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Harpal Singh vs State Of Haryana

Punjab-Haryana High Court8 September 2010Jitendra Chauhan

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where an accused is charged under Section 307 IPC, conviction does not require that the injuries inflicted be capable of causing death; it is sufficient if there is present an intent to cause death or knowledge of the likelihood of causing death coupled with some overt act in execution thereof, and the court must examine whether the act was done with such intention or knowledge irrespective of its result. The nature of injury inflicted is not material to establish guilt under Section 307 IPC where the seat of injury, the weapon used, and the circumstances of the occurrence establish the accused's intention and knowledge to cause death. Where an injury is declared dangerous to life by medical evidence, and there is consistency between the ocular testimony of the injured and eye-witnesses and the medical findings regarding the nature and causation of the injury, this corroborates the factum of injury inflicted by the accused. A delay in obtaining a medical opinion declaring an injury dangerous to life does not affect the authenticity of such opinion where the injury was medico-legally examined on the date of occurrence itself and the delayed opinion is based on radiological reports received at a later stage. The fact that an accused was a student at the time of the occurrence is not a sufficient mitigating factor to warrant a lenient sentence where serious injuries have been inflicted in trivial altercations, as such leniency would adversely affect society and public interest.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 Date of decision : 08.09.2010

Harpal Singh

...Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana

...Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE JITENDRA CHAUHAN

Present: Mr. Kapil Aggarwal, Advocate, for the appellant.

Mr. Kshitij Sharma, AAG, Haryana.

JITENDRA CHAUHAN, J.

1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated

7.5.2001 (for short as 'impugned judgment') passed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul (for short as 'trial Court'), vide which

the accused-appellant Harpal Singh has been convicted for the commission

of offence under Section 307 IPC and under Section 25 of the Indian Arms

Act in FIR No.277 dated 4.11.99 registered at Police Station City Narnaul.

2. The facts of the present case in the prosecution story as set up

before the trial Court are that the complainant/injured Sunil Kumar (PW9)

was student of P.G. College, Narnaul. In the academic year 1999-2000 he

was student of B.A. Part-II. On 4.11.99 at 12.00/12.30 noon he was present

at the bus stand of Narnaul for returning to his village Nasibpur, when all

the four accused came there. Harpal accused was holding a knife/gupti Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 2 Ex.P1. Jaswant, Ramesh and Ajay accused caught hold of him and Harpal

accused gave a knife blow in the left side of his waist. Dharminder (PW10)

and Naresh who were present at bus stand were attracted to the spot. On

seeing them the accused fled. Dharmender and Naresh removed him to Civil

Hospital, Narnaul where he was examined medico-legally by Dr. S P

Sharma (PW12). Doctor presented a ruka Ex.PM to ASI Chand Singh

(PW7) who was already present in the hospital with regard to investigation

of some other case. He moved an application Ex.PF before the doctor to

seek his opinion regarding fitness of the injured to make a statement.

Doctor declared him fit. His statement Ex.PG was recorded at 4.30 p.m.

and on the basis of that statement, FIR Ex.PG/1 was drawn.

3. The injured was referred to Medical College and Hospital,

Rohtak (MCH) for further management where he was operated upon the

same day by Dr. Anil Sharma (PW3). As per operation findings, there were

performation of size 1 X .5 cm each on anterolateral aspect of descending

colon near the splenic flexure.

4. On 22.12.99 an application was presented before Dr. S.P.

Sharma (PW12) to seek his opinion regarding nature of injury. The doctor

vide his endst. Ex.PN declared the injury dangerous to life. Initially the

FIR was drawn under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC. On the

basis of the opinion of the doctor the offence was converted under Section

307 IPC."

5. On the basis of the above allegations in the prosecution case,

all the accused were arrested and after completion of investigation, the final

report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented and accordingly charge was

framed against the accused to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 3 trial.

6. In order to support its case, the prosecution examined as many

as 12 witnesses, namely, Niranjan Lal as PW1; Krishan Kumar as PW2; Dr.

Anil Sharma of MCH, Rohtak, as PW3; C. Mahesh Kumar, Draughtsman,

who prepared the site plan Ex.PB, as PW4; ASI Ram Niwas as PW5; ASI

Chand Singh as PW7; Dr. Rajesh Verma as PW8; Sunil Kumar, injured, as

PW9; Dharmender, eye-witness, as PW10; Chhaju Ram, Investigating

Officer, as PW11 and Dr. S P Sharma, who medico-legally examined the

injured, as PW12.

7. After the prosecution closed its evidence, the accused were

examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by putting them all the incriminating

material against them in prosecution case which they all denied and pleaded

their false implication.

8. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence before it,

acquitted Ajay Kumar and Jaswant and Ramesh Chand while observing that

the prosecution has failed to bring home guilt against them. However, the

present appellant was convicted under Section 307 IPC and Section 25 of

Indian Arms Act vide judgment dated 7.5.2001..

9. Aggrieved against the conviction, the accused-appellant-Harpal

Singh has challenged the judgment of the learned trial Court by filing the

present appeal before this Court.

10.. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the

occurrence took place on 4.11.1999. Initially the FIR was registered under

Section 324/34 of IPC. On 12.12.1999, Section 307 of IPC was added.

The injured stood already discharged from the hospital on 15.11.1999.

