Her Highness Mehr Tej., Nawab Sajeela Sultan vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

1. The appellant -- Her Highness Mehr Tej Nawab Sultan -- (since deceased and now represented by her legal heirs) daughter of (late) His Highness Nawab Mohd. Hamidullah Khan, the erstwhile Ruler of Bhopal received a notice from the competent authority calling upon her to furnish returns of her lands, providing information under Section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (for short "the Act"). In responding to the same, she did not furnish "returns" in respect of those agricultural lands which she described as the Ruler's private property. A sort of immunity pertaining to those was claimed by her contending that the Act did not apply to the private properties earmarked by the Ruler as his own when ceding the State in the late forties to the Governor General of India and then to the Indian Union. The authorities concerned at the lowest and the appellate stages held against her adding those properties to her account. When she took the matter to the High Court in writ proceedings, the High Court focussed the question but left it unanswered, taking the view that it would not go into it in writ proceedings expressing the view that the competent authorities had not exceeded their jurisdiction and that if there was any dispute about ownership, the appellant could take it to a civil court. The said order of the High Court is under challenge before us.

2. As is plain, the present effort of the appellant is to have that question answered as to whether or not the Ruler's private property culled out at the time of ceding of the State was held thereafter in Bhumiswami rights and thus accountable to the State for ceiling purposes? Such question was pristinely of law and we are not impressed by the reasoning adopted by the High Court that it should have been left to the ceiling authorities or to the civil court to settle this question. The High Court should have come to grips with it, We are presently taking this view more on account of certain subsequent events which have assumed dimensions and necessitate a solution. After the High Court gave its judgment on 22-3-1977, an amendment was caused in Section 158 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 whereby Sub-section (2) was inserted which reads as follows:

"(2) A Ruler of an Indian State forming part of the State of Madhya Pradesh who, at the time of coming into force of this Code, was holding land or was entitled to hold land as such Ruler by virtue of the covenant or agreement entered into by him before the commencement of the Constitution, shall as from the date of coming into force of this Code be a Bhumiswami of such land under the Code and shall be subject to all the rights and liabilities conferred and imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under the Code.

Explanation.--In this section the expressions "Ruler" and "Indian State" shall have the same meanings as are assigned to these expressions in clauses (22) and (15) respectively of Article 366 of the Constitution of India."

3. On behalf of the State of M.P., this amendment was brought to the notice of this Court, suggesting that this was a complete answer to the supposed grievance of the appellant and that anything which might have been left to the interpretative process dehors the amendment, stands now surfaced clearly, and on that basis, the claim of the appellant to immunity concerning the Ruler's private properties, shall be taken to have been negatived. In response, the appellant has maintained that not only do the provisions of Section 158, dehors the amendment, do not make the appellant Bhumiswami of the Ruler's private lands, the amendment as such was unworkable and was otherwise ultra vires of Article 31 of the Constitution, as it stood then. In aid, a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Court rendered in Usha Devi v. State of M.P., 1995 MPLJ 113 has been employed to contend that the amendment is wholly unworkable as it causes adverse affectations in certain provisions of the Act; all the more due to its retrospectivity. The learned Single Judge found the said provision to be inapplicable. We have not been apprised of the fact as to whether any steps were taken by the State to challenge that decision in higher forums and the fate thereof. Be that as it may, the said aspect is of utmost importance and relevance to the instant controversy because Mr Shukla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State, is sanguine that dehors the amendment, it is not expedient or prudent to settle this appeal on merits as they stood placed before the High Court.

4. In the wake of the stand adopted by Mr Shukla and the resistance offered by the appellant, it becomes expedient that a remand be affected putting back the matter on the file of the Division Bench of the High Court as the matter was dealt with and disposed of at that level, requiring it to examine the desirability of giving a decision on merit because of the pristinely legal question involved about the claimed immunity to the Ruler's private lands as also about the validity of the amendment and the correctness of the view of the learned Single Judge.

5. The appeal is thus disposed of and the matter is remanded to the High Court for further consideration. Interim orders passed by this Court shall remain valid till the disposal of the writ petition by the High Court.

6. No costs.