiff. In the circumstances, the grant of
an order of temporary injunction with reference to specific
names stated in the product catalogue of plaintiff for a
limited period would avoid situation of grant of an order of
temporary injunction on vague terms and this would also 41
avoid likelihood of plaintiff misusing the order to curb the
business activities of II-defendant. The learned trial judge
has not referred to documents relied upon by plaintiff. The
learned trial judge has failed to notice that breach of
confidentiality and misuse of confidentiality are actionable
rights. The learned trial judge has proceeded an erroneous
assumption that in the absence of contract and breach of
contract, the plaintiff had no actionable right against II-
defendant. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be
sustained.
53. In the result, I pass the following:-
ORDER
The appeals are accepted. Defendants 1 & 2 are
restrained by an order of temporary injunction from carrying
on business in India or carrying on business with, dealing or
in any manner transacting with any of customers of plaintiff
by utilizing confidential information whether in the form of
technical data, correspondence and information pertaining
to, manufacturing process, marketing plans, offers, pricing, 42
customer list, software, specifications, engineering methods
and know-how, consumer grievances, customer solutions,
service logs, service history and service feedback pertaining
to clients or method of resolving area specific problems in
relation to following namely :- Optimat NKD 720, Optimat
KTD 820, Ambition 1200, Ambition 1210/Ambition 1210F,
Ambition 1220 C/Ambition 1220 FC, Ambition 1430
C/Ambition 1430 FC, Ambition 1440 FC/Ambition 1440
F2C, Ambition 1650 FC/Highflex 1650, Optimat SWT 124
RK, Optimat SWT 315 X, Optimat SWT 325 RL, Optimat
SWT 335 QCH, HPM 120, HPP 180/38/38, HPP
230/31/31/HPP 250/31/31, HPL 430/38/22, Ambition
2260, Ambition 2262, Venture 20/22, Venture 316 M, KFL
326C, FPR 225/FPR 226, BAZ 322/40/K, BAZ 722,
WoodCAD/CAM, NDS 102, Optimat BST 503, BHX 050
Optimat/BHX 055 Optimat, PTP 160 PLUS, Venture 2M and
Vantage 100/480, pending disposal of suit.
Having regard to nature of restraint imposed in terms
of this order, the trial court shall decide the suit on merits 43
within a period of one year from today, for which both
parties shall extend their co-operation. If plaintiff does not
co-operate for disposal of suit within one year from today,
plaintiff cannot seek for extension of order of temporary
injunction. If defendants 1 & 2 fail to co-operate for disposal
of suit within one year from today, plaintiff will be at liberty
to seek for extension of order of temporary injunction for
such period as may warranted by situation.
Sd/-
JUDGE
SNN/Np
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