Thus, the huge delay in obtaining the opinion of the doctor creates Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 4 considerable doubt on the genuineness of the prosecution version

particularly when it has come in the statement of Dr. Anil Sharma, PW-3,

Medical College and Hospital, Rohtak that the injured was operated upon

on 4.11.1999 itself.

11. It is further argued that from the evidence on record, it is

apparent that the name of the appellant was added at a later stage.

According to the injured/complainant, he left for Medical College Rohtak at

about 1-1/30 p.m., whereas as per the statement of Investigating Officer, the

statement of injured was recorded at 4.30 p.m. at Narnaul itself.

12. Learned counsel has further argued that a perusal of the DDR

would reveal that neither the names of co-accused Ajay and Jaswant nor the

place of occurrence was mentioned. Furthermore, the names of eye-

witnesses and the time of the alleged occurrence has also not been given in

the DDR. The weapon of offence has been mentioned as `knife' instead of

`gupti'. He has also submitted that alleged recovery is stated to be affected

from an open space, which makes the recovery highly doubtful.

13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has argued that

case of the prosecution is proved beyond reasonable doubt as the appellant

had caused incised wound on the person of the injured, which was declared

dangerous to life as per Exhibit PN, therefore, he has prayed that the

judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the learned trial Court be

maintained.

14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record with their able assistance.

15. The injured/complainant Sunil (PW9) has made a categoric

statement that he was given knife blow on the left side of waist by the Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 5 appellant. Dharmender, PW10 (eye-witness) has corroborated the statement

of injured. Dr. S.P.Sharma, PW12, who medico-legally examined the

injured, has given description of the injury caused by the appellant, as such,

the factum of the injury inflicted by the appellant stands corroborated. It

has further come in the testimony of PW-12 that as per Exhibit PN, the

injury was declared as dangerous to life. This witness, after examining the

weapon of offence, gave opinion to the effect that the said injury could be

caused by the said weapon. Thus, there is complete consistency between

the ocular version and the medical evidence.

16. So far as the delay is concerned, it is made out from the record

that the appellant was medico-legally examined on 4.11.1999 itself and

after receiving the radiological report, the injury was declared dangerous to

life by Dr. S.P.Sharma, PW12 vide Exhibit PN, on 12.12.1999. Therefore,

there is no delay in the instant case. The report, Exhibit PN, is based on the

radiological report, which was prepared on 6.2.2001. The radiological report

was received at a little belated stage, but does not affect the authenticity of

the document. The injured was admitted in the hospital on the same day.

He made a categoric statement that knife injury was given by the appellant

as there was some altercation between them 2-3 days prior to the occurrence

when they were taking tuition. Thus, there was a motive available with the

appellant to cause injuries on the person of the complainant. The seat of

injury and the weapon used in the commission of offence fully establish the

intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the injured. From

the evidence, it is sufficiently established that the appellant had intention

and knowledge of causing death, therefore, the nature of injury is not

material. However, it is important to note that in the instant case, the injury Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 6 was declared dangerous to life.

17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Saleem @ Chamaru and another, 2005 (3) RCR (Crl.) 749 has observed as

under:-

"12. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307, if

there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in

execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable

of causing death should have been inflicted. The Section

makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its

result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act,

irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or

knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section.

Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot

be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim

were in the nature of a simple hurt."

18. In State of M.P. v. Kashiram & others, 2009 (1) RCR (Crl.)

956, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under:-

13. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would

do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public

confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long

endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of

every court to award proper sentence having regard to the

nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed

or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by

this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991

(2) RCR (Crl.) 427.

Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 7

14. After giving due consideration to the facts and

circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate

sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and

mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has

been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of

really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the

Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has

been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v.

State of Callifornia, 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no

formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a

reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate

punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may

affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof

which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to

correctly assess various circumstances germane to the

consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in

the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment

may be equitably distinguished.

19. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil & others, 1983 AIR (SC) has observed as under:-

"10. The High Court, in our opinion, was not correct in

acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 307, I.P.C.

merely because the injuries inflicted on the victims were in the

nature of a simple hurt. Therefore, that part of the judgment of

the High Court acquitting the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 11 of the

offence under Section 307, I.P.C. cannot be sustained and must

be set aside. They have, however, already served out sentence Crl. Appeal No.630-SB of 2001 8 of imprisonment for two years for the offence under Sections

147 and 148, I.P.C. in pursuance of the order of the High

Court. When the State filed an appeal against them they were

arrested again and had to remain in jail for three months

before they could be released on bail. Thus, they have already

served a sentence of two years, three months. In the

circumstances, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence

is limited to the period already undergone."

20. Admittedly, the appellant was student at the time of occurrence.

However, this fact itself is not a sufficient mitigating factor to taking a

lenient view in such matters. In the cases where serious injuries are

administered on trivial altercations would bring disastrous impact on society

and such a view would also not serve the public interest. Thus, the case of

prosecution is fully established beyond reasonable doubt from the statement

(s) of the injured witness, eye witness and on the basis of medical evidence.

21. For the reasons mentioned above, the present appeal is

dismissed. The impugned judgment dated 7.5.2001 passed by the learned

trial Court is maintained. The appellant is stated to be on bail. His bail

bonds shall stand cancelled and he be taken into custody forthwith to serve

remainder of his sentence.

8.9.2010 (JITENDRA CHAUHAN) atul/mk JUDGE

Note: Whether to be referred to the Reporter? Yes / No

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