Miss Lucy
← All judgments

Hem Raj vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Supreme Court8 April 2026Prashant Kumar Mishra

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. A person may be convicted separately under Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act in addition to conviction under Section 20, because Sections 25 and 29 contemplate independent offences distinct from the principal offence under Section 20. Section 25, which punishes allowing premises or conveyances to be used for commission of an offence, establishes a separate offence when the owner or occupier knowingly permits such use. Section 29, which addresses abetment and criminal conspiracy, likewise establishes independent offences, as criminal conspiracy is well-settled to be a substantive and independent offence. An occupier of a conveyance in which drugs are found may be convicted under Section 25 even if that person does not own the conveyance but occupies and has control over it. 2. Separate sentences may be imposed for convictions under Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act in addition to sentence under Section 20, notwithstanding that Sections 25 and 29 refer to "the punishment provided for that offence" rather than specifying punishment independently. This reference to the punishment under the principal offence constitutes legislation by reference and incorporation, whereby the legislature has referred the punishment prescribed for an offence under Section 20 to be applied also as the punishment for offences under Sections 25 and 29, thus making those provisions enforceable with separate sentences in addition to the principal offence. 3. Where separate convictions arising from the same transaction or indivisible course of action result in separate sentences being imposed, the sentences should run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy; the rule that sentences run concurrently operates to prevent double punishment. 4. Where sentences are directed to run concurrently, a fine imposed as part of the sentence in respect of two offences shall not be imposed twice; the concurrent operation of the sentence extends to the fine component, and the offender is required to pay only one fine rather than cumulative fines. The fine is part of the sentence within the meaning of Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code, and concurrent running of sentences encompasses both imprisonment and fine components. 5. A term of imprisonment imposed in default of payment of fine is not part of the sentence but a penalty incurred only on non-payment of fine; consequently, if an offender has already undergone imprisonment equal to or exceeding the total sentence imposed (including the default imprisonment component), the offender is entitled to be released.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2026 INSC 332 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._______OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 19691 of 2025)

HEM RAJ …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH …RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is directed against common

judgment and order dated 05.12.2023 passed by the High

Court of Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 93 of

2020 and Criminal Appeal No. 230 of 2020, in so far as the

decision relates to Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 2020, which

was the appeal preferred by the appellant herein.

2.1. The High Court partly allowed the appeal by

Signature Not Verified modifying the sentence part of the judgment of learned Digitally signed by NISHA KHULBEY Date: 2026.04.08

Special Judge by reducing the substantive sentence of the 17:00:18 IST Reason:

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 1 of 28

appellant to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment from 12

years of rigorous imprisonment, separately imposed for the

offences under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) and also under Sections

25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 19851. Rest of the sentence awarded by the

Special Judge remained unaffected.

2.2. The Court of learned Special Judge, Chamba

Division, Chamba (H.P.) decided Sessions Trial No. 8 of

2015 (NDPS Act) by its judgment dated 07.11.2019 against

the present appellant Hem Raj, son of Shri Devi Singh and

co-accused Kulwant, son of Shri Bhagwant. Both the

accused including the appellant herein came to be convicted

for commission of offence punishable under Sections

20(b)(ii)(C) and 25 read with Section 29 of NDPS Act.

2.2.1. After hearing the convicts on the quantum of

sentence, learned Special Judge by the order dated

16.11.2019 sentenced both the convicts to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for a period of 12 years each and to

pay fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- each and in default of payment

1 Hereinafter, “NDPS Act”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 2 of 28

of the amount of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

a period of one year each for the commission of offence

punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act.

2.2.2. In respect of offence punishable under Section 25

read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act, the appellant and the

co-convict were sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of 12 years each and to pay a fine

of Rs. 1,20,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to

undergo rigorous imprisonment of further period of one year

each.

2.2.3. It was directed that both the sentences shall run

concurrently. In the appeal preferred by appellant Hem Raj

before the High Court as stated above, the sentence came

to be reduced to 10 years from 12 years of rigorous

imprisonment. The remainder part of the sentence stood

confirmed as awarded by learned Special Judge.

2.3. As noted by this Court in order dated 28.11.2025,

the assail to the judgment and order of the High Court in

this appeal is on two grounds. Firstly, that the appellant

could not have been convicted separately for offence

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 3 of 28 punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) on one hand and

Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act on the other. Second

ground has been that the fine sentence could not have been

imposed separately for both the offences and that since the

sentences were ordered to run concurrently, the appellant

is not required to pay the double amount of fine.

3. Noticing the facts, on 22.12.2014, the police squad

was exercising Nakabandi duty at Tunnuhatti Police Barrier

in wee hours. At around 3.50 a.m., while checking the

vehicles, a grey coloured Esteem car bearing registration

No. PB-65A-9377 was seen coming from the side of

Banikhet. The police party stopped the car for checking. The

driver revealed his name to be Kulwant Singh who was also

the registered owner of the car, and the appellant Hem Raj

sitting on the front seat, were the two occupying the car.

When driver Kulwant Singh opened the window glass, the

smell of cannabis spread out.

3.1. Upon search of the said two persons and the vehicle,

a blue coloured carry bag having transparent polythene

packets containing black hard substance was found kept

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 4 of 28 below the leg space of the front seat occupied by the

appellant herein. The said blue coloured bag had in it eight

transparent polythene packets containing black substance

in round and stick shape. When it was checked with the

drugs detection kit, the same was found to be charas of the

quantity of 4 kgs.100 gms.

3.2. After undertaking the necessary procedure both the

accused were nabbed and were charged with the offence

punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 25 read with

Section 29 of the NDPS Act in the chargesheet filed on

14.08.2015.

4. Learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. Ajay Marwah

while not challenging the conviction, highlighting the

limited yet substantial challenge to the sentence imposed,

submitted that the courts below were not justified in

imposing separate punishments for the offences under

Section 20 as well as under Section 25 read with Section 29

of the NDPS Act, despite the fact that both the convictions

arose from one indivisible transaction. Learned counsel

took the court through Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Act to

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 5 of 28 pinpoint that no separate punishment was provided under

Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act.

4.1. It was additionally submitted that as borne out from

chargesheet, the registered owner of the vehicle was co-

accused Kulwant Singh and not the appellant herein,

therefore, it was submitted, in absence of ownership, the

‘occupation’ and ‘control’ over the vehicle was not of the

appellant and that he could not have “knowingly permitted

its use” . On such basis it was sought to be submitted that

the very foundation of invoking Section 25 of the Act against

the appellant was lacking and that the appellant could not

have been convicted under Section 25.

4.1.1. It was next submitted without prejudice that even if

the appellant could be booked for the offence under

Sections 25 and 29, the said provision does not prescribe

an independent punishment or sentence. According to the

learned counsel for the appellant, the offences

contemplated under these Sections are merely in the nature

of extension of the main offence in the nature of commission

of supplemented act creating vicarious liability with the

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 6 of 28 principal offence, which was under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the

Act. It was submitted that the sentence awarded to the

appellant amounted to double punishment which is

prohibited under Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602

as well.

4.1.2. It was the next submission on behalf of the appellant

that when the sentences for the said offences were directed

to run concurrently, the entire punishment including the

fine should have a concurrent operation. In this regard it

was submitted that ‘punishments’ under Section 53, IPC

includes both imprisonment and fine, therefore, treating

imprisonment to be concurrent but treating the fine as

cumulative would be illogical and would not be permissible.

4.1.3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

due to poor condition, the appellant is not in a position to

pay the fine. It was submitted that till January 2026, the

appellant has already suffered incarceration for about 11

2 Hereinafter, “IPC”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 7 of 28 years including the remission, as indicated in the custody

certificate.

4.2. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondent State Mr. Bimlesh Kumar Singh refuted the

arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant to submit

that FIR No. 140 of 2014 dated 22.12.2014 was registered

against the appellant and the co-convict which was for the

offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the

NDPS Act for possessing, transporting and commissioning

the crime with criminal conspiracy, to have in the car below

the front driver seat 4 kgs and 100 gms of Charas and that

both the persons came to be convicted for the said offence,

the appellant having not challenged the said conviction.

4.2.1. It was submitted that the High Court considering

the aspect that appellant had already undergone 9 years of

imprisonment and further that there was no complaint in

the jail conduct of the appellant, the substantive sentence

came to be reduced to 10 years from 12 years for the

offences committed under Section 20 as well as 25 and 29

of the Act.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 8 of 28 4.2.2. Learned counsel for the respondent further

submitted that the sentence prescribed under Section

20(b)(ii)(C) is of rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10

years which may extend to 20 years and fine to be not less

than Rs. 1 lakh extendable to Rs. 2 lakh. It was highlighted

that the commercial quantity of Charas was found to be in

possession of the accused persons which was proved in the

trial leading to conviction under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the

Act. The car was used for transportation of narcotics,

submitted learned counsel for the respondent, the offence

attracted Section 25 read with Section 29, which provisions

prescribed for awarding same sentence as of the main

offence.

4.2.3. It was emphasised that the appellant was “occupier”

of the car from whom the contraband was found and

recovered and both acted in criminal conspiracy as held by

the courts below. It was submitted that therefore the

conviction and imposition of sentence under the said

sections separately done is justified. Learned counsel for the

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 9 of 28 respondent submitted that there is no error in imposition of

separate fine amounts which is part of sentence.

4.2.4. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted

that the sentence awarded is in consonance with the

provision of the Section 65 of the IPC which provides that

the term for which the court may direct the offender to be

in prison in default of payment of fine shall not exceed up

to 1/4th of the term of imprisonment which is the

imprisonment maximum fixed for the offence if the offence

is punishable with imprisonment as well as with fine.

4.2.5. By relying on the decision of this Court in

Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of

Gujarat3, it was submitted by learned counsel for the

respondent that the term of imprisonment in default of

payment of fine is not a sentence, but it is a penalty which

a person incurs on account of non-payment of fine. Same

principle was sought to be highlighted from another

decision of this Court in Shantilal v. State of M.P.4 It was

3 (2013) 1 SCC 570 4 (2007) 11 SCC 243

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 10 of 28 submitted that the minimum sentence prescribed is 10

years of rigorous imprisonment, therefore no option is

available but to impose such minimum sentence in the list,

which is done by the High Court.

4.2.6. Learned counsel for the respondent proceeded to

submit about deleterious impact of narcotic drugs and the

activities in dealing with the narcotic drugs on the society

and that how the menace of drug addiction has the

tendency of destroying the life of an individual and the

derailing the quality of the society to have the effect on the

generations to come, by pressing into service the

observation of this Court in Gurdev Singh v. State of

Punjab5.

5. In order to find an answer as to whether separate

sentence for the offence under Section 20 on one hand and,

on the other hand, for the offences committed under

Sections 25 and 29 of the Act is permissible to be awarded

and whether offences under Sections 25 and 29 could be

considered as part of the main offence under Section 20,

5 (2021) 6 SCC 558

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 11 of 28 and therefore not attracting separate punishment and

sentence, it is necessary to consider various provisions in

Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985, titled as “Offences and

Penalties”. In different Sections, the punishment for

contravention of different kinds of contrabands prohibited

under the Act is considered.

5.1. Section 15 of the Act is about punishment for

contravention in relation to poppy straw, whereas

punishment for contravention in relation to coca plant and

coca leaves is dealt in Section 16. Punishment for

contravention in relation to prepared opium in Section 17

whereas punishment for contravention in relation to opium

poppy and opium is contemplated in Section 18.

5.1.1. The measure of sentence in Sections 15, 17 and 18

is made dependent upon whether the quantity involved is

small quantity or the quantity lesser than commercial but

greater than small quantity or whether the contravention

involves commercial quantity as the case may be. Section

16 as well as Section 19 provide for punishment for

embezzlement of opium by cultivator. In the provisions from

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 12 of 28 Section 15 onwards, the specific punishment of the term of

imprisonment, is expressly provided for.

5.1.2. Similar is the punishment for contravention in

relation to manufactured drugs and preparations under

Section 21, wherein also the specific punishment is

provided for, depending upon the quantity of the

contraband involved. Provision of Section 22 is in respect of

punishment for contravention in relation to psychotropic

substances whereas Section 23 is for punishment for illegal

import into India, export from India, or transhipments of

narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Section 24 is

about punishment for external dealings in narcotic drugs

and psychotropic substances in contravention of Section

20. For the offences under these sections also, punishment

is expressly and specifically provided.

5.2. In the present case, the commission of offence under

Section 20(b)(ii)(C) is established against the appellant

convict. Section 20 which is in respect for punishment for

contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis

reads as under,

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 13 of 28 ‘20. Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis.—Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder,—

(a) cultivates any cannabis plant; or

(b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable,— (i) where such contravention relates to clause (a) with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; and

(ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause

(b),— (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both;

(B) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees;

(C) and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.’

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 14 of 28 5.2.1. The conviction against the appellant is also recorded

under Sections 25 and 29 of the Act. Section 25 relates to

the punishment for allowing premises, etc., to be used for

commission of an offence. The said section is extracted

hereinbelow,

‘25. Punishment for allowing premises, etc., to be used for commission of an offence.-Whoever, being the owner or occupier or having the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space, place, animal or conveyance, knowingly permits it to be used for the commission by any other person of an offence punishable under any provision of this Act, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence.’

5.2.2. Section 29 dealing with the punishment of abetment

and criminal conspiracy, is reproduced hereinbelow,

‘29. Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.

(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which—

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 15 of 28

(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or

(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India.’

5.3. Reading Sections 15 to 19, 21 to 24, 25A, 27 as well

as Section 20 which is relevant to the present case, it would

be noticed that all these sections prescribed punishment

and sentence separately for the offence related to

contraband mentioned therein. Section 25 however says

that a person who is found to be owner or occupier or having

the control or use of any house, room, enclosure, space,

place, animal or conveyance, is found to be knowingly

permitting it to be used for the commission by any other

person of an offence punishable under any provision of this

Act shall be punishable with “the punishment provided for

that offence”. Similar phraseology is employed in respect of

punishment in Section 29 which says that a person found

guilty of abetment and criminal conspiracy to commit an

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 16 of 28 offence under Chapter IV “be punishable with the

punishment provided for the offence”, notwithstanding

anything contained in Section 116 of the IPC.

5.4. The argument is sought to be founded on the

variation of language in Section 20 (as also noticeable in

other sections mentioned above) vis-a-vis Sections 25 and

29 that since Section 20 specifically provides for a

particular punishment and Sections 25 and 29 only says

that punishment for the said offences which may be

imposed would be the same “as provided for that offence”,

the conviction under Sections 25 and 29 could not have

attracted a separate and distinct punishment. What is

contended is that punishment imposed under Section 20 on

the appellant would take care of the punishment for the

conviction under Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act,

which according to learned counsel of the appellant, are

only part of substantive offence.

5.5. The submission namely that the appellant could not

have been held to have committed offence under Section 25

of the Act in as much as the appellant was only sitting in

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 17 of 28 the front seat in the car belonging to the other person – the

co-convict, therefore, could not have been said to have

‘knowingly permitted’ the car to be used for the commission

of offence by that another person, may be dealt with. The

submission which looks attractive at the first blush, has no

substance when Section 25 is read carefully.

5.5.1. The provision contains the words “occupier” as well

as “use of any house, space, conveyance, etc. by person”.

The appellant was an occupier of the car. In capacity of

occupier the appellant could be said to have committed the

crime under Section 25. Section 25 could be applied to

operate in two ways. In any view, along with Section 25,

conviction is also recorded under Section 29. The conviction

is not challenged.

5.6. There exists an apparent fallacy in what is sought to

be canvassed that separate sentence is not permissible to

be awarded. Various sections in Chapter IV of the Act relate

to different independent offences pertaining to the

contraband. Section 25 and Section 29, which are part of

the group of sections, also speak of the offences. Allowing

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 18 of 28 premises etc. to be used for commission of an offence is

conceived by the legislature to be a separate offence and

engrafted in the Act accordingly as an independent offence

under Section 25.

5.6.1. In a given case, an offender may have permitted the

other person to use the house, room, space, place, animal

or conveyance etc. to facilitate the commission of any

offence under the Act. This conduct would fall squarely

within Section 25 to become a distinct and independent

offence by that person who so permits the use of house,

conveyance etc. for the purpose of committing an offence by

the other person.

5.7. Looking at Section 29, it speaks of punishment for

the offence of abetment and criminal conspiracy. An

abetment of a thing is an independent offence mentioned in

the IPC. Section 116, IPC mentions about the abetment of

offence punishable with imprisonment - if offence be or be

not committed.

5.7.1. Section 116, IPC is relevant to be noticed as under,

‘116. Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment—if offence be not committed.—

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 19 of 28 Whoever abets an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence; or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with both; if abettor or person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent offence.—and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.’

5.7.2. Now, Section 29 says that “notwithstanding

anything contained in Section 116 of the IPC, be punishable

with the punishment provided for the offence”. What it

contemplates is that whoever abets the offence under the

NDPS Act in Chapter IV shall be punished for the

‘punishment provided for the offence’. In other words, the

fetter and limitation about the term of imprisonment

mentioned in Section 116 IPC, is done away with in relation

to offence of abetment under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

5.8. The offence of criminal conspiracy which is

inherently covert and rarely leaves behind direct traces and

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 20 of 28 whose existence could be inferred from the surrounding

facts and circumstances, where any overt commission of act

not always present, is seldom capable to be proved by direct

evidence. Section 120B, IPC is the punishment for the

offence of criminal conspiracy.

5.8.1. It is well settled that conspiracy is an independent

offence. In Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab6, this Court

referred to its earlier decision in State (NCT of Delhi) v.

Navjot Sandhu7, as also in Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf

Momin v. State of Maharashtra8, to underline that

conspiracy is an independent offence and may be

punishable even if the substantive offence committed by the

conspirators does not ultimately materialise.

5.8.2. It was held in Noor Mohammad (supra) that Section

120B, IPC makes criminal conspiracy a substantive offence

which postulates an agreement between two or more

persons to do or cause to be done an act by illegal means.

6 (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669 7 (2005) 11 SCC 600 8 (1970) 1 SCC 696

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 21 of 28 Thus, criminal conspiracy, which is an independent offence,

is so incorporated in Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

6. When the offence under Section 25 is entirely

possible to be committed separately as an independent

offence to remain distinct in itself, and when the offences of

abetment and criminal conspiracy mentioned in Section 29

are in themselves independent offences, it is entirely logical

to deduce and conclude that commission of these offences

once established, would attract separate punishment and

sentence.

6.1. It would not be right to say that when Section 25

and Section 29 mention the punishment for allowing

premises to be used for the offence or for abetment and

criminal conspiracy in the commission of an offence under

the Chapter, and that punishment is not expressly

mentioned, but what is mentioned is “punishment for that

offence,” it would mean that the imposition of separate

punishment is not contemplated. Both the Sections 25 and

29 mention that the commissioner of offence in question

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 22 of 28 shall be punishable with the punishment provided for “that

offence” or “the offence”.

7. Section 25 and Section 29 insofar as they provide

that the punishment for the respective offences mentioned

therein is same which would be for the principal offence, is

an instance of legislation by reference. The legislature has

referred to the punishment mentioned in the particular

section to be referred to and applied for the purpose of

punishment and sentence to be imposed under another

section. Stating differently, the punishment provided for the

offence under Section 20 of the Act is mentioned by way of

reference under Section 25 and Section 29 to be read into it

in a similar way to be applied for the imposition.

7.1. The doctrine of reference is a well-recognised tool of

legislation. It is a process whereby the legislature refers to

the provision of one statute in the provisions of the other

statute to be read into the other statute. In that way, the

provision in one statute becomes part of the provisions of

the other statute in which it is referred to. Analogous is the

doctrine of incorporation, which bears a fine distinction

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 23 of 28 with the doctrine of reference where provision from one

statute is bodily lifted to be incorporated to be part of

provision in another enactment.

7.2. While the Court is not concerned in this case with

the distinction, it would suffice to say that the provisions of

Section 20, or as the case may be, vis-à-vis Sections 25 and

29 in the NDPS Act, when refers to the punishment under

Section 20 conforming to the main offence, as the case may

be, to be also the punishment under Section 25 and Section

29 of the Act, it also becomes legislation by incorporation,

since provision in one section of the statute is made to be

referred, to be read into, and to be applied in the provision

of other sections of the same statute. Given this legislative

mandate, the contention has to be negatived that no

separate punishment and sentence is contemplated in

respect of Section 25 and Section 29 of the Act.

8. However, a riding clarification may be necessary.

Even though punishment for the offences under Section 25

and Section 29 of the Act is separately contemplated and

could be imposed independently and additionally, in a given

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 24 of 28 case and in most of the cases these offences have a connect

and an interaction with any of the main offences mentioned

in Sections 15 to 19, 20 to 24 and others. It may happen in

large number of cases that offences under Section 25 and

29, as the case may be, take place along with the other

substantive offences mentioned in Chapter IV, in course of

the same transaction. The two offences may be part of an

inclusive transaction. In other words, though separately

punishable, the offences under Sections 25 and 29 could be

parasitic and derivative.

8.1. The conviction is possible for two offences which

may be inclusive or interdependent arising out of same

course of action or the transaction. However, since the

offences committed for their kind and nature, would be

distinct offences, would entail separate punishment.

Therefore, even while imposing separate punishment for

such different offences, it would be the rule of wisdom to be

followed by the court that in such cases, the sentence is

made to run concurrently. In the instant case, the

sentences are ordered to run concurrently.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 25 of 28 8.2. The punishment and sentence should not result in

double jeopardy. One of the objects of concurrent running

of the sentence is to avoid double punishment. This

principle would readily apply when two separate

punishments are awarded, and sentences are imposed for

two offences relatable to one set of facts. It would call for

applying concurrent sufferance of punishment.

9. This takes the Court to the second remaining

question as to whether the fine imposed separately as part

of the punishment of two offences would be liable to be

treated concurrent along with the sentences of

imprisonment.

9.1. Section 53 IPC deals with the punishments. It says

that punishments for which the offenders are liable under

the provisions of this Code are death, imprisonment

whether rigorous or simple, forfeiture of property and fine.

Both imprisonment and fine are treated as punishments.

9.2. In the present case, the appellant is sentenced by

the High Court to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment,

and to pay fine of ₹1,20,000/- and in default to undergo

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 26 of 28 further rigorous imprisonment for one year. This is a default

imprisonment. In Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v.

State of Gujarat9, this Court observed that the term of

imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence

it is a penalty which a person incurs on account of non-

payment of fine. On the other hand, it was further observed,

if sentence is imposed, an offender must undergo unless it

is modified or varied in part or whole in the judicial

proceedings.

9.3. What it implies is that although the default

imprisonment clause is taken out of the concept of sentence

and is treated as penalty for not observing sentence of fine,

the amount of fine imposed required to be paid by the

convict is a sentence and has to be treated as part of

sentence. Section 53, IPC mentioned above also includes

fine as a punishment to be part of sentence. In that view

when the sentence is directed to run concurrently, the

appellant cannot be made to pay fine twice.

10. It is not in dispute that the appellant has undergone

total 11 years of imprisonment till January 2026, which

9 (2013) 1 SCC 570

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 27 of 28 includes the default imprisonment. Since the appellant has

suffered the default imprisonment also and that he is not

required to pay double amount of fine, he is entitled to be

released from the jail.

10.1. As a result, the appellant is directed to be set at

liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in

respect of any other offence.

11. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms and the

direction.

Interlocutory applications, as may have been

pending, shall not survive.

………..…………………………..,J.

[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

…………………………………..,J.

[N.V. ANJARIA] NEW DELHI;

APRIL 08, 2026.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl) No. 19691 of 2025 Page 28 of 28

This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.

Research this judgment with Miss Lucy

Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.

Try Miss Lucy